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Abstract 
 
 
The aim of this work is to question the notion of space that underlies the claimed ‘spatial turn’ in 
geographical and social theory. Section 1 examines this theoretical literature, drawing heavily on 
Soja as the self declared taxonomist of the genre, and also seeks parallels with more populist texts 
on cities and space, to suggest, following Williams, that there is a new ‘structure of feeling’ 
towards space. Section 1 introduces two foundational concepts. The first, derived from Soja’s 
misunderstanding of Borges’ story The Aleph, argues for an ‘alephic vision’, an imposition of a 
de-materialized and revelatory understanding of space. This is related to the second, an ‘ecstatic 
vision’, which describes the tendency, illustrated through the work of Koolhaas and recent 
exhibitions on the experience of cities, to treat spatial and material experience in hyperbolic and 
hallucinatory terms. 
 
Section 2  offers a series of theoretical reconstructions which seek to draw out parallels between 
the work of key theorists of what I term the ‘respatialization’ literature (Harvey, Giddens, 
Foucault and Lefebvre) and the work of Hillier et al in the Space Syntax school. A series of 
empirical studies demonstrate that the approach to the material realm offered by Space Syntax is 
not only theoretically compatible but can also help to explain ‘real world’ phenomena. However, 
the elision with wider theoretical positions points to the need for a reworking of elements of 
Space Syntax, and steps towards this goal are offered in section 3. 
 
In the final ‘speculative epilogue’ I reopen the philosophical debates about the nature of space, 
deliberately suppressed from the beginning, and suggest that perhaps the apparent theoretical and 
empirical versatility of Space Syntax, based upon a configurational approach to space as a 
complex relational system, may offer an alternative approach to these enduring metaphysical 
debates. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Pasmore’s Predicament 
 
 
 
 
 
“By what geometry must we construct the physical world now that Euclid’s gone and Newton 
dead?” [Victor Pasmore, Word and Image, 1974, etching and aquatint] 
 
 
Since Victor Pasmore voiced this provocative question in 1974, much has been written on the 
subject of space. Indeed, it has been claimed that we are living in an era of space, that 
‘spatialization reigns supreme’, and many theorists, prominent among them Ed Soja, have written 
of the ‘reassertion of space in critical social theory’ [Foucault, 1980, 1984; Bertens, 1995; Soja, 
1989].  
 
This ‘space’ of contemporary theoretical concern has been christened ‘deep space’ by Smith, and 
his definition is worth returning to. “By deep space”, he argues, 
 
I refer to the relativity of terrestrial space, the space of everyday life in all its scales from 
the global to the local and the architectural in which…different layers of life and social 
landscape are sedimented onto and into each other. Deep space is quintessentially social 
space; it is physical extent fused through with social intent, Henri Lefebvre’s ‘production 
of space’ in its richest sense [Smith, 1990; p 160-61]. 
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This thesis will seek to problematize this apparently effortless elision between ‘physical extent’ 
and ‘social intent’, and will re-examine the role of material space, ‘physical extent’, in the 
‘quintessentially social space’ of those I shall dub the ‘respatialization theorists’. For it appears 
that despite the overwhelming attention given to questions of space, and the apparent theoretical 
latitude of ‘deep space’, the status of space remains contentious. As Smith argues, “there are very 
different understandings of space afoot”, characterized by the fault-line between material and 
metaphorical understandings which he aims to overcome. He argues that for those approaching 
space as metaphor, the materiality of space, “is so unproblematic …that it raises few if any 
worthwhile questions”. By contrast, “[f]or those of us trained in geography, the materiality of 
space (socially as well as physically constituted) is such a central assumption…that it goes 
virtually unchallenged” [ibid.; pp 167-9]. 
 
It is just these unchallenged assumptions that I wish to revisit, questioning the place of the 
material in the dominant socially-constructed understandings of space. Rather than see this as a 
distinction between material and metaphorical space, however, I wish to follow Crang and 
Thrift’s loose distinction between ‘real world’, ‘theoretical’ and ‘actual’ spaces [2000; p 1]
1. 
While they argue that the meanings of these ‘spaces’, “run into each other before they have been 
properly interrogated”, I wish to make a related, though slightly different argument; that the 
theoretical space of contemporary social theory is conceptually removed from the physical, 
‘actual’ space of a shared common experience (of say, Paris, Berlin or Naples, to follow Crang 
and Thrift). I wish to suggest, therefore, that the blurring that Crang and Thrift identify conceals 
at base an inadequate set of theoretical tools through which to approach ‘actual space’, and link it 
to the ‘spaces of theory’ by anything more than simply allusion. This is not to argue for a ‘true’ or 
a ‘real’ space, nor to deny that all conceptions of space are inherently culturally specific 
constructs. And yet, within the cultural domain of the discourse on space and social theory 
(predominantly a Western academic tradition) there is undeniably a common consensus, at least a 
common intuition, that space concerns a material experience, that it relates to physical things, and 
is more than a theoretical tool by which to ‘question materiality’ – more than simply “a 
representational strategy” [ibid.].  
 
                                                 
1 Thrift gives the examples of ‘real world’ as referring to changes in “the space of communications”, leading to the 
compromise of geographical distance, the “spaces in theory” such as the assumption of mobility, as opposed to ‘actual 
space’ such as the cities of Paris, Berlin or Naples. This is a distinction to be borne in mind, as my own empirically 
based enquiry into ‘actual spaces’ will also focus predominantly on writing about, and the experience of cities. Introduction  11 
My argument aims to re-ground this ‘theoretical space’ which, I will argue, has ‘lifted off’ from a 
material understanding. Pasmore’s question is in some way still relevant, therefore, for we are left 
with the enduring problem of how to approach ‘material space’. My aim will be to explore the 
possibility for the approach of Hillier and others within the Space Syntax ‘school’ to offer an 
alternative approach to the socio-spatial problematic, which can open the possibility for an 
integration of a materialist perspective with contemporary approaches. 
 
While it is not my intention to begin with the customary discussion of approaches to space, it is 
necessary to make clear what this thesis is not, particularly in relation to the heritage of ideas on 
space. Of critical importance are two ‘moments’, temporal and theoretical turning points in the 
genealogy of contemporary approaches, which continue to have a powerful influence. 
 
The first is now a distant event, but one whose echoes still resound within socio-spatial theory, 
underpinning subsequent debate and, according to Cloke, Philo and Sadler, setting many of the 
parameters within which contemporary research is conducted [1991; p 4]. This was the rejection 
of the environmental determinism of the early twentieth century, epitomized by authors such as 
Semple and Ratzel, and the social Darwinism upon which it was based. The implications of this 
rejection will be examined later in the context of the Space Syntax approach (see chapter 5). 
 
The second moment develops from the rejection of the ideographic approach of regional 
geography, characterized in the work of Vidal de la Blanche and Sauer among others, which 
offered a more nuanced approach to the man-environment problem based in the notion of the 
‘pays’ and its relation to particular ‘genres de vie’. Peet argues that after the collapse of 
environmental determinism, “geography turned inwards avoiding topics which were obviously 
not ‘geographical’, drawing little from and contributing less to, contemporary scientific 
knowledge”, until the salvation of the ‘quantitative revolution’ [Peet, 1992; p 72]. Burton dates 
what became known as ‘the quantitative revolution’ to between 1940 and 1960, noting that in the 
sense of a revolution it was over by the 1970s, having itself “become part of the conventional 
wisdom” [Burton; 1972; p 143]. The revolution was founded upon an increasing interest in 
epistemological questions and on applying the technical and conceptual apparatus of modern 
science in a turn from the idiographic to nomothetic concerns with spatial order [Davies, 1972]. 
Key texts in that revolution which sought to reverse the “disastrous situation” of geography’s 
alienation from ‘modern science’ were Bunge’s Theoretical Geography [1962], Chorley and 
Haggett’s Models in Geography [1967] (including an essay by Harvey), and ironically Harvey’s Introduction  12 
own Explanation in Geography [1969]. Harvey’s inclusion is ironic because he himself was a key 
player in my second critical moment, the rejection of this ‘spatial science’ that the quantitative 
revolution promoted. 
 
Indeed, Harvey’s 1969 text is already prefaced by reservation, and he argues that his aim is to 
open the field of play rather than to establish the basis of a new orthodoxy. By 1989 he was more 
critical, arguing that despite the work modeling spatial behaviours which represented “no mean 
achievement”, the positivism of ‘spatial science’ led to a restriction of the questions to be asked, 
and had proved incapable of tackling the ‘big questions’, such theoretical and conceptual 
developments as had been advanced adding up to, “the proverbial hill of beans” [Harvey, 1989b; 
pp 212-3]. Ley’s criticism is more melodramatic. “[I]n an era of social unrest and 
experimentation, analytic spatial models did not speak the language of the protests against the 
Vietnam war, the passions of civil rights or environmental movements” [Ley, 1989; p 227]. 
 
Gregory has offered a dual critique of spatial science, firstly in his Ideology, Science and Human 
Geography [1978], returning to the subject in Geographical Imaginations [1994], the latter 
drawing upon Smith’s notion of ‘deep space’ and so bringing this genealogy to the present. 
Between the two works his critique remains the same. Firstly, that strategies of representation that 
treat discourse as an unproblematic reflection of the world should be rejected in favour of a 
recognition of the constitutive, creative function of theory, and that the subject of enquiry should 
be those spatial structures that are both the conditions and consequences of human action. 
Secondly, that reflexivity was lost in spatial science to an estrangement from people, places and 
landscapes, and thirdly, that spatial science denied the situatedness of geographic knowledge 
within moral and political structures [1994; pp 75-6]. What changes between the two critiques, 
however, are his aspirations for future directions. While in 1978 he appealed to the rise of 
historical materialism and humanism as informing the turn away from spatial science, in 1994 he 
recognizes that these too represented an attempt to replace one set of orthodoxies with another, 
advocating rather the more polyvalent positions of ‘deep space’, associated more with feminism, 
post-structuralism and postcolonialism, which reject even the notion of a restrictive ‘canonical 
grid’ [ibid.; pp 75-76]. 
 
It must be clear, therefore, what this thesis is not. Firstly, I wish to emphasize that in arguing that 
‘deep space’, with its evident links to wider theoretical perspectives, lacks a critical formulation 
of material space, I do not wish to construct a reactionary argument, nor to advocate a return-Introduction  13 
swing of the theoretical pendulum back to the abandoned positivist approaches of the ‘spatial 
science’ of the 1950s and 60s, still less its antecedent determinism. At the heart of this project, 
therefore, lies the important distinction between positivism and empirical science, which, as 
Christensen argues, are frequently misunderstood as synonymous. She characterises the 
difference between them as follows; 
 
The sole essence of an empirical science is that it yields a precise, exact and certain truth 
limited from the perspective of a defined theoretical framework. On the other hand, 
positivism and scientific realism accord science the status of the most privileged form of 
knowing which makes all other forms superfluous and meaningless and which yields 
absolute truths [1982; p 54, emphasis added]. 
 
She makes it clear that it is erroneous to describe those who engage in empirical research as 
positivists and argues that indeed, while phenomenological perspectives involve a rejection of 
realist and empiricist beliefs, they do not imply a rejection of empirical science [ibid; pp 42 and 
54]. 
 
My concern, therefore, is to demonstrate the shortcomings within contemporary approaches, and 
the possibility for an understanding of material space derived from Space Syntax’s 
‘configurational’ and empirical approach to add to, rather than detract from, that body of 
discourse. I aim to show that this is not a reactionary argument, for the superficial understanding 
that many critics have of Space Syntax as ‘spatial science’ and deterministic are unfounded. 
Indeed, Space Syntax exhibits many fundamental theoretical similarities with more widespread 
approaches, which provide a basis for common ground. 
 
Secondly, I do not seek to present a historiography of geography. Such projects, both ‘traditional’ 
and revisionist, already exist [see among others, Glacken, 1967; Stoddart, 1986; Cloke, Philo and 
Sadler, 1991; Livingstone, 1992; Smith, 1992; Gregory, 1994]. Neither do I wish to restrict 
myself to the confines of any one identified ‘discipline’. To follow Gregory, it is the discourse of 
space, rather than any one discipline claiming a privileged association with space that is my 
concern [see Gregory, 1994; p 11]. Indeed, Space Syntax, by its theoretical and empirical 
concerns at the urban and architectural scale, inherently subverts the traditional boundaries 
between the ‘spatial disciplines’ of geography and architecture. The critical ‘moments’ in the 
development of contemporary approaches are exhibited equally within architectural discourse, for 
example in the turn from ‘scientific’ approaches such as Alexander’s of the 1960s to current 
debates (similarly antithetical to my own intentions) which argue that architecture’s traditional Introduction  14 
association with physical substance needs to be extended in a reworking of the ‘subject - matter’ 
of architecture to include bodies, telecom networks, computer programs [Hill, 2001]. 
 
Finally, there is no intention to argue for a meta-theory of space. My aim is to advance an 
approach to material space, which by avoiding the difficulties of spatial science and determinism 
can relate theoretical, ‘real world’ and actual spaces. The aim is complementary rather than 
contradictory. It is important, therefore, to distinguish between theoretical extent and 
epistemological intent. Peattie has characterized the scope of geography as follows: 
 
This treating of cabbages and Kings, cathedrals and linguistics, trade in oil, or commerce 
in ideas makes a congress of geographers more or less a Committee on the Universe 
[Peattie, 1940; quoted in Lowenthal, 1961]. 
 
However, it is important to stress that such a congress (perhaps of ‘spatial theorists’ in the current 
context) should not imply a consensual perspective, but nor does such polyphony deny a 
theoretical common ground. This distinction is critical to the aims and structure of this thesis. 
Section 1 will aim to uncover the common perspective towards space which underlies 
contemporary approaches, while section 2 aims to offer a series of contextual re-constructions 
across a range of scales (from cabbages to kings) using a material conception of space derived 
from Space Syntax. However, both sections themselves stand as ‘evidence’ supporting the more 
philosophical propositions of the ‘speculative epilogue’, section 3. There I wish to re-examine the 
advances made in the previous sections towards understanding ‘actual’ and ‘real world’ spatial 
problems, and to ask what this might imply for our theoretical outlook on space. It is for this 
reason that I have not begun my argument with a conventional discussion on approaches to space. 
For throughout this work I wish to conform to the proposition that philosophical speculation 
should be made responsible to reality (even a positional reality) [the phrase is Smith’s; 1990; p 
viii]. This is not, however, to argue for a ‘true space’, but rather to argue [following Lefebvre, see 
chapter 9] for ‘a truth of [material] space’; that is to say not that we can say everything of 
cabbages and kings, but that we can say something of both cabbages and kings, indeed of material 
things, that has social and theoretical significance. 
 
Section 1 examines a range of sources dealing with ‘real world’ spaces and excavates their 
implicit theoretical positions. Moving from the academic work of Soja on Los Angeles [chapter 
2], to the more populist understandings of contemporary cities in the recent Cities on the Move 
exhibitions [chapter 3], two common traits are identified which relate discourses on ‘real world’ Introduction  15 
and theoretical space. The first I term the ‘alephic vision’, derived from Soja’s misreading of 
Borges’ story of the same name. The alephic vision refers to the tendency of seeing the world as 
fragmented, chaotic and unintelligible, a spatial dogma that will be shown to be rooted in 
imposed theoretical preconceptions. The second trait is termed the ‘ecstatic vision’ and refers to 
the characteristically hyperbolic style in which a supposed common experience of such real world 
spaces is presented. The final, pivotal, chapter of the first section aims to extend these two tropes 
across a range of literature, and examines the origins of these positions towards theoretical and 
‘real world’ spaces. I argue that it is with the engagement of ‘deep space’ with post-structuralism 
and postmodernism identified by Gregory that the alephic and ecstatic visions merge and come to 
define contemporary approaches to space. 
 
Although dealing in the currency of ‘theory’ I do not wish to overburden this argument with 
additional theoretical apparatus. However, this first section resounds with Williams’ idea of a 
‘structure of feeling’, here directed towards space. Certainly, I will seek to justify the most 
superficial understanding in terms of ‘the culture of a period’, and further that the change is wider 
than simply the ‘institutional or formal’. Furthermore, the idea of the alephic and ecstatic visions 
are consistent with a “change of style which also turns out to be a change of content”, related to 
an [assumed] experience with [claimed] palpable effects, what Williams describes as “meanings 
and values as actively lived and felt”
2. However, I am interested by Thrift’s emphasis on 
‘structure of feeling’ as a process, and note that he turns to the “social and cultural conditions of 
academe out of which this structure of feeling has arisen”, commenting that, “we have now 
reached a point where western cultures have become increasingly self-referential” especially in 
relation to “sources and horizons of meaning... which are based in hybrid images of machine and 
organism, especially images based on speed, light, and power” [Thrift, 1994; 192-3]. Likewise, 
Harvey uses the ‘structure of feeling’ concept in a similarly suggestive manner, arguing that, 
“[t]hemes of creative destruction, of increased fragmentation, of ephemerality…have become 
much more noticeable in literary and philosophic discourse in an era when the restructuring of 
everything from industrial production to inner cities has become a major topic of concern” [1996; 
p 245]. 
 
Central to my argument will be the assertion that academic and populist approaches have become 
increasingly self-referential, and show an unparalleled ‘lifting off’ from everyday experience. The 
                                                 
2 These qualifications relate to Thrift’s summary of the structure of feeling concept [1994]. See also Williams, 1977; p 
132. Introduction  16 
alephic and ecstatic visions blur as the ‘academic flâneur’ has become a parody of the academic 
air-traveller. Chambers argues that; 
 
It [being simultaneously everywhere] is a condition typical not only of the contemporary 
traveller, but also of many a contemporary intellectual. Viewed from 35,000 feet, the 
world becomes a map. Recently some of the views brought back from the high flying 
have arrived at the conclusion that the world is indeed a map. At that height it is possible 
to draw connections over vast distances, ignoring local obstacles and conditions. At that 
height certain common sense objections (‘down-to-earth’ views) to a reading of the 
terrain can be ignored. When further height is gained, the flight plan only needs to 
consider the relation between the plane (undergoing rapid transformation into a spaceship 
at this point) and the flat referent beneath its fuselage. At this point, the meanings of 
events elsewhere are incapable of penetrating the space we have put between ourselves 
and them. Meaning contracts into the pressurized cabin. Life inside the plane, with the 
observation it affords, becomes more ‘real’ than the ‘reality’ we presume to observe. 
Knowledge of the social, political and cultural globe becomes the knowledge of a second-
order reality, a ‘simulacrum’ [1987; p 1-2]
3. 
 
Section 1 will argue that such ‘theoretical highflying’ is as detached from common 
understandings of material space as the ‘viewing platforms’ of spatial science ever were. I wish to 
propose, therefore, that the ‘spatial structure of feeling’ uncovered in Section 1 can be seen at a 
counter level as a ‘spatial pathology’, perhaps as a form of ‘psychasthenia’. The psychasthenic is 
unable to distinguish between their own body and the surrounding space; it is a pathology of 
spatial relations in which the perception of material relations and spatial representation breaks 
down. “To these dispossessed souls, space seems to be a devouring force. Space pursues them, 
encircles them, digests them in a gigantic phagocytosis”, until the ties of material experience are 
lost as represented space and the material body become indistinguishable - the familiar mantra of 
the supposed common experience of “being in all places while not really being anywhere” 
[Olalquiaga, 1992; Callois, 1984]. 
 
Although deliberately hyperbolic and provocative, the idea of psychasthenia and a spatial 
pathology is useful for three reasons. Firstly, it reflects the targeting of my critique not at ‘real 
world’ phenomena, conversely the basis for my reworking, but rather at the self-referential 
discourses of spatial theorists, the ‘psychasthenics’ detached from the material. Secondly, the idea 
of a pathology is important, for it signifies more than a blindness. My argument is not that 
theorists are unaware of the importance of the material realm, indeed quite the converse as we 
find continual oblique assertions to its importance. Rather, there is a pathological inability to deal 
                                                 
3 I note in my own department the prominent posting of an article on “Overcoming jet-lag”. Introduction  17 
effectively with the material realm for fear of returning to the rejected spatial science and 
antecedent determinism. Psychasthenia, finally therefore, captures the idea of a crisis of 
representation [developed in chapter 4], not in Jameson’s sense relating to an inability to 
articulate the supposedly fragmented ‘real world’, but in the sense of a crisis in the theoretical 
representation of material space, which in turn drives the hallucinatory representations of the ‘real 
world’. 
 
Section 2 offers a resolution to this representational crisis, developing the configurational 
approach of Space Syntax while simultaneously broadening and strengthening the argument of 
section 1 with a series of detailed analyses and reworkings of the positions of a number of key 
theorists in the ‘respatialization’ literature. In so doing, the scale of analysis deliberately moves 
from the urban (with the work of Harvey) to the community (Giddens) to the individual scale 
(Foucault), thereby stretching the contributory potential of Space Syntax to its limit. The 
proposed elision between contemporary theory and the material approach of Space Syntax 
implies a mutual accommodation therefore, and the beginnings of a reworking of Space Syntax 
itself will be offered in the final section, in the context of a consideration of what impact the 
empirical advances achieved have on our theoretical approaches towards space. 
 
1.2 Prologue - of cabbages and kings 
 
Although I have made clear above my commitment to making philosophical speculation 
responsible to reality, and my intention to approach the inevitable discussion of the nature of 
space circuitously, using the evidence of (I hope) a renewed understanding developed in sections 
1 and 2, it is nonetheless necessary to say something of my own starting position, my own innate 
prejudices, if for no other reason than to stand as counterpoint to what I hope will be a more 
substantiated position in the final section. It is for this reason that the conventionally more 
personal ‘prologue’ follows the orienting argument of the introduction. 
 
Of primary importance, naturally, is my own approach to space. Again, I would wish to draw 
upon a characterization of Hillier, who describes his approach as ‘WYSIWYG’; what you see is 
what you get
4. This formulation captures a ‘strategic naivety’, for as will become apparent in the 
course of this argument (particularly chapter 5 which introduces the principles of Space Syntax in 
greater depth), there is no suggestion that material space is unproblematic. Rather it asserts both a Introduction  18 
commitment to empirical enquiry, as distinct from the reduction of empiricism [see above, 
Gregory, 1994; p 74 and Christensen, 1982], and that our understanding must be accessible to 
common discourse and relevant to material experience, that is, to ‘actual spaces’ as well as 
theoretical spaces. 
 
Although sensitive to its now reactionary character, I sympathize to an extent with Lowenthal’s 
description of geography, again standing in here for a broader a-disciplinary approach to space. 
 
Beyond that of any other discipline, however, the subject matter of geography 
approximates the world of general discourse; the palpable present, the everyday life of 
man on earth is seldom far from our professional concerns [Lowenthal, 1961; p 241]. 
 
Lowenthal’s characterization, expanded from geography to a wider concern with space, 
articulates two facets of the WYSIWYG approach. Firstly, the concern with the ‘palpable’ and 
the ‘everyday’, with the attendant recognition that the critique of ‘spatial scientists’, who “strive 
to stand far above their material, for a view from nowhere, with the hope that they will thereby be 
able to plunge well below the surface of reality” is ironically as applicable to today’s ‘spatial 
flâneurs’ who see their own projects as antithetical to spatial science [Tuan, 1979; pp 234-40]. I 
wish to ‘re-activate’ Tuan’s attention to the superficial, to “living at the surface”, developed from 
his perceived need to “open ourselves up to the minutiae as well as to the grand scaffoldings” of 
an abstracted theory. Secondly, although many of the ‘re-spatialization theorists’ would 
themselves concord with Tuan’s advice to stand only a little above their material, “and move only 
a little below the surfaces, where all human joys and sorrows unfold”, and would support the 
theoretical primacy of the minutiae of ‘everyday life’, they do so in contravention of Lowenthal’s 
appeal to ‘the world of general discourse’.  
 
Just as my argument concerns the linkages between the discourse on space, ‘real world’ and 
actual spaces, so I see the idea of WYSIWYG as relating in some sense to the character of my 
own discourse. The critique of the ecstatic vision similarly addresses this linkage between the 
character of language used to structure theoretical ideas and the character of the real world that 
these theories address. My critique [of some, it must be emphasized] spatial theorists, from 
academic and traditionally ‘non-academic’ fields, reflects Magee’s concerns with the writing of 
contemporary philosophy. He argues that there are observable fashions in the character of 
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philosophical writing, a post-war period of clarity (exemplified by the likes of Popper and 
Russell, themselves reacting to a prior tradition) giving way to contemporary traits of hyperbole 
and obfuscation. I would not wish to go so far as Magee and return to Schopenhauer’s assault on 
the philosophy of Weisse and others who, “[t]o conceal a want of real ideas, many make for 
themselves an imposing apparatus of long compound words, intricate flourishes and phrases, new 
and unheard-of expressions, all of which together furnish an extremely difficult jargon that 
sounds very learned. Yet with all this they say - precisely nothing” [Schopenhauer, commenting 
on Weisse, quoted in Magee, 2000; p 23]. However, I find sympathy with Magee’s assertion that 
much contemporary writing on the experience of cities and space follows in the pseudo-Kantian 
tradition of “writing in an oracular, incantatory way designed to spellbind their readers into taking 
the simple for the difficult”
5. As he argues, difficulty of ideas does not presuppose unclarity; “[t]o 
suppose that if a problem is tortuously difficult it needs to be addressed in prose that is tortuously 
difficult is to make a logical error - one parodied by Dr Johnson in his remark: ‘Who drives fat 
oxen should himself be fat’” [ibid.; pp 25-6]. 
 
My argument develops therefore from what may seem a naïve, even arcane, starting point. To 
return to Tuan; 
 
Appreciation for nature or landscape [perhaps ‘actual space’] is a principal reason for 
becoming a geographer. The aesthetic impulse and experience are not, however, confined 
to any class of individuals. They are a universal human trait, and we find evidence of it in 
all areas of human life. Satisfaction with life consists largely of taking pleasure in form 
and expressiveness - in sensory impressions, modified by the mind, at all scales from the 
smile of a child to the built environment and political theatre [op Cit.; p 233]. 
 
I begin, therefore, from an intention to address an intuitive ‘actual space’ through ‘general 
discourse’; a deliberate provocation and one which runs as an undercurrent through my [at times 
perhaps polemical] argument. Ultimately, I hope to demonstrate that rather than being naïve, it 
might in fact form the basis for the reassertion of [material] space in critical social theory. 
 
Finally, Tuan’s confessional statement serves to introduce the importance of my own academic 
trajectory, which is of particular importance in the selection of authors for more detailed analysis 
                                                 
5 Magee develops this argument from Macaulay’s comments on reading the first translation of The Critique of Pure 
Reason, that “I tried to read it, but found it utterly unintelligible, just as if it had been written in Sandskrit”. Magee 
argues, following Schopenhauer, that contemporaries mimicked the impenetrable Kantian style to ‘pass off’ less 
original work. 
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through sections 1 and 2. This similarly confessional ‘prologue’ is of strategic importance to the 
structure of the project as a whole, which remains defiantly personal. My intention has been to 
return to the questions and misgivings that I had as an undergraduate geographer, particularly 
with the theoretical treatment of space in relation to the experience of built environments. It is to 
these questions, which stimulated my engagement with the more analytical and architectural 
perspective of Space Syntax, that I now return, unashamedly revisiting the ‘key players’ of my 
earlier concerns; Soja, Harvey, Giddens, Goffman, Hägerstrand, Foucault and Lefebvre. This is 
far from an exhaustive list of those who have been at the forefront of the ‘reassertion of space in 
social theory’. However, for me this project is concerned with revisiting old ground from new 
perspectives, and like the frog crawling out of the well, in sliding one step back to leap two 
forward. In the more speculative epilogue, ‘towards a spatialized ontology?’, that bookends this 
prologue, I wish to return to Tuan’s model of a more inclusive geography of form and 
expressiveness in the light of the new perspectives on material space gained through tackling the 
socio-spatial problematic, and to reopen the dormant problem that lies at the heart of this 
argument; the nature of space itself. The re-assertion of ‘space’ in social theory?  21 
Section 1 - Deconstruction 
 
Chapter 2 
The re-assertion of ‘space’ in social theory? 
 
2.1 “The Aleph” – Soja and Borges’ double trap 
 
Ed Soja’s work provides a convenient vehicle for approaching the wider ‘respatialization 
literature’ for a number of reasons. Firstly, although there have been numerous books published 
within the last two decades dealing with the relationships between society and space, as any 
library search would attest, it is Soja who is the self-styled taxonomist of the school, with the 
publication in 1989 of his Postmodern Geographies, subtitled “The Reassertion of Space in 
Critical  Social Theory” [Soja, 1989].  It is a theme that he has consistently pedalled since the late 
seventies (eg Soja and Hadjimichalis, [1979]), producing a considerable volume of work 
developing similar synthetic arguments. It is this synthesising approach which is the second 
reason for using Soja as a starting point. His work draws heavily on other theorists, most notably 
Lefebvre, but also Foucault [Soja, 1989 and 1996], Poulantzas and Lipietz [ Soja, 1984], hooks 
and White [1996] and many others, making him a convenient bridging link to these other ‘spatial 
players’. Thirdly, and most importantly, it is the style of argument that makes him an appropriate 
starting point. As Moss notes, “After finishing [Thirdspace] and reflecting on its contents, I was 
vexed by his approach to writing theory and grew disdainful of his textual claims to authority” 
[Moss, 1999; p 249]. She continues; 
 
He makes some enormous claims, grandiose in scale, to get his point across in his attempt 
to make what he says more important, more credible, as for example, likening the 
preservative modernization of Amsterdam’s core to the Dutch conquest of the sea (page 
283) and in describing himself as standing “nearly two meters high” and weighing “more 
than an eighth of a ton” (page 283). In response, I wondered how comparing scales of 
colonialism and knowing Soja’s dimensions help me understand the geohistory of 
Amsterdam. I am not saying that such comparisons cannot; what I am saying is that his 
rendition does not. [ibid; p 250] 
 
What Moss has identified is a persistent over-extension of Soja’s arguments, often in association 
with “what he considers empirical demonstrations” but which are in reality unsubstantiated 
anecdotal asides, “autobiographical snippets to claim authority” [ibid]. Another related stylistic The re-assertion of ‘space’ in social theory?  22 
tendency is the exuberant coining of new terms, “Thirdspace’ being a case in point. In his 
enjoyment of wordplay he seems to throw caution to the wind however, and it is the tentative 
minting of a new term, the awful ‘LA-leph’, which provides an entry point into a more theoretical 
discussion of his ideas. 
 
Essentially then, Soja makes easy pickings while introducing important themes that run 
throughout this first section, connecting with other key theorists on the way. I start, then, with 
Soja’s treatment of Borges’ Aleph, which in its superficial glibness fails to engage with the real 
significance of the Borges story. I hope that this re-reading will provide a window into Soja’s 
ontological and epistemological positions to be unearthed in the following section. The analysis 
of The Aleph provides a window into Soja’s work and  a mirror of, and vehicle for, my critique: 
an Aleph within The Aleph – to parody Soja. 
 
Soja and ‘The Aleph’ 
 
Soja uses Borges’ 1949 story The Aleph, “to provoke new ways of looking at and understanding 
contemporary Los Angeles” [1996; p 54] both in Postmodern Geographies and in its successor, 
Thirdspace. He finds himself “drawn once more to ‘The Aleph’” for two reasons, captured in his 
choice of opening quotations for the relevant chapter in the earlier work [1989; p 222]. Firstly, it 
captures the idea that the Aleph, and by extension Los Angeles, contains all other places. 
 
‘The Aleph?’ I repeated. 
‘Yes, the only place on earth where all places are – seen from every angle, each standing 
clear, without any confusion or blending’ [Borges, 1970; p 23, quoted in Soja, 1989; p 
222; 1996; p 55] 
 
The theme is picked up immediately. Soja declares, “Its [Los Angeles’] spatiality challenges 
orthodox analysis and interpretation, for it too [like the Aleph] seems limitless and constantly in 
motion, never still enough to encompass, too filled with ‘other spaces’ to be informatively 
described” [ibid]. We are encouraged to invoke the Aleph in Los Angeles, in classic Soja 
rhetorical style; 
 
What is this place? Even knowing where to focus, to find a starting point, is not easy, for, 
perhaps more than any other place, Los Angeles is everywhere. It is global in every sense 
of the world. Nowhere is this more evident than in its cultural projection and ideological 
reach…making Los Angeles perhaps the epitomizing world-city, une ville devenue 
monde. [sic][1989; pp 222-3]. The re-assertion of ‘space’ in social theory?  23 
 
We are to see Los Angeles in all places, therefore, and all places in Los Angeles , “Everywhere 
seems also to be in Los Angeles” -  it is only surprising that Soja did not pick up on Borges’ later 
passage, “I saw the Aleph from every point and angle, and in the Aleph I saw the earth and in the 
earth the Aleph and in the Aleph the earth” [Borges, 1970; p 28]. 
 
The story also gives Soja a clue as to how to approach the understanding of Los Angeles, for he 
argues that “[Borges’] distinctive version of the rich Latin-American tradition of ‘magical 
realism’ resounds so well with Lefebvre’s fascination with concrete abstractions, his 
paradoxically materialist idealism, and his adventurous explorations into the simultaneous worlds 
of the real-and-imagined” [1996; p 54]. 
 
The second quotation that Soja uses concerns just this idea of simultaneity, and the restriction that 
sequential language systems place on the description of the synchronous. 
 
…Then I saw the Aleph…And here begins my despair as a writer. All language is a set of 
symbols whose use among its speakers assumes a shared past. How, then, can I translate 
into words the limitless Aleph, which my floundering mind can scarcely encompass? 
[Borges, 1970; p 26, quoted [sic] in Soja, 1989; p 222; and 1996; p 55]. 
 
Again, he draws out the parallel, “appeal[ing] to Borges and the Aleph for appropriate insight”, 
and blending Borges’ and his own text seamlessly. He continues, (quoting), 
 
Really, what I want to do is impossible […]. What my eyes beheld was simultaneous, but 
what I shall now write down will be successive, because language is successive. 
Nonetheless, I will try to recollect what I can.(Soja quoting Borges) 
 
I [Soja] too will try and recollect what I can, knowing well that any totalizing description 
of the LA-leph is impossible [Soja, 1989; p 223]. 
 
He defends his analytical approach, therefore, with an appeal to the appropriateness of the 
Borgesian style to deal with a supposedly Aleph-like phenomenon such as Los Angeles. “What 
follows then is a succession of fragmentary glimpses, a freed association of reflective and 
interpretative field notes which aim to construct a critical human geography of the Los Angeles 
urban region” [ibid]. 
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What is notable here is the way that Soja ‘appeals’ to Borges and the Aleph in relation not only to 
his ontological position (The Aleph as Los Angeles), his epistemological stance (the use of 
Borges as authority for his ‘fragmentary glimpses’) but also his methodological approach (the 
resonance identified between Borges and Soja’s mainstay Lefebvre). It is worth returning to 
Moss’s criticism cited above; she was “vexed by his approach to writing theory” and “grew 
disdainful of his textual claims to authority”. She ends, “[f]or it was Soja’s use of text that 
overrode any critical engagement with his ideas…” [Moss, 1999]. 
 
This is undoubtedly true, not only for the reader, but perhaps for Soja himself. A closer reading of 
the Aleph reveals that his repeated enthusiastic use of that text has perhaps overridden a critical 
engagement with his own ideas. In engaging with Borges, notorious for his labyrinths, Soja has 
fallen into a trap which should help to reveal some of the weaknesses in his theory as a whole. 
 
The Borgesian Trap 
 
Soja’s appraisal of The Aleph is revealing – and wholly wrong. “‘The Aleph’” he states, “ is an 
invitation to exuberant adventure as well as a humbling and cautionary tale, an allegory on the 
infinite complexities of space and time” [1996; p 56]. This is, paradoxically, not only a 
misunderstanding of the story but a perfect illustration of both Borges’ intentions and one of my 
principal criticisms of Soja. 
 
The subject of the story is hardly ‘the Aleph’ at all, at least not in Soja’s sense of a material 
object. For, as Lindstrom notes, “The treatment of the Aleph directs attention away from this 
phenomenon and towards the two characters who find it” [Lindstrom, 1990; p 55]. The object 
itself is unmentioned in the first part of the story, where attention is focused on the two central 
characters, Daneri and Borges himself. This leads Lindstrom to conclude that, “the magic sphere 
is brought into being by force of desire [of these two characters and, by extension, all who seek 
the Aleph] and enjoys no existence unless sought” [ibid; pp 55-6]. 
 
 There is plenty of evidence from the text to support such a reading, evidence that Soja cites in his 
own work but appears not to understand. 
 
Firstly, after the title there are the “two classical quotations to amplify his intentions” [Soja, 1996; 
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texts, does not comment, and seems to think they are referring to the Aleph, rather than the 
perceiver of the Aleph. 
 
The first, important in this context, is from Hamlet; 
 
O God! I could be bounded in a nutshell, and count myself a king of infinite 
space….[Hamlet, II,2; quoted in Borges, 1970; p 15; and Soja, 1996; p 54]. 
 
The context, unmentioned by Soja but surely familiar to Borges, is the re-encounter between 
Hamlet, en-route to Denmark, and Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. Hamlet compares Denmark to a 
prison, Rosencrantz protests, “We think not so, my lord”, to which Hamlet replies; 
 
Why then ‘tis none to you; for there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it 
so. To me it is a prison. 
 
Rosencrantz relates this ‘thinking’ to Hamlet’s ambition, (“Why then your ambition makes it 
one”), which prompts the line from Hamlet used by Borges, which in fact ends, “- were it not that 
I have bad dreams”, which Guildenstern in turn picks up on, rejoining, 
 
Which dreams indeed are ambition, for the very substance of the ambitious is merely the 
shadow of a dream. 
 
In this exchange it is Hamlet’s outburst, chosen (deliberately?) by Borges, that is perhaps the 
most expressive, although the least important in developing the central ideas of the passage. It is 
not the idea of infinite space (a kingdom) within a finite space (a nutshell) that is important. 
Borges uses this to mirror his idea of The Aleph, and Soja is fooled. What Borges is pointing to, 
as in his own story, is the power of dreams, the force of ambition, which is illustrated by 
Hamlet’s outburst but is only apparent within the context of the scene as a whole. 
 
There are other clues that Soja misses, or even deliberately ignores. He picks up the story at the 
point of discovery of the Aleph. Daneri tells Borges that, 
 
One day when no one was home I started down [the cellar steps] in secret, but I stumbled 
and fell. When I opened my eyes, I saw the Aleph [Borges, 1970; p 23; quoted in Soja, 
1996; p 55]. 
 
Again, it is the preceding context, which Soja crops out, that is crucial. Borges writes, The re-assertion of ‘space’ in social theory?  26 
 
I discovered it when I was a child, all by myself. The cellar stairway is so steep that my 
aunt and uncle forbade my using it, but I had heard someone say that there was a world 
down there. I found out later that they meant an old-fashioned globe of the world
1, but at 
the time I thought they were referring to the world itself. One day…[continues as above]. 
 
The focus of Borges’ story is not the Aleph, but the dreams and ambitions that bring the Aleph 
into existence. As a child Daneri enters the cellar expecting to see the world. He falls, and sees 
the world as revealed by the Aleph. As Daneri continues, arguing against the fictional Borges’ 
own scepticism, “Truth cannot penetrate a closed mind”. Again, this is quoted by Soja, but he 
seems to miss the significance in his enthusiasm for the LA/Aleph (‘LA-leph’) metaphor. The 
Kerrigan translation might be even more appropriate, “Really,” Daneri responds, “truth does not 
penetrate a rebellious understanding” [1968; p 147, “recalcitrant understanding” in the Hurley 
version, Borges, 1999; p 281]. 
 
The story is not “an allegory on the infinite complexities of space and time” as Soja would have it 
[1996; p 56]. Rather it is a comment on, “the determination of human beings to master some 
absolute form of knowledge” [Lindstrom, 1990; p 56]. The irony is that in his dogged reading of 
space into the story, Soja has fallen exactly into Borges’ trap. Soja has seen his LA-leph within 
The Aleph, just as Daneri (and of course Borges) do within the cellar, because all three desired to 
do so, not because it was there. Soja would have done well to read Borges a little more widely, 
particularly a conversation at the University of Chicago in 1980 where he states; 
 
I think that time is the one essential mystery. Other things may be mysterious. Space is 
unimportant. [transcribed in Barnstone, 1982] 
 
The Aleph is in fact spaceless; it is both dimensionless and contains no space, for rather than 
conceiving it as a window to the world, as Soja does, it is in fact a mirror. As Alazraki argues, 
“Mirrors are a constant in Borges’ poetry, but long before becoming a major theme or motif in his 
works, mirrors had been for Borges an obsession that goes back to his childhood years” 
                                                 
1 This is translated variously as ‘globe’ [Borges, 1970, translated by Norman Thomas di Giovanni], ‘trunk’ [Borges, 
1968a, translated by Anthony Kerrigan] and ‘steamer trunk’, [Borges, 1999 translated by Andrew Hurley]. The word 
makes little difference because it stands in each case as a metaphor for the world itself. I have used the 1970 version 
throughout, firstly because it is the text used by Soja, and secondly because the translation was made in co-operation 
with Borges himself. As Borges writes in the preface, “Perhaps the chief justification of this book is the translation 
itself, which we have undertaken in what may be a new way. Working closely together in daily sessions, we have tried 
to make these stories read as though they had been written in English” [Borges, 1970; p 9]. Borges is well aware of the 
differences in metaphorical possibility offered by the two languages [see Borges in Barnstone 1982] and it would seem 
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[Alazraki, 1998; p 107]. Again, there are clues in the story itself. In the middle of Borges’ 
recollection of the Alephic vision he lists;  
 
I saw my empty bedroom; I saw in a closet in Alkmaar a terrestrial globe between two 
mirrors that multiplied it endlessly; 
 
In Borges’ own 1970 translation this seems to echo the globe in the cellar, and all three 
translations studied use the image of the globe between mirrors (though not in the cellar, see 
footnote above). In his own comments on the story, Borges says that his “chief problem in writing 
the story lay…in the setting down of a limited catalog of endless things” , where “every 
apparently haphazard element has to be linked to its neighbor either by secret association or by 
contrast” [Borges, 1970; p 264, sic.]. 
 
The secret association here is between the vision of Borges’ own (childhood) room and the 
mirroring of the globe. He recalls that as a child he had three full length mirrors in his bedroom 
and that, “I felt before large mirrors that same horror of a spectral duplication or multiplication of 
reality” - “I always stood in fear of mirrors” [Borges, 1968b, quoted in Alazraki, 1998, reprinted 
Borges, 1999; Barnstone, 1982]. 
 
Alazraki explains the significance of the mirror to Borges, “That illusory reality that mirrors 
produce becomes in turn a profound mirror of our own universe since our image of the world is 
just a fabrication of the human mind”. We return therefore to the central theme identified above, 
the power of fabrication of the human mind, which Borges points to before the story begins with 
his reference from Hamlet and which Soja totally misses. Alazraki unwittingly makes the same 
connection back to scene two of Hamlet and Guildenstern’s comment on dreams; “[M]irrors and 
dreams have for Borges an interchangeable value” [Alazraki, 1998; p 109]. 
 
The Aleph-as-mirror reveals, therefore, not the world but Soja himself reflected in his own 
endless series, his “succession of fragmentary glimpses” [Soja,1989; p 223]. As Borges says, a 
writer starts out to describe a kingdom of castles and horses, but ends by tracing the lines of his 
own face [in Barnstone, 1982; p 74]. The re-assertion of ‘space’ in social theory?  28 
The double bind 
 
Soja is caught doubly in Borges’ trap, however. Not only has he misunderstood the Aleph and 
revealed his own desire to find it, he also opens up the results of his ‘appeal to the Aleph’ to 
Borges’ scorn, for the Aleph is far from the oracle for “appropriate insight” that Soja hopes 
[1989; p 223].  
 
In his appeal to Borges the author, he ends up identifying with Borges the character, not realising 
that not only are the two not the same, but that the former is full of contempt for the latter - 
Borges’ double trap! Although Daneri is scorned by the fictional Borges, the parallels between 
the two characters are strong. Daneri attempts to use the Aleph to construct a complete vision of 
totality, expressed in his poem, ‘The Earth’. “Borges, too, would like a vision of totality, though 
not of the world but solely of his Beatriz”, the lost love for whom he grieves [Lindstrom, 1990; p 
54]. Lindstrom notes the passage where Borges is captivated by the photographs of Beatriz on 
Daneri’s walls, each a fragmentary image of the whole reality he seeks, and although the 
incomplete representation forms the motivation for appealing to the Aleph for the revelation of 
the desired whole, it is the fragmentary representation which lays hold of Borges’ imagination. 
 
For Soja, Los Angeles becomes his Beatriz, and he turns to the Aleph for the chance of a 
revelation of her identity. Soja’s appeal to Borges is misplaced however, because in leading him 
to the Aleph, Borges mocks him, for we (Borges the author and we the reader, though obviously 
not Soja) realise the contents of the oracle “turn out to be worthless” [ibid; p 55]. Soja’s mistakes 
are multiple; he has confused Borges and Borges, and has identified with the character, mistaking 
him for the author (forgetting Borges’ fear of mirrors!). But he makes yet another characteristic 
slip. Lindstrom identifies three principle examples that Aleph-seeking can take; “Daneri’s poem 
‘Earth’, Borges’ campaign to preserve all information concerning Beatriz; and the sphere in the 
underground chamber” [ibid; p 56]. Soja is guilty of all three; he creates the sphere through his 
own desire (to read a spatial dimension into The Aleph); he attempts to use the Aleph to recover 
his Beatriz (his appeal to the Aleph) and finally, - here being the double trap – he opens himself 
to Borges’ own scathing criticism, missing the worthlessness of the oracle’s inspiration and 
constructing, like Daneni, a rhetorical ‘succession of fragmentary glimpses’, - ‘Thirdspace’. 
Borges the author is represented by the hidden figure of Dante Alighieri, parodied in Argentino 
Daneni, who realises that his own Beatrice should remain largely unknown. Borges, the character, The re-assertion of ‘space’ in social theory?  29 
makes the mistake (as does Soja) of seeking knowledge of his Beatriz in the Aleph while trying 
nonetheless to maintain a symbol of perfection (unknowability in the case of Soja’s LA). 
  
However, Borges realises his mistake, 
 
“the vision of Beatriz, far from fulfilling Borges, leaves him feeling assaulted and 
defrauded…Most significantly the image of Beatriz is so full of information that it is 
essentially false, even if everything it contains were true. A uniform, indiscriminate, 
unnuanced spew of data cannot do justice to the complexity of the human being, whose 
nature is to be now one thing and now another” [ibid; p 55].  
 
Borges the character realises this, and dismisses the Aleph to destruction. He and Daneri are both 
“fools of the Aleph” [ibid; p 56], but Daneri incomparably the more so because he, like Soja, does 
not even realise the worthlessness of the revelation. He uses it as the basis for his inspiration and, 
“loads more and more heterogeneous elements into his monstrous poem ‘Earth’, (another clear 
reference to Dante and his divine comedy), in defiance of the common-sense principle that art 
requires selectivity and the repetition of significant uniformities”. 
 
Here lies the significance of the second opening quotation to the story, from Leviathan, which 
Soja replicates but misreads. Hobbes says, 
 
But they will teach us that Eternity is the standing still of the present time, a Nunc-stans 
(as the schools call it); which neither they, nor any else understand, no more than they 
would a Hic-stans for an Infinite greatness of Place. [Leviathan, IV, 46; quoted in Borges, 
1970; p 15 and Soja, 1996; p 54]. 
 
Soja interprets this as a scene-setter, “to amplify his intentions”, which it does but not as Soja 
thinks. The message contained here is that these totalities, of time, of space, in essence of 
knowledge are unintelligible, while in the infinities of The Aleph Soja does identify prospects for 
a renewed understanding. Dante realises this at the outset, Borges too late, only once he has been 
made the ‘fool of the Aleph’, but Daneri never cottons on. 
 
While identifying with Borges the author, Soja has fallen into this double bind and instead of 
seeing Borges as the spectral Dante behind the characteristically mirrored surface of ‘The Aleph’ 
he has made the cardinal error of associating with his namesake, Daneri, and mistaking the 
descent into the cellar as a revelation of knowledge rather than the descent into Hell which it 
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This Borgesian labyrinth now wraps around Soja entirely, and it is Borges himself who provides 
the criticism of Soja’s own use of the Aleph through his scorn of Daneri, the bait for all who 
follow. He says of Daneri, “His mental activity was continuous, deeply felt, far-ranging, and – all 
in all – meaningless. He dealt in pointless analogies and in trivial scruples” [1970; pp 16-17]. The 
scorn that Borges reserves for Daneri’s style mirrors Soja’s rhetorical impulses beautifully. He 
ridicules the stanza which Daneri reads aloud, and his pompous explanation of the various 
allusions to literary authority (remember Moss’s criticisms), which ends with the verse; “The 
voyage I set down is…autour de ma chambre “ [sic]. Recall Soja’s verbose appeal to Los Angeles 
as a mirror of the Aleph [“What is this place?…quoted above, p 22] which ends, “making Los 
Angeles perhaps the epitomizing world-city, une ville devenue monde [1989; p 223, sic]. Borges 
comments on other stanzas of ‘The Earth’, “There was nothing remarkable about them. I did not 
even find them worse than the first one” [op. cit. p 19], which mirrors Moss’s final assessment 
that, “[I]f you have read the first versions of Soja’s essays, do not read these” [1999; p 250]. Also 
identified in Borges is Soja’s term-coining mentioned above. “He had revised them [stanzas of 
the Earth] following his pet principle of verbal ostentation. […] The word ‘milky’ was too easy 
for him; in the course of an impassioned description of a shed where wool was washed, he chose 
such words as ‘lacteal’, ‘lactescent’, and even made one up – ‘lactinacious’”[op. cit. p 20-21]. 
 
The parallel is complete
2, and although stylistic comparisons between Daneri and Soja may seem 
glib, in the next section the faults revealed by Borges’ trap will become central to the detailed 
criticism of Soja’s work, on ontological, epistemological and methodological grounds. The Aleph, 
and Soja’s misunderstanding of it, provides a useful start, because at root the issue is not space 
but epistemological positions. Lindstrom paraphrases this clearly; 
 
In ‘The Aleph’, Borges and Daneri make their mistakes through unawareness of basic 
principles or ground rules for the construction of knowledge. Borges, more intelligent 
than Daneri, grasps the nature of his mistake and pronounces the Alephic vision false by 
reason of its senseless amassing of truths. Dante is a wiser figure because he understands 
from the start that, even in a sweepingly grand project, inclusivity is not worth attempting 
[1990; p 56]. 
 
In contrast to Soja’s understanding of The Aleph as, “an allegory on the infinite complexity of 
space and time” [1996; p 56], Lindstrom offers two implications, firstly that, 
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this story is [a] warning that one should be conscious of Alephs and the human 
susceptibility to their allure [op. cit.; p 57] 
 
and secondly that, 
 
the story implicitly encourages readers to maintain a suspicious attitude towards the 
cheap appeal of unmediated revelation and to value, instead, the truths conveyed through 
artful, selective representation [ibid; p 54]. 
 
It is for both these reasons that a less naïve reading of The Aleph itself than Soja achieves makes a 
perfect starting point for a critical understanding of his wider work. Alephs, after-all, reveal only 
those who invoke them. 
 
 
2.2 Soja as Daneri, and the reassertion of space in critical social theory 
 
The analysis of The Aleph presented above ended with two observations; the first that we should 
be conscious and distrustful of the appeal of Alephs, and secondly that we should be suspicious of 
the ‘alephic vision’ that results. Soja, like Daneri, is guilty of placing his trust in the Aleph, and 
this is particularly important when we consider the interpretation of the story presented above, for 
as Lindstrom argues, the real subject of the story is the possibility of knowledge. Borges 
highlights our propensity to allow our desires to dictate our experience, or perhaps our dreams to 
conjure our reality. To restate his point using a more academic lexicon, he warns that theoretical 
positions may compromise empirical perspectives, that the relationship between epistemology 
and ontology is complex and referential. 
 
It is this commentary that makes Soja’s use of The Aleph so ironic, because the epistemological 
and ontological reworkings that lie at the heart of Soja’s project are full of paradoxes. While The 
Aleph should stand as a warning that theoretical perspectives can railroad our perceptions of 
reality, Soja uses The Aleph in quite the contrary manner; to bolster his perception of the 
experience of Los Angeles, thereby revealing the degree to which his understanding is a result of 
his theoretical perspectives. Once again, he should have been mindful of Borges’ precise use of 
language and literary referents, and in particular his interest in Hebrew and Cabbalistic belief, in 
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story of Mohammed and the mountain; nowadays, the mountain came to modern Mohammed; a spatial fix?! [op. cit.; p 
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which, “the Aleph […] is considered the foremost Hebrew letter, a symbol of all other letters and 
by extension of the universe itself” [Fishburn and Hughes; 1990].  Although this reading in some 
ways validates Soja’s use of the Aleph as a synechdotal metaphor of Los Angeles (‘LA-leph’) 
and contemporary spatial experience, Fishburn and Hughes note that in one interpretation “its 
symmetrical shape symbolises the concept that everything in the lower world is a reflection of its 
archetypal form in the world above”. The very figure of the Aleph itself should alert us therefore 
to the influence of this idealized ‘upper’ world on the ‘lower’ world of (imposed?) 
understandings. 
 
To begin then, let us review in more detail Soja’s reference to empirical work on this lower 
world, before uncovering the theoretical debates that govern his perceptions. 
 
Approaches to Los Angeles - Historical-Geographical Materialism and the LA-leph 
 
The empirical work in both Soja’s books is concentrated at the end, and is presented very much as 
an illustration of the theoretical evolutions which have gone before
3. Despite the 1996 subtitle, 
“Journeys to Los Angeles and other real-and-imagined places” the focus is almost entirely on Los 
Angeles (with the exception of a short comparison with Amsterdam, [1996a; p 280-310; 1996b]. 
Two distinct approaches emerge that are never confidently resolved. This struggle to ride two 
horses at once becomes most obvious in the ‘empirical’ sections of his work, but as we shall see 
the roots of the conflict lie in the effort to unite and overcome two conflicting theoretical 
positions which is the essence of Soja’s work, a project that ultimately fails at its outset. 
 
Soja’s work has consistently focused on the development of a spatialized historical materialism, 
the project culminating in the 1989 publication which begins with a lengthy summary of the 
evolution of these ideas [see especially Soja 1989, 1988, 1987a, 1985, 1984, 1980; Soja and 
Hadjimichalis 1979]. His contribution forms part of that wider theoretical rejuvenation within 
geography identified in the introduction as the response to the perceived constrictions of ‘spatial 
science’, such that geography, “that most stiflingly cocooned of traditional disciplines”, evolved a 
critical perspective “reaching outside of its traditional Kantian cage” [Soja, 1987b; pp 289 and 
291]. 
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While Soja would highlight differences between his approach and his contemporaries’, 
particularly the degree to which a ‘critical human geography’ implied a spatialization of Marx as 
well as a ‘Marxification’ of spatial perspectives, there is nonetheless an identifiable ‘school’, 
particularly evident in the similar approach to empirical work. There are strong parallels, for 
example, between Soja, Harvey, Castells, Lefebvre and Davis in their focus upon issues of 
regional restructuring and the importance of a ‘spatial fix’ to overcome the latest ‘Mandelian-
bottleneck’ in a crisis-prone capitalist system. 
 
I would not wish to ignore the marked differences between these authors, which will be discussed 
in later chapters, but these differences lie within the domain of theoretical positionings, and tend 
to be swamped by the practicalities of empirical exposition; they indeed appear subtle beside the 
very great conflicts within Soja’s own approach. On the one hand his historical-geographical 
materialist method gives us carefully researched accounts of cycles of investment and labour 
market restructuring, the historical and geographical evolution of contemporary and previous eras 
of capital accumulation which would seem to tie in well with the work of Harvey or Castells
4. On 
the other hand we have the ‘LA-leph’. 
 
It is difficult to characterise this development in Soja’s writing without turning to parody or to 
reflect once again on the parallels with the character Daneri, who as we recall, “dealt in pointless 
analogies”. The conflict between approaches is quite deliberate, emerging as the ‘surprise’ sting-
in-the-tail realignment at the end of Postmodern Geographies. Soja is perhaps playing a game 
that he learnt from Giddens; to end each book with the opening to the next, a trait that he termed 
‘redoubling the helix’, [Soja, 1989; p 138; 1983; p 1267]. The chapter headings give the game 
away; “It All Comes Together in Los Angeles” leads into “Taking Los Angeles Apart: Towards a 
Postmodern Geography”, the final chapter in the 1989 book, while Thirdspace [1996] ends with, 
“The Stimulus of a Little Confusion”, tritely concluding in the final section, (“Towards 
Postmetropolis”), “Only one ending is possible: TO BE CONTINUED….” [p 320, sic], a plug for 
the [then] forthcoming Postmetropolis. 
 
However, for Soja the idea of a redoubling is much more than a reiteration, and more 
fundamental to his project than the ‘sting-in-the-tail’ presentation would suggest. His interest in 
his own text is also imported from elsewhere, in this case directly from Lefebvre (although it is a The re-assertion of ‘space’ in social theory?  34 
key feature of a wider concern with ‘authorship’, see chapter 4). His comments on Lefebvre’s The 
Producion of Space [Lefebvre, 1991], “arguably the most important book ever written about the 
social and historical significance of human spatiality and the particular powers of the spatial 
imagination” [Soja, 1996; p 8] are revealing and in the light of the discussion above, highlight the 
debt that Soja owes to Lefebvre. He continues; 
 
The Production of Space is a bewildering book, filled with unruly textual practices, bold 
assertions that seem to get tossed aside as the arguments develop, and perplexing 
inconsistencies and apparent self-contradictions. 
 
He defends Lefebvre’s text, and consequently his own, by revealing that; 
 
its meandering, idiosyncratic, and wholesomely anarchic style and structure are in 
themselves a creative expression of Lefebvre’s expansive spatial imagination [ibid]. 
 
Although on first readings Soja admits that he found the chapters following the “extraordinarily 
exciting and relatively clearly written introduction” difficult to “navigate”, he decides to “set 
aside [his] frustrations with the rest of the text as a product of [his] own linguistic deficiencies 
and Lefebvre’s complicated writing style” [ibid]. However, in the context of the writing of 
Thirdspace Soja realises that, 
 
he [Lefebvre] may not have intended The Production of Space to be read as a 
conventional academic text, with arguments developed in a neat linear sequence from 
beginning to middle to end. Taking a cue from Jorge Luis Borges, who in his short story, 
“The Aleph”, expressed his despair in writing about the simultaneities of space in such a 
linear fashion, and from Lefebvre’s frequently mentioned love of music, I began to think 
that perhaps Lefebvre was presenting The Production of Space as a musical composition, 
with a multiplicity of instruments and voices playing together at the same time. More 
specifically, I found that the text could be read as a polyphonic fugue that assertively 
introduced its keynote themes early on and then changed them intentionally in 
contrapuntal variations that took radically different forms and harmonies [ibid.; pp 8-9]. 
 
Soja articulates three purposes that this approach has, each of which he reverentially embraces in 
his self-confessed “following” of Lefebvre [ibid.; p 9]. It spatialized the text, “breaking the 
temporal flow of introduction-development-conclusion” and thereby permits the exploration of 
new “rhythms” of argument, to be ‘navigated’ more than read; it “spatialized the equally 
temporal, sequential logic of dialectical thinking”; and it transforms the text into “a series of 
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heuristic ‘approximations’”, thereby protecting Lefebvre from the “canonisation of his ideas into 
rigidly authoritative protocols” and received dogma [ibid.]. 
 
The spatialization of his own text becomes a key theme for Soja, even though in this and other 
references he perhaps does more than anyone to canonise Lefebvre himself, even if his use of The 
Production of Space in chapter 2 of Thirdspace “would have probably discomforted Lefebvre” 
[ibid]
5. He begins Postmodern Geographies with a ‘Preface and Postscipt’, in order to “signal 
right from the start an intention to tamper with the familiar modalities of time, to shake up the 
normal flow of the linear text to allow other, more ‘lateral’ connections to be made” [Soja, 1989; 
p 1], returning to the theme of a spatialized text in chapter 9
6. 
 
It is evident that Soja’s own ‘redoubling of the helix’ is considerably more complex than that 
which he perceives in Giddens’ work. For the redoubling, or reflection, occurs on many levels 
and contains not only a radical inversion in approach, but also a justification and defence of that 
inversion. So even if redoubling the helix might seem to lead to a tangle, we are to understand 
that this is the nature and intention of such a polyphonous approach, and are encouraged in “the 
stimulus of a little confusion” to focus on our stimulus and to trust in, or ignore, our confusion. 
 
Unravelling the helix 
 
However, to begin to unravel this genetic metaphor and reach some clarity, a first step is to recall 
that we should be interested not so much in the reflections and twists of the helix itself, but in the 
DNA at its core. To get there we can identify a number of redoublings which, once neutralised, 
cease to act in their own defence and, I believe, point to a fundamental circularity in Soja’s 
position. 
 
The polyphonous and self-consciously subjective and anecdotal approach marks a distinct change 
from the tight empiricism of his historical-geographical materialism. He asserts, despite an early 
career concerned with the development of an effective Marxist geography reproduced in the early 
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5 This passage provides the opportunity for an  autobiographical snippet that Moss argues is such a shallow way of 
building textual authority, and illustrates Soja’s near canonisation of Lefebvre; “In the first of our all too brief 
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chapters of Postmodern Geographies, that “[t]otalizing visions, attractive though they may be, 
can never capture all the meanings and significations of the urban when the landscape is critically 
read and envisioned as a fulsome geographical text” [1989; p 247]. The change in approach, 
which can be defended of course as a new ‘approximation’, centres around a ‘textual’ reading of 
the city, and a new interest in a semiotic approach not apparent in the early work, applied not only 
to the city as a whole, but also individual buildings, most notably the Bonaventure Hotel. And yet 
despite the rejection of ‘totalizing visions’ we are told that, “Underneath this semiotic blanket 
there remains an economic order, an instrumental nodal structure, an exploitative spatial division 
of labour” [ibid.; p 246]. 
 
Significantly, the stimulus of a renewed approach turns to confusion and contradiction in the 
context of a changed focus, away from the political economy of Los Angeles, and towards the 
subjective experience of Los Angeles. It is this subtler change that proves the weakness at the 
heart of Soja’s project and provokes the circularity. 
 
The conclusion to Postmodern Geographies provides a key; 
 
I have been looking at Los Angeles from many different points of view and each way of 
seeing assists in sorting out the interjacent medley of the subject landscape. The 
perspectives explored are purposeful, eclectic, fragmentary, incomplete, and frequently 
contradictory, but so too is Los Angeles and, indeed, the experienced historical 
geography of every urban landscape [1989; p 247]. 
 
This passage contains three assumptions that need to be clarified. The first is that the 
polyphonous approach, the “many different points of view”, does assist in the understanding of 
Los Angeles. The second is that Los Angeles is “eclectic, fragmentary, incomplete, and 
frequently contradictory”, at least for Soja (although this can be read as either a subjective or a 
normative statement), and the third that “indeed [so is] the experienced historical geography of 
every urban landscape”, clearly now a normative statement. What is critical is to understand the 
justification for the smooth transition from one assumption to the next. 
 
We can work backwards, beginning with the experience of Los Angeles. We are told that the 
“lived experience of the urban [is] increasingly vicarious, screened through simulacra, those exact 
copies for which the real originals have been lost” [1989; p 245 sic]; that “[w]ith exquisite irony, 
contemporary Los Angeles has come to resemble more than ever before a gigantic agglomeration 
of theme parks, a lifespace comprised of Disneyworlds” [p 246]; that Los Angeles is a The re-assertion of ‘space’ in social theory?  37 
“hyperspace”, an “elastic urban context” , a “confusing collage of signs”[p 245]. In a passage 
most reminiscent of Daneri’s poem ‘The Earth’, we are treated to a page-long list of the “dazzling 
array of sites in this compartmentalized corona of the inner city”, concluding with the ecstatic 
promise of “so much more: a constellation of Foucauldian heterotopias ‘capable of juxtaposing in 
a single real place several spaces, several sites that are themselves incompatible’ but ‘function in 
relation to all the space that remains’” [pp 239-40, sic]. 
 
This normative description of Los Angeles as experienced is grounded in an effusive 
anecdotalism; Soja’s conviction that the experience of Los Angeles is fragmented, polyvalent, 
confusing, is so strong that it carries before it the need for any evidence. As Soja develops his 
argument into the experiential realm of what he refers to as ‘lived space’ he abandons his 
materialist roots in favour of “different routes”; this radical subjectivism based in semiotics. Yet 
his only justification for this volte-face and the consequent mapping of his own understandings on 
to others is a circular appeal once again to the power of polyvalence; 
 
Empirical regularities are there to be found in the surface geometry of any city, including 
Los Angeles, but they are not explained in the discovery, as is so often assumed. 
Different routes and different roots must be explored to achieve a practical understanding 
and critical reading of urban landscapes. The illusions of empirical opaqueness must be 
shattered, along with other disciplining effects of Modern Geography [1989; p 243]. 
 
The other “disciplining effects of [modernism?]” which go out with the sullied bathwater of 
empirical opaqueness would seem to include all forms of substantiation . As Marden argues, the 
later ‘empirical’ chapters of Postmodern Geographies are “ambivalent and confusing” [Marden, 
1992; p 47]. Soja thus confuses the importance of empirical research with the opaqueness of 
empiricism and a positivist position. As Christensen argues, this implies that “if one engages in 
empirical research, then, by definition, one is a positivist in the logical empiricist sense of a 
person who idealises a human science in terms of physics”, seeking explanation simply in 
regularity [see above, p 13 and Christensen, 1982; p 42
7]. 
 
This egocentric approach to scholarship is exaggerated in the second part of Thirdspace [Soja, 
1996] where “he weaves his way through what he considers empirical demonstrations of what he 
means by thirdspace” [Moss, 1999; p 249]; a journalistic amalgam of culled ‘facts’, a discordant 
return to his pre-subjectivist materialism, anecdote, and subjectivism arranged into an series of The re-assertion of ‘space’ in social theory?  38 
“scenes” of Los Angeles reminiscent of Robert Altman’s film Short Cuts. Soja himself would 
undoubtedly see this as a compliment, but his scenes mask a simplistic synecdoche that magnifies 
his semiotic approach. Los Angeles represents every urban landscape, and is represented in turn 
by key ‘sites’, the epitome of this chain of signification being perhaps the Bonaventure Hotel; 
 
[A]n amazingly storeyed [sic] architectural symbol of the splintered labyrinth that 
stretches sixty miles around it. Like many other Portman-teaus which dot the eyes of 
urban citadels in New York, San Francisco, Atlanta and Detroit, the Bonaventure has 
become a concentrate representation of the restructured spatiality of the late capitalist 
city: fragmented and fragmenting; homogeneous and homogenizing, divertingly 
packaged yet curiously incomprehensible, seemingly open in presenting itself to view but 
constantly pressing to enclose, to compartmentalize, to circumscribe, to incarcerate. 
Everything imaginable appears to be available in this micro-urb but real places are 
difficult to find, its spaces confuse an effective cognitive mapping…. [1989; pp 243-4]. 
 
The building represents not only Los Angeles as a whole; 
 
[i]n so many ways, its architecture recapitulates and reflects the sprawling  manufactured 
spaces of Los Angeles….The Bonaventure both simulates the restructured landscape of 
Los Angeles and is simultaneously simulated by it. 
 
but significantly  Soja’s epistemological position also; 
 
From this interpretative interplay of micro- and macro-simulations there emerges an 
alternative way of looking critically at the human geography of contemporary Los 
Angeles, of seeing it as a mesocosm of postmodernity [ibid]. 
 
 
And so we arrive back at the first assumption, that alternative ways of looking at Los Angeles 
provide a key to understanding what we see. The key theme to extract is the tendency to conflate 
a fragmented and eclectic understanding of Los Angeles (and by extension “every urban 
landscape”) with a normative description of the experience of Los Angeles (and by extension, 
naturally, every urban landscape) as fragmented, eclectic and, it would seem, confused. 
 
The tangled helix retains credibility by relying on the ‘confusion of a little stimulus’ enveloping 
the reader. As Marden has argued at length; 
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Soja’s postmodernism represents the ‘worst of times’ with respect to realigning 
geography with the recent advances in social theory. Like most of the literature on 
deconstruction and postmodernism, it leads us into a realm of provocative obscurity with 
an almost Messianic zeal because it promises the enlightenment of an alternative logic 
divorced from the tired old axioms of Marxist discourse. In particular, the language gives 
the impression of profundity and surety of argument. Hence, any confusions of the text is 
more often than not seen as reflecting the reader’s shortcomings, rather than the abstruse 
narrative, a trait that characterises much of the literature on deconstruction and 
illuminates one of its major paradoxes: how does one ‘deconstruct’ deconstruction? 
[Marden, 1992; p 48] 
 
However, I hope that the trap set by Borges can unravel this labyrith, offering an anchor by which 
to deconstruct Soja’s position. The LA-leph, like the Aleph, simply reveals the desire of the 
author to find the world as he or she conceives it. While in 1979 Soja was able to assert that, 
“[t]his growing spatial consciousness and its rootedness in changing material conditions […] does 
not spring from the thin air of isolated intellectual contemplation” [Soja and Hadjimichalis, 1979] 
this claim becomes less sustainable as his interests move from dialectics into ‘trialectics’. When 
the ‘LA-leph’ comes to form the core of his empiricism we have come full circle and as Borges 
warned, the thin, perhaps ‘rarefied’, air of isolated intellectual contemplation seems to have gone 
to his head. Behind the ‘trialectics’ of a supposedly fragmented common experience of the city, 
the fragmented architecture of the Bonaventure Hotel, and a fragmented understanding, stands 
nothing but Soja’s own ontological position. 
 
 It is this theoretical outlook that is mirrored in the seductively shimmering mirrored-glass of the 
Bonaventure Hotel as much as the panorama of the city beyond, for as the ‘mirror-phobe’ Borges 
warns us, whenever anyone invokes an Aleph, the only content to be found is the theoretical 
position of the author (in my case as much as Daneri’s). So, while I agree with the concerns of 
Moss (see above pages 21 to 24, 30 and 37), I feel she is jousting at windmills to take on either 
the conception of ‘thirdspace’, the vacuousness of Soja’s empirical demonstrations or his process 
of constructing authority in text as separate symptoms – for this ability of the helix to repair and 
retangle itself makes it a hydra of an adversary. Rather it is necessary to find what is essential to 
every head of the hydra, and Soja’s misguided appeal to the Aleph directs us to his ontological re-
workings. 
 
This chapter uncovers two questions that are central to this first section. Firstly, why does Soja’s 
ontological position lead to such circular confusion when tackling the experience of space, and 
secondly, what prompts him to confront this experiential realm in the first place? The re-assertion of ‘space’ in social theory?  40 
2.3 Towards a spatialized ontology? 
 
It is chapter 5 of Postmodern Geographies, “Reassertions: Towards a Spatialized ontology”, that 
forms the key-stone of Soja’s argument, the culmination of the theoretical re-workings of marxist 
geography and the bridging link into the later more empirical section. As our understanding of the 
Alephic vision predicts, it is in this section dealing with his ontological position that we uncover 
the kernel of his argument and find the basis for its unravelling. For just as in Borges, desires 
provoked experience and dreams conjured a reality, so here epistemological and ontological 
positions become equally confused and self-reinforcing. 
 
Reading Soja’s work, and indeed that of many of the ‘respatialization theorists’, it is apparent that 
the word ‘space’ itself is often exchanged for the more illusive ‘spatiality’. Soja makes a late 
justification for this substitution in a later paper, Postmodern Geographies and the Critique of 
Historicism [Soja, 1993]. In a section entitled ‘Retheorizing Spatiality’ he writes: 
 
I have defined spatiality as part of an encompassing trialectic of relationships that 
together form the existential macroparameters of human life. This ontological assumption 
is not as bold or as idiosyncratic as it might at first sound, for it is little more than an 
extension and a social specification of the conventional ontological triad of the physical 
world; space, time and matter. For matter I substitute social being and then socially 
activate the existential trialectic into a triple ontology of Becoming, defined as the 
consciousness-shaping social construction (or “making” if you prefer) of history (as 
historicity), geography (as spatiality), and society (as sociality) [ibid.; p 126]. 
 
It is clear that for Soja this trialectic is the basis not only for his understanding of society but also 
the relationship between society and the phenomenal world. “All generalizations about human 
phenomena”, he states, “from ontological statements on the condition of being to theoretical 
statements about the contingencies of the empirical world, revolve around these specifying and 
contextualizing fields of expression” [Soja, 1993; p114]. However, his ‘socially activated’ 
trialectic is more than simply an extension of the ‘conventional ontological triad of the physical 
world’. While ‘space’ and ‘time’ undergo transformation to become the more socially animated 
‘spatiality’ and ‘historicity’, ‘matter’ is lost entirely, and without justification, in favour of ‘social 
being’, ‘sociality’ and ‘society’. This is a critical theoretical step which underpins Soja’s inability, 
identified above, to deal in any satisfactory way with the concrete experience of the city, despite 
his declaration that his trialectic aids understanding of the “practical consciousness of the 
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abandons the possibility of any materialistic conception of space as a foundation of his ontology 
[Soja, 1993; p 114, drawing on Berman, 1982]. 
 
And yet, drawing on Poulantzas and Lefebvre, he sees his project as the redirection of Marxist 
analysis “towards a materialistic interpretation of space and time” [Soja, 1989; p 118 emphasis 
added]. Spatial and temporal matrices, the ‘material groundedness [of capitalism]’, “establish a 
primal material framework, the real substratum of social life…[and]…assign to space what had so 
assertively been attached to time in the Marxist tradition: a fundamental materiality” [ibid.; p 
119]. Soja resolves this paradox, therefore, by moving from a materialistic conception of space to 
a materialistic conception of spatiality, which in seeking social animation has dropped the key 
ingredient of any ‘materialistic’ philosophy: matter
8. 
 
The justification for this reorientation lies in the “more meta-theoretical project” which 
accompanies the reworking of Marxist analysis by Poulantzas, Lefebvre and others: “a search for 
an appropriate ontological and epistemological location for spatiality, an active ‘place’ for space 
in a Western philosophical tradition that had rigidly separated time from space and intrinsically 
prioritized temporality to the point of expunging the ontological and epistemological significance 
of spatiality” [ibid.]. This ontological project forms the core of Soja’s argument, for the 
reassertion of space in social theory “cannot be accomplished simply by appending spatial 
highlights to inherited critical perspectives” but must begin at the level of ontology, with the 
resolution of a double-bind he identifies at the core of the Western philosophical tradition, 
allowing for the restoration of a “meaningful existential spatiality of being and human 
consciousness, [the composition of] a social ontology in which space matters from the very 
beginning” [ibid.; pp 6-7 and12]. 
 
His double-bind revolves around the tension between two ‘misplacings’ of spatiality, what he 
terms the “physical-mental dualism”. ‘Spatiality’, the key term in his ontological trialectic, can be 
distinguished from the preceding conceptions of ‘space’ as the “physical space of material 
nature” and the “mental space of cognition and representation” because of its key attribute of 
being socially produced. This manoeuvre “shatters the traditional dualism”, recognising that both 
“spaces of nature and cognition” are incorporated and transformed in the social production of 
spatiality, “setting important limits to the independent theorizations of physical and mental space” 
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[p 120]. Despite its appearance of objectivity and separation, nature, like spatiality, must be seen 
as socially produced and reproduced, as must cognitive or mental space, which is always wrapped 
in the complex and diverse representations of human perception and cognition [p 121]. 
 
The misleading conception of an independent physical and mental space rests for Soja on two 
illusions. The first, the illusion of opaqueness, can be thought of as a form of myopia; “the short-
sighted interpretations of spatiality which focus on immediate surface appearances without being 
able to see beyond them. Spatiality is accordingly interpreted and theorized as a collection of 
things, as substantive appearances which may ultimately be linked to social causation but are 
knowable only as things-in-themselves” [p 122]. Soja traces this legacy through Hume, Locke 
and Comte’s emphasis on sensory-based perception; Cartesian mathematical-geometric 
abstractions; the mechanical materialism of a post-Newtonian social physics to Bergson’s 
“extraordinary devaluation and subordination of space (relative to time)” [pp 122-3], in all of 
which “spatiality is reduced to physical objects and forms, and naturalized back to a first nature 
so as to become susceptible to prevailing scientific explanation in the form of empirical 
regularities (largely in the spatial co-variation of phenomenal appearances” [ibid.]. The weakness 
of such an approach, Soja argues, is that when description is substituted for explanation, such a 
narrow empirical and positivist outlook is found to be socially inert, and incapable of explanatory 
power, ignoring as it does the social production of space and the consequent contextual 
importance of politics, power and ideology [pp 123-4]. 
 
The second illusion is conversely a form of hypermetropia – extreme far-sightedness. The illusion 
of transparency “sees right through the concrete spatiality of social life by projecting its 
production into an intuitive realm of purposeful idealism and immaterialized reflexive 
thought…[in which]…[s]patiality is reduced to a mental construct alone, a way of thinking, an 
ideational process in which the ‘image’ of reality takes epistemological precedence over the 
tangible substance and appearance of the real world” [pp 124-5]. His blame for this philosophical 
wrong-turn runs back to Plato, ‘boosted’ by Leibniz’s ideas on the relativism of space, “its 
existence as idea more than thing”, but is pinned mostly onto Kant’s transcendental spatial 
idealism, culpable for a “vision of human geography … in which the organisation of space is 
projected from a mental ordering of phenomena, either intuitively given, or relativized into many 
different ways of thinking” [ibid.]. 
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Soja resolves these two defects of academic sight with his conversion of space into socially 
activated spatiality that subsumes, transforms and supersedes the traditional dualism of physical 
and mental space. The result is “a materialist interpretation of spatiality” whose generative source 
is the recognition that “spatiality is socially produced and, like society itself, exists in both 
substantive forms (concrete spatialities) and as a set of relations between individuals and groups, 
an ‘embodiment’ and medium of social life itself” [p120]. It is useful to clarify this complex 
theoretical development graphically, see figure 2.1. 
 
 The core of Soja’s ‘Ontological trialectic’, spatiality, is the product of another trialectic, that I 
have called the ‘Socio-spatial trialectic’ and it is here that the problematic dualism between 
physical and mental conceptions of space is socially animated and thus resolved. Soja’s argument 
develops from ‘bottom up’, beginning with yet another inversion (too complex to represent!), the 
re-working of the space/ time/matter triad into space/time/society which forms the basis of his 
essentially epistemological trialectic (the level of understanding of socio-spatial relationships) 
which in turn feeds his ontological trialectic, the level of becoming. 
 
This edifice lasts, but as we have seen before, only as long as the logic is not reversed and we do 
not return to question the foundation. However, this is exactly what Soja invites us to do by his 
appeals to experience, examined in the preceding section. He opens this weakness in the same 
context as he develops this theoretical structure, with continued assertions that theory must be 
grounded in a concrete material reality, with “empirical demonstration, the application of a 
materialist interpretation of spatiality to contemporary ‘real world’ issues and politics” being “a 
promising alternative path” [ibid.; p 131]. He offers his own work on the urban restructuring of 
Los Angeles as a paradigmatic example, but as we have seen, that is to acknowledge only one 
aspect of his approach to the urban context. The socially based concept of spatiality may provide 
a successful framework for a reworking of the essentially economistic aspects of Marxian 
analysis, as much of Soja’s early work, as well as the work of Lefebvre, Harvey, Castells and 
others (to be reviewed in section 2) has shown. It feeds a contextual understanding of space; for 
example spatial inequalities of the market, of capitalism of the labour market. However, as Soja 
makes his more ‘experiential’ forays, his ontological trialectic is left compromised. The re-assertion of ‘space’ in social theory?  44 
Figure 2.1 Soja’s socio-spatial trialectic 
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The reason that Soja, in discussing the experience of sites such as the Bonaventure Hotel, has to 
resort to normative statements and synechdotal hyperbole is that in over-turning the 
“conventional ontological triad” of space/time/and matter in favour of a more socially sensitive 
conception, with the consequent reworking of physical and mental conceptions of space, he has 
lost the ability to theorise very literal concrete material forms (such as the Bonaventure) as the 
physical component ‘matter’ has become isolated from his ontological system. In making the 
trade of ‘society’ for ‘matter’ he has exchanged the sensitivity of one tool for another, and then is 
unable to recapture that precision when it is needed. 
 
Space, metamorphosed into spatiality, is a ‘second nature’ concept in Lefebvre’s schema, one that 
is socially defined, but Soja’s system has lost the ability to reconnect this to the ‘first nature’ of 
matter. His appeals to the ‘context of material life’ fall into a grey area around the level of 
experience therefore [see figure 2.1] as it is unclear whether or not this links back through first 
nature concepts to the ostracised ‘matter’. It seems, therefore, that in the resolution of the two 
illusions of spatiality, Soja has firmly rejected the material illusion while being caught in the 
illusion of transparency himself, of which he himself says, “[s]ocial space folds into mental 
space, into diaphanous concepts of spatiality which all too often take us away from materialized 
social realities” [ibid.; p 125]. 
 
‘Materialized social realities’ for Soja are the “concreteness of capitalist spatial practices” [p 120] 
and not the physical spaces (as opposed to his preferred ‘material spatialities’) of urban 
experience. He therefore makes a conceptual separation between the related organisation of 
people in space (analagous to his less formal ‘spatial practices’) and the organisation of space 
itself that lies at the core of Hillier’s approach [see Hillier and Hanson, 1984 pp 26-27, and 
below, chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion]. In fact, the only place given to physical space in 
his discussion is for the effects of ‘friction of distance’, apparently the only contribution of pre-
Lefebvrian Geography that Soja can call to mind. “Physical and biological processes”, he states, 
“affect society no matter how much they are socially mediated, and social life is never free of 
such restrictive impingements as the physical friction of distance” [pp 120-21], and later, 
“[e]xistence means having to deal with the friction of distance whether it be on the level of the 
‘primal setting’ or in the dull routines of everyday life. A distance-ordered space-time patterning 
thus pervades the existential setting of human interaction and cannot be ignored in theory 
construction” [p 149]. This despite the fact that he faults modern Geography’s neo-Kantian 
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organisation of society, “a deadened product of the ordering discipline of the friction of distance” 
[p 124]. 
 
There is no substantive place for physical space within Soja’s theoretical structure, yet, 
“[p]hysical and biological processes affect society no matter how much they are socially 
mediated”. He continues, “[t]he impress of this ‘first nature’ is not naively and independently 
given, however, for its social impact always passes through a ‘second nature’ that arises from the 
organised and cumulative application of human labour and knowledge” [p 121]. The question 
remains, how is this connection back to first nature to be made once the closed loop of the space, 
time and society triad is firmly anchored to the ‘second nature’ concept of spatiality? Until this 
link is re-established Soja’s appeals to spatial experience cannot lie within his declared meta-
theoretical project of a new spatial ontology. 
 
The second section of this thesis will attempt to rebuild this project, recapturing the explanatory 
potential of the dismissed space/time/matter triad, while retaining the undisputed gains of Soja’s 
social animation. It will address the possibility of a socially active conception of physical space, 
with an associated empirical possibility, that is neither reductionist, nor concedes explanatory 
power to analytical and descriptive precision. 
 
First, however, I wish to turn to less formally ‘academic’ representations of contemporary space, 
to build upon the notion of a ‘structure of feeling’. Here the focus will be not only on what is said 
of cities and spaces, but also the related style of writing, recalling Thrift’s clarification of a 
‘structure of feeling’ as a change in style and content.  Delirious cities – ecstatic space  47 
Chapter 3 
Delirious cities – ecstatic space 
 
 
This chapter will introduce the second theme of this section. The first was the idea of the 
“Alephic Vision” and highlighted the buried understandings of space that underlie a particular 
view of the experience of cities. The second theme concerns the nature of these views, and 
examines contemporary characterisations of cities. Once again, my intention is to make inroads 
into this vast subject area by focusing on one particular example. Just as Soja’s work was 
presented above as representative of a theoretical position towards contemporary cities and spatial 
concerns, so here I wish to examine the Cities on the Move exhibition (Hayward Gallery, London, 
1999) as symptomatic of current attitudes to urbanism which seem increasingly pandemic, 
bleeding between popular and academic discourses.  
 
I am aware that this approach may seem hypocritical in view of the fact that one of my principal 
concerns with much recent writing on cities is the reliance upon a synechdotal narrowing around 
key exemplars (perhaps the most obvious example being the Bonaventure Hotel and Ridley 
Scott’s Bladerunner). However, in the following chapter I will make the case for these two 
examples being representative of what I suggested above was a new ‘structure of feeling’ towards 
space, by drawing links with a wide field of theoretical and popular literature on cities, as well as 
developing the linkages between the two themes of this first section. 
 
 
3.1 Cities on the Move; an archaeology of ideas 
 
Cities on the Move was an exhibition that toured Europe and North America between 1997 and 
2000
1. Ostensibly it examined the rapid urban and social changes of Asian cities over the 
preceding decade through the work of artists and architects working in the region. However, I 
                                                 
1 Following my visit to the London exhibition I became involved in a discussion forum about the show run by the 
curatorial staff at the Hayward Gallery. This led, through a series of coincidences mainly, to my being invited to 
participate in a previously unplanned date on the itinerary in Bangkok, the only Asian city on the tour. I traveled to 
Bangkok in October of 1999 and had the opportunity of speaking with the curatorial staff there as well as participating 
in the exhibition through a photographic installation and discussion forum that aimed to address directly with visitors 
and other exhibitors the images of Asian Cities, and by extension cities generally, presented both by the Cities on the 
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think it is a useful indicator of a more widespread sentiment towards cities for a number of 
reasons. 
 
Firstly, a core theme lying behind the presentation of life in Asian cities was that of globalization. 
In the introduction to the comprehensive catalogue (written for the Bordeaux manifestation of the 
show) the curators Hanru and Obrist present a well-argued case for linking global economic 
changes with urban and social changes in Asia [Hanru and Obrist, 1997]. A central aspect of that 
argument was the pressure imposed on Asian cities by rapid modernization following a perceived 
‘western’ capitalist model and the loss of a distinctive society within the growing networks of 
capital. Although the specific focus was Asian cities, implicitly there lay within a critique of 
related global processes of capitalism and urbanization. 
 
Secondly, the exhibition was inevitably not about cities so much as ideas about, and approaches 
to, cities. The focus of the following discussion will be precisely upon these buried ideas. What is 
revealing, therefore, is to note the systems of reference of curators and artists alike, even their 
biographic details. I would suggest that what we see is a profound and sophisticated engagement 
with a discourse on cities, architecture, social and economic theory and semiotics which is rooted 
in contemporary ‘western’ debates. There is, of course, nothing wrong with that, but it draws 
attention to the globalization of ideas as much as any other form of social or cultural production. 
Again, this reinforces my proposition that there is a new ‘structure of feeling’ towards cities and 
space, indeed one that transcends cultural and global boundaries
2. 
 
It must be born in mind, therefore, that Cities on the Move represented Asian cities through an 
optic that is equally applied to European and American cities (perhaps the fashionable ‘global 
cities’ would be apposite). Furthermore, this is not an ‘un-tinted’ optic, but one that conforms to 
the alephic distortions encountered in the previous chapter. So, for example, we find the 
pandemic influence of key figures such as Baudrillard, and particularly of architect and urban 
theorist Rem Koolhaas, while in one venue of the Bangkok exhibition, entire dialogues with Peter 
Cook and Cedric Price were reproduced and appeared to receive the same solemn reverence from 
students that has been my experience in London. Indeed, the biographies of the artists reveal the 
diffusion pathways of these ideas. The typical formula appears to be either, “born in Bangkok, 
                                                 
2 In making this argument I have drawn upon a collection of faxed proposals from artists hoping to include work in the 
original exhibition, an extraordinary and extensive primary source too detailed to discuss at length, for the access to 
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lives and works in Bangkok and New York”, or, “Lives and works in Bangkok; after studying at 
…in USA/ London/ Berlin”
3. 
 
I wish therefore to turn to these buried ideas which seem to have such a strong influence upon the 
more populist views of cities portrayed in the Cities on the Move exhibition. 
 
The Koolhaasian City 
 
Despite their academic genealogy, the texts that accompanied Cities on the Move (in both its 
London and Bangkok incarnations) make no pretence of ‘academic status’ in the sense of the 
customary rigorous attribution of sources and ideas. However, there is one clear source of 
reference for many of the themes about the city that are advanced. Rem Koolhaas was involved 
with Ole Scheeren (architect and prime mover behind the Bangkok show) as the designer of the 
exhibition space in the Hayward Gallery, London, and is interviewed by one of the overall 
curators of the show, Hans-Ulrich Obrist, in the London catalogue. Scheeren was then responsible 
for the information that accompanied the following exhibition in Bangkok, essentially a rewriting 
of the more extensive exhibition catalogues which accompanied the earlier shows, particularly at 
the 1997 Vienna Secession and at the Musee d’art Contemporain, Bordeaux [here referred to as 
Hanru and Obrist, 1997]. 
 
This seeming reliance on Koolhaas is interesting for two reasons. Firstly, through his discussions 
with the curator and his actual physical involvement with the architecture of the gallery space, he 
opens a parallel channel towards understanding the view of cities presented by the exhibition, a 
reinforcing dialogue to the contents of the exhibits themselves. Secondly, through a deeper 
archaeology into his previous writings about cities, we can perhaps use Koolhaas as a bridge to 
link contemporary popular understandings of the city, such as Cities on the Move, with academic 
debates and a genealogy of ideas traced from Koolhaas back to Soja, and then beyond. 
 
The starting point for this chain is the London exhibition. Rem Koolhaas was invited by the 
curators to design the exhibition space and used the opportunity as a way of adding reflexivity to 
the exhibition, introducing a dialogue between exhibition and exhibited, subject and object that is 
                                                 
3 My own experience at the About Café in Bangkok (one of several venues for the exhibition spread around the city) 
was that almost without exception the curators and exhibitors that I met had worked or studied in either the UK or USA 
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a familiar theme from the earlier analysis of Soja (and will be returned to in the following 
chapter). He explains; “Here, Ole Scheeren and I have tried first to accumulate previous Hayward 
designs, then to reassemble them, almost as a form of urbanism” [Rem Koolhaas, quoted in 
London Catalogue, Hayward Gallery, 1999; p 16]. Drawing a parallel with the German artist 
Schwitters and his urbanistic installation ‘Merzbau’, “an accumulation of (urban) debris”, 
Koolhaas and Scheeren re-used the “architecture” of the previous Hayward exhibitions, Patrick 
Caulfield and Zaha Hadid’s structures for Addressing the Century: 100 Years of Art and Fashion, 
to make “a kind of intimate streetscape” [ibid.; p 17]. A first step to interrogating Koolhaas’s 
ideas on the city, and therefore those of the exhibition more generally, is to examine the ‘pseudo-
city’ of the exhibition structure itself. 
 
Merzbau as City 
 
The reference to Schwitter’s Merzbau is revealing of Koolhaas and Schereen’s understanding of 
the physical structure of cities. Just as they reused the ‘ready-made forms’ of earlier exhibitions, 
Schwitters (Hanover 1887-1948) used the then avant-garde medium of collage, with its 
“emphasis on ready-made forms that are largely the products of urban culture (fragments of 
newsprint, photographic imagery, urban debris)” to break with the orthodox easel-based artistic 
tradition [Dietrich, 1993; p 3]. His was a language of “brutal fragmentation and violence” which 
was expressed as much in his collages as in his texts, whose “rhetorical strategies aim[ed] at 
chaos by scrambling linguistic codes” [ibid; pp 18 and 73]. He coined the term ‘Merz’ as a 
description of his collage process but applied it to all of his work; the production of images, 
graphics, texts, musical composition and architecture. It is interesting that in all his work he 
seems to be concerned more with spatial arrangement than pictoral representation. Pieces, such as 
Merz 19 and Merz 169, Formen in Raum (Forms in Space) [see figure 3.1] suggest this interest, 
while the very different and more representational Aquarelle series also depicts a world in which 
“the spatial and positional relationships have gone awry” [ibid.; p 88]. Dietrich argues that 
Aquarelle 1, Das Herz geht vom Zucker zum Kaffee explores “his new-found understanding of a 
world set in motion by technology” and cites Schwitters himself as arguing that this picture 
represented a microcosm of a larger world in motion. 
 
                                                                                                                                                
gallery space was on an exchange program from the Witney Museum in New York (In fact she was herself Japanese 
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Figure 3.1 Kurt Schwitters, Merz 169, Formen im Raum [Forms in Space], 1920. Collage, 
18x14.3 cm Kunstsammlung Nordrhein-Westfalen, Düssseldorf [Source: Dietrich, 1993]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Kurt Schwitters, Merzbau, [Merzbuilding], general view with Blaues Fenster (Blue 
Window), c. 1930, photograph destroyed [Source: Dietrich, 1993]. 
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The key themes of the collage process, an aesthetic of fragmentation and violence, the impact of 
technologies of acceleration and a collapsing of spatial scales producing worlds within worlds  
show strong parallels with the ideas of Soja and Koolhaas
4. Schwitters united these strands “into 
an all-encompassing new work of art: the Merzbau, an assemblage always expanding towards 
architecture” [ibid.; p 3]. 
 
There are important features of Schwitters Merzbau that direct our understanding of both 
Koolhaas’s approach and the Cities exhibition. There are many physical resemblances between 
this ‘architectural installation’ and the Cities exhibition [see figure 3.2]. Like the Cities on the 
Move ‘set’, Schwitter’s Merzbau took over the rooms of his studio and house to become an “all-
encompassing, ever-expanding collage environment”. It comprised two referential parts; an 
interior of collage material and an outer ‘shell’ of architectural forms punctuated by glass 
windows or “grottoes”, as he referred to them, to allow a view to the displayed objects in the 
interior. Indeed, these are contrasted directly by Dietrich with museum display cases [ibid., p 
164]. 
 
But both Koolhaas’ and Schwitters’ designs are more than simply a display case. As the curators 
Hanru and Obrist affirm, Koolhaas and his assistant Scheeren have “[thought] the exhibition 
through conceptually and thematically…to make an exhibition design which is a complex, 
dynamic system based on use, a microcosm of the modern city” [Hou Hanru and Hans-Ulrich 
Obrist, quoted in London catalogue, Hayward Gallery, 1999; p 15, emphasis added]. Mohsen 
Mostafevi concords with this reading - “The exhibition is an analogous city made anew with the 
accumulated traces of economic and cultural debris; of what has been and what is yet to come” – 
as does Susan Ferleger-Brades, Director of the Hayward, who argues, “they have created an 
‘event city’ for the exhibition: a shifting cityscape of urban possibility” [ibid.; p 4]. 
 
This idea of cities within cities is interesting for several reasons. Firstly, it is reminiscent of 
techniques uncovered in the writing of Soja, particularly the synechdotal reference to idealised 
                                                 
4 As well as others, in particular Castells, Harvey and Jameson as will be discussed in subsequent chapters. In this 
section particular attention is paid to Koolhaas’ Delirious New York because it is mentioned directly in the exhibition 
literature. However, the conviction of a chaotic and unintelligible urban experience pervades much of his written work 
and teaching. His course at the Harvard Graduate School of Design, the now famous ‘Project on the City’, was founded 
upon the realization of ‘a double crisis’; “the academic and professional bewilderment with urban conditions 
that seem to defy traditional description” and the failure of design professionals to cope with these changes 
[Harvard Graduate School of Design website]. These ideas are developed in publications from the course, 
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urban forms such as the Bonaventure Hotel as referents for an assumed wider reality. Secondly, 
in making this play between contrivance and reality, designed exhibition space and urban space, 
Koolhaas and Scheeren open softer ground on which to search for the buried archaeology of 
implicit ideas and assumptions about the city that inevitably permeate the exhibition, principally 
Koolhaas’s own writings which seem to underpin not only many of the exhibited texts but also 
the form of the exhibition space as synechdotal referent for all that is exhibited. 
 
The ‘conceptual and thematic’ approach to the design of the exhibition refers directly to these 
buried ideas. In designing an experiential metaphor for the Asian city, Koolhaas and Scheeren 
bring their concepts of what a city is to the very surface, and as this fantasy city is juxtaposed 
with the presentation (by other artists and architects, Koolhaas included) of the experience of 
‘real’ Asian cities, we should be reminded also of the lessons learned from Soja when similar 
reflexive parallels are made. The analysis of Soja’s work above suggested that we should be 
suspicious of these synecdotal metaphors which can relate more to the authors’ specific 
understandings of an [urban] situation than to the supposed ‘reality’ which the metaphor 
describes. Here again, I suggest, we see the cyclical self-referential processes of Borges’ Aleph 
taking hold, although in a slightly different form. 
 
What is critical in this section that tries to draw parallels between academic and more populist 
understandings of the city, is that we see in the London catalogue a broad spectrum of critics in 
concordance with their reading of the city – Ferleger Brades, the gallery director, Hou Hanru and 
Hans-Ulrich Obrist, international curators living and working around the globe, Mohsen 
Mostafavi, Chairman of the Architectural Association in London. Although one would expect all 
these contributors to be ‘on message’, nonetheless, their views concord with a more general view 
of cities, evident in Soja’s work as well as other academic and popular sources to be examined in 
following chapter; that cities are frantic and chaotic, unintelligible places. As with the analysis of 
Soja’s work, we need to find the basis of Koolhaas’ idea of the urban before we can begin to 
understand properly his contribution to this exhibition and my overall argument. 
 
Merzbau as emotional response 
 
As an introduction to Koolhaas’ ideas, I wish to argue that the significance of Koolhaas’ 
reference to the Merzbau goes far beyond a simple parallel with a physical and procedural 
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attitude towards their structures and aspirations for their impact on those who experience them. 
The two elements of Merzbau and equally the Cities exhibition (the architectural structure and the 
exhibited material) were seen to be in continuous dialogue and the external form responded and 
grew in response to additions to the core. Schwitters described the Merzbau as “dynamic” and 
“unfinished out of principle”, remaining “forever in flux” [Dietrich, 1993; pp 166 and 198]. 
Merzbau is not, therefore, simply a sculptural representation. It is also “a model for societal 
reorganization...Merz [referring to the whole of his oeuvre and method] does not want to form, 
Merz wants to transform” [ibid.; p 200]. 
 
The work of both Schwitters and Koolhaas is intended actively to influence the visitor. The effect 
of the experience of the Merzbau and the transformation it induced is recorded by one visitor to 
the studio, Rudolf Jahns. He describes entering the cave-like structure and the path leading to the 
centre which, “was very narrow, since new sections and constructions, together with the already 
existing Merz-reliefs and caves, grew into the empty space”. However, on reaching the centre he, 
“was overcome by a sense of rapture” [ibid.; p 204, emphasis added]. 
 
Dietrich argues that Schwitters here reveals himself a follower of Nietzsche - the Merzbau a 
controlled environment in which the Nietzschean Abyss can be contemplated, even conquered. I 
wish to suggest that this notion of “rapture” is also critical in the work of Koolhaas where it 
emerges as the notion of ‘ecstasy’. Both rapture and ecstasy refer to a complex emotion, 
incorporating a disturbing undertone, captured by Merzbau’s alternative title, The Cathedral of 
Erotic Misery, which echoes the tensions between freedom and destruction in Nietzche’s term 
rausch. I will argue below that the notion of ‘ecstasy’ is central to the contemporary ‘structure of 
feeling’ towards space. 
 
Our archaeology into the work of Koolhaas must be sensitive to these two strands therefore – the 
relationship between the physical structure and character of the city and the emotional response 
that the city prompts in the inhabitant or critic. 
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3.2 Delirious New York 
 
Koolhaas’ Delirious New York, is subtitled, “A Retroactive Manifesto for Manhattan”, and I 
suggest that we can look at his design for the Cities on the Move exhibition in the same way – a 
retroactive blueprint for the building of Asian cities. 
 
Unlike Soja, Koolhaas explicitly points out that, like all manifestos, his is grounded in a personal 
and particular understanding of the city. He begins with a quotation from Giambattista Vico’s 
Principles of a New Science:  
 
Philosophers and philologists should be concerned in the first place with poetic 
metaphysics; that is, the science that looks for proof not in the external world, but in the 
very modifications of the mind that mediates on it. Since the world of nations is made by 
men, it is inside their minds that its principles should be sought [Quoted in Koolhaas, 
1994; p 9]. 
 
As if to emphasise the solipsism of his approach, he adds a quotation from Dostoyevski; “Why do 
we have a mind if not to get our way?” [ibid.]. However, Delirious New York is as much an 
interpretation of the physical reality of Manhattan as a theoretical project. He states that, “The 
fatal weakness of manifestos is their inherent lack of evidence”, while for Manhattan the situation 
is reversed; “it [Manhattan] is a mountain range of evidence without Manifesto” [ibid.]. 
Consequently, Koolhaas parallels his approach to that of a ghost-writer (“I was Manhattan’s 
ghost-writer”) whose role it is to discover patterns, express unarticulated intentions and to record 
and remember significant events [ibid.; p 11]. The book is, therefore, 
 
an interpretation of that Manhattan which gives its seemingly discontinuous – even 
irreconcilable – episodes a degree of consistency and coherence, an interpretation that 
intends to establish Manhattan as the product of an unformulated theory, Manhattanism, 
whose program – to exist in a world totally fabricated by man, i.e., to live inside fantasy – 
was so ambitious that to be realized, it could never be openly stated [ibid.; p10, sic]. 
 
The book is a blueprint, therefore, “that describes an ideal state that can only be approximated…a 
theoretical Manhattan, a Manhattan as conjecture, of which the present city is the compromised 
and imperfect realization” [ibid.; p 11, sic]. 
 
From the outset, therefore, there is a complex interplay between notions of theory and evidence, 
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Baconian and Cartesian methodologies. While Soja makes claims to be an empiricist, beginning 
with his supposedly value-free observations of L.A. and reading off from them a theory of reality, 
Koolhaas’ approach is more complex. He seems content to let the ambiguities of a bleeding of 
theory and evidence take their course, and even sees this as the very essence of his manifesto 
project. The result is perhaps more robust to criticism than Soja’s work, for what we have is an 
overtly personal understanding of the city which because of its ‘retroactive’ nature and theoretical 
intent makes explicit relationships between theorisation and the view of the material city. 
 
It is not a surprise then, given this freedom of approach, that we find a familiar parallel drawn 
between the structure and subject of the book that mirrors the architectural intent of the Cities 
exhibition. “In terms of structure”, Koolhaas argues, “this book is a simulacrum of Manhattan’s 
Grid: a collection of blocks whose proximity and juxtaposition reinforce their separate meanings” 
[ibid.; p 11]
5. However, unlike Soja’s deployment of a similar technique, Koolhaas is able to 
avoid straddling the two epistemological horses of objectivity and subjectivity by renouncing the 
academic constraints of justification and judicious argument, thereby credibly extending his 
argument further. It is for this reason, perhaps, that such polemics are so persuasive and generate 
such committed following, Delirious New York being no exception. 
 
Koolhaas’ view of the city is premised on its ‘legibility’ and, therefore, decipherability. 
Manhattan is “the 20
th century’s Rosetta stone” [ibid.; p 9] – by implication a text whose 
decoding provides a cipher with which to approach all similar 20
th century cities [texts]. This 
textual interpretation is particularly evident in the treatment of the tower - “In 50 years the tower 
has accumulated the meanings of: catalyst of consciousness, symbol of technological progress, 
marker of pleasure zones, subversive short-circuiter of convention and finally self-contained 
universe”[sic] - but it is apparent and emphasised throughout; “This book is an interpretation of 
that Manhattan…” [ibid.; pp 9-10]. The method then is similar to Soja’s approach to the 
Bonaventure; an artefact or building is taken as a singular referent of the whole from which it 
comes, a process of synecdoche. In Koolhaas’ words; “[f]rom all the episodes of Manhattan’s 
urbanism this book isolates only those moments where the blueprint is most visible and most 
convincing” [ibid.; p 11]. From these interpretative moments a theory of Manhattanism, and so of 
urbanism, is constructed. 
                                                 
5 The same artifice is used in Soja’s work, with parallels drawn between the text and L.A. through the intermediary of 
Borges and the Aleph, and furthermore (according to Soja) in Lefebvre’s work, which can be read “spatially” (see Soja, 
1996; pp 8-9 and above p 34 on reading Lefebrvre’s Production of Space). In the following chapter this recurrent theme 
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While his approach is to “discover patterns” in the surfacing of Manhattan’s blueprint at the level 
of the legible in these particular sites, his aim is to access the “unarticulated intentions” behind 
key events of Manhattan’s development. He has a particular interpretative bent however, which I 
would suggest is quite erotic. The basic interpretative structure of the book is that Manhattan is 
paradigmatic of a culture of congestion, which in turn, “consistently inspire[s] in its beholders 
ecstasy about architecture” [ibid.; p 10, sic].  
 
Here we find the union of the two themes identified earlier in relation to the Cities on the Move 
exhibition and the Merzbau: the physical congestion of the urban form producing a rapturous or 
ecstatic response. The notion of ‘ecstasy’ is perhaps a deceptively complex one. Its immediate 
connotations are with joy and pleasure, perhaps in some degree erotic, even sexual, but there 
exists also a polarized reading that contains a more sinister element. It is often used to imply a 
subtext of danger or death and is chosen to make this juxtaposition (“an ecstasy of fumbling” in 
Owen’s famous Dulce et Decorum est). The roots of this double meaning lie in the word’s Greek 
origins; ecstasis means literally “being out of normal rational state”, used in the sense of ‘to drive 
a person out of his wits’, forming the basis for concepts of ‘insanity’ and ‘bewilderment’. 
However, later associations are made with the idea of the ‘withdrawal of the soul from the body’, 
coming together with the classical meanings to give the current complex significance of ‘ecstasy’. 
Ecstasy is “a state of being ‘beside oneself’” related to frenzy, stupor, anxiety, astonishment, fear 
and passion. However, it is also used by early writers to refer to “all morbid states characterized 
by unconsciousness” such as trance and catalepsy and so becomes used to describe a state in 
which “the mind, absorbed in a dominant idea, becomes insensible to surrounding objects”. It is 
therefore associated with the idea of ‘rapture’ in which the body becomes “incapable of 
sensation” while the mind is “engrossed to the exclusion of thought” [Oxford English 
Dictionary]. Both ideas are clearly related to the experience of the psychasthenic. 
 
There is a link, then, between the idea of ‘ecstasy’ as used by Koolhaas and ‘rapture’ by 
Schwitters, with its Nietzchean associations, and the supposed experience of contemporary urban 
and architectural environments. All these themes converge in Koolhaas’ vision of ‘ecstasy’ which 
comes to define, I will argue, his approach to the understanding of the city. 
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The ecstasy of congestion 
 
Throughout the book there are references to sex, death, denial, subversion and a delight in the 
macabre which seem to constitute collectively Koolhaas’ ecstatic vision of architecture and 
Manhattanism, indeed urbanism. 
 
The culture of congestion refers as much to the built form of the city, the hyper-density that 
Koolhaas sees as the ‘splendor and misery’ of the urban condition (note the echo with Schwitters 
Cathedral of Erotic Misery), as to the congestion of competing ideas, “Manhattanism’s unspoken 
theory of the simultaneous existence of different programs on a single site…” [Koolhaas, 1994; p 
197]. He draws a parallel between the metropolis as a whole and the prototypical theme parks on 
Coney Island, an “embryonic” and “foetal Manhattan”, which becomes a stage for unnatural 
phenomena, appropriately for an island whose Indian name means “Place Without Shadows” [pp 
28 and 30]. There Koolhaas uncovers three theatres, ‘The Creation’, ‘The End of The World’ and 
‘The Circus’, each sharing a single cast, “a precise metaphor of life in the metropolis, whose 
inhabitants are a single cast playing an infinite number of plays” [p 53]. However, the congestion 
on Coney Island is not only related to the numbers of visitors, but also to conflicting and 
incompatible views of reality, the normality of the metropolis is expunged through the 
architectural and technological apparatus of deception that develops a “psycho-mechanical 
urbanism” at “frenzied pace” [p 62]. Creation and destruction are key pillars in his thesis of 
Manhattanism, for, “In Manhattan’s Culture of Congestion, destruction is another word for 
preservation”, which means that sites in the city become, “not simply the end product of a long 
pedigree, but even more its sum, the simultaneous existence – on a single location, at a single 
point in time – of all its ‘lost’ stages” [p 151, sic]. This congestion of experience and 
simultaneous activities upon one site is, for Koolhaas the “unforseeable and unsustainable” 
promise of the skyscraper, which, “in spite of its physical solidity, [the skyscraper] is the great 
metropolitan destabilizer; it promises perpetual programmatic instability”, an “unknowable 
urbanism” [p 87]. 
 
There is a clear resonance with the idea of Soja’s Aleph; the concentration of experience in a 
single synechdotal referent and a shared tendency to hyperbole in his rhetoric on the city. Indeed 
for Koolhaas, Manhattan itself can be seen as a “congestion of hyperbole” [p 208]. But in 
Koolhaas this hyperbole is inherent to the quasi-sexual ecstasy that the culture of congestion 
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This ecstasy has several different components; sex, death, subversion, denial, repression. At the 
most superficial level, Koolhaas uses the images of Madelon Vriesendrop as the frontispiece 
(cover of the original 1978 edition) and chapter plates, each making playful reference to 
skyscrapers as players in some pseudo Freudian soap opera [see figure 3.3]. It is also Madelon 
Vriesendrop who is afforded special credit in the acknowledgements; “above all, Delirious New 
York owes a special debt of inspiration and reinforcement to Madelon Vriesendorp” [pp 317]. 
 
These overt sexual parallels are mirrored by various textual references; the ‘uterine’ Radio City 
Music Hall [p 210], the ‘clitoral’ Coney Island [p 30], and the ‘Ferrissian womb’ which produces 
the same image of Manhattanism regardless of the source of impregnation [p 117]. Although 
these are of little significance, they do direct the reader to a more attuned reading of the rest of the 
work. 
 
Manhattan is seen as “an accumulation of possible disasters that never happen”, the “leitmotiv of 
the island’s future development”, inspired by Otis’ dramatic demonstration of the safety 
mechanism on his elevator which prevents him plunging to his death
6. Like the elevator, 
Koolhaas argues, “each technological invention [upon which Manhattan is predicated] is pregnant 
with a double image: contained in its success is the spectre of its possible failure” [p 27]. 
  
Perhaps the best example of this juxtaposition of technological disaster and sexual frisson is the 
Leap Frog Railway at the Dreamland park on Coney Island, an amusement ride in which two 
railway carriages heading towards each other pass on the one track by means of bent rails 
attached to the roof which allow them to pass over and under one another, mimicking, Koolhaas 
observes, animals copulating. He continues, “Ostensibly the Leap Frog Railway is a prototype to 
‘reduce the mortality rate due to collisions on railways’, but in this apotheosis of the tradition of 
barely averted disaster Reynolds [the impresario speculator] has blended the mechanics of sex 
with the imminence of death in a single respectable experience” [p 61]. 
 
The sexual tension in Koolhaas’ Manhattan derives not just from the inescapable vulnerability of 
the congested population in the city itself, but their willing complicity. Koolhaas’ search for 
“unarticulated intentions” remains at the level of the consciousness of Manhattanites, who remain 
either [willfully?] unconscious or in denial. These elements of subversion and denial in his  
                                                 
6 This is an urban vision paralleled in Mike Davis’ more recent book, The Ecology of Fear: Los Angeles 
and the imagined disaster [1998]. Delirious cities – ecstatic space 
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Figure 3.3 Madelon Vriesendorp (Clockwise) Delirious New York Cover 1978 and frontispiece 
1994, Aprés l’amour, p 80, Flagrant délit, p 160 Freud Unlimited, p 23 [Source: Koolhaas, 1994, 
page references refer to Delirious New York, 1994 edition].  
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reading of Manhattan seems to be the core of his ‘Manhattanism’, “doctrine of indefinitely 
postponed consciousness” [p 110], and the reason for the successful blending of reality and 
fantasy in Koolhaasian city. He argues, 
 
[t]he subversiveness of the skyscraper’s true nature – the ultimate unpredictability of its 
performance – is inadmissible to its own makers; their campaign to implant the new 
giants within the grid therefore proceeds in a climate of dissimulation, if not self-imposed 
unconsciousness. [p 87, see also p 293, on the idea of ‘self-imposed’ unconsciousness]  
 
Manhattan has, he states, “no time for consciousness” [p 162]. 
 
What I wish to emphasise is not a particular sexual interpretation of Koolhaas’ Manhattanism, but 
the ostensibly less controversial statement (which he affirms himself) that he is moved to 
‘ecstasy’ by Manhattan. I believe, however, that this ecstasy carries with it more important 
implications than would a purely sexual understanding. For in Koolhaas’ ‘ecstasy’ there are 
elements of a suspension, even suppression, of consciousness through denial, a macabre 
fascination with the potential of disaster and death, a certain frisson derived from juxtaposition, 
fragmentation, confusion, layering of polyphonic understandings and dualism of consistent 
incompatibles, an excitement in the blending of fantasy and [what remains of] reality. 
 
Cities on the Move; resurfacing of ideas 
 
These ingredients of ecstasy inform Koolhaas’ view of Manhattan, “the 20
th century’s Rosetta 
Stone” [p 9] and appear 20 years later in his understandings of Asian cities presented in Cities on 
the Move. 
 
The London exhibition, at The Hayward Gallery (13
th May to 27
th June 1999), embedded many of 
these ideas, in the accompanying catalogue and on the gallery text panels, and in the analogous 
urban environment constructed as the exhibition space itself. As was shown above, all the 
contributors to the catalogue appeared to subscribe to the view that this represented a city, and 
this was also made explicit to visitors; “a form of urbanism in itself, the installation complements 
and intensifies the exhibition” [introductory panel, Cities on the Move, Hayward Gallery]. 
 
The exhibition was organised into five sections, dictated mainly by the galleries of the Hayward; 
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the categories, the main idea of ‘Street’, “confront[ing] the viewer with the cacophony and visual 
chaos of the city street” [ibid] became a unifying theme. Throughout the space there was also an 
“urban wallpaper” as a backdrop, a collage of “urban images, urban realities” designed by 
Koolhaas and Scheeren as “a background, a grey presence everywhere, kind of overwhelming. 
That’s the whole point of cities [Koolhaas continues], a nightmare in a way. An overkill. Urban 
overkill inside the Hayward” [Hayward Gallery, 1999; p 17]. 
 
A representation of the result is pictured below, photographs taken in four of the differing zones 
[see figure 3.4]. Perhaps the most interesting image comes from the catalogue and shows 
Koolhaas [?] working on the model of this pseudo city, surrounded by words which seem to 
reflect not only Koolhaas’ inspiration but also an assumed reality, mappable areas within this 
constructed blueprint of a city [figure 3.5]. 
 
The themes - but most importantly the attitude - identified above re-surface here in Koolhaas’ 
description of his approach to the designing of this analogous city. He says of this designed city, 
in an interview with the curator Hans-Ulrich Obrist; 
 
RK: “We’ll do newness, like airport construction, but we’ll also do decay, sex and drugs 
like in a real city. 
HUO: You think that at present the exhibition is not sexual enough? 
RK: Yes, very unsexual. I mean, given the fact that there is an enormous volume of sex 
tourism and that sex is one of the most important forms of transaction between people in 
cities, this show as it has been so far is almost oblivious to it. The problem is doing it 
without exoticism…” [Hayward Gallery, 1999; p 17]. 
 
This passage reflects two of the key traits of Delirious New York; the use of synecdoche – airport 
construction as a symbol of all that is new in the Asian urban context – and also the references to 
decay, “moral and physical” [from the introductory exhibition text], in relation to sexualized 
understanding. The message that seemed to be promoted by the Cities on the Move exhibition, at 
least in the incarnation I saw in London, was that Asian cities, and perhaps by extension cities 
more generally, were places of ‘chaos’, ‘confusion’, ‘cacophony’, and inhabitants of these spaces 
were overwhelmed, bewildered by contradictory messages and fragmented identities, even to a 
state of schizophrenia. 
 
However, as the examination of Koolhaas’ earlier work reveals, the genesis of many of these 
ideas predates the current urban phenomena of Asian cities, and was conceived in relation to  Delirious cities – ecstatic space 
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Figure 3.4 
Images from Cities on the Move, 
London, Hayward Gallery. Clockwise 
from top left: Business, Street, 
Commerce, Decay [Source: Hayward 
gallery, author’s own photographs]. Delirious cities – ecstatic space 
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Figure 3.5 Centre spread from the Cities on the Move, catalogue for the London exhibition. Note 
the characteristic ‘and yet’ juxtapositions: architecture, decay; airports, blandness; sterility, 
danger; food, drugs; sex, commerce, shot through with the constant appeals for a ‘photo 
opportunity’. [Source: Catalogue, Hayward Gallery, 1999]. 
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Manhattan. Once again, I believe at root there is an ‘Alephic’ process at work; Koolhaas’ 
portrayal of cities owes more to his own conviction about what a city is than to any dispassionate 
engagement with the material conditions of Asian urbanism. Recall the opening quotations in 
Delirious New York; 
 
Since the world of nations [perhaps cities] is made by men, it is inside their minds that its 
principles should be sought [quoted in Koolhaas, 1994; p 9]. 
 
This Koolhaasian juxtaposition of material and constructed realities, perhaps of fantasy and 
reality, is of particular interest in relation to the Cities on the Move exhibition in Bangkok 
(October 1999). This was an unofficial stop on the otherwise exclusively western tour imagined 
for the show (Vienna, Bordeaux, New York, Humlebaek (Denmark), London and Helsinki) which 
was organised by Ole Scheeren, Koolhaas’ partner on the design of the London exhibition, and 
Thomas Nordanstad, an independent curator from Sweden. While the majority of the material for 
the exhibition had not been shown before in the other shows (the window between the close of 
the London show and the opening in Helsinki being little more than one month), the essential 
message of the exhibition remained unchanged. Unlike the London show there was little 
information accompanying the exhibition itself but the press pack contained statements from the 
curatorial team, Hanru, Obrist, Schereen and Nordanstad, which reiterate the ideas presented in 
the earlier exhibitions. 
 
Once again, Hanru and Obrist present a well researched summary which engages in a serious way 
with the issues of global economic change, social changes and post-colonialism that are all of 
acute relevance for cities such as Bangkok. However, as their text begins to deal with the material 
and experiential aspects of the city we are presented with a re-emergence of many of the 
Koolhaasian ideas (Koolhaas is the only source referred to in the text), and the rhetoric begins to 
switch away from the academic and back to the ecstatic, ticking off a ‘wish-list’ of appropriate 
concepts; chaos, schizophrenia, “theme-parkization”, “Disneyfication”, simulacra, “Generic city”, 
“Frenzy City”, advanced communication technology as “indispensable ‘survival kits’ for urban 
inhabitants” and, as we expect, the exhibition as a city itself, within the city. 
 
Their argument is that “Hyper-capitalism”, which is never defined or explained, produces “Cities 
of Exacerbated Difference” (from Koolhaas) in the Asian context, and this process of 
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“nothing is established, harmonious and ‘normal’”, “everything is in permanent transformation”
7. 
They continue; 
“one can even coin it as ‘Frenzy City’”, which serve as the prototype of a future “Generic 
City” (from Koolhaas). “Hyper-Capitalism causes systematically competition, frenzy 
desire, frustration, restructuring of social classes, and, eventually, establishment of a new 
totalitarian power of the Capital itself [sic], let alone the problems of the separation 
between the urban rich and the urban poor, between the ‘electronic haves’ and ‘have-
nots’ …[as]… “the most advanced telecommunications technologies have become a 
‘natural’ aspect of everyday life in Asian urban societies. Mobile phone, internet and 
video games are not only trendy gadgets for young people to show off but indispensable 
‘survival kits’ for the urban inhabitants”. Within this ‘generic city’ the conservative 
middle classes prompt a melding of “the most advanced architectural know-how and 
‘Asian identity’…[t]he typical result [of which] is the Disneyfication of Asian urban 
spaces…the final disappearance of real historic areas and the appearance of ‘more than 
real’, highly sterilised simulacras of history and tradition…second reality par excellence” 
adding to “the frenzy schizophrenia of the new urban life”[Hanru and Obrist, Cities on 
the Move 6, press information pack, sic]. 
 
Again, we see the wish list of appropriate references (particularly the influence of Baudrillard and 
Eco) wrapped in characteristically hyperbolic rhetoric. But these themes are taken to another level 
by Ole Scheeren, Koolhaas’ assistant in London and effectively the principal curator of the 
Bangkok show. His contribution begins; 
 
…this might be an attempt to describe the city through the structure of an exhibition – or 
maybe vice versa…[sic] 
 
and continues: 
 
Bangkok, City in the Future 
543 years later….The city of Bangkok is full of Robot-Buildings, Louis-XIV-Towers and 
Skeletons of unfinished constructions. They seem to be the dominant typologies, vertical 
characters, the ones to survive the battle of urban growth and mutation. In-between: The 
city is floating again, rivers, flows everywhere, brutally-carefully carving out and filling 
in what is left around the buildings. Concrete substitutes of what was previously streams 
of water now lifted above the ground. A fluidum of vehicles – boats are cars are moving 
points are continuous lines. Gravity is finally overcome: Elevated highways. Skytrains. 
Express and walkways. Pipes and tubes. Never sure who dominates, the vertical or the 
horizontal, the concrete snake, biting off the corner of a tower, or the robot that forces the 
snake to twist in curves and curls at his appearance. Endless competition. 
 
The opening passage ends; “The city of the future…” 
                                                 
7 There are significant, and not coincidental, echoes with Berman’s characterization of modernity, derived of course 
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This opening and the four pages that follow are the most extreme example of the ‘architectural 
imagination’ tending to the ecstatic. There are a number of very close parallels to Koolhaas’ work 
as we would imagine (Scheeren not only collaborated with Koolhaas on the Hayward project but 
on several other projects, and as an architect at the OMA office, Rotterdam from 1995 to ‘96). 
Firstly, there seems to be the macabre fascination with the potential, but never realized, imminent 
disaster. Secondly, the possibility of architectural anarchy within a culture of encouraged 
congestion (“Congestion is created within the belief of endless advancement”), Thirdly, the 
blending of mental construct and ‘reality’ (“it is no longer walls that are moving, or floors, it is 
buildings, structures [possibly in a social/theoretical as well as architectural sense], concepts, it is 
a whole city”). Fourthly, the excitement of simultaneity and juxtaposition “co-existence of 
ultimate extremes… [s]eeming contradiction resolved within no-time… [b]uilding and re-
building, connections and disruptions, distortions and merging, collaboration and competition, 
tension and suspension, Sense and no sense [sic], colliding in simultaneous operation. The new 
and the old, progress and tradition, the street and the mall, the dust and the highway, the river and 
the skyscraper. Speed turns points into lines…”. 
 
Here too, a prominent place is reserved for the importance of new technologies of communication 
and reproduction, defying space and time and producing duplicate realities, simulacra: 
 
Spatial and non-spatial. The image in a fixed location within the urban context. And the 
appearance within a specific moment in time [as sheer availability]. The permanent and 
the temporal. The billboard and the newspaper. The poster. And television. Internet… 
 
The colour of the future is pink. Apart from pink, all that is left is black: Black copies [a 
good deal] of all imaginable material: computer, clothing, artworks. Even entire buildings 
are available as duplicate… 
 
Media are no longer looked at in search for information [content], but as realities in 
themselves, as relationships, as structures, containers of potentialities. Simultaneity of 
juxta and super-Positions. A hybrid of absolute existence [virtuality] and specific 
inscription [real space]. Where one medium is no longer sufficient as container, the 
moving into [un]related territories promises immediate help and relief. Space, Scale. 
Time. Shift… 
 
This theme is extended more explicitly in another section: 
 
Space: emptiness. Content: information. Or stories. Sequences. Rays of light as only 
physical matter. Absorption of the image inside the void of sheer endless rooms… 
[Scheeren, in Cities on the Move 6, press information pack, Bangkok 1999] 
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There seems to be another echo here of the earlier arguments made in relation to Soja’s work. 
There it was argued that at the heart of Soja’s position was the separation of matter from his 
‘ontological trialectic’, to be replaced with an idea of ‘spatiality’, a mediated “second nature” 
concept. Here we find intimations of the same separation; matter is superseded by image and data 
as ‘space’, perhaps in its traditional [Euclidean] understanding, collapses into sign and 
information. 
 
The second theme of this section, introduced in this chapter as the ‘ecstatic vision’, concerns 
principally the character of much contemporary writing on the city based upon a rhetorical 
analysis: the hyperbolic rhetoric and various key images that are recurrent (the city as chaotic, 
frenzied, exhilarating yet dangerous). However, we have also seen a convergence with the first 
theme, the ‘alephic vision’, which emerged from a theoretical analysis of the work of Soja. The 
main elements of that argument were that the world view (Soja’s in that instance) was driven less 
by empirical referents and more by a priori conviction, and that the result seemed to be the 
abstraction of a material conception of space into a more fluid definition of socially defined 
spatialities. This convergence intuitively suggests a connection between the two themes, a 
connection that can be established through a further archaeology into the sedimented layers of 
Koolhaas’ scheme of reference. 
 
 
3.3 Uniting the ‘alephic’ and ‘ecstatic’ visions 
 
The key to the union lies in blurring of epistemological, ontological and methodological 
positions. Just as we found Soja relying heavily on Borges to illustrate his epistemological and 
ontological principles, so Koolhaas turns to Dali and the Paranoid Critical Method, which I aim to 
show, has strong parallels with Borges’ Aleph. 
 
In the section entitled, “Europeans”, Koolhaas describes the visits to New York by Dalí and Le 
Corbusier, both aiming to ‘conquer and reclaim Manhattan for Europe’, Dalí conceptually, Le 
Corbusier “by proposing literally to destroy it” [p 235]. Koolhaas has more sympathy with Dalí 
and his Paranoid Critical Method [PCM], whose basis Koolhaas describes in terms similar to his 
own project - “the conscious exploitation of the unconscious” [p 237]. This continual tension 
between unconscious intentions made conscious has been noted already, and the parallel is clear 
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imposed unconsciousness; it is the ardent task of the final part of this century to deal with the 
extravagant and megalomaniac claims, ambitions and possibilities of the Metropolis openly” [p 
293, sic]. 
 
What Dalí proposes is “a tourism of sanity into the realm of paranoia” whose definition is taken 
beyond the realm of “simple persecution mania” to mean “a delirium of interpretation” [pp 237-8 
sic]. Gibson points to two important influences on the development of Dalí’s method; the suicide 
of his godfather Gal and the importance of a local friend and ‘remarkable crackpot’ Lídia Noqués 
[Gibson, 1997; pp 120-1]. Gibson quotes Dalí as explaining, 
 
Lídia possessed the most marvellously paranoiac brain aside from my own that I have 
ever known. She was capable of establishing completely coherent relations between any 
subject whatsoever and her obsession of the moment, with sublime disregard of 
everything else, and with a choice of detail and a play of wit so subtle and so 
calculatingly resourceful that it was often difficult not to agree with her on questions 
which one knew to be utterly absurd. [Dalí, 1968 quoted in Gibson, 1997]. 
 
What Dalí himself points to here is the persuasive nature of such personal interpretations of the 
sort that both he and Koolhaas provide. However, his last comment is revealing for it suggests 
that he is aware that such paranoiac creations can be ‘absurd’ and therefore judged against some 
other yardstick of ‘reality’. For Dalí there is, therefore, still a distinction between the ‘inner’, 
interpretative world of the paranoiac and the ‘outer world’, presumably of some unclarified 
notion of objective reality. He continues; 
 
She [Lídia] would interpret d’Ors’s articles as she went along with such felicitous 
discoveries of coincidence and plays on words that one could not fail to wonder at the 
bewildering imaginative violence with which the paranoiac spirit can project the image of 
our inner world upon the outer world, no matter where or in what form or on what 
pretext. The most unbelievable coincidences would arise in the course of this amorous 
correspondence, which I have several times used as a model for my own writings [ibid.]. 
 
For Dalí then, the paranoiac vision is still a ‘projection’ upon, rather than a construction of, 
reality. We also find within the paranoiac-critical method the twin generators of death and 
sexuality that were seen to be the basis for what was termed above the ‘ecstatic vision’ of the city. 
Gibson makes the link between Dalí and Freud, who met in London in 1939, the latter proposing 
a link between paranoia and sexuality, asserting that paranoia, “regularly arises from an attempt 
to fend off excessively strong homosexual impulses” [Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, 
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Interpretation of Dreams was “one of the capital discoveries of my life” and in his work Visible 
Woman [Dalí, 1930] Dalí validates this link, focusing in the piece entitled ‘Love’ on the relations 
between dreams, sexuality and the death wish [Ades, 1982]. 
 
Gibson suggests, therefore, that the provoked paranoiac method was a way of ‘precluding 
paranoia’, a way of ‘cheating’ his family history (the suicide of Gal) and a defence against his 
sexual impulse. Freud also provided a methodological inspiration, however, and Ades draws the 
parallel between Freud’s idea of the transcription of the dream narrative and the automatism at 
the core of the surrealist movement which Dalí joined in 1929. Breton describes this process of 
automatism as; 
 
Pure psychic automatism through which it is intended to express, verbally or in any other 
way, the true functioning of thought; thought transcribed in the absence of any control 
exerted by reason, and outside any moral or aesthetic pre-occupation. [Breton, 1934, 
quoted in Ades, 1982; p 72] 
 
Ades describes how, for Dalí, this automatism took the form of painting an image that had been 
fully formed previously in his mind, rather than letting the painting ‘sublime’ off the surface of 
canvas. However, Breton argues [and perhaps decades later Koolhaas validates his comment] that 
the paranoiac-critical method, “shows itself capable of being applied with equal success...to all 
manner of exegesis” [ibid.; p 119]. Certainly for Dalí the method of actively stimulating 
paranoiac readings became central to his approach, to the degree that the division between a 
productive methodology and an objective view of reality, identified previously in his view of 
Lídia Noqués’ paranoiac connections as persuasive yet ‘absurd’, begins to dissolve. His 
paranoiac-critical methodology that underpins his epistemological approach to understanding the 
world begins to dominate his view of ‘reality’. He argues that; 
 
I believe the moment is near when, through a process of thought of a paranoiac and active 
character, it will be possible (simultaneously with automatism and other passive states) to 
systematize confusion to the total discrediting of the world of reality. [L'Ane Pourri, in 
Dalí, 1930]. 
 
We see that Dalí’s methodological reliance upon the paranoiac-critical method influences not 
only his approach to his subject matter but also his view of the objective reality from which it is 
drawn, such that PCM legitimates a preconceived view of the world that is imposed as an 
objectified understanding, ‘discrediting the world of reality’. Ades describes the PCM method as 
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Koolhaas’ work and also directly from the Cities exhibition in Bangkok where the ‘motto’ of one 
of the curators was “confusion is progress”
8. Dalí himself describes PCM as, “a delirium of 
interpretation in which suites of images, ideas or events are perceived as having causal 
connections, and are all related to one central idea...” [Dalí, 1930, quoted in Ades, 1982; p 122]. 
 
This theme of a ‘delirium of interpretation’ is directly paralleled in Koolhaas’ ecstatic vision 
evident in Delirious New York, which clearly owes much to Dalí's methodology. There is a direct 
relation between interpretation, Koolhaas’ declared aim at the beginning of the book (“This book 
is an interpretation of that Manhattan” [p 10]), and the consequent delirium of the title. Koolhaas 
quotes from Dalí, “[PCM is] the spontaneous method of irrational knowledge based on the critical 
and systematic objectifications of delirious associations and interpretations…” demonstrating the 
way that methodology underpins epistemology which then defines ontological perspectives 
[quoted Koolhaas, 1994; p 237]. This is to say that the product of delirious interpretation and 
association is objectified, fantasy is made real. This is exactly what we see in Koolhaas’ and 
Soja’s normative descriptions; the personal interpretation is presented (through the techniques of 
aphorism, synecdoche and maxim) as objective fact. 
 
This is exactly what happens to Borges; he falls down the cellar stairs, strikes his head and in his 
moment of delirium makes the interpretation and free association between the globe/trunk and the 
world, which he believes he actually sees [see above, chapter 2]. The parallels with the story of 
the Aleph are more profound however, for as Koolhaas himself acknowledges; 
 
Each fact, event, force, observation is caught in one system of speculation and 
“understood” by the afflicted individual in such a way that it absolutely confirms and 
reinforces his thesis – that is, the initial delusion that is his point of departure. The 
paranoiac always hits the nail on the head, no matter where the hammer blows fall. 
 
Just as in a magnetic field metal molecules align themselves to exert a collective, 
cumulative pull, so, though unstoppable, systematic and in themselves strictly rational 
associations, the paranoiac turns the whole world into a magnetic field of facts, all 
pointing in the same direction: the one he is going in [p 238, sic]. 
 
Koolhaas ends by making a clear point about the epistemological position that this implies, 
drawing on Dalí; 
                                                 
8 This comment was listed as the motto of Thomas Nordanstad in the Cities on the Move 6 (Bangkok) press 
information pack. In response to a public debate at the exhibition venue and an article I wrote for The Bangkok Times, 
Thomas Nordanstad tried to disassociate this comment from the content, and indeed the organization, of the exhibition. 
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The essence of paranoia is this intense – if distorted – relationship with the real world: 
“The reality of the external world is used for illustration and proof…to serve the reality 
of our mind…” [ibid.]. 
 
The theory of PCM maps precisely onto the Aleph therefore, and reveals the strong 
epistemological continuity and shared problems between Koolhaas and Soja. Furthermore, the 
method of PCM is also duplicated. Koolhaas explains; 
 
As the name suggests, Dalí’s Paranoid-Critical Method is a sequence of two consecutive 
but discrete operations: 
 
1.  The synthetic reproduction of the paranoiac’s way of seeing the world in a new light 
– with its rich harvest of unsuspected correspondences, analogies and patterns; 
 
This might correspond to Soja’s ontological trialectic for example, the quasi-obsessive 
‘discovery’ of interpretative triptychs. This is a fairly common trait, to draw out threads that link 
to and substantiate a theory. The second operation, however, resounds with echoes not only of 
Soja but also the rhetorical excesses of Koolhaas and the text and presentation of the Cities on the 
Move exhibitions; 
 
2.  The compression of these gaseous speculations to a critical point where they achieve 
the density of fact: the critical part of the method consists of the fabrication of 
objectifying “souvenirs” of the paranoid tourism, of concrete evidence that brings the 
“discoveries” of those excursions back to the rest of mankind, ideally in forms as 
obvious and undeniable as snapshots [p 238, sic] 
 
…such as the Bonaventure or the immersive  congestion of a gallery space constructed as just 
such a souvenir of a paranoiac tourist-excursion to Asian cities. These ‘souvenirs’ are the 
synecdochal objects about which Soja, Scheeren and Koolhaas hang their objectified fantasies of 
the world. Once the cipher for their decoding is given, they are presented as signifiers for all the 
evidence that could have been presented but was not, perhaps lest it conflicted too overtly with 
the common understandings of familiar environments. Reading Mike Davis, the Bonaventure 
hotel symbolizes the dystopian future of fragmented urbanism – until I visited it and found it a 
close relation of Croydon’s Whitgift Centre, and no more sinister. Similarly, travelling to 
Bangkok for the first time as part of the Cities on the Move entourage, I did not find an 
experiential hyperbole. I found a city much like most others I have visited, in which notions of 
the Disneyfication, fragmentation, schizophrenia etc. bore little relevance to the pragmatic 
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of the cultural critique [perhaps ‘clique’] in which they originated. Indeed, part of my project 
undertaken there for Cities on the Move involved translating (as far as was possible) the 
Baudrillardesque exhibition literature on Bangkok into Thai – a gesture that incredibly the 
organizers had not thought necessary – and attempting to extend the dialogue beyond the rarified 
walls of the gallery by turning the quotations and commentary to the street. Few people that I 
spoke to seemed to identify with the ideas presented there. 
 
There is a second relevance of paranoia in this context (perhaps ‘critical paranoia’, rather than 
Paranoid – Critical). The Bonaventure Hotel first comes to prominence as symbol of late 20
th 
century urbanism when Frederic Jameson gets lost there trying to find his way to a conference, an 
anecdote told, appropriately, by Soja
9. Having selected it as such a powerful simile for the 
supposed ‘non-place realm’, others have to follow suit, to adhere to the academic convention of 
trumping your predecessor by showing you have read the book and have your own angle. I am 
conforming now. The question is whether the Bonaventure Hotel was first an urban or an 
academic landmark. My guess is that no one paid it much attention, and still don’t, unless they 
have received the ‘academic cipher’ by which its ‘true’ significance is revealed. It is in this way 
that the critique inevitably defines a clique. 
 
 Ultimately, there is a question here that relates to the coincidence between academic 
understandings and popular understandings, and between interpretative positions and a ‘reality’ or 
truth. It is significant to note, therefore, that Koolhaas’ presentation of the second stage of Dalí’s 
method (the sublimation of delusion into objective fact) perhaps over-states Dalí’s intentions, for 
his description of PCM quoted above continues; “[suites of images] are all related to one central 
idea, and are internally coherent for the subject of the delusion, though meaningless to an outside 
observer” [Dalí, 1930, quoted in Ades, 1982; p 122, emphasis added]. Herein lies the difference 
between the method of Dalí and that method as utilized by Koolhaas. For Dalí paranoiac-critical 
method is an active state in that it encourages a mental process which allows him to represent the 
world as he saw it, to concretize his understandings. For Koolhaas paranoiac-critical method 
invokes a normative understanding of how the world is. Thus the Cities on the Move exhibition 
and the work of Koolhaas and Soja presents an objectified, not a personal, view which presents at 
best an explanation, but more often a dictation, as to the nature of the city. 
 
                                                 
9 Soja tells this anecdote in an Open University programme in the Understanding Modern Societies series 
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The character of that normative presentation has been the subject of this chapter. I would suggest 
that its central trait is the rejection of the mundane and everyday lived experience of cities in 
favour of an obsession with a sensationalized reading of the city, presented through a narrative 
whose exaggerated rhetoric exoticizes the urban. As a corollary of this focus on a hermeneutic 
approach bedded in semiotics, a reading of the city, what is lost is an empirical understanding of 
the lived experience and use of space by the anonymous population rather than the identified 
critic. 
 
A final illustration of this academic rejection of the ‘common view’ comes from Koolhaas 
himself, commenting on Gorky’s visit to New York. Gorky is disgusted by his visit to Coney 
Island, Koolhaas’ source of inspiration; “Everything is stripped naked by the dispassionate 
glare…. The visitor is stunned; his consciousness is withered by the intense gleam; his thoughts 
are routed from his mind; he becomes a particle in the crowd…” [Gorky’s essay, Boredom; 
quoted in Koolhaas, 1994; p 69]. Koolhaas argues that, “Gorky’s disgust represents the modern 
intellectual’s dilemma: confronted with the masses, whom he admires theoretically, in the flesh, 
he suffers from an acute distaste. He cannot admit to this disgust; he sublimates it by identifying 
external exploitation and corruption as the reason for the masses’ aberrations” [ibid.]. 
 
For Koolhaas [and it is tempting to expand this to others writing about contemporary cities in a 
similar vein] the masses are represented by the concept of the ‘common understanding’. The 
mundane, continuous and ordinary is either rejected as homogeneous and uninteresting or the 
experience and understandings of ‘the [Gorkian] masses’ is sublimated into an ecstatic 
understanding of reality and lived experience, which is then re-imposed through a obfuscatory 
and didactic rhetorical style. As Gorky is unable to accept the masses’ collusion in what he 
considers to be the exploitative vulgarity of Coney Island for the sake of his theoretical 
continuity, so it is imperative that Koolhaas presents his view of the city as a seamless reality, 
rejecting the consideration of an alternate and less sensational reading. The ‘ecstatic vision’ is 
predicated upon a union of ‘art’ and ‘life’ seen in Dalí’s approach, a merging of aesthetic vision 
and experienced ‘reality’, and therefore fundamentally upon the denial of the possibility of 
empirical referents in a system of understanding based entirely upon the radical hermeneutics of 
the ‘ecstatic vision’. This breakdown of empirical referents in relation to the discussion of the 
‘everyday’ experience of the city is exactly mirrored in Soja’s understanding of Los Angeles. 
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In the previous two chapters I have aimed to show that this is a construction developed out of a 
pre-inclination to ‘hit the nail on the head’. In the following chapter I want to broaden the debate 
out, both to demonstrate that the themes examined thus far are indeed widespread across a wide 
canon of academic and popular literature dealing with the city and also to examine what 
relationships exist between this approach to the empirical problem of describing urban and 
architectural environments and the wider context of contemporary social theory. 
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Chapter 4 
The ‘rush to the post’ and ‘the eclipse of the real’
1 
 
 
Following on from the previous argument, I will attempt in this chapter to widen the debate and 
to justify my apparently synecdotal (and hence hypocritical) position that the analysis of Soja’s 
work and of the Cities on the Move exhibition can be extrapolated to apply to a range of writing 
on the contemporary city and the treatment of spatial issues in theoretical debates. This chapter 
has three distinct aims; firstly, to demonstrate the connections between the two cases explored 
thus far and the wider literature identified above. Chapter 4.1 will begin with an analysis of 
contemporary writing on the city that falls into the ambiguous, and often persuasive, middle-
ground between academic and popular discourse. Rather than return to well-worn examples, such 
as Ridley Scott’s Bladerunner and the novels of Pynchon and others, I will turn to a recent series 
of books published under the title Topographics which deal primarily (though not indeed 
exclusively) with the contemporary urban experience, and also to the work of Iain Sinclair, whose 
poetry, prose and commentaries focus primarily on his experiences of London, our common city. 
 
This investigation will attempt to demonstrate shared themes, and the second aim of this chapter 
will be to uncover the origins of these motifs, an exploration which, in part 4.2, will draw us back 
to nineteenth century literary inventions. The final aim will be to relate these arguments to 
contemporary theoretical positions on space and the city (4.3 and 4.4). 
 
Ultimately, the aim of this chapter will be to unite the two dominant themes of this first section: 
the view of cities and the theoretical approach to space. I will aim to show that the two are 
intimately linked, justifying my claims of a new ‘structure of feeling’ towards both our spatial 
experience and understanding [see above, chapter 1]. This chapter forms a critical bridge in the 
overall thesis, therefore, for it is through the argument presented here that the ‘problem’ that lies 
at the heart of this research is exposed - the loss of a material basis from the understanding of 
space that has come to be such a critical variable in contemporary social analysis. It is my 
intention to demonstrate that this attitude to space is widespread across a number of genres of 
writing, justifying the mobilization of Williams’ potent terminology. 
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The argument, therefore, moves forward and back between academic and popular positions, not 
following a precise chronology of ideas but rather, as was the case in the preceding chapters, 
starting with an analysis of one text (in this case the Topographics series) and overlaying 
successive layers of analysis and exploration. 
 
 
4.1 "Urban Lepidopterists” 
 
Topographics 
 
The Topographics series begins in 1995 with the publication of Barber’s Fragments of the 
European City [Barber, 1995]. The ‘mission statement’ inside the back cover (and, in shortened 
version, on all subsequent volumes) is a useful springboard for this analysis. The editors state that 
the series “appraises the geographies people inhabit” through a mingling of “analysis with 
anecdote, criticism with original expressive writing”, with the intention of “explor[ing] the 
creative collision between physical space and the human mind”. Already we are clearly inhabiting 
the same genre as Soja’s more expressive work (for example Thirdspace) and the quasi-
analytical, quasi-rhetorical approach of Koolhaas and the Cities on the Move exhibitions. 
Therefore, while in a literal sense it is true that “Topographics features new writing about place”, 
the assertion that “[t]he new literature about place is still in its infancy: its character and identity 
will be  formed in this series” belies the considerable links that the volumes of the series exhibit 
with established narratives of the city
2. 
 
We can draw various key themes from the series that relate initially to the analysis in the 
preceding two chapters, but with a longer focus, can be seen to originate in the ‘character and 
identity’ of innovative nineteenth century literature. Of great importance yet again is the idea of 
the blurring of the subject and the narrative. Although the editors in their ‘mission statement’ 
argue that unlike travel literature the texts “do not depend on a journey to supply a plot”, most of 
the volumes develop the idea that the narrative is based upon, or indeed is, a walk through the 
city. Richie explores his Tokyo both literally and metaphorically on a walk from centre to suburbs 
– “as the circles become more irregular, we stray to related topics, led (as is the city) by 
association, and by the end of the book we are out in the suburbs” [Richie, 1999; p 7] as does 
                                                 
2 Indeed, some volumes are reprints and translations of existing works, such as Réda’s The Ruins of Paris, first 
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Barber in his extended journey around the periphery of Europe, culminating in a walk through the 
Parisian suburbs beyond the péripherique [Barber, 2001]. Hertmans catalogues those who have 
explored the city on foot, from don Pasos to Proust and Joyce [Hertmans, 2001] and Réda’s text 
is explicitly based around a series of walks through Paris, and overtly parallels the nineteenth 
century figure of the Flâneur. Indeed the predictable itinerary of Réda's passage (the Grandes 
Boulevards, Champs Elysées, Bastille, faubourg Montmartre, Les Halles - a nineteenth century 
synecdochal itinerary of Paris as reductive as the twentieth century’s equivalent in Los Angeles) 
mirrors exactly the ‘prototypical walk’ discussed by Schlör, who begins his second volume of the 
series with the statement that “Passion and sleeplessness lure one out to walk the streets of the 
city” and encourages his reader to follow suit [Réda, 1996; Schlör, 1998; p 17, 1999; p 9]. 
Finally, Keiller’s Robinson explicitly sets out on a journey to explore the ‘unknown spaces’ of 
England following in the example of Defoe’s Tour of the early Eighteenth Century [Keiller, 
1999; p 20], and Burgin similarly goes on a ‘grand tour’ of cities around the world. 
 
What is critical, however, is the layered inference that the text itself is like a city, the experience 
of reading mirroring the author’s walking experience. We find this association in many of the 
works (“Therefore, I decided to draw my picture of Tokyo in the shape of Tokyo itself” [Richie, 
1999; p 7]) and crucially in the editorial comment, “[l]ike the city, the text pulsates, creatively 
chaotic, raw and exhilarating” [Frontispiece, Barber, 1995]. Richie elaborates on the reasons for 
this inflection, arguing that “to have offered a logical, straightforward, obvious historical 
description of the place would have been to misrepresent this illogical, subtle, brash, teeming and 
utterly human place”, suggesting that “through this construction I hope to reflect the sudden turns, 
the instant felicities, the surprising incongruities of [Tokyo]”. However, his comment that “[t]his 
is perhaps not the ordinary way to construct a book” would seem to be undermined by the 
frequency with which this rhetorical trick is employed. We have seen such a reflection in Soja’s 
work, as well as in his analysis of Lefebvre’s The Production of Space (to be understood as a 
network or map, rather than as a consecutive text, according to Soja [see chapter 2, p 34). We also 
encountered it forcefully both in the Cities exhibition and in the writing of Koolhaas, while it 
surfaces in the work of Perec (Life: a users manual), Prendergast [1992], and also in Pile and 
Thrift’s City A-Z [2000] (to be discussed below). 
 
The significance of this trait is that it blurs distinctions between the subject and the text such that 
the characteristics of the latter reflect the perception of the former. We can identify two principle 
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An aesthetic of fragmentation and the Aleph 
 
The first could be categorized as an ‘aesthetic of fragmentation’. In relation to the texts 
themselves this is manifested in a literary style based around the ‘vignette’. We have encountered 
this already in Koolhaas’ staccato text, whose ‘blocks’ he compares to the Manhattan that is his 
subject. It is likewise a common feature of the Topographics series, part of the ‘new’ character 
and identity developed through the series
3. Keiller, Burgin and Richie all exhibit this literary 
form, while Barber’s text, “[p]rovocatively written as a series of interlocking poetic fragments”, 
epitomizes the style. His work consists of 50 such fragments (a figure not arbitrarily chosen, 
echoing as it does his key referent, Baudelaire and his work Paris Spleen), each of which captures 
a declamatory and dogmatic style which translates into a normative account of the nature of the 
observed. 
 
This normative dogmatism arises because the vignette (a literary analogy with a pictorial, 
typically photographic technique) is, implicitly, a selection, a cropping and blurring of a point of 
view, be it pictorial or intellectual, and is therefore an imposition upon the viewer of the author’s 
selective perspective. This style of observation characteristically confirms its empirical validity 
solely by the authoritative manner in which it is presented, relying upon a series of aphorisms [“a 
short pithy statement or maxim – a general truth or rule of conduct expressed in a sentence” 
OED, emphasis added] thus distracting the reader from peering into the artfully shaded borders of 
the image to detect the broader picture beyond. This is the same technique of obfuscation 
condemned by Schopenhauer and Magee, and highlighted by Marden in relation to Soja’s work 
[Magee, 2000 and Marden, 1992. See discussion above pages 18-19 and 38-39 respectively]. 
 
Similarly, this stylistic fragmentation also typifies the view of the city described therein, indeed 
derives from it. This fragmentation applies not only to the physical form of the city but also to the 
narratives and understandings emanating from it. Barber argues that: 
 
The flux between the city and its inhabitants is a site of ferocious visual tension, with 
imageries generated that collapse and reformulate the perception of the city, its 
languages, its societies, its nationalities, its cultures. The cities have never possessed 
unity, and now the multiplicity of voices passing through the transforming city and the 
transforming individual creates an utter fragmentation [1995; p 9]. 
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This passage encapsulates several key themes. The city is reduced to a system of images, 
“overhauled by digital-image screens signs and hoardings – “proliferating visual facades of every 
kind” [2001; p 7]; an ocularcentrism based upon a hermeneutic understanding of the urban rooted 
in semiotics. This is allied to a predominant sense of flux and change rather than continuity which 
itself is seen as a break from the past such that ‘now’ is characterized by physical fragmentation 
and explanatory polyphony. 
 
These themes recur insistently throughout Barber’s work: “The contemporary... unstoppable in its 
broken rhythms and cacophonies” [1995; p 10]; “...Europe resides in fragments” [p 14]; “The city 
is perpetually invested with a dynamic jarring and upheaval of its configuration” [p 29]. They are 
also mirrored in other texts. For example, Richie concludes his exploration of Tokyo with the 
comment that: 
 
Looking at Tokyo, one is reminded of the Buddhist condition shogyo mujo. All is 
transient, impermanent; nothing is fixed, all is in motion - life is illusory. Tokyo is in this 
sense a Buddhist capital, a mandala illustrating mujo, impermanence itself [Richie, 1999; 
p 134]. 
 
This passage captures the inter-dependence between key strands of contemporary debate; the city 
is seen as transient and illusory, mirroring the comment by Marx, used to great effect by Berman 
in his characterization of modernity, that “all that is solid melts into air” [see below]. However, it 
is also seen as a mandala, a symbol to be ‘read’ and a condensation of a world view, an 
ocularcentrism that leads him to claim (in romantic mood!) that without a vantage point (such as 
Sacré Coeur in Paris or the Capitoline in Rome) Tokyo is ‘unintelligible’, the signs and hoardings 
of the street merge to form a “semiotic babble” [pp 32 and 37]. 
 
Here is the idea of the city as chaotic and fragmented expressed not only in the textual references 
to the physical form of cities and the polyphonous narratives and identities within them, but also 
in the very character of those texts themselves. Again, Barber illustrates this tendency most 
clearly, but behind it lies an understanding of space that underpins the entire Topographics series. 
Richie extends his analysis of Tokyo as a place of impermanence by concluding that, 
 
Even space itself is mutable. It is not to be defined as something contained within walls. 
It is fluid and in constant transformation [ibid.; p 134]. 
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Similarly, Keiller describes his character Robinson as going in search of new spaces of 
production that are themselves produced ‘new spaces’; new spaces which Burgin links to 
developments in information and communication technologies. He argues in relation to Orléans 
(and a multimedia archive established there) that, “[t]he old spatial and historical dimensions of 
the city of Orléans have collapsed into the black hole of the archive. Today, satellite television - 
and other forms of electronic communications indifferent to geographical and political boundaries 
- have consigned the expression ‘city limits’ to the realm of nostalgia” [Burgin, 1996; p 178]. 
Finally, for Barber, as the physical city becomes overhauled by ubiquitous screens “it becomes 
increasingly impossible to separate [even] yourself from that visual envelopment” – once again 
the spatial pathology of the psychasthenic [Barber, 2001; p 45]. 
 
This first characteristic of the Topographics series, which I termed an aesthetic of fragmentation, 
has many overlaps with the ‘alephic vision’ identified in chapter 2. Both are rooted in a spatial 
understanding of their subject matter that contradicts what might be seen as a traditional approach 
to the understanding of space. Soja describes a similarly fragmented Los Angeles, which, like his 
reading of Borges’ Aleph, reflects cities around the world as described in the work of Barber and 
others. Indeed, both Richie and Burgin use this image of the Aleph; Richie in relation to the 
theme parks which congregate “all of the interesting localities on earth...located in one spot”; and 
Burgin in relation to television, “spaces that open onto all space through the ubiquitous ambient 
video screens”. He chooses to end his work with a quotation from Calvino's Invisible Cities in 
which Marco Polo argues that “Every time I describe a city, I say something about Venice” 
[Richie, 1999; p 84; Burgin, 1996; pp 150 and 213, quoting Calvino, 1997]. However, the second 
strand of my analysis of The Aleph suggested that such views depended heavily on the 
preconceptions of their authors. There are intimations of this second strand in the Topographics 
series also. Indeed the summary of the project provided by the editors (cited above) suggests that 
such a personal viewpoint is exactly the point of the series - the aim being “to explore the creative 
collision between physical space and the human mind” [op. Cit., above, p 77]. 
 
There are other indicators that a similar process is at work. Key figures of nineteenth century 
literature lurk behind the scenes in most of the texts, principally Baudelaire and his commentator 
Benjamin whose influence has already been noted in relation to Barber’s work, and who are 
referred to by Richie [pp. 12, 110], Burgin [p 42] Réda and Schlör. Another key reference is 
Borges himself, whom Richie invokes comparing Tokyo to a ‘Borgesian labyrinth’ [p 43], while 
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the character Robinson moves to Reading after misreading de Certeau’s Practice of Everyday 
Life, inspired by the statement that “reading is ...a place constituted by a system of signs” in a 
book that “inspired his [Robinson’s, and we assume Keiller’s] entire project” [Keiller, 1999; p 2]. 
 
These literary references are not unimportant, for they highlight that Keiller’s work, and I would 
argue that of the series as a whole, is not ‘new’ other than in the literal sense, but demonstrates 
awareness, and hence forms part of, a much wider discourse on the nature of urbanism and indeed 
of space. The question arises, therefore, as to where this conception of the urban as chaotic, 
fragmented and unknowable originates, with its attendant theme of material space as somehow 
negated through the contemporary processes of related social and technological change. 
 
The ecstatic vision revisited 
 
Before turning to this question (the second aim of this chapter) it is necessary to return to the 
theme of the ‘ecstatic vision’ and substantiate my claim that this too forms a pervasive trait of 
literature on the city. It is convenient to continue with Keiller’s Robinson who, 
 
“was very excited by [the] literary associations of the town [he identifies a connection to 
Rimbaud – and note also the connections discussed above], which he praised with a 
euphoria reminiscent of that of Nietzsche for Turin, so much so that I was concerned for 
his well-being and the extent of his commitment to the derangement of senses [Keiller, 
1999; p 2, sic]. 
 
Recall the derivation of ecstasy discussed above, ‘standing outside oneself’, and the links made to 
Koolhaas’ theme of delirium, a state which Robinson exhibits here. It is unsurprising then to find 
that Keiller declares himself to be interested in Surrealism, “which transform[s] experience of 
what already exists”, and its relationship to “designers, architects and manufacturers, who 
produce new things” [ibid.; p 223, sic]. The approach of the author to the subject is critical here. 
For Koolhaas this was determined by Dalí’s paranoiac-critical method - “a tourism of sanity into 
the realm of paranoia”. Here the approach to the city is determined by the related state of 
hallucination, presented as a tourism of the rational/sane into a dreamlike state that nonetheless 
captures something of what the city is. This is most clearly expressed in the opening to Barber's 
Fragments of the European City: 
 
The European city is a hallucination made flesh and concrete, criss-crossed by marks of 
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exploded signs - signs that mediate the city to the individual, and that individual to the 
city. For all their pockets of stasis and stagnation, the European cities have taken on a 
momentum of transformation in the final decade of the twentieth century, and that 
transformation demands constant, obsessional exploration. The eyes of the cities’ 
inhabitants are in a process of visual suffusion...The process of experiencing the 
European city is one of corrosion.…From this mesh of space and time...the imageries of 
television and cinema are ejected into the city: television constantly, droning with the 
noise of the city, and cinema intermittently, performing its dense projection of visions 
into the eyes of its spectators. The inhabitant of the European city is a participant 
entangled utterly in the visible, susceptible to an infinity of aural and visual acts that 
encompass the tortuous, the exquisite and a vast array of the banal: the banal supports the 
city and gives it life.… The survival of the figures that inhabit the European city hinges 
on a questioning of - a penetration of - the hallucination that is a city [Barber, 1995; pp 7-
8]. 
 
The character of the city as hallucination has many similarities with the ‘Koolhaasian’ city of 
‘paranoid delusion’. The rhetoric resounds with themes of negation and destruction, “corrosion”, 
overload, and as with Koolhaas’ Manhattanities, the inhabitants are “participants” rather than 
victims of these sinister undercurrents, despite them apparently jeopardizing their very ‘survival’ 
[see above]. Likewise, the “true identity” of Keiller’s London “is in its absence” and “...Tokyo’s 
style is an absence of style...the resulting mayhem is the style of Tokyo” [Keiller, 1999; p 223 
and Richie, 1999; p 11]. Again, there is a duality at work; on the one hand the city is 
characterized by this negation and void, while on the other it is just this negative reading that 
stimulates the ecstatic “obsessional exploration” of the Topographics authors. 
 
This theme of the poignant juxtaposition is pervasive throughout much architectural discourse. It 
is standard practice in architecture schools to use two projectors, constantly invigorating one 
image by the other, and here the same process is at work. Schlör uses the technique in both his 
volumes. Nights in the Big City, although one of the more ‘traditional’ works in the series in 
terms of its approach and language, is structured around the duality of the city at night as site of 
pleasure and yet fear, while Tel Aviv explores themes of contradiction, juxtaposition and paradox 
through a polyphonous narrative, captured by the cover photograph of a modernist tower block 
rising behind derelict buildings. 
 
The use of language reinforces the technique of juxtaposition and what might be termed the 
‘epistemology of paradox’, the conjunction “yet” seeming to capture the flavour of contradiction 
(as in Barbers’ suffusion yet stagnation). Similarly, photographs are used to reinforce and 
illustrate the conviction of juxtaposition as the urban zeitgeist. The photographs of Richie’s Tokyo 
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people in traditional costume in modern settings (in the metro, watching television, Sumo’s 
jogging, a teenage girl standing next to a man reading a pornographic magazine) to illustrate the 
contradictions of Tokyo presented in the text. Hertmans offers a series of characteristically 
macabre juxtapositions of city life culminating with “only vaguely visible, [the] partly mangled 
body under a tram that has stopped just too late” [2001; pp 9-10]. Similarly, Burgin presents a 
photographic story of a car crash in Los Angeles. Significantly, it is an accident in which he is 
involved, dissolving the barrier between observer and protagonist. Witnessing one accident he is 
involved in a second, and while insurance documents are exchanged one car rolls downhill and 
causes a third. “Contemplating the carnage, the woman flashed a smile and asked: ‘Is that a 
British accent? Are you in the movie business?’” [Burgin, 1996; p 74]. 
 
“Strangely-Familiar” 
 
My concern is that such anecdotes, with their disconcerting cocktail of irony and sinister 
eroticism, are presented as apposite vignettes of urbanism, synecdotal signs of an urban 
experience that we all supposedly share. But as with all such inferences they presume either a 
shared experience or a cipher by which to decode the sign. If such an empathetic experience is 
lacking, these juxtapositions seem hollow. For example, Keiller writes: 
 
In 1817, the Shelleys moved to Albion House in Marlow, where she transcribed his 
Revolt of Islam and prepared Frankenstein for publication. 
 
Marlow is also home to the UK headquarters of Volvo, Saab and Rank Xerox, and at 
Cookham near the home of Stanley Spencer, is the home of the Chartered Institute of 
Marketing [Keiller, 1999; p 23, sic.]. 
 
The implied significance of these associations is lost without the necessary cipher, which in the 
case of Keiller is an understanding of the relationship between contemporary economic and 
cultural changes. It is appropriate, therefore, to question again whether these ‘ecstatic visions’ do 
not speak more of the author’s own theoretical predilections revealed through the hallucinatory 
stimulus of the city than of any facet of the city itself. A hallucination is, after all “the apparent 
perception of an external object or sense-datum when no such object or stimulus is present; the 
mental state of being deceived, mistaken or deluded; an unfounded idea or belief, a delusion” 
[OED]. Keiller states that “[i]t is certainly easy to find a disconcerting aesthetic in the post-
Conservative landscape, especially in the country”. His ‘disconcerting aesthetic’ is reminiscent of 
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The windowless sheds of the logistics industry, road construction, spiky mobile phone 
aerials, a proliferation of new fencing of various types, security guards, police helicopters 
and cameras, new prisons, agribusiness, UK and US military bases, mysterious research 
and training centres, ‘independent’ schools, eerie commuter villages, rural poverty and 
the country houses of rich and powerful men of unrestrained habits are visible features of 
a landscape in which the suggestion of cruelty is never far away [ibid.; p 211]. 
 
And yet, in discussing the project Keiller admits that: 
 
In fact, we didn’t find it [his suggested new spaces] for a long time...it wasn’t visible 
enough. It did change: as we went along, it became more aggressive - the points on the 
fence got sharper; the difference between a prison and a supermarket became more 
difficult to discern; the atmosphere became more S&M. 
 
There is clearly a degree, therefore, to which Keiller and his character Robinson ‘discover’ the 
character of space that they are looking for. Keiller, influenced by surrealism, has found, like the 
paranoiac, that he “always hits the nail on the head, no matter where the hammer blow falls” 
[Koolhaas, 1994; p 238, see discussion above, chapter 3]. As he himself confesses, “I had a 
preconception about this, an idea that there is something up in the countryside, that the 
countryside is actually a rather forbidding place...The countryside seems more scary. I don’t 
know how real this is because I don’t live in the countryside” [op cit.; p 228]. 
 
It is unsurprising, therefore, that another recurrent characterization of the city in literature that 
attempts to span the academic/popular divide is that the city is “strangely familiar” [Keiller, 1999; 
Borden et al, 1996
4]. I would suggest that this familiarity is prompted by the circularity of 
dominant narratives of the city, which influence the perception and presentation of cities in 
popular as well as academic literature. Before returning to the academic, and the provenance of 
these ideas, I wish to turn to a final example from wider canon of literature on the city - the 
poetry, prose and fiction of Iain Sinclair. 
 
                                                 
4 This volume also illustrates many of the traits discussed. It consciously integrates written and visual material without 
prejudicing either with the demeaned status of either ‘illustration’ or ‘caption’ in an attempt to make the work more 
polyvalent and accessible. However, its essence is a series of essays by ‘the usual suspects’ of urban theorists and 
historians. It implicitly reinforces what I have argued is an exoticization of the city, its deliberately “provocative” views 
focusing on the “unexpected...and the complexity of the everyday” [Borden et al., 1996, rear cover]. Even Soja’s more 
mundane contribution advocates the “stimulus of a little confusion”, conforming to the unchallenged conviction that the 
city is a place of fragmentation and confusion [ibid.; p 30]. The ‘rush to the post’ and ‘the eclipse of the real’  86 
“Urban Lepidopterists” 
 
Sinclair’s work is interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly, he ranges across the spectrum of 
literary genres, from poetry in the 1970s and ’80s, to fiction, prose writing and criticism more 
recently. Secondly, his work deals predominantly with London; the novels (White Chappel, 
Scarlet Tracings [1987], Radon Daughters [1995], and Slow Chocolate Autopsy [1997]) all focus 
around East London where Sinclair lives, while the poems make frequent reference to sites such 
as London Fields, Victoria Park and the Isle of Dogs (see for example Jack Elam’s Other Eye 
[1991])
5. Finally, like the Strangely Familiar project (see footnote above), he has collaborated 
with several illustrators and photographers, likewise insisting that, “the books don’t need images, 
and the photographs don’t need words”, opening a parallel channel to his understanding of the 
city that is his obsessive subject [Atkins and Sinclair, 1999; p 223]. 
 
This body of work exhibits many similarities with Topographics: one of his most recent books, 
Liquid City, in which he writes of “the mess of the moment, the rushing, babbling chaos”, 
forming part of the series [Atkins and Sinclair, 1999; p 59]. The language encapsulates the same 
mix of exhilaration and didacticism, while employing the familiar sinister imagery of chaos and 
destruction (see for example Nil by Mouth [1991] and Significant Wreckage [1988] and Kotope 
[1975] - “carnage and mutilations at Moorgate” - and Back Garden Poems [1970]). The early 
poem collections (Lud Heat [1975] and Suicide Bridge [1979]) focus particularly on the myths of 
London’s occult and criminal figures, but through a second inflection relate this ‘literary 
geography’ to a cabbalistic geography of London revealed in various ‘triangulations’. His is a 
consciously ‘spatialized’ narrative, therefore, reflecting the concerns of the Topographics series. 
Sinclair describes significant “occult structures” in the built form of London, linking the mound 
at Whitechapel to similar mounds in Oxford and Cambridge; subsystems of obelisks and bulls (in 
Lights Out for the Territory [1997]); triangulations of churches and stars, the eight churches of 
Hawksmoor producing an ‘envelope’ -  “the shape of these, fear” [Lud Heat, 1975]. 
 
Sinclair’s interest in the occult drives the cabbalistic rhetoric which pervades his work and 
uncovers a “subterranean preconscious text… a sorcerer’s grimoire” principally through the walk 
                                                 
5 His most recent book, Landor’s Tower [2001a] although set in the countryside of the English-Welsh borders, is (like 
many of his books as will be discussed below) profoundly autobiographical, the main character a writer and habitué of 
London who returns to his rural roots an urbane outsider. Reviewing the book Sinclair described his own move to 
London as a search for the anonymity of the city and the draw of the density of myth and history found there, and 
discussed the importance of the concept of borderlands for his wider ‘psycho-geographical’ literature examined here 
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as a revelatory experience [1997; p 1, commenting on Radon Daughters, 1995]. He asserts in the 
introduction to his most extended walking narrative, Lights out for the Territory [1997], that, 
“[d]rifting purposefully is the recommended mode, trampling asphalted earth in alert reverie, 
allowing the fiction of an underlying pattern to assert itself” [ibid.; p 4]. Again, we find the 
tension between the city as revealed to the author and the city as fictionalized by the author. 
Similarly, the character of the revelation echoes those examined above. Sinclair returns to the 
theme of the walk, arguing that; “as we progress, the city reveals itself as a confederation of petty 
mysteries: no square mile, but a chaos of triangulations, botched mandalas, competing 
hieroglyphs”; a sentence that unites themes of chaos with a revealed undercurrent of spatial 
significance, the primacy of the sign and a hermeneutic approach, and the idea of the city as 
mandala, symbol of a dystopian (‘botched’) universe [ibid., p 103]. 
 
Yet it is Sinclair himself, rather than any innate quality of the city, that is the motor behind this 
apocalyptic impression. He constructs a speculative city around the protagonists of his fictions, be 
they the manifestations of his own “rampant schizophrenia” or the quasi-fictional characters of 
his autobiographical novels. “Such autobiography as I want to deliver”, he argues,  “comes 
through portraiture, exaggeration, caricature. The city as a darker self, a theatre of possibilities in 
which I can audition lives that never happened” [1999; p 8 and p 7]. He is conscious of his own 
exaggerated predilection for the macabre, parodying his role in a discussion with J.G. Ballard as 
“the low relief, mumbling apocalyptic nonsense in a riverside dive”. Evidently he has 
considerable sympathy with Ballard’s appreciation of Dalí, particularly the idea of pursuing one’s 
own psychopathologies as a game that forms the basis of the paranoaic-critical method discussed 
above [Sinclair, 1999 and above chapter 3.3, p 68 onwards]. For Sinclair, this game is the process 
of the walk, through which he confronts myth, and the “living breath” of its “Siamese twin”, 
place [1979]. Through the process of the walk the physical space of the city, in a Euclidean sense, 
is sublimed into a series of key places, themselves the physical residue of myth, such that “what 
we walk is myth flattened into space”. Ultimately, space becomes the conceptual connections 
between places, the thematic vectors of triangulation, while in Sinclair’s apocalyptic vision, 
“[p]lace, finally, can be only one thing: where you die” [ibid.]. 
 
Sinclair’s London celebrates a highly personal view that offers an understanding of space de-
materialized into myth. His defence against the argument of “no-bullshit materialists” for whom 
he speculates his project sounds like “fin de siècle decadence” is that, unlike the nineteenth 
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on philosophical conversation pieces”, the contemporary “dedicated psycho-geographer” notices 
and records everything; “alignments of telephone kiosks, maps made from moss on the slopes of 
Victorian sepulchres, collections of prostitutes’ cards…the crystalline pattern of glass shards 
surrounding an imploded BMW quarter-light window….” [1997; pp 4 and 72]. As with Borges’ 
attempt at suggesting an infinite series [above p 27] this represents a selection which echoes 
Sinclair’s own preferences articulated in his introduction to an anthology of contemporary poetry, 
Conductors of Chaos. “The work I value”, he writes, “is that which seems most remote, alienated, 
fractured. I don’t claim to ‘understand’ it but I like having it around” [1996; p xvii]. 
 
My reservation (no doubt being what Sinclair would identify, perhaps mistakenly, as a “no-
bullshit materialist”) is not with the approach of psycho-geography per se, but rather with the 
obvious macabre predilections which are apparent in his supposedly encyclopaedic “noticing of 
everything”. This is nowhere more visible than in his collaboration with illustrators, particularly 
most recently with the photographer Marc Atkins
6. He describes them as being like, “Victorian 
lepidopterists; bagging unusual specimens”, and Atkins’ photographs as “perfect representations 
of chaos”, complementing his own written efforts to “mould wriggling chaos” [1999; pp 8-9]. 
Sinclair has used a mix of text and imagery to persuade the reader of his sinister convictions of 
urban chaos since his earlier works, including Back Garden Poems [1970] and the disturbing 
images, reminiscent of Piranesi’s nightmarish cartoons or Goya’s Capricios and ‘Black 
Paintings’, in Jack Elam's Other Eye [1991]. However, it is only in his 1999 volume, Liquid City, 
that he discusses the role of the photographer, highlighting through their collaboration the 
selectivity of both visual and literary images. He comments that, “[i]f an image is too complacent, 
if it fails to disturb, it will be put aside”, perhaps a rare contingency since, “...in the alchemy of 
the darkroom, he [Atkins] subverts this impersonal neutrality [of a “clean, crisp print”]. He will 
“print the darkness”, and “give it a stronger, more disquieting element” [1999; p 7]. 
 
The most graphic illustration of his style is achieved in the collaboration with illustrator Dave 
McKean in Slow Chocolate Autopsy [1997] which tracks a fictional character ‘Norton’ who 
resembles Sinclair himself (just as Robinson doubles Keiller). Although Robinson makes a tour 
of rural England at a specific time, Norton is confined to London spatially, but achieves great 
temporal freedom, being present at a series of sinister events from the murder of Marlowe to the 
activities of the Krays. The imagery is common to the two projects however. One of three 
                                                 
6 See Lights out for the Territory [1997], and Liquid City [1999]. Atkins also appears as a character in Radon 
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‘graphic stories’, The Griffin’s Egg, begins with the statement, “WANTED: INTERPRETER. 
UNEDITED CITY” which is picked up a few pages later in the statement that, “Pin down the true 
images and words are redundant. Stick any two postcards to a wall and you’ve got a narrative” 
[see figure 4.1]. Here again we see the idea of the city as unedited, somehow unintelligible 
without the mediation of a specialist (interpreter), and the related idea that there are certain 
images that, juxtaposed, access an underlying verity about the city, a ‘true’ narrative. These 
ciphers become as predictable and recurrent as the Bonaventure Hotel and Bladerunner; in this 
particular story Sinclair returns obsessively to the MI6 headquarters on the river Thames in 
London, to the apartment owned by Jeffery Archer and the government buildings on the north 
side of the Thames – “buildings which [for Sinclair] generate paranoia. That’s their only 
purpose”. 
 
This paranoia is a constant theme, Norton declaring surveillance to be the art form of the 
Millennium, and leads to a preoccupation with death as Norton crosses the river towards the 
triangulation around Vauxhall and is seen plunging from the balcony of what is indeed Jeffrey 
Archer’s apartment [figure 4.1]. Again, this is reminiscent of Keiller’s obsession with security in 
his ‘new spaces’ and their increasing ‘S&M’ character as he explores his post-Thatcherite 
landscape, and also of the juxtaposition of zones in the Cities exhibition - ‘commerce’ with 
‘decay’. Norton/Sinclair’s approach to the city is perhaps typified by his encouragement to “treat 
London like an autopsy catalogue” [figure 4.1] and the ‘mapping’ of places of significance into a 
space of sinister relationships. For as he suggests elsewhere, “Stone as meat, that’s what Atkins 
sees...Stone, conduit of urban memory...” [Atkins and Sinclair, 1999; pp 168 and 135]. 
 
“Information-age Orientalism” 
 
It might have been tempting to isolate the Cities exhibition as being of little consequence, perhaps 
driven more by a particular curatorial vision, and yet the literature on the city examined above 
seems to reiterate familiar themes and to be written in similar ecstatic vein. Indeed, in retrospect 
the Cities on the Move exhibitions provide an excellent yardstick of both artistic responses and 
contemporary thinking on cities
7. It would furthermore be a mistake to isolate these 
                                                 
7 Indeed, since my involvement with Cities on the Move, there have been two other high-profile exhibitions in London 
dealing with cities. The first, Century City: art and culture in the modern metropolis [Tate Gallery, 2001] reiterated 
many of the themes of Cities on the Move although in the context of a broader review of 20
th century artistic responses 
to the city. Blazwick’s catalogue draws heavily on familiar academic references, including Lefebvre, Benjamin and 
(perhaps surprisingly) Soja’s Postmodern Geographies [Blazwick, 2001; p 11], while Sardar’s argues that the “urban 
space [of the ‘modern Western metropolis’] frightens its citizens; their dreams are of decay - the Robocop imagery, the The ‘rush to the post’ and ‘the eclipse of the real’  90 
understandings as limited academic or ‘high-brow’ genres. Recent advertisements, significantly 
for mobile ’phones, emblematic of the communications changes that are often seen as the 
generators of the fragmentation and ‘placelessness’ of modernity, have exposed a far wider 
audience to these themes. Figure 4.2 shows an advert for Vodaphone in which the city is literally 
deconstructed into a system of eponymous signs. A simultaneous campaign for Orange 
encourages viewers to ‘Bring your world to you’, illustrated by a series of scenarios in which 
space and scale collapse, such that users of the mobile ’phone watch a police car chase along the 
top of a bar and a football match in the palm of their hand. These texts should not be ignored, the 
more so, because through them, as well as Soja’s work and the work of other theorists both 
popular and academic, there is the added normative argument that this is what “everyday life” is 
like. 
 
This imposition appeared to me to be particularly evident in the case of the Bangkok Cities on the 
Move exhibition. My impression, as a visitor and exhibitor for one week, was that the exhibition 
re-presented a version of Asian ‘real life’ back to Bangkokians as somehow ‘revealed’ through 
the explanatory envelope of western pseudo-academic discourse examined in the previous 
chapter
8. It seemed the most crass example of Orientalism imaginable, and just the type of 
exoticisation that paradoxically Koolhaas warned against [in discussion with the curator Hans-
Ulrich Obrist, Hayward Gallery, 1999; p 17 and above p 62]. 
 
My impression of the Bangkok show echoes that of one reviewer of the London exhibition; 
 
The show’s portrait of the East Asian city as a site of incommensurate chaos, an unstable 
emblem of 21
st century exoticism, is an information-age Orientalism. The terms have  
                                                                                                                                                
millenarian visions of destruction, disjuncture and the death of meaning” [Sardar, 2001; p 268] He further legitimates 
my extension of the Asian focus of Cities on the Move to a more general attitude, arguing that there is a globalization of 
the idea of the Western city as the subordination of all other futures. He therefore idealistically conceives of an 
opposition between Western and non-western cities, the latter being sites of resistance where “meaning and identity...is 
rooted in religion” [ibid.; p 269]. In relation to London, Dexter draws on Benjamin’s description of city as a dream 
world and catastrophe [Dexter, 2001; p 79, Benjamin, 1999] and notes the sense of melancholy in works chosen to 
represent London’s recent contribution to visual arts – Landy’s Costermonger Stall and Melanie Counsell’s British Art 
Show 1990 speaking of an end of  an era and conveying “a  sense of foreboding, of immanence and suspense”. In 
contrast the Facts of Life: contemporary Japanese art exhibition [Hayward Gallery, 2001] is “more about realism” 
[Jonathan Watkins, curator, quoted by MacRitchie, 2001]. While a welcome change from the imposed hyperbole of the 
Cities exhibition, I take MacRitchie’s statement that those expecting to find “such staple clichés of contemporary life in 
Japan [as] manga comics and digital monsters, Bladerunner neon and gadgets galore…are in for a disappointment” as 
confirmation of my claim of the recent ubiquity of these references. 
 
8 I am thinking here particularly of the derivative hyperbole of Scheeren. In relation to the rhetoric of mobile 
communications advertisers, recall the idea of new communications technologies as “indispensable ‘survival kits’ for 
urban inhabitants” in Bangkok [Hanru and Obrist, Cities on the Move 6 (Bangkok) Press Pack]. The ‘rush to the post’ and ‘the eclipse of the real’ 
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Figure 4.1 Images from Sinclair’s Slow Chocolate Autopsy. Note once again the juxtaposition 
between sinister and erotic visual and textual imagery [Source: Sinclair, 1997]. The ‘rush to the post’ and ‘the eclipse of the real’ 
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Figure 4.2 Screen grabs from the Vodaphone advertisement “Plane Simple” in which two 
characters experience the city, and indeed themselves, deconstructed into text [Source: BMP  
DDB Ltd]. 
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changed – instead of being mired in tradition, it’s now the most rapidly changing place on 
earth – but it’s still the same phantasm of an unknowable Asia [Rugoff, 1999]. 
  
While I would agree with Rugoff that Cities on the Move exhibited ‘Orientalism’ in the sense of 
the exoticized ‘other’ of Said’s original conception, it is, I would suggest, cities generally that are 
exoticised, not ‘an unknowable Asia’ (although the ‘intellectual imperialism’ is just as 
eurocentric)
9. Hence the metropolis has become a “myth of our times” which through its 
“allegorical extension” has become “unmappable”, unknowable [Chambers, 1990; p 54]. This 
more reflexive brand of ‘orientalism’ reflects an unshakeable conviction as to the nature of cities 
and the contemporary experience of living in cities which becomes a conceptual straitjacket 
forced without exception over contemporary experience. 
 
The effects of these forcings are at times visible. Rugoff comments that the Cities exhibition 
“desperately yearns for that passé epithet ‘cutting edge’”, its ‘nowness’ being its principal claim 
to importance, but argues that, “beneath its modish veneer, this exhibition is singularly, and 
uninspiringly old-fashioned”. 
 
Mired in dusty assumptions about the borders between art and life, it ends up leaving us 
with little more than a revised cliché of the inscrutable and exotic East…[based in a] 
creaky utopianism underlying the whole show” [ibid]. He concludes; “Displays such as 
these are yet another expression of the way Cities [on the Move] wants to persuade us 
that art and life can merge. It is an idea that has haunted much 20
th Century art, and sits 
close to the heart of the modernist impulse. Essentially, it springs from the utopian 
yearning to erase the difference between alienated spheres of activity, to sew aesthetics 
and reality into a holistic existence” [ibid.].  
 
Rugoff here points to the fact, which should already be apparent, that many of the essential 
components of the ‘ecstatic vision’ are derived from concepts originating in the context of 
modernism – the fascination with speed, with change, with scale, the blurring of aesthetic vision 
and reality, and the Freudian relationships between sex and death. Likewise, the vignette form, 
with its didactic and revelatory style typical of this literature which masks the imposition of 
normative understandings of the city, has its antecedents in the literary inventions of 19th Century 
modernism. In this epistemological muddle it is necessary to draw apart these contradictory and 
complimentary strands to unravel the continuities and subtle inflections between 21st and 19th 
century understandings of cities and space. 
                                                 
9 See Edward Said’s enormously influential Orientalism on the creation of ‘The East’ in ‘western’ discourse [Said, 
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4.2 The unreal city; 19
th century origins of the ‘ecstatic vision’ 
 
The Futurist Manifesto of 1909 identified the city as being “the pre-eminent theme” of Modern 
poetry and prose, affirming the central concern of literature and painting since the mid 19th 
Century [Timms, 1985; p 1]. Sharpe argues that this literature exhibits a ‘classic trajectory’, “a 
movement from initial disorientation to a feeling of the city’s impenetrability or mystery, 
followed in turn by alienation from city, self and Other, and then finally a sense of hallucination, 
of being adrift in the unreal city” [1990; p 12]. Indeed, Prendegast argues (in relation to Paris) 
that even by 1860 the idea that the city ‘lies beyond intelligibility’ is “already a stereotype... 
entered into the stock of city-clichés or parisianismes”, and that “the proposition that the city is 
too complex to be understood or known will become increasingly naturalised from the later 19th 
century onwards” [Prendegast, 1992; p 3]. Sharpe extends this continuity, arguing that the city 
has been a ‘place of estrangement’ since biblical times. He notes that the founding of the first city 
by Cain is as a direct consequence of his exile, and traces the continuity through Blake’s 
‘London’ of 1793, where: 
 
I wander thro’ each charter’d street, 
Near where the charter’d Thames does flow, 
And mark in every face I meet 
Marks of weakness, marks of woe. 
[Blake, 1793; quoted in Sharpe, 1990; p 1]. 
 
Sharpe argues that Blake’s reference to three biblical cities, Babel, Babylon and New Jerusalem, 
“points to three principal visions of the city: the city as a text, as a sexual object and as unreal” 
[ibid.; p 2]. 
 
There are striking similarities with the approach of contemporary authors above, but although 
Sharpe’s ‘classic trajectory’ exhibits many common features - impenetrability, alienation and 
finally hallucination - it does not explicitly mention the dual response that was captured above by 
the notion of ‘ecstasy’. He notes elsewhere, however, that the city has always been a “divided 
sign” - while God marks Cain as a punishment (“a fugitive and vagabond shalt thou be in earth” 
[Genesis 4:12]) he also offers Cain salvation (“the Lord set a mark upon Cain lest any finding 
him should kill him” [Genesis 4:15]), by extension marking the city as both a place of 
estrangement and of hope and salvation [Sharpe, 1990]. Similarly, Preston and Simpson-Housley 
find parallels in Wordsworth’s Prelude, Book VII. Describing the Bartholemew Fair, 
Wordsworth is at first drawn to the wealth of sights and experiences, but ultimately judges; The ‘rush to the post’ and ‘the eclipse of the real’  95 
oh, blank confusion! and a type not false of what the mighty city is itself 
 
He continues, prefiguring not only 19
th Century responses of poets such as Baudelaire but also the 
analysis of commodities by Marx and the attention to  ‘flows’ of much contemporary theory, that 
people are; 
 
slaves unrespited of low pursuits, 
living amid the same perpetual flow, 
of trivial objects, melted and reduced 
to one identity, by differences 
That have no law, no meaning, and no end. 
 
while elsewhere describing the city in terms that, as we shall see, present parallels with many 
postmodern approaches: 
 
those mimic sights that ape 
the absolute presence of reality  
[Wordsworth, Prelude, Book VII lines 695-704 and 247-8, quoted in Preston and 
Simpson-Housley; 1994] 
 
There is a continuity among responses to the city, therefore, divided into the celebration of the 
variety and vitality of the city, and the abhorrence of what Wordsworth terms its “Babel din” 
[ibid.]. The importance of the city in literature, however, reaches its climax during the 19
th 
Century, particularly in relation to Paris, and the work of Baudelaire, whom Prendegast argues is 
of central importance [op cit; p 26]. Following the argument that it is the role of poetry to “re-cast 
‘normal’ ways of describing reality”, Prendegast suggests that the provocativeness of 
Baudelaire’s language develops an “aesthetics of shock” which opens a series of new urban 
themes [pp 26-7]. The principal such theme developed among the writers of 19
th Century Paris is 
the idea of the city as “a site of atomistic fragmentation and dispersal on such a scale as to defy 
intelligibility itself” [p 11]. 
 
In this literature of the Nineteenth Century a critical link is made between the city as the site of 
social and most importantly technological changes, particularly in transportation and 
communication, and the identity of the urban dweller. For Prendegast this critical fulcrum is 
epitomised by two classic arrival scenes: the disorientation of Rousseau’s Saint-Preux and the 
excitement of Balzac’s Lucien de Rubempré when faced with the ‘tourbillon social’ and the 
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Baudelaire’s response. In the Poems en Prose he describes the “délire officiel d'une grande ville 
fait pour troubler le cerveau du solitaire le plus fort”
10, while describing the satisfaction of a 
destructive impulse metered out upon a stranger in Le Mauvais Vitrier. Yet in Les Foules he 
describes the pleasures of “un bain de multitude” - a cleansing ‘bath’ in the Parisian crowd, while 
in Le Chien et le Flacon he retracts this, treating the crowd with contempt, arguing that like the 
dog they should be offered “des ordures soigneusement choisies” - carefully selected filth. 
Likewise in the Tableaux Parisiens he contrasts, 
 
Fourmillate cité, cité pleine de rêves, 
 
with in the next stanza, 
 
Un matin, cependent que dans la triste rue 
Les maisons, dont la brume allongeait la hauteur, 
Simulaient les deux quais d'une rivière accrue, 
Et que, décor semblable à l'âme de l'acteur
11. 
 
Vigny, in his poem ‘Paris’ of 1831, perhaps offers the most succinct illustration of Sharpe’s 
‘divided sign’, exclaiming, “Enfer! Eden du Monde!” – “This Eden is the world’s Inferno!” 
[quoted in Collier, 1985; p 32] - perhaps illustrating the point made by Timms and Kelley and 
Davies that even in the most exuberant prose of the Futurists there remains an underlying 
disorientation [Timms and Kelley; 1985; pp 1-2; Davies, 1985; p 65]. 
 
The central idea is the relationship between the new technological environment of the modern era 
and the impact that this has on the understanding of identity, mediated through the experiential 
form of the city itself. For Baudelaire the observation of the city’s outside space as through a 
window leads to a knowledge of the ‘inner space’ of the individual as through a window on the 
self [Norman 1997]. The main driver is the influence of speed as a fundamental condition of 
modernity, which authors such as Simmel and Nietzsche relate to the fracturing of urban 
identities, and the consequent ‘destruction of space through time’, a theme developed from Marx 
that has become endemic to the discourse of modernity [see Berman, 1982]. 
 
                                                 
10 “the officialized delirium of  a great metropolis, calculated to unbalance the sanest loner’s mind”, from Un Plaisant, 
(A Wag) referring to New Years celebrations. Translation by Francis Scarfe, [Baudelaire, 1989]. 
11 “Pulsating city overrun with dreams…. Daybreak. A dismal street. The houses yawn: Grim quays along a riverbank 
in flood. Under the brown fog of a winter dawn (the set design reflects our hero's mood)”, from Les Sept Viellards in 
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There is, however, a second critical change in 19
th century literature that exhibits direct parallels 
and continuities with contemporary writing on the city, for not only did the subject of this 
literature change, but so too did its style. Once again, Baudelaire was at the forefront of this 
development arguing that the ideal form for the prose of the city should be: 
 
musicale sans rythme et sans rime, assez souple et assez heurté pour s’adapter aux 
mouvements lyrique de l’âme, aux ondulations de la rêverie, aux soubresauts de la 
conscience
12 [Baudelaire quoted in Collier, 1985]. 
 
The result is a fragmentary style that mirrors Baudelaire’s understanding of the city itself, “a new 
lyricism that will subsume and sublimate the fragmentation and dislocation of modern urban life” 
[Collier, 1985; p 36]. As Simmel argued, “art not merely mirrors a world in motion, its very 
mirror has itself become more labile” [quoted in Prendegast, 1992; p 6] and we find Baudelaire 
describing his work as having “ni queue ni tête”, such that “puisque tout, au contraire, y est à la 
fois tête et queue”
13 [Baudelaire, 1989]. Baudelaire goes on to argue that, “Nous pouvons couper 
où nous voulons...car je ne suspends pas la volenté rétive de [le lecteur] au fil interminable d’une 
intrigue superflue”
14 [ibid], perfectly prefiguring the arguments presented in the Topographics 
series, as well as by authors such as Pile and Thrift, that texts can be approached spatially, the 
readers as literary flâneur
15. Indeed, this is a connection advanced by both Prendegast and Lehan 
in their analyses of the city in literature, both suggesting parallels between their own work and the 
city [Prendegast, 1992; p 3 and Lehan, 1998; p 4]. 
 
We find in the 19th century, therefore, the origins of the bleeding between perceptions of city 
form and writing on the city that seemed the hallmark of contemporary literature. Indeed, 
possibly the most important critic of Baudelaire who highlighted this elision, Walter Benjamin, 
himself epitomises this style, carrying it into the 20
th century, and on to the 21
st, where Pile and 
Thrift list him as a ‘contributor’ to their City A-Z who “has a ghostly presence throughout this 
book” [2000; p. vii]. Benjamin focused on the importance of the snap-shot as the defining 
technique of 19
th Century expression, and charted its influence upon the fragmentary and 
dissonant rhythms of 19
th Century literature. It is, however, his own works and most particularly 
                                                 
12 “musical but lacking rhyme and rhythm, supple and jerkey enough to marry the lyrical impulses of the soul, the 
meanderings of the daydream, and the twitchings of consciousness”. 
13 “neither beginning nor end, indeed everything is at once head and tail”. 
14 “We may break off or skip wherever we wish...for I have not strung [the readers] wayward will to the endless thread 
of some unnecessary plot”. 
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his analysis Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century, and his more illusive One Way Street that 
have become the critical fulcrum between 19
th Century and contemporary writings on the city. 
 
In Benjamin’s work we find the fragmentary aesthetic taken to its extreme. As Buck-Morss 
argues, “To the mind that would comprehend intellectual phenomena in terms of logical or 
chronological development...his work offers little satisfaction. It is grounded, rather, on 
philosophical intuitions sparked by cognitive experiences reaching as far back as childhood. 
These ‘develop’ only in the sense that a photographic plate develops...” [Buck-Morss, 1989; p 7]. 
The result was an attempt to describe the transformation of his contemporary world through a 
collection of “aphorisms, jokes, dreams” which loosely use the city as a medium to connect social 
changes to individuals [Benjamin, describing One Way Street, quoted in Buck-Morss, 1989; p 
16]. Buck-Morss argues that the text incorporates the “outside world of gas stations, metros, 
traffic noises, and neon lights” and juxtaposes them with intellectual thought, “like so many 
discrete pieces in a photomontage or Cubist collage” producing a friction which generates 
“cognitive sparks, illuminating the reader’s own life-world” [ibid.; pp 18-19]. Of fundamental 
importance is Benjamin’s attitude to the city and to the treatment of images. Benjamin treats the 
city as a fossil from which history can be read, and his approach privileges the visual, reducing 
the city to a succession of images which he approaches through his dialectical method [see Buck-
Morss; p 67]. Buck-Morss argues that his approach to materialism is based in this “quasi-
magical” attitude towards objects [p 13] which are imbued with meaning and hence sublimated to 
image, in turn to be animated through the process of montage which resists a “harmonizing 
perspective” through juxtaposition, in a similar way to which Baudelaire denied the reader the 
security of a linear narrative [ibid; p 67]. Through One Way Street Buck-Morss argues that 
Benjamin redeems the practice of allegory, such that “modernist fragments, images of the city 
and of commodities” characterise urban modernity. She concludes that, “[t]he allegorical mode 
allows Benjamin to  make visibly palpable the experience of a world in fragments, in which the 
passing of time means not progress but disintegration” [ibid.; p 18]. 
 
Although here the main focus has been upon the development of modernism in the sphere of 
literature, there are equally many parallels with the visual arts. Clarke addresses the innovation of 
the Impressionists in Paris following Manet, while Whiford focuses on the German expressionists 
Munch and Ensor, picking out the same thread of wonder and horror and the development of an 
increasingly subjective aesthetic based upon fragmentary and violent metaphorical images [Clark, The ‘rush to the post’ and ‘the eclipse of the real’  99 
1985; Whitford, 1985]. Long provides an synthesis of the relationship between Modernism, the 
city and identity, arguing that; 
 
[w]e are used to the idea of Modernism as an art of disintegration; and to the idea that its 
typical location, the scene and the cause of the disintegration it records, is the city. An art 
of despair and pain; a dissonant, fragmented art that confronts meaninglessness; an art 
bred by the city where the scale of life dwarfs the individual and where each isolated 
person lives in bewildering, shifting patterns of relationships with others, or in no 
describable patterns at all...[Long, 1985; p 144]. 
 
I have shown that the pivotal figures of Baudelaire and Benjamin open a continuity in both 
literary form and the related perception of the city from the 19
th century into the 20
th century, 
from the beginnings of modernism to its extension in writers such as Joyce, Pound and Eliot, in 
whose Wasteland “the Modernist, fragmented city is virtually the poem’s protagonist” [ibid.; p 
145]. These new perspectives were critically related to the advent of new technologies, 
particularly of communications and transportation affecting the speed of life and the perceptions 
of space. 
 
However, these technologies themselves are similarly always developing, and hence while we 
find Benjamin noting the importance of the snapshot, by contrast Ezra Pound, commenting on 
Eliot’s Wasteland remarks that “The life of the village is narrative.…In a city the visual 
impressions succeed each other, overlap, overcross, they are cinematographic” [Pound, quoted in 
Timms and Kelley, 1985; p 3, emphasis added]. It is to the role of technological development in 
defining our contemporary understandings of cities and space more generally, extending this 
genealogy of ideas from the 19
th through to the 21
st Century, which I now wish to turn. 
 
 
4.3 ‘Here no longer exists...’ 
 
I wish to argue that as modern transmogrifies into ‘postmodern’, literary responses once again 
focus on the relationship between technological change and identity as mediated through our 
supposedly shared experience of the city. However, as the driver moves from the ‘snapshot’ then 
‘cinema’ to the more generic and pandemic ‘screen’, and the speed of technologies accelerate 
exponentially, I wish to suggest that in the subtly altered intellectual climate of ‘postmodernism’ 
the spatial themes present in the modernist discourse become amplified, with three important 
consequences. The ‘rush to the post’ and ‘the eclipse of the real’ 100 
Firstly, modernism was essentially concerned with an aesthetics of speed. While this has 
implications for the experience of space and relates to the increasing understanding and 
representation of experience as fragmentary, the primary concern was with time. Spatial effects 
result from increased speed (principally of communication and transportation, [see Harvey, 
1989]). In the current era, however, the focus of interest is more directly on these spatial 
outcomes, time dropping from the equation as speeds of communication reach (for all practical 
purposes) the instantaneous. The change is subtle, but I would suggest that whereas 19
th century 
representations focus on the turbulence of the modern city with its fragmenting effects, 
contemporary literature tackles abstract spatial themes overtly. So, whereas Conrad characterised 
modernity as “living in the flicker” [Heart of Darkness], many contemporary authors tackle 
directly themes such as the ‘placelessness of cyberspace’, as popular and academic 
representations have become increasingly blurred, self-aware and auto-referential. 
 
Secondly, I wish to suggest that the themes of the ‘Alephic’ and ‘ecstatic visions’. which have 
been treated as related but distinct, fold into one. It is the direct engagement with ideas of space 
itself (as opposed to the city) that prompts the horror and joy of the ecstatic vision.  
 
Thirdly, and as a consequence of the above, I wish to argue that these discourses have ceased to 
share any mutual ground with common understandings and experiences of the city, as the 
conception of space becomes divorced from any relation to the material and empirical. It is ironic 
that much contemporary theory, which has opened itself to the polyphony of ‘other’ perspectives 
in a critique of the ‘privileged’ discourses of the Enlightenment, has thereby created an equally 
privileged and remote discourse. Relieved of its emancipatory responsibility, postmodern 
discourse becomes increasingly remote, despite its polyphonic aspirations, rejecting ‘common 
understandings’ just as Gorky rejected the people of New York whom he found contrary to his 
idealistic expectations
16. While embracing ‘the other’, the paradox of contemporary theory is that 
it becomes unintelligible to far larger uninitiate ‘other’, the non-academic other, the presumed 
‘another’ (in conspiratorial sense of ‘another one of us’, sharing a common understanding). 
 
This ‘lifting off’ of theory [Chambers, 1987, 1990] has precedents in the academic and literary 
approaches of the 19
th and early 20
th century work discussed above. The quintessential modernist 
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it may not be generalizable to the experience of all. Certainly, Prendergast argues in relation to 
Baudelaire that “the tension between the poetic endeavour and the recalcitrance of the urban 
reality with which it engages becomes increasingly more apparent” [Prendergast, 1992; p 27], and 
Timms and Kelley are more explicit still, arguing that, “underlying the work of almost all the 
artists and writers reviewed in this book [focusing on the literature and art of Modern Europe] is a 
reluctance to accept the city in its mundane routine. They are visionaries rather than realists. They 
explore the extremes of hope and dread, between distant utopia and immanent Apocalypse” 
[Timms and Kelley, 1985; p 7]. 
 
I will seek to argue that, as with so many themes of modernism that become exaggerated in the 
contemporary era, this tension between normative presentation and the mundanities of everyday 
existence is stretched to breaking point, as the discourse becomes increasingly inward looking 
and self-referential. One could suggest (perhaps provocatively) that while modernist authors 
sought to describe a common experience through the allegorical character of the flâneur, 
contemporary authors have rejected any attempt to access a ‘common experience’ on 
philosophical grounds, and have instead validated their own subjective experiences and 
understandings, the key protagonist being the academic [flâneur] themselves (a rhetorical 
wordplay that Prendergast, among others, actually uses). There are good reasons why such a 
reading may not be as provocative as it may sound. The key lies in the multiple related positions 
advanced in recent decades under the banners of post-structuralism and postmodernism, and it is 
the impact of these currents of thought upon socio-spatial theory more generally that is the final 
destination of this chapter. 
 
Faced with the Gordian knot of contemporary theory, it is tempting to fall back on the now 
ubiquitous argument that the text should be approached spatially, even ‘as a city’, that is itself an 
example of the bleeding between rhetorical and explanatory forms. However, through an analysis 
of key texts I hope to tease out the important strands that impact directly on the understanding of 
space, which is the fundamental concern of this argument. I do not hope or intend to provide an 
exhaustive discussion of the relationships between the complex and interwoven strands of 
contemporary theory, particularly the ‘posts’ of post-modernism, -structuralism, and the related 
                                                                                                                                                
16 See above p 74; “Gorky’s disgust represents the modern intellectual’s dilemma: confronted with the masses, whom 
he admires theoretically, in the flesh, he suffers from an acute distaste. He cannot admit to this disgust; he sublimates it 
by identifying external exploitation and corruption as the reason for the masses’ aberrations”  [Koolhaas, 1994; p 69]. The ‘rush to the post’ and ‘the eclipse of the real’ 102 
arguments of post-colonial theory and feminism
17. Rather I will draw from the melting pot of 
contemporary approaches those important ideas that seem most influential on contemporary 
thinking about cities and space and the socio-spatial relationship. Indeed, one might suggest that 
it is in their approach to spatial questions that some common ground can be found between these 
related yet fractious positions, and for this reason the themes critical to this discussion surface in 
the often confusing cross-pollination between these related positions.  
 
However, it is with the ‘postmodern’ that this archaeology will begin for several reasons. Firstly, 
‘postmodernism’ is in some sense the ‘end-stop’ of many of these debates, evolving in what Best 
and Kellner describe as “complex twisting pathways”, specific to each disciplinary context, which 
nonetheless seem to coincide into a ‘postmodernism’ that they cautiously describe in the singular. 
Indeed, they argue that it is this parallel emergence in individual fields and this “coalescence” 
into some hard-to-define and recalcitrant worldview that signals the “new paradigm” [Best and 
Kellner, 1997; p viii]. Secondly, it is under the banner of the postmodern that many of these 
debates reach their vertiginous apogee, consequently placing the greatest stress upon their 
coherence and opening them to the greatest vulnerability. Thirdly, it is within the heterogeneous 
positions of the postmodern that the question of space has been so explicitly problematized, a 
focus which, while owing an intellectual debt to the precursors of the postmodern, was not 
previously of such critical importance. Finally, it is postmodernism and most specifically the 
‘condition of postmodernity’ that has exercised the greatest interest among the theorists of the 
socio-spatial relation that are the subjects of this thesis, particularly because of the explicit links 
between postmodernism and urban culture. 
 
Chambers underlines the linkages between postmodern theory and the urban environment; 
“[p]ostmodernism, whatever forms its intellectualizing might take, has been fundamentally 
anticipated in the metropolitan cultures of the last twenty years: among the electronic signifiers of 
cinema, television and video, in recording studios and record players, in fashion and youth styles, 
in all those sounds, images and diverse histories that are daily mixed, re-cycled and ‘scratched’ 
together on that giant screen that is the contemporary city” [op cit.].  However, a more profound 
understanding of the key issues relevant to this thesis, the interrelated character of the writing on 
space, and the nature of space that is proposed as the basis for a ‘respatialized’ social theory, 
necessitates a more detailed investigation of the relevance of ‘the posts’. 
                                                 
17 For such an overview see the excellent summaries upon which I have relied heavily in Best and Kellner, [1991 and 
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“The rush to the post” 
 
Best and Kellner provide a sweeping description; “there is today an emerging postmodern 
paradigm organized around a family of concepts, shared methodological assumptions, and a 
general sensibility that attack modern methods and concepts as overtly totalizing and 
reductionistic; that decry utopian and humanistic values as dystopian and dehumanizing; that 
abandon mechanical and deterministic schemes in favour of new principles of chaos, contingency 
and spontaneity, and organism; that challenge all beliefs in foundations, absolutes, truth, and 
objectivity, often to embrace a radical scepticism, relativism, and nihilism; and that subvert 
boundaries of all kinds” [1997; pp 18-19]. ‘Postmodernism’ is indeed an “exasperating term” 
leading to “epochal confusions” [Bertens, 1995; pp 3 and 12], for while it seems to capture a 
sense of the uniting of many positions, Best and Kellner caution against a reductivism to a 
postmodernism or a postmodern mind. “In a strict sense, then”, they continue, “there is no such 
thing as ‘postmodern theory’; rather, there are a diversity of postmodern theories” [ibid.; pp 21-
22]. Furthermore, they caution that it should not be used as “a slogan or a buzzword” referring to 
“the contemporary moment in which we live, or contemporary novelties… [without] substantive 
analysis” [ibid; pp 20 and 23]. 
 
I am mindful of this in my introduction of the term here, and yet would draw on Best and Kellner 
once more in their assertion that ‘postmodernism’ is often “a placeholder, or semiotic marker”, 
that something is “new and needs to be theorized, that something is bothering us and requires 
further thought and analysis” [ibid.]. It will be apparent from the preceding discussion on the 
linkages between 19
th and 20
th century literature on the city that I sympathise with those who see 
a continuity between modernism and postmodernism rather than a clear rupture. Nonetheless 
there are critical elements to the theoretical position that have changed with profound 
consequences for the understanding and representation of cities and space such that 
postmodernism can best be thought of as an acceleration or “radicalization” of modernism
18. 
  
                                                 
18 The latter term is Best and Kellner’s [ibid; p 26]. I do not think that it is necessary here to rehearse arguments over 
the chronology of the postmodern evolution/turn/rupture (depending upon one’s stance) nor the ‘line up’ of ‘key 
players’ who defend each position. Such an analysis is provided by Anderson [1998], Best and Kellner [1991 and 
1997], and Bertens [1995] among others. 
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If one were to identify a single motor for this acceleration it would perhaps be the reliance upon 
Nietzsche, whose philosophy has been influential both directly and indirectly
19. Nietzsche’s most 
direct impact has been his critique of rationality and the authority of scientific method to access 
an essential truth about the world [see the critique of ‘Socratic’ or ‘Theoretic’ man in The Birth of 
Tragedy, Nietzsche, 1967]. He argues in An Attempt at Self Criticism that “it was the problem of 
science itself, science considered for the first time as problematic, questionable” that 
distinguished his critique [quoted in Best and Kellner, 1997; p 59]. There are a number of 
compounded results of this position that similarly have clear echoes in the postmodernist arsenal. 
It raises the profound epistemological problem of how we are able to know the world if we 
abandon the belief, held since the Enlightenment, in rationality and the exclusive validity of the 
scientific method in uncovering facts about the world. But furthermore, it introduces a 
metaphysical critique, for from this attitude of radical positionality Nietzsche argues that “there 
are no eternal facts, just as there are no absolute truths”, arguing that metaphysics imposes a 
contextual view of the world upon past epochs [Human, All too Human, quoted in Best and 
Kellner, 1997; p 63]. Thus, as Best and Kellner explain, “postmodern assaults on Enlightenment 
rationality and universalism, as well as postmodern relativism, perspectivalism, difference and 
particularity, stem as much from the philosophical critiques of Western thought that began with 
Nietzsche and continue through Dewey, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and feminism, as from 
particular political experiences”. 
 
This genealogy, passing through the critical figure of Wittgenstein, opens another channel of 
impact for Nietzsche’s ideas. Wittgenstein developed the critique of ‘reality’ through his 
approach to the use of language, particularly as a form of game. This linguistic turn has formed 
the basis for much of the post-structuralist critique that further develops the questioning of an 
absolute, knowable and representable ‘reality’, as well as opening the semiotic approach, through 
the work of Barthes and Eco among others, which treats the knowable in terms of signs, such that 
language constitutes rather than reflects the world
20. While Bertens is adamant that post-
structuralism and postmodernism must be kept distinct, highlighting significant differences 
between the two in relation to their treatment of subjectivity and authorship, there are clearly 
many parallels and cross-fertilizations, most particularly in the approach to the possibility of 
                                                 
19 Nietzsche too links the modern and postmodern in terms of the view of the city as well as in theoretical terms, 
refering to the, “haste and hurry now universal...the increasing velocity of life” and of the “hurried and over-excited 
worldliness” of the modern age [Untimely Mediations, Nietzsche, 1983; p 148, quoted in Prendergast, 1992; p 5. See 
also Thrift, 1994; p 219]. 
20 Berterns also notes that there is a parallel with the psychoanalysis of Lacan which similarly sees the subject as 
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making objective statements about the phenomenal world, and Best and Kellner see the two as 
closely linked, postmodernism in some way as emergent from post-structuralism.  
 
Lyotard’s “La Condition Postmoderne” bridges the two approaches, applying Wittgenstein’s 
theory of a language game to epistemological questions of the nature of contemporary 
knowledge. He makes a distinction between the scientific and narrative that is not dissimilar to 
Nietzsche’s distinction between the Apolline and Dionysiac (Birth of Tragedy), and argues that 
while narrative is concerned more with the transmission of understanding (treating scientific 
knowledge as a subset), scientific knowledge rejects the narrative as based on opinion, fable and 
myth and fatally lacking in proof that is the basis of the scientific ‘game’ of denotation (of truth) 
[Lyotard, 1979; pp 23-7]. However, Lyotard argues that modern science has taken on a 
“transcendental authority” as it has left behind the metaphysical foundations, the ‘first proof’, or 
‘proof of proof’, that was the grounding of Aristotle’s science [ibid.]. Therefore, the “rules of 
truth” emerge through consensus within the game, resulting in the “modern proclivity to define 
the conditions of a discourse in a discourse on those conditions” [ibid.; p 30]. 
 
Clearly there are many parallels with Nietzsche’s critique of rationality upon which Lyotard 
draws. Nietzsche argues that all ideas, values and positions are posits of the individual constructs 
of the ‘will to power’ and are to be judged against the extent to which they serve the ends of the 
will. There are, therefore, no facts, only interpretations, and “all interpretation was thus inevitably 
laden with presumptions, biases, and limitations” [Best and Kellner, p 64]. “Ultimately”, 
therefore, “ man finds in things nothing but what he himself has imported into them: the finding 
is called science” [The Will to Power, quoted in Best and Kellner; p 68]. This could read as an 
evaluation of Borges’ Aleph, and there are important resonances here with the earlier idea of the 
‘Alephic vision’, which while apparently concerned with the experience of space was in fact seen 
to address epistemological concerns with circular self-referential perspectivism. 
 
This analysis of the thought of Nietzsche that lies behind both the postmodern and post-
structuralist positions has attempted to answer why it is that these metaphysical and 
epistemological questions, the approach to space and the approach to the possibility of 
knowledge, are implicitly bound together in the work of Soja and others dealing with the 
contemporary urban experience within the contemporary theoretical zeitgeist. At root the two 
themes develop from Nietzsche’s critique of rationality, scientific method and therefore ‘reality’, 
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However, Nietzsche’s thought also unites the other strand of my earlier analysis, the idea of the 
‘ecstatic vision’. Certainly, the linguistic developments and the blurring of more dispassionate 
(scientific) academic styles with more informal subjective (narrative) work reviewed above relate 
in some measure to the Nietzschean critique on privileged vantage-points. However, this was 
only one aspect of the ‘ecstatic vision’, the other being the character of ‘ecstasy’ itself. Here too, 
Nietzsche’s work is of prime importance, and especially The Birth of Tragedy once again. For 
while The Birth of Tragedy forms an oblique critique of science as discussed above, it ostensibly 
deals with the relation between the Apolline and Dionysiac in art. Nietzsche describes artistic 
endeavour in terms of a ‘perpetual antagonism’ between these two polarized approaches which 
are only united, he suggests, in Attic tragedy [Nietzsche, 1967; p 33]. While he associates the 
Apolline more with sculpture, a concern with surface appearance, individuation and the clarity of 
depiction (and hence with the rational and scientific mind), the Dionysiac overcomes this rational 
ordering, producing a loss of clarity, a blurring of the principles of individuation which Nietzsche 
describes in terms of “rausch” or an intoxication. For Nietzsche this response is arrived at through 
music, particularly in his opinion that of Wagner, although Tanner offers a more contemporary 
analogy of this loss of identity among the community of spectators in football crowds [Tanner, 
1994]. 
 
I would wish to suggest a further contemporary parallel, for the character of “rausch” described 
by Nietzsche carries important associations with the idea of ‘ecstasy’ introduced earlier. 
Nietzsche describes the “...curious blending and duality in the emotions of the Dionysian revellers 
[which] reminds us...of the phenomenon that pain begets joy, that ecstasy may wring sounds of 
agony from us. At the very climax of joy there sounds a cry of horror or a yearning lamentation 
for an irretrievable loss” [Nietzsche, 1967; p 40]. As with the writing of Koolhaas, Sinclair and 
the rhetoric of the Cities exhibition a duality of excitement and yet horror is critical. But 
Nietzsche is more specific as to the causes of this horror than these others. He argues that, 
 
...Schopenhauer has depicted for us the tremendous terror which seizes man when he is 
suddenly dumbfounded by the cognitive form of phenomena because the principle of 
sufficient reason, in some one of its manifestations, seems to suffer an exception. If we 
add to this terror the blissful ecstasy that wells from the innermost depths of man, indeed 
of nature, at this collapse of the principium individuatonis, we steal a glimpse into the 
nature of the Dionysian, which is brought home to us most intimately by the analogy of 
intoxication” [ibid.; p 36]. 
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The ecstatic response is, therefore, rooted in the breakdown of reason in the face of phenomena 
that lie beyond the realm of accessibility. Initially I would suggest that the city may be, for many 
commentators such as those introduced above, just such a phenomenon. But Nietzsche puts 
emphasis upon the horror of ecstasy relating to an “irretrievable loss”. I wish to argue that what 
has been lost, within the envelope of the ‘post-Nietzschean’ critique of reality, is the conception 
of a material space. To justify this claim I wish to turn to the extremes of postmodern literature, 
both academic and literary (if such distinctions survive) before tracing these threads back to the 
more moderate positions of the theorists who are at the core of the ‘reassertion of space in critical 
social theory’. 
 
Baudrillard and Gibson: cyberpunks or social theorists? 
 
Best and Kellner accuse Baudrillard not only of extremism but also of “theoretical opportunism” 
(along with Lyotard), switching between extreme and more moderate position as is expedient 
[1997; pp 24-6]. But, however extreme his approach, they do not deny his significance, and 
indeed I will suggest that Baudrillard emerges as a critical fulcrum between the philosophical 
positions described above and the more contextual writing on cities. Baudrillard’s approach can 
be seen as a development from Nietzsche’s position in a number of ways, particularly in terms of 
its relativism and subjectivity, his highly aestheticized style of writing, and the idea of the 
‘simulacrum’
21 [Best and Keller, 1997; p 60]. 
 
However, Baudrillard’s important contribution is to relate Nietzsche’s critique of reality as it 
emerges through postmodern theory to the post-structuralist linguistic focus, particularly the ideas 
of semiotics. Baudrillard develops a critique of Marx, arguing that commodities are treated as 
signs and are valued as such more than for their use or exchange values. Indeed, he collapses the 
referent into the sign, arguing that “there is no fundamental difference between the referent and 
the signified” [quoted in Bertens, 1995; p 87]. The ‘real’ then, is replaced by a simulacrum that is 
the ‘hyperreal’ with the result that, “Los Angeles and the America surrounding it are no longer 
real, but of the order of the hyperreal and of simulation” [Baudrillard, 1983; p 25]. Bertens is 
dismissive of these later writings, arguing that, “he sketches a surreal apocalypse in terms that 
leave no room for argument...exhibit[ing] all the worst traits of post-structuralism; a contempt for 
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facts and definitions, a style that is equally reluctant to give concessions to the demands of the 
concrete, and a grand vision that develops distinctly metaphysical overtones” [op cit.; p 133]. 
 
These themes are perhaps most apparent in his America [Baudrillard, 1988a] in which America is 
reduced to “a great hologram”, a filmic simulacrum [p 29] which seems to reach its apogee on the 
freeways of Los Angeles and in the “labyrinthine convolution” of the Bonaventure Hotel which is 
“pure illusion...a box of spatio-temporal tricks” [p 59]
22. Indeed, as well as this obvious 
synechdoche, Baudrillard exhibits all the features of the alephic and ecstatic visions described 
previously. His narrative is driven by a preconception of what he will find (“I went in search of 
astral America...the America of the empty, absolute freedom of the freeways” [p 5]), and his 
response on finding his ‘aleph’ is one of ecstasy which has an undercurrent of his own brand of 
apocalyptic nihilism, (the desert is an “ecstatic form... an ecstatic critique of culture, and ecstatic 
form of disappearance” [p 5], just as New York provides “the sheer ecstasy of being together” [p 
15]). However, he is clear that he does not deny the existence of the real, as “radical thought does 
not annihilate the real...It puts it out of play, out of equivalence”. Rather he ‘does not believe in 
realism’, challenging reality through his focus on the simulacrum [1998; pp 23 and 34-5]. His 
approach bears a striking resemblance to that of Dalí as he argues that his intention is to “push the 
paradox to the limit...to the point of collapse” through thought as “provocative acceleration” [p 
23]. This limit, perhaps exceeded to collapse, results in what Best and Kellner describe as a 
“devouring” of truth, reality and power - ultimately “...a new stage of abstraction, a 
dematerialization of the world through semiological (re) processing in which images and signs 
take on a life of their own...” [1997; pp 95 and 99]. 
 
Virilio also advances similar arguments, focused around the influence of technology and what he 
has termed “La Vitesse de Libération”, the pre-eminent significance of the speed of light which 
becomes the critical measure of time and shrinking-space in the relativistic spaces of a 
communicational “teletopia” whose violent concertina risks an “economic and social crash”
23 
[Virilio, 1997 and 2000; p 67]. There are consequences for the city, the “real city, which is 
situated in a precise place...giving way to the virtual city”, a ‘de-territorialized meta-city’ at the 
centre of a communications web [2000; p 10]. However, like Baudrillard his argument extends to 
question not just the form of contemporary urbanism but also reality and space. He argues, 
developing the arguments of Lyotard, that scientific knowledge is now defined by that which can 
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be digitized, that as knowledge becomes ‘cybernetic’ the result is not the acceleration of history 
[‘as in the past’] but “the dizzying whirl of the acceleration of reality” resulting in, “a knowledge 
which denies all objective reality...the eclipse of the real” [Virilio, 2000; p 3 sic.]. “What is being 
revealed here”, he states in the characteristic declamatory style of the genre, “are the beginnings 
of the ‘end of space’...” 
 
This idea of the ‘end of space’ is explicitly explored in the writing of ‘cyberpunks’ such as 
William Gibson, whose work can be understood as part of the wider tradition of approaching 
issues of technology and identity through spatial imagination examined above. Indeed, Gibson’s 
work in particular is important for it forms a link between the postmodern theorists such as 
Baudrillard and the more moderate writing of geographers and others who would perhaps 
distance themselves from Baudrillard’s rhetorical excesses. As the boundaries between 
‘academic’ and ‘literary’ give way in the face of the post-structuralist and post-modern critique, 
Kellner is able to argue that Gibson’s Neuromancer can be read as social theory, in contrast to 
Baudrillard’s work, which can be considered science fiction, and goes so far as to argue that since 
both authors problematize the subject and notions of time and space, “providing cognitive 
mappings and poetic figuration to illuminate the constellations of our contemporary high-tech 
media culture”, Gibson has ‘taken over’ the challenging mantle that Baudrillard dropped as he 
became increasingly “dull and repetitive” in the late 1980’s  [Kellner, 1995; p 299]. 
 
The genre of fiction known as ‘cyberpunk’ is interesting because it represents the extreme 
development of the continuities between 19
th century and contemporary literature examined 
above, being predicated upon an implicitly spatial imagination revolving around the concept of 
‘virtual reality’, with many tacit links to contemporary academic thought. Following the template 
of modernism, the key driver for ‘cyberpunk’ remains the intersection between technology and 
identity, mediated through the spatial environment of both the city and ‘virtual reality’. In their 
wide-ranging review of the impact of telecommunications on the city, Graham and Marvin [1996] 
argue that “[t]he shift to telemediated economic and social networks undermines the old notion of 
the integrated, unitary city which has an identifiable boundary and is separated from others by 
Euclidean spaces and the all-powerful friction of distance” [p 71]. Similarly, Mitchell argues that 
what he terms the “infobahn” is reconfiguring spatial and temporal relationships, principally 
through the advent of fibre-optic networks and the Internet. Significantly, he argues that the 
                                                                                                                                                
23 Although their arguments are very similar Baudrillard is critical of Virilio’s analysis of the ‘cyberworld’ which he 
describes as “intransigent and inexorable” [Baudrillard, 1998; p 22]. The ‘rush to the post’ and ‘the eclipse of the real’ 110 
Internet is not simply a-spatial (a familiar although not itself uncontestable claim, I would argue), 
but that it is “fundamentally and profoundly anti spatial” [Mitchell, 1995; p 8]. 
 
The three authors, therefore, see these new telecommunications technologies as having a 
profound impact on our understanding of the urban, concluding, in a reiteration of the familiar 
theme of the Modernist epoch that, “[there is a] widening perception that we are losing our ability 
to view and understand the contemporary city...” [Graham and Marvin; 1996; p 376], to the 
extent that the “very notion of a city is challenged and must eventually be re-conceived” 
[Mitchell, 1995; p 107]. This demand for “new notions of place and urbanity”  [Graham and 
Marvin, 1996; p 71] becomes subsumed, however, within the search for a renewed understanding 
of identity, for critically the spatial implosion attributed to the current technological revolution 
condenses around the body. The central thesis, expounded by Mitchell among others, is that, 
“[w]e are all cyborgs now. Architects and urban designers of the digital era must begin by re-
theorizing the body in space” [op cit; p 28]. 
 
However, the most challenging explorations of what this new relationship between the body and 
space might be are to be found in the work of performance artists such as Stelarc
24 and the 
writings of the ‘cyberpunks’ such as William Gibson. Featherstone and Burrows offer a detailed 
description of the linkages between the nested terms ‘cyberpunk’ and ‘cyberspace’, exploring the 
variants of Barlovian and Gisbsonian cyberspace and the more generic ‘virtual reality’ 
[Featherstone and Burrows, 1995; pp 5-7]. However, it is the rhetorical excesses of Gibson’s 
fiction which emerge as epitomising both terms, and they reproduce Gibson’s own landmark 
definition of cyberspace as: 
 
A consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, in every 
nation, by children being taught mathematical concepts.... A graphic representation of 
data abstracted from the bank of every computer in the human system. Unthinkable 
complexity. Lines of light ranged in the nonspace of the mind, clusters and constellations 
of data. Like city lights receding. [Gibson, 1984; p 51, quoted in Featherstone and 
Burrows; 1995; p 6]. 
 
Indeed, others such as Rushkoff widen the definition, arguing that ‘cyberia’ is where one goes 
both in “the wildest speculations of every imagination” and in out of body experiences alluded to 
by all mystic religions. He argues that this heady blend of technological change and “the rebirth 
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of ancient spiritual ideas” have “convinced a growing number of people that Cyberia is the 
dimensional plane in which humanity will soon find itself” [Rushkoff, 1994; pp 16-17]. And yet 
this dimensional plane is no promised Eden. As Mitchell notes (in relation to the possibilities of 
teleworking) there is a considerable polarization of attitudes which he interprets along politicized 
lines as a right wing hope for a return to family values and stable localized communities, and a 
left wing fear of a return to the [digital] dark satanic mill [op cit.; p 102]. 
 
The polarities are more apparent in fictional responses. Pawley’s Terminal Architecture takes up 
Graham and Marvin’s demand for new conceptions of place and urbanity with an exploration of 
possible architectural futures. The title, Terminal Architecture captures the bifurcation typical of 
the genre, suggesting as it does on the one hand the redundancy and inevitable failure of current 
approaches, as well as expressing the hope of a renewed architectural, urban and social vision 
based around the idea of the building as a ‘terminal’ through which to access the “operating 
system” of an alternative reality. The resulting flight of imagination, Terminal 2098, a notional 
visit to the Ideal Terminal Exhibtion of 2098 (“We dont say house [home] anymore we say 
‘terminal’”), bears many resemblances to Robinson’s tour of England or Sinclair’s suggestive 
psyco-geographic derivés around the East End in its focus upon the “authentic architecture” of 
distribution centres, factories and petrol stations and disturbing imagery of pervasive security and 
decay. The description is of a landscape of Tardis-like ‘terminals’ which through access to a 
technological placenta become “brain pods, virtual worlds”, more ‘real’ than the ‘outside’ to the 
extent that, when asked “What’s it like living in Dorset?” [where, incongruously, Terminal 2098 
is set], the interviewee responds; 
 
Terminal people don’t think like that.... They’ve left all that stuff behind them. Time is a 
vast continuum for them. Just like space. Jim doesn’t think about living in Dorset, he 
lives everywhere [Pawley, 1998; pp 15-16]. 
 
Pawley’s fictional character, like Keiller’s Robinson, acts as a mediator to the author’s own 
views, and shows clear parallels with the semiotic collapse of Baudrillard’s America;  
 
I realized that our progress [by jeep] over this bland but uneven landscape was a 
paradigm of the future, as purposeful yet as meaningless as the noise of a tank, car or 
plane in a video game. Everything that had happened in 100 years had already begun 
happening in our own time. Nothing was new. Everything was different [ibid.; p 18]. 
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This is the prelude to his assessment of the potential for a new urbanism, based in the conviction 
of the computer as “a state-of-the-art medium for simulating and transforming reality that could 
transcend time and distance: a piece of equipment capable of creating reality that could become 
part of the normal equipment of everyday life anywhere and everywhere in the world”[p 28]. 
Crucially, “this, of course, is what is beginning to take shape today” he claims, as satellite 
communications have, “made the concept of physical travelling speed as meaningless as it was 
thousands of years ago, when mankind could only walk” [ibid.; pp 164 and 166]. The “of course” 
is important, for here we see resurface the didacticism that was a common trait of the 
Topographics series. Speaking of the present (and therefore on my behalf!) he argues that, 
“Citizens feel as though they are dwindling to the size of pygmies while their states of 
communication, which are the ‘cities’ they really live in, are growing to infinite size.... It is as 
though the environment they have lived in for years has suddenly been magnified one million 
times while they, its former masters, have become no more than atoms within it” [ibid.]. 
 
Such interpretations of the future/present are not isolated. Indeed, they have percolated from 
perhaps the literary fringes of cyberpunk to mainstream incarnations in recent films such as The 
Net, The Matrix, and eXistenZ, (all released 2000-2001) as well as their now cult-classic 
predecessors Tron and Bladerunner, which explore Mitchell’s claim that “we are all cyborgs 
now” [ibid.; p 28]. This genre is important to my argument for two reasons.  Firstly, it illustrates 
the blurring of contemporary theoretical and imaginative approaches which exhibit “a ‘habit’ of 
folding into each other” in what Featherstone and Burrows describe as “a recursive relation 
between the fictional and the analytic”, which they parody as “a hyperreal positive feedback 
loop” [op cit.; p 9]. Secondly, and more importantly, in consequence of this blurring we find the 
central themes of the alephic and the ecstatic visions emerging in the work of the cyberpunks as 
we did in the analysis of the theorists examined above. But it is through an analysis of the 
literature of cyberpunk, drawing on Coyne’s notion of ‘technoromanticism’, that we can finally 
validate the merging of the two main themes of this section, and show that it is de-materialized 
space that is seen to be the catalyst of contemporary ‘ecstasis’, no longer the city itself. 
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Ecstasy, The Aleph and the ‘postmodern’ vision 
 
Gibson himself describes Neuromancer as “a way of trying to come to terms with the awe and 
terror inspired in me by the world in which we live” [Gibson, quoted in Kellner, 1995]. We have 
charted this duality between ‘awe’ and ‘terror’ from the nineteenth century literature examined in 
the previous part (4.2) through the ‘modern’ literary responses to the city of contemporary 
authors. However, recently this duality has become more blurred as what Prendergast terms 
narratives of “end-time” (the dystopian view of imminent disaster) and of “playtime” (the 
jouissance or thrill of the urban) have moulded into one [Prendergast, 1992; p 207]. While 
affirming that “if apocalyptic imaginings and ludic fantasies have acquired pride of place among 
our postmodern urban shibboleths, they are less novel than we might think”, I would reject the 
continued distinction that Prendergast draws between these two narratives in the contemporary 
context in which “the fixative [of the collage-city is] no longer holding, as life speeds up more 
and more” [ibid.]. Rather, the two narratives of end-time and playtime, paralleled in Koolhaas’ 
reference to the theatres of the beginning and end of the world on Coney Island [see above p 58], 
have become fused, mirroring the duality of Nietzsche’s ‘rausch’. We see this transition in the 
move from the clean aspirational styling of Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey to “the more grimy, 
post-urban realism of Batman, Neuromancer and Bladerunner” [Rushkoff, 1994; p 17], in the 
apocalyptic arousal of Ballard’s Crash and Cocaine Nights [Ballard, 1995 and 1996] and in 
Fielder’s question, “Do those who imagine the end of the city, whether in fire or ice, wish it or 
dread it - or, like me, dread they wish it, wish they dreaded it?” [Fielder, 1981; p 120]. 
 
Coyne characterizes such responses as “technoromanticism” and draws parallels with the earlier 
Romantic movement of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries. In particular, he stresses the 
inheritance of Kant and Burke’s idea of the ‘sublime’ – “awe and admiration at the various 
spectacles of nature...arousing emotions akin to fear rather than merely joy” [Coyne, 1999; p 60-
61
25]. Kant makes the contrast between the responses to the ‘beautiful’ and ‘sublime’, suggesting 
that, “The mien of a man who is undergoing the full feeling of the sublime is earnest, sometimes 
rigid and astonished.... [the] feeling is sometimes accompanied with a certain dread, or 
                                                 
25 See also Davis’ Ecology and Fear [1998] where he argues that in the face of natural disasters Los Angeles is 
reinventing itself from former “Land of Sunshine” to “Book of Apocalypse theme park”, partly though literature that 
seems to revel in the destruction of the city on average three times annually since the 1950’s [pp 6-7 and 276]. He notes 
that “[n]o other city seems to excite such dark rapture” and although he sees in this the re-emergence of the ghost of 
idea of romantic sublime, he argues that for Los Angeles, the horror tinged with pleasure of the sublime is turned more 
in favour of the pleasure of destruction [p 277]. 
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melancholy...”, a state which Kant describes as the “terrifying sublime”, offering a series of 
illustrations of enjoyment tinged with horror: such as “...Night is sublime, day is beautiful...The 
sublime moves, the beautiful charms” [Kant, 1991; p 47-48]
26. Burke is more explicit, stating that,  
 
Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain, and danger, that is to say, 
whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a 
manner analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime; that is, it is productive of the 
strongest emotion which the mind is capable of feeling... When danger or pain press too 
nearly, they are incapable of giving any delight, and are simply terrible; but at certain 
distances, and with certain modifications, they may be, and they are delightful, as we 
every day experience [Burke, 1970]. 
 
Coyne’s analysis of a re-emergence of the Kantian sublime parallels closely the analysis above of 
Nietzsche’s ‘rausch’. Indeed, the Kantian sublime is the cornerstone of Lyotard’s argument in La 
Condition Postmoderne, and there are many resonances with the critique of academic authority 
and authorship and the rejection of unitary meta-narratives in favour of a polyvalent multiple 
understanding that is the hallmark of postmodernism. Kant’s approach in the Observations is to 
look for an understanding of the beautiful and sublime in the reaction of viewers, and not in the 
object itself
27. His was a revolutionary approach (in contrast to the rationalists) because of this 
subjectivism, his descriptive rather than prescriptive style which draws upon his own experience, 
and his rejection of the essentiality of unity to beauty, declaring that “Multiplicity is beautiful” 
[Kant, 1991; p 67, Goldthwait, 1991; p 23]. Furthermore, Kant’s distinction between the 
noumenal (real but unknowable) world and the phenomenal (knowable but filtered through 
consciousness) world dovetails with Baudrillard’s claim that “radical thought does not annihilate 
the real...It puts it out of play” [op cit.]. 
 
We saw above that this ‘postmodern turn’ resulted in the merging of what I had termed the 
alephic and ecstatic visions, and it was suggested, without substantiation, that it was the 
experience of space itself that now prompts the response of the sublime. Coyne’s analysis applied 
to the cyberpunk literature, legitimates this link by arguing that the current “technoromanticism” 
unites the neo-romantic idea of the sublime with the neo-platonic idea of ‘ecstasis’ - the release of 
the soul from the body (that was described earlier in relation to Koolhaas’ work [see above, 
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chapter 3]). He argues that in the cybernetic narrative the idea of the soul is replaced by that of 
the mind, and the state of ‘cybernetic rapture’ achieved through the ‘ecstasis’ of the “immersion 
in an electronic datastream” [p 10]. This separation of mind from body means that “the material 
world [is] transcended by information” [ibid.]. He argues that this ‘cybernetic excess’ is evident 
in narratives which subvert notions of space and challenge the distinction between mind and 
body, reality and virtual reality; “[i]t is in the desire for ecstasis, and the mistrust of the body, that 
the confluence between Neoplatonism, romanticism, and the cyberspace theorists is strongest” [p 
47 and 65]. 
 
Featherstone and Burrows also point to the overcoming of the material body and the dissolution 
of the boundaries between subject, body and outside world as critical to the understanding of 
cyberspace. While Benedikt offers a moderate assessment of the possibilities of cyberspace to 
“violate the rules of space”, insisting that it remains within the limits of “credibility, orientation 
and narrative power” and offering the metaphysical middle-ground that cyberspace will “displace 
rather than replace objective reality”, other authors enthusiastically stretch the metaphysical 
possibilities much further [Featherstone and Burrows; 1995, Benedikt, 1991b; pp 124-5]. 
Notably, Heim in the same volume argues that, “cyberspace is more than a breakthrough in 
electronic media or in computer interface design. With its virtual environments and computer 
simulated worlds, cyberspace is a metaphysical laboratory, a tool for examining our very sense of 
reality”, and more beligerently still, Rushkoff asserts that there is a “battle for your reality”, 
which is “up for grabs” [Heim, 1991; p 59, Rushkoff, 1994; pp 13-15, emphasis added]. The 
consequences of Cyberspace are summed up by Rushkoff with a quotation from McKenna, 
 
We’re going to find out what ‘being’ is.... We’re going the distance with the most 
profound event that a planetary ecology can encounter, which is the freeing of life from 
the chrysalis of matter [ibid.; p 19]. 
 
As with the analysis of Soja’s ontology presented in chapter 2, so here the analysis of postmodern 
theory (which concluded with the “dematerialization of the world through semiological 
(re)processing”) and of the cyberpunk fiction (which “marginalizes the world of practice - of 
material, human, and technological contexts [through the] trope of dematerialization” [Coyne, 
1999; p 68]) both end with this dematerialization of the understanding of space. Gibson’s work 
was seen to be pivotal, blending cyberpunk and social theory. However, Gibson is also the 
fulcrum for another merging, between cyberpunk and the more moderate analysis presented by 
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argued that Neuromancer is a “stunning example of how realist ‘extrapolative’ science fiction can 
operate as a prefigurative social theory...” [Davis, 1992, quoted in Featherstone and Burrows, 
1995; p 6, see also Bukatman, 1993; p 144 on the relationship between Davis, Gibson and 
Bladerunner]. This link from Davis through Gibson to the ideas of Baudrillard among others is 
interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly, because Davis is an important commentator on Los 
Angeles which, more than any other city, has been at the forefront of recent debates about the 
nature of the urban and has been of critical importance to key theorists such as Soja, Jameson, 
Harvey and others. Secondly, it is important because Davis writes within a generally Marxist 
framework, and this is a common inheritance that he shares with many key figures among the 
‘respatialization theorists’, significantly Soja, Harvey, Castells and Lefebvre. Critically, however, 
it points to a common approach to space between the postmodern extremists such as Baudrillard 
and these more moderate theorists, not only in terms of empirical approaches to questions of 
urbanism, but also in terms of epistemological issues of the approach to space and therefore 
theoretical, ontological, even metaphysical questions relating to space. 
 
 
4.4 ‘Freeing life from the chrysalis of matter’ – ‘spatialization reigns supreme’
28  
 
It is inevitably dangerous to group together such authors amongst whom there are many subtle 
nuances of position and interpretation as well as glaring differences of opinion (as much as there 
were between the various ‘post-’ positions examined briefly above). However, I would assert that 
the commonality lies in what is not theorized rather than in what is; that is to say that a material 
understanding of space is dropped in favour of a more ‘socially sensitive’ idea of ‘spatiality’. This 
in itself is not necessarily problematic, were it not for the fact that the ‘cultural turn’ that is 
implicit in postmodernism has drawn commentators such as Soja, Harvey, and Castells away 
from the conservatism of their Marxist roots towards an engagement with contemporary cultural 
expressions and the ‘experience’ of contemporary urbanism [for example Soja, 1996, Harvey, 
1989, Castells, 1996]. Without a framework that is able to deal empirically with the use and 
experience of space as well as making theoretical linkages within the socio-spatial problematic, 
such texts have recourse to the imposed and universalized ‘experiences’ of the commentators 
themselves. The result is the replaying of the well-worn characterizations of urban and spatial 
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experience examined above: that space is fragmented, chaotic, and cities a bewildering 
cacophony of signs and images that exhibit the traits of the alephic and ecstatic visions
29.  
 
Certainly Jameson is a key bridge between the theoretical developments of Baudrillard, Lyotard, 
Lacan and others and authors such as Soja, Harvey and Castells, and he similarly notes that “[t]he 
more fundamental modification in the situation today involves those who were once able to avoid 
using the word [postmodernism], out of principle; not many of them are left” [Jameson, 1991; p 
xv]. He is among the first to draw the parallel between postmodernism as an aesthetic theory and 
epistemological critique, and the process of capitalism and to claim that, “[I]t is in the realm of 
architecture, however, that modifications in aesthetic production are most visible, and that their 
theoretical problems have been most centrally raised and articulated”, architecture being in some 
sense “a privileged aesthetic language” (1984; 1991; p 2 and 37). Jameson’s discussion of the 
Bonaventure Hotel in Los Angeles and his reliance upon Venturi, Scott-Brown and Izenour’s 
Learning from Las Vegas set a precedent for the treatment of architectural and urban issues. 
Jameson’s Bonaventure, which through the most extreme synechdotal extrapolation becomes the 
referent for a universalized “lived experience of built space itself” [ibid.; p 6], is treated in terms 
of the “depthlessness” that Jameson finds in his analysis of Warhol’s Diamond Dust Shoes [ibid.; 
pp 8 to 10]. He argues that, “[n]or is this depthlessness merely metaphorical: it can be 
experienced physically and ‘literally’...” and continues, drawing on ideas of the fragmentation of 
the subject and schizophrenia from Lacan and Lyotard’s notions of ‘intensities’ and the sublime, 
that “I think it is at least empirically arguable that our daily life, our psychic experience, our 
cultural languages, are today dominated by categories of space rather than by categories of time” 
[p 16, emphasis added]. 
 
And yet he does not present this ‘empirical evidence’ in support of his claim that, “the city itself 
...has deteriorated or disintegrated to a degree surely inconceivable in the early years of the 
twentieth century” [p 33]. He begins his analysis of the Bonaventure with the assertion and 
clarification of his earlier remarks; 
 
I am proposing the notion that we are here in the presence of something like a mutation 
of built space itself. My implication is that we ourselves, the human subjects who happen 
into this new space, have not kept pace with that evolution; there has been a mutation in 
                                                 
29 Cloke, Philo and Sadler provide a useful distinction between postmodernism as subject (of study), object (such as the 
Bonaventure) and attitude (of authors to subject and object), and the tendency for these distinctions to become blurred 
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the object unaccompanied as yet by any equivalent mutation in the subject. We do not yet 
possess the perceptual equipment to match this new hyperspace... [ibid.; p 38] 
 
Jameson’s account of the ‘architectural space’ of the Bonaventure is an unstable mix of the 
‘architectural’ treated as allegorical (particularly the technical components of the building; the 
elevators, ‘gigantic kinetic sculptures’, ‘emblems of movement’ and ‘allegorical devices’, and the 
exterior whose “glass skin repels the outside’) and the spatial treated in terms of the movement of 
people. He argues that visitors are characterized by “milling confusion, something like the 
vengeance this space takes on those who walk through it”, suggesting that what he terms the 
“total space” of the Bonaventure, symptomatic of his new space of postmodernity, corresponds to 
“a new collective practice, something like the practice of a new and historically original kind of 
hypercrowd” [pp 40-43]. He universalises his own disorientating experience in the Bonaventure 
to a general defining condition of the contemporary (“I am anxious that Portman’s space not be 
perceived as something either exceptional or seemingly marginalized” [p 44]), characterized by 
the “transcend[ence] of the capabilities of the individual human body to locate itself” and 
ultimately, “an alarming disjunction point between the human body and its built environment” 
[ibid.]. Indeed, it is perhaps critical distance, the possibility for objective analysis, that “has very 
precisely been abolished in the new space of postmodernism. We are submerged [he continues] in 
its henceforth filled and suffused volumes to the point where our now postmodern bodies are 
bereft of spatial co-ordinates and practically (let alone theoretically) incapable of distanciation” [p 
49]. 
 
Although Harvey is critical of Jameson for “losing his foothold [as does Baudrillard in his 
‘frenetic writings’] on both the reality he is seeking to represent and the language that might 
properly be deployed to represent it”, he nonetheless follows Jameson in his treatment of the 
Bonaventure Hotel and the approach to architecture generally [Harvey, 1989; p 351]. Once again, 
Harvey is drawn towards a discussion of the ‘lived experience’ of urbanism which, despite his 
being “refreshingly sceptical of hyperbole” [Bertens; 1995; p 220], tends towards the same 
imposed and unsubstantiated ‘readings’ of the urban experience which founder on a confusion of 
architectural style and a presumed impact upon perception and behaviour
30. Similarly, Castells 
focuses upon the socio-spatial relation, arguing, as do Jameson, Harvey, and Lefebvre
31, that 
                                                 
30 A more detailed analysis of Harvey’s approach to space is the subject of chapter 6. 
31 I have chosen in this section, which aims briefly to draw the link between authors such as Castells, Harvey, Soja and 
contemporary social theory, to omit a discussion of the work of Lefebvre whose ideas underpin most current writing on 
socio-spatial issues. I have one defence for this; that it has been my intention throughout this thesis to reach theoretical 
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space should be considered as “an historically-constituted social relation”, as a material product 
of social practice rather than as a “physical given” which “presupposes the determination of  
social behaviour by reactions to a particular physical environment”, thus drawing a clear 
distinction between ‘habitat’ and ‘inhabiting’ [1977; p vii ,115 and 105]. He clarifies, “[a]lthough 
spatial forms may accentuate or deflect certain systems of behaviour...they have no independent 
effect, and, consequently, there is no systematic link between different urban contexts and ways 
of life” [p 108]. 
 
His more recent work joins the debate on the impact of technologies [1989, 1996, 1997, 1998] 
and proposes a new ‘space of flows’ as the expression of contemporary ‘network society’, 
following from his earlier assertion that “there is no theory of space that is not an integral part of 
a general social theory” [1996; p 410; 1977; p 115]. However, in understanding space as “the 
material organization for time-sharing social practices” he creates a division between the 
essentially conceptual space of the network of circuits of electronic impulses, nodes and hubs and 
managerial elites that make up the space of flows, and the residual spaces where, “[t]he space of 
flows does not permeate down to the whole realm of human experience in the network society” 
[ibid; pp 412-415 and 423]. “Indeed [he continues] the overwhelming majority of people, in 
advanced and traditional societies alike, live in places, and so they perceive their space as place-
based”. This signals a return to the conception of space in terms of meaning that was prominent in 
The City and the Grassroots, where he argued that, “[w]e will call urban social change the 
redefinition of urban meaning” [1983; p 304]. Hence we find a similar distinction to that in 
Jameson’s work between space on the one hand as abstract and related in some way to what 
Castells calls “time-sharing social practices” [1996; p 412], Jameson terms “collective practice” 
(and that I will term co-presence, following Hillier and Giddens in the following section), and 
space conceived in terms of meaning. 
 
These two unresolved understandings tend both to be mobilized in passages dealing with the 
“lived experience” of architectural and urban space. The argument thus far, originating with the 
‘case studies’ of Soja and the Cities exhibition and broadening these initial themes through the 
                                                                                                                                                
philosophical debates are emergent from empirical real-world problems, “to make philosophical speculation 
responsible to reality” [Smith, 1990; p viii, see above, chapter 1]. Lefebvre offers little opportunity for this type of 
analysis as his work, particularly the influential Production of Space does not engage in any substantive way with the 
phenomenal realm. As Harvey says; “Show me where it is Henri!” [comment at public lecture LSE, 1999]. I will 
therefore return to the work of Lefebvre in the summary of the following section, having explored through empirical 
work the possibility for a synthesis of ‘spatiality’ (perhaps epitomized in Lefebvre’s position) and a material approach 
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discussion of contemporary theoretical and literary approaches, has sought to illustrate that there 
exists a common understanding of the ‘lived experience’ of cities that, despite the differences in 
approach between different authors, is united by the rejection of a material space at the heart of 
the socio-spatial problematic. It was argued in chapter 1 that this rejection neutralised the threat 
of a latent determinism and the reductionism of spatial science. The result is that without an 
effective empirical tool for analysing the experience and use of space, authors rely heavily upon 
unsubstantiated assertions which, while claiming to access a common experience, in fact 
constitute a ‘lifting off’ of explanation from common understandings of space, related to the 
material environment. 
 
Chambers argues the point forcefully, parodying the synechdochal reference to particular sites 
that I have drawn attention to (in this case the ubiquitous ‘airport as city’ and the 747 as the 
vantage point of the academic; see Augé, 1995, 2000; Barber, 2001; Chambers, 1987, 1990; 
Haggett, 2001; Hertmans, 2001; Pascoe, 2001; Sinclair, 1997; Sudjic, 1992; Virilio, 1997 among 
others including Koolhaas and the Cities exhibition examined above). He argues that the airport is 
a “metaphor of cosmopolitan existence” where the pleasure of travel is not only to arrive but also 
to be “simultaneously everywhere”. However, he twists this around drawing a parallel, as I have 
sought to do, between the position and positionality of the ‘academic flâneur’, updated in his 
analysis to the academic air traveller. It is worth quoting again in full: 
 
It [being simultaneously everywhere] is a condition typical not only of the contemporary 
traveller, but also of many a contemporary intellectual. Viewed from 35,000 feet, the 
world becomes a map. Recently some of the views brought back from the high flying 
have arrived at the conclusion that the world is indeed a map. At that height it is possible 
to draw connections over vast distances, ignoring local obstacles and conditions. At that 
height certain common-sense objections (‘down-to-earth’ views) to a reading of the 
terrain can be ignored. When further height is gained, the flight plan only needs to 
consider the relation between the plane (undergoing rapid transformation into a spaceship 
at this point) and the flat referent beneath its fuselage. At this point, the meanings of 
events elsewhere are incapable of penetrating the space we have put between ourselves 
and them. Meaning contracts into the pressurized cabin. Life inside the plane, with the 
observation it affords, becomes more ‘real’ than the ‘reality’ we presume to observe. 
Knowledge of the social, political and cultural globe becomes the knowledge of a second-
order reality, a ‘simulacrum’ [Chambers, 1987; p 1-2, see above, chapter 1 p 16]. 
 
Chambers’ metaphor precisely captures the elements of my argument, the idea of a blurring 
between epistemological, ontological and metaphysical positions that is the hallmark of an 
attempt to engage with the perception, behaviour and use of space with a theory that lacks an 
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There is then, I would argue, something approaching what in Williams’ terminology might be 
called a new ‘structure of feeling’ about space. Thrift uses this term in relation to his theory of 
‘mobility’ in which he argues that we are living in an “almost/not quite world” of a nascent 
cyborg culture resulting from a shift in the realm of experience characterized by changes in the 
“machinic complexes” of speed, light and power [Thrift, 1994; pp 191-2]. His argument engages 
with many of the same themes that I have addressed here, but from a more sympathetic 
standpoint, arguing for “an almost/not quite ontology” that results from the late twentieth century 
synthesis of speed, light and power. In his “new order reality” in which “the modern world is 
increasingly seen as decentralised and fragmented”, space takes on “critical importance” as “a 
battlefield and zone of mixing, blending, blurring, hybridizations”, and is understood in terms of 
boundaries and boundedness which transgress the physical and non-physical to constitute “a new 
kind of materiality” which rejects the analytical independence of space in favour of a Bergsonian 
‘space-time’ [ibid.; 215-9]. 
 
Despite our divergent arguments, Thrift’s explanation and defence of the ‘structure of feeling’ 
concept in the context of a changing understanding of the experience of space can equally apply 
here. Certainly, I have sought to justify the most superficial understanding in terms of ‘the culture 
of a period’, and further that the change is wider than simply the ‘institutional or formal’, 
consistent with a “change of style which also turns out to be a change of content”, and is related 
to an [assumed] experience with [claimed] palpable effects
32. However, I am interested by his 
interpretation of a ‘structure of feeling’ as a process and note that he turns to the “social and 
cultural conditions of academe out of which this structure of feeling has arisen”, while noting that 
“we have now reached a point where western cultures have become increasingly self-referential” 
especially in relation to “sources and horizons of meaning... which are based in hybrid images of 
machine and organism, especially images based on speed, light, and power” [ibid.; 192-3]. 
 
I wish to argue that this spatial ‘structure of feeling’ is born of a process of academic inflection 
within the fuselage of Chambers’ pressurized cabin, and through the abandonment of all notions 
of space relating to ‘material objects’ (that is the ‘enclosure’ which Thrift relegates to a “mystical 
past” [ibid.; p 218]
33) compromises the possibility of extending this new and impoverished  
understanding of space into empirical work dealing with the use and experience of space. While 
Thrift provides evidence of such an ‘empirical bent’ in the social sciences and humanities now 
                                                 
32 These qualifications relate to Thrift’s summary of the structure of feeling concept. See also Williams, 1977. 
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“saturated with the vocabulary of mobility”, these range from “nomadic criticism” to “the 
increasing use of metaphors based on maps, topography, billboards, networks, circuits, flows”, 
work on the “not quite/almost places of mobility” (such as airports once again, that recurrent 
synechdotal device), the “extraordinary...importance of street life”, and the “meanings of 
electronic spaces...the communication spaces of the telephone, fax and radio”, none of these 
approaches relate to a physical space grounded in matter or, following Thrift, ‘enclosure’ [ibid.; p 
228, emphasis added]. 
 
However, it is in just such accounts, which nonetheless often presume to describe some common 
experience of space, that space is reified in terms of the ‘ecstatic’ or ‘sublime’. And indeed, this 
should be no surprise since Jameson argues that the Kantian sublime, which underlies both his 
and Lyotard’s foundational description of postmodernism, differs from the Burkian in including 
within it a sense of a ‘crisis of representation’, such that “the object of the sublime becomes not 
only a matter of sheer power and of the physical incommensurability of the human organism with 
nature but also of the limits of figuration and the incapacity of the human mind to give 
representation to such enormous forces” [Jameson, 1991; p 34]. As Gregory argues, “the sublime 
is of immense importance for postmodern thought”, because; 
 
it marks that moment when we confront something that  we are unable to represent as a 
purposive unity, something that exceeds our capacity for totalization, intuitively or 
conceptually, and when we are wrenched away from our tranquil contemplation of the 
world’s seemingly obedient regularity [Gregory, 1994; p 143]. 
 
But Jameson is yet more precise in identifying the instigator of the “hysterical sublime”: it relates 
to the impossibility of representing the ‘new global spaces’ of late capitalism in which “our 
bodies are bereft of spatial co-ordinates”, and which have “moved closest to the surface of our 
consciousness, as a coherent new type of space in its own right” [1984; pp 87-8].  
 
Such concerns with the possibility of representing (and hence understanding) cities and space 
preoccupy authors such as Pile and Thrift. They conclude their City A-Z with a ‘Technical Note’ 
which draws a parallel between their approach to the [edited] text (“a vortex of thoughts”) and the 
possibility for knowledge of the city understood as “a patchwork of intersecting fields, as a 
discordant symphony of overlapping fragments...to all intents and purposes, an unassimilable, 
irreducible and sometimes even incomprehensible entity” [Pile and Thrift, 2000; pp 303 and 309]. 
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city in favour of opening a ‘space’ of tension using their “representational technologies” of 
diagrams, montage, screen and clues. However, their appeal to the impossibility of ‘knowing’ a 
totality such as the city (a reductio ad absurdum with which no-one could disagree) is used as a 
veil for the abandonment of a more plausible, though evidently for Pile and Thrift less appealing, 
project of a systematic understanding of the city. Such an understanding founders on the fashion 
for contextual rather than material understanding of space, fostered by the lack of a coherent 
theory for linking material space and society without recourse to the deeply unfashionable spatial 
science or comprehensively rejected determinism. 
 
I would point, therefore, to a crisis of representation of the ‘old’ material spaces in contrast to the 
‘new global spaces’ which have been the focus of ‘saturating’ attention, and, in contrast to 
Jameson who argues that the postmodern sublime can only be theorized in terms of “that other 
reality of economic and social institutions”, would point to this abandonment of a material 
approach as the genesis of the current ‘sublime’ or ecstatic approach to the understanding of cities 
and space generally [Jameson; 1991; p 38]. As Chambers argues, there are “stubborn referents - 
material, sometimes even geological - that periodically pierce the daily networks of sense”, and 
he extends his airport analogy by suggesting that the academic high-fliers are ‘in-flight’ in the 
alternative sense of fleeing this confrontation with the material [Chambers, 1987; p 2]
34. In the 
current atmosphere of scepticism towards realism and the fear of a latent determinism and 
scientific reductionism in any discourse relating a physical space to social outcomes, there is no 
adequate empirical approach to the use and experience of ‘lived spaces’, a lack compounded by 
empiricism’s, “sober narratives of common-sense realism [which] leave no space for the heady 
speculations of [its usual antagonist,] romanticism” [Coyne, 1999; p 68]. 
 
There are two possible ways to proceed. The first is typified by Chambers. He argues that both 
Benjamin and Nietzsche (key protagonist in the development of the current ‘structure of feeling’ 
towards space that I have outlined), “in considering attempts to represent the sense, the pulse, the 
fullness and tactile sensuousness of the world, recognise the necessity of failure” and that, “there 
is ultimately...no resolution [between multiple perspectives]. We are condemned to wander - 
critically, emotionally, politically...passionately, in a world characterized by an excess of sense 
which while offering the chance of meaning continues to flee ahead of us. This is our only world, 
our responsibility, our only chance” [Chambers, 1990; p 12]. The ‘rush to the post’ and ‘the eclipse of the real’ 124 
 
The alternative case, while couched in equally fatalistic language, is put by Bertens; 
 
After an overlong period in which Enlightenment universalist representationalism 
dominated the scene, and a brief, but turbulent period in which its opposite, radical anti-
representationalism, captured the imagination, we now find ourselves in the difficult 
position of trying to honor the claims of both, of seeing the value of both 
representationalism and anti-representationalism, of both consensus and dissensus...this is 
our fate: to reconcile the demands of rationality and those of the sublime, to negotiate a 
permanent crisis in the name of precarious stabilities [1995; p 248] 
 
 
It is this reconciliation that is the aim of the second section of this thesis - an alternative 
representation of space, based in materialism, that opens the opportunity for empirical study of 
the use and experience of space without resorting to determinism, and which also advances not a 
‘reassertion’ of space into social theory, but an approach to the socio-spatial problematic that is 
resolutely spatial from the outset.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
34 I acknowledge that this is to use Chambers’ attractive concept somewhat out of context, as his notion of the real that 
academics are in flight from, “violence, strikes, war, earthquakes...”, has little common ground with my proposition of 
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Section 2 - Reconstruction 
 
Introduction 
 
The world of supermodernity does not exactly match the one in which we believe we 
live, for we live in a world that we have not yet learned to look at. We have to relearn to 
think about space. 
Non-Places; introduction to an anthropology of supermodernity, [Augé, 1995; pp 35-6] 
 
In the first section I have sought to twist conventional arguments to suggest that if at the heart of 
contemporary theory there is a crisis of representation, provoked predominantly by our difficulty 
in representing space, it lies not in our ability to represent the ‘new spaces’ or ‘spatialities’ which, 
as Chambers notes, have become the focus of saturating attention, but rather in our continued 
difficulty in representing the ‘old space’ of material phenomena. Bertens emphasises that this 
‘crisis’ is peculiar to the humanities and is dismissed by the ‘hard sciences’
1. Indeed, there are 
many on the fringes of the cyberpunk/social theory melting pot who decry the genre’s excesses. 
Graham and Marvin argue that the notion that the material city has been ‘undermined’ is “naive, 
short-sighted and dangerous”, and Featherstone and Massey counter assertions by Rushkoff 
among others that “the attitudes of the cyberians will become as difficult to ignore as the 
automatic teller machine and MTV”, questioning their claimed impact
2. Kevin Robins is perhaps 
the most outspoken detractor, arguing in a parody of Gibson’s Neuromancer,  that “[t]he 
contemporary debate on cyberspace and virtual reality is something of a consensual hallucination 
too”, driven by a “feverish belief in transcendence”, to the degree that ideas of a new and 
alternative space or reality represent a “tunnel vision [which] has turned a blind eye on the world 
we live in” [Robins, 1995]. 
 
However, this appeal to address the ‘world we live in’ juxtaposed to a ‘new’ and transcendental 
sense of space and reality is problematic, for it appears to advocate a return to a previous  
                                                 
1 See for example Sokal and Bricmont’s scathing parody of the ‘abuse’ of science by the ‘intellectual impostures’ of 
postmodern philosophers [Sokal and Bricmont, 1999]. 
2 Featherstone argues that; “ ...theorists of the postmodern often talk of an ideal-type channel-hopping MTV (music 
television) viewer who flips through different images at such speed that she/he is unable to chain the signifiers together 
into a meaningful narrative, he/she merely enjoys the multiphrenic intensities and sensations of  the surface of the 
images. Evidence of the extent of such practices, and how they are integrated into, or influence, the day-to-day 
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consensus in the approach to space and in particular its contentious relation to society and the 
material realm, that has never existed. I wish, then, to approach this problem from the aspect of a 
‘crisis of representation’ of space, and to propose the configurational approach of Space Syntax 
as an alternative representation which may begin to resolve these problems. I aim to show that by 
departing from a different representation of space, Space Syntax opens empirical possibilities 
without encountering the bugbear of a crude determinism, and is able to develop a coherent, if 
perhaps restricted, approach to the socio-spatial dynamic. Certainly it offers the theoretical and 
empirical latitude to develop the possibility of “systematic knowledge of human action [and] 
trends of social development”, the questioning of which by postmodern theory Giddens’ 
dismissed as “unworthy of serious intellectual consideration”
3 [Giddens, 1990; pp 46-7]. But 
perhaps it also offers a suggestion of a new approach to conceptualizing the role of space in other 
fields, not least the relation between space and the material realm. Given the current saturation of 
‘spatiality’ which “reigns supreme”, and the beginnings of a turn against thinkers such as 
Baudrillard (instrumental in that saturation and still fêted recently by an audience at the Bartlett 
School of Architecture), now caricatured by some as a “jaded Frenchman” with “hackneyed 
reflections”, I might even go so far as to claim a degree of ironic radicalism, inverting 
Baudrillard’s own rhetoric to argue that, “radical thought does not annihilate the real...It [brings it 
into] play, [into] equivalence”
4 [Chambers, 1990; Bertens, 1995; Kellner; 1995; Baudrillard, 
1998; p 35]. 
 
My approach will be to offer only the essentials of a theoretical elaboration of the theory of Space 
Syntax before developing a number of case studies which explore the possibilities for an elision 
with the work of other authors perhaps more prominent in the socio-spatial discourse. This initial 
introduction to the main theoretical positions, and their development in subsequent chapters, will 
be uncritical, my own critique and evaluation of the theory being reserved for the final chapter of 
this section in the context of the contributions of those other authors. There are a number of 
reasons for, and necessary clarifications of, this approach. Firstly, it must be clear that my task is 
not to reiterate the work of Hillier and others but to recontextualize it within the broader 
discourses of theory dealing with the socio-spatial relation. There seems a need for this exposure 
not only in the elaboration of the theory itself but also in its application to empirical situations. 
Too often, it seems to me, the potential of interesting empirical work to challenge accepted 
                                                 
3 Indeed, Giddens continues that, “Were anyone to hold such a view [that no systematic knowledge were possible] they 
would hardly write a book about it”, reaffirming Magee’s correspondence between the style and subject of writing, in 
rejection of Dr Johnson’s jest that “he who drives fat oxen should himself be fat” [see above p 19]. 
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theoretical approaches is lost as empirical results are not related back to theoretical positions 
outside the practice of Space Syntax. Secondly, it is not my intention to replace or ‘overwrite’ 
other positions on space or ‘spatiality’ examined above. My aim rather is to add to these 
understandings, and to address what I believe to be some of their failings when extended (as they 
must eventually be) into the phenomenal realm of experience which precipitates the crisis of 
[spatial] representation.  
 
Finally, despite the need for a brief theoretical introduction, the aim is to develop theoretical 
positions from empirical observation. While Hillier uses this approach to develop a theory of 
society and space, drawing heavily on Hacking’s notion of the ‘creation of phenomena’ [Hacking, 
1983], my ultimate intention is to move through empirical work and theory to reopen the 
ontological and metaphysical debates about the nature of space. Therefore, while applauding 
Robins’ call to “disillusion ourselves”, I reject his regret that cyberspace discourse focuses on 
ontological and metaphysical questions such as “what is the nature of body/reality?” [his 
example] to the exclusion of “social and political issues of the ‘real world’” [Robins, 1995]. 
Rather I would argue that it is just such social questions of the ‘real world’ that perhaps hold the 
key to a renewed approach to the question of space at the ontological and metaphysical level, and 
that such a speculative aim is best approached circuitously through the application of renewed 
understandings of space through empirical work leading to theoretical proposal, rather than 
through the construction of elaborate but perhaps detached theoretical structures whose 
application to ‘real world’ empirical phenomena remains awkward if not impossible. 
 
With this intent, chapter 5 will introduce the theory of Space Syntax, and subsequent chapters in 
this section will seek to illustrate fruitful elisions with the work of other authors, chapter 6 with 
that of Harvey, chapter 7 with Giddens, chapter 8 with Foucault, before critically evaluating the 
potential for Space Syntax to rejuvenate the approach to space in social theory, and opening the 
speculative epilogue of the final section. 
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Chapter 5 
Space Syntax: towards a theory of space as configuration 
 
 
Let us begin this introduction to the concepts behind Space Syntax with a direct comparison with 
the work examined in the previous section, this time returning to Frederic Jameson. Jameson 
epitomizes the ‘city as chaos’ belief, asserting that, “the city itself ...has deteriorated or 
disintegrated to a degree surely inconceivable in the early years of the twentieth century” [1991; p 
33]. Furthermore, he begins his analysis of the Bonaventure Hotel by relating this disintegration 
to a change in the nature of the built space of the city, and in our abilities to comprehend this 
renewed urban environment; 
 
I am proposing the notion that we are here in the presence of something like a mutation 
of built space itself. My implication is that we ourselves, the human subjects who happen 
into this new space, have not kept pace with that evolution; there has been a mutation in 
the object unaccompanied as yet by any equivalent mutation in the subject. We do not yet 
possess the perceptual equipment to match this new hyperspace...” [ibid.; p 38, and above 
pp 117-118]. 
 
This position, as well as his proposal of a renewed ‘cognitive mapping’ drawing on the work of 
Lynch, is at dramatic variance with the position advanced by Hillier and others within the Space 
Syntax ‘school’. Cities, Hillier argues, are ‘nearly ordered’, not ‘nearly chaotic’, indeed are, 
“utterly remote from chaos” [1999b; p 170]. Although this statement is made in relation to the 
topology of the city form, it is the central tenet of Hillier’s approach that this material form, 
approached through the analytic of configuration, relates to social processes. Uniting these basic 
positional statements (and drawing on Hanson’s distinction between intuitive geometric ‘order’, 
such as found in planned towns, and the non-geometric, non-intuitive ‘structures’ identified by 
Space Syntax [Hanson; 1989]) we could characterise Space Syntax as an approach to socio-
spatial structures through the configurational analysis of spatial layouts. Such a definition 
performs a useful orientation, for it clearly places Space Syntax in the same domain as those 
theorists concerned with the ‘re-assertion of space’ into social theory, with two crucial 
differences. Firstly, Space Syntax does not seek to ‘insert’ space into an existent theoretic as a 
theoretical addendum or rejuvenator (the most obvious example being those theorists who have 
proposed a spatialization of a Marxist understandings of the city) but treats space as the starting 
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than conceptual terms, that is in terms of the physical spaces of the city and buildings, rather than 
in the contingent terms of the spaces of...[the market/ capital/ etc]. Hillier describes this as “a key 
element in the meta-theoretical foundation of Space Syntax: that space is not to be treated as a 
background either to objects or human activities, but as an intrinsic aspect of both” [1999b; p 
184]. Again, the proposition that space is an intrinsic aspect to both social and material life is not 
by any means an idea unique to Space Syntax, indeed it is one of the most basic areas of 
correspondence between Space Syntax and the wider canon of socio-spatial theories with which I 
would hope to broker a common ground. However, it is the approach to space, indeed the theory 
of space, which is at the heart of Space Syntax that differs so markedly. 
 
Perhaps the most explicit statement of the Space Syntax position in regard to these theoretical 
debates has come in two recent contiguous papers; A Theory of the City as Object [Hillier, 2001] 
and Society seen through the Prism of Space [Hillier and Netto, 2001]. Together these mark a 
return to the project of presenting a theory of the socio-spatial problematic, which has not been so 
explicitly stated since the early work of Hillier and Hanson [1984]. While there has been 
considerable work in the interim, both published and unpublished, this has often focused more on 
the presentation of the results of empirical research
5. While it is neither possible nor appropriate 
to wholly separate that empirical work from the theoretical developments upon which it depends 
and which it in turn drives, it is important to recognise that all too often Space Syntax is 
understood simply as a representational tool with associated analytical techniques without 
sufficient regard to the parallel and significant development of an approach to the socio-spatial 
problematic that is its foundational concept
6. My concern here is to present these foundational 
concepts rather than the computational and representational techniques upon which the empirical 
work is based, although these will be encountered in the following chapters where I draw upon 
both my own and the Space Syntax Laboratory’s work, as well as the work of other authors in the 
field. 
 
In Society seen through the Prism of Space, Hillier and Netto attempt to engage directly with 
some of the current debates about the impact of technology on the city and to counter what they 
term the ‘myth of historical spatiality’ - the idea that in the past we were somehow more spatial 
and local, as opposed to now being ‘virtual’ and global, resulting in the present seeming strange 
                                                 
5 Notable exceptions would be the crucial theoretical papers Natural Movement [1993], Cities as Movement Economies 
[1996], and Centrality as a Process [1999a]. 
6 A perfect example of this misunderstanding is exhibited by Soja’s own contribution to the Third International Space 
Syntax Symposium [Soja, 2001], analyzed in detail below (Chapter 9). Towards a theory of space as configuration 130 
and alienating [Hillier and Netto, 2001; p 4]. While their conclusion that the resurgence in urban 
living provides little evidence of the claimed destruction of cities through technology is in some 
respects to joust at windmills, the argument really being about the annihilation of space itself 
through modern communications, nonetheless the preceding analysis of the relation between 
society and space is persuasive. They begin with a direct counter to the views of authors such as 
Jameson, quoted above, by arguing that we have no means of identifying a change in the relation 
between society and space without, “a theory of society and space adequate to account for where 
we are now”, thus prohibiting any speculation about the impact of technological changes. The 
reason they give for this “theoretical deficit” is that previous attempts to build a theory of society 
and space have looked for space in the output of society and have therefore missed the 
“constructive role of space in creating and sustaining society” [ibid.; p 1]. 
 
While again this is to misrepresent the approach to society and space among many authors for 
whom the idea of a recursive and constitutive relation is central (indeed forming another of the 
principal arenas of correspondence with Hillier’s own position), it does highlight Hillier’s unique 
approach, “looking first at space and trying to discern society through space”; what he describes 
as looking at society “through the prism of space” [ibid.]. Rather than looking at the material 
expression of society and positing a process by which such an outcome is produced and is in turn 
productive (the approach of authors such as Castells, Harvey, Soja, Davis et al), Hillier begins 
from the twin proposition that for there to be any systematic relation between society and space 
two conditions must be satisfied
7. Firstly, “society must have or be capable of having spatial 
necessity of some kind”, which is to say that society must be material in some sense and not 
entirely non-spatial. Secondly, “space must have, or at least be capable of having, social 
potentials of some kind”, it must express society in some way [Hillier and Netto, 2001; p 5]. 
 
Beginning from the acceptance that there is a relation between society and space, Hillier satisfies 
the first condition by presenting a theory of society that is fundamentally spatial. His starting 
point is to revisit what he describes as the ‘core problem of social theory’ - the dichotomous 
positions of methodological individualism and organicism, with their polar foci on the individual 
and society as a singular organism - and to restate this as a problem of space. “[W]hatever else 
societies are”, he argues, “at one level they seem to be relational [...] constructs out of 
                                                 
7 I have elected to reverse the order of these two conditions which relate to the argument presented across the 
consecutive 2001 papers, as well as the order of those papers themselves in constructing the overall argument. The 
reason, in part, is once again to avoid an overly precise replication of Hillier’s arguments, but also to move from socio-Towards a theory of space as configuration 131 
individuals”, with interaction and co-presence being what is manifested of society in space-time 
[pp 8 and 11]. And yet interaction seems at once too transient and governed by embedded social 
rules to itself become the basis of a spatial understanding of society. But within the polarized 
model of individuals and society, Hillier returns to the question of the locus of social rules, 
arguing that like language, it is impossible to propose that they are either exclusive to individuals, 
nor purely social abstractions, but rather are realised in space and reproduced through time in the 
dispersed situated practices and interactions of individuals [pp 9 to 10]. Just as with language, 
Hillier argues that the abstract rule set that governs the emergence of global patterns (in this case 
the culturally specific relation between a society and its spatial expression) are recoverable from 
our localised experience of concrete realities [p 10; see also Hillier and Hanson, 1984; Hillier, 
Hanson and Graham, 1987; Hillier, 1996; Hanson, 1998]. 
 
There are strong parallels between this position and Giddens’ idea of the duality of structure by 
which structure is conceived of as both the medium and outcome of situated practices in space-
time, thereby similarly linking the production of social realities in space-time to the reproduction 
of structure
8 [Giddens, 1984a; Hillier and Netto, 2001; p 10]. However, Hillier suggests that one 
failing of the Giddens formulation is that as well as being embodiments of social rules, societies 
are large scale patterns, emergent structures that are produced through localized recursive 
activity. Giddens, therefore, only satisfies half of the first criteria for a systematic relation 
between society and space. What is further required is a theory that explains the spatial necessity 
of the emergent global structure, as well as the reproduction of that structure at the local level. 
 
Hillier suggests that society can be seen as a system of relations between individuals, conceived 
as a graph - hypothetical because of its inconstructable complexity, and yet theoretically critical 
because it is the product of situated practices and therefore of the mechanism of social 
reproduction. Arguing that society can be understood in some sense as a network of inter-
dependence that acts as an insurance policy, he suggests that it is indeed the role of social 
interaction to construct this larger graph of social relations upon which the global structure and 
stability of a society depends
9. This leads to a ‘tentative’ definition of society which expands 
                                                                                                                                                
spatial questions to the buried approach to space and the material that has been the pattern throughout this 
‘archaeology’ and, indeed, is my ultimate focus. 
8 See chapter 7 for a fuller and empirical comparison of the work of Giddens and Hillier. 
9 Hillier substantiates this position by drawing upon anthropological evidence; the fluidity of composition in individual 
hunter-gather groups yet the strength of the society as a whole and, in more sedentary societies, the frequency of 
divorce as a mechanism for strengthening society as a whole. See also Hillier and Hanson, 1984, for a fuller discussion 
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upon Giddens’, including both “the large graph of pure relatedness”, in addition to what it takes 
to produce and reproduce it - the situated practices that are the foundation to both Giddens’ and 
Hillier’s approach. Society then, conceived of in terms of the successful construction of the global 
graph, is inherently spatial not only in the local sense of the importance of co-present activity for 
social reproduction (Giddens’ ‘situated practices’) but also in the additional sense that space has 
been overcome in the construction of the global graph. Indeed, Hillier argues that the existence of 
the global graph entirely changes our notion of society by suggesting that at its core society is a 
global entity, and the localised practices through which the graph is created will be selected for 
their ability to construct and manage the global graph in spite of the spatial dispersal of 
individuals. 
 
Yet problems still remain, for we are still left with a theory that appears to treat individuals and 
society as separate categories, despite the one being emergent from the localized practices of the 
other. While individuals clearly inhabit a material realm and society implicitly involves the 
overcoming of spatial distance in the formation of the global graph, it is still not clear whether 
society, conceived as a graph or “strongly relational system”, is an abstract or material entity; that 
is, in terms of the first condition for a systematic relation between society and space outlined 
above, whether society has ‘spatial necessity’ beyond the trivial aspect of occupying a continuous 
territory. 
 
In representing the argument in this way I have reversed Hillier’s own presentation in Society 
seen through the Prism of Space to emphasise the importance of the solution to this problem for 
the theory of Space Syntax, for the approach to the ‘space-time status’ of strongly relational 
systems lies at the heart of the conception of both society and space. I introduce it here, therefore, 
as a device by which to link the two conditions with which the argument began - that society 
should exhibit spatial necessity and that space should exhibit social capacity - with their common 
solution in the concept of spatial configuration. 
 
Approaching strongly relational systems 
 
Following Russell, Hillier acknowledges that relations themselves seem to be neither of the 
physical world nor purely a mental construct and hence, for society to exist in some material 
sense at the supra-individual level we need to be clear as to the ‘space-time status’ of the relations Towards a theory of space as configuration 133 
which seem to link individuals into a society
10. This is the central concept within Space Syntax - 
that such systems of relations be understood in terms of the more sophisticated concept of 
‘configuration’. While a relation need invoke no more than a binary pairing, the concept of 
configuration takes into account at least a third, and at most every other discrete binary relation in 
a much more complex system [Hillier and Hanson, 1984; Hillier, Hanson and Graham, 1987; 
Hillier, 1996; Hillier and Netto, 2001]. This is critical because, unlike the simpler ‘relation’, 
configurations exhibit empirical characteristics and can be shown to exhibit independent material 
effects. 
 
The complexity of configurational structures is approached through an application of graph 
theory, and in particular the idea of the ‘justified graph’. Using a series of model examples, 
Hillier develops a depth analysis technique that represents a configuration of elements as a 
sequential series of ‘moves’ or ‘steps’ of incidence from a given starting position. Each element 
in the system is a potentially different starting point, the resultant graphical representation of the 
system as a whole as viewed from that point being one of a corresponding number of ‘justified 
[‘J’] graphs’. He demonstrates that any system treated to such analysis can be found to be 
different from each perspective, and argues that these differences are not only the foundation of 
the idea of structure in space, but also the means by which that structure can be quantified  
[Hillier and Netto, 2001; p 16; see also Hillier, 1996 chapter 3, and Hillier et al, 1987]. The final 
step is the summation of all these individual graphs into the global graph for the system as a 
whole (referred to as an ‘Axial Map’ in the line analysis of urban systems) which quantifies the 
relative “integration” of each element into the overall system [see figure 5.1]. 
 
We have rehearsed Hillier’s arguments for approaching society as a complex global graph, and he 
makes the additional observation that each individual who forms an element in the global graph 
would in turn have their own justified graph describing their relationship to the social whole. The 
importance of this is that both the society and the individuals who constitute it are defined by the 
same structure - an individual being, “ a particular position from which the whole of the graph 
can be seen”.  Individual and society are, therefore, no longer polar concepts but different ways of 
viewing the same thing [ibid.]. 
 
                                                 
10 Hillier uses Russell’s example of the relation that ‘Edinburgh is to the North of London’ seems not to be a material 
thing in the same sense as Edinburgh and London are, and yet does seem to exist ‘out there’ as a real thing in some 
sense. Towards a theory of space as configuration 
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Figure 5.1 The top two figures demonstrate how small changes in morphology represent 
significant configurational changes, expressed through the j-graph. The lower figure is an axial 
map of London, the summation of the individual j-graphs of every line in the system. The ‘hotter’ 
colours indicate higher integration, that is fewer ‘steps’ to every other line in the system. 
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While the treatment of society as a configurational structure remains a theoretical abstraction, the 
same theoretical stance is developed into an empirical methodology in regard to the analysis of 
the spatial systems that make up the material realm of experience. The configurational approach 
is again deployed successfully in satisfying the second requirement of a systematic relation 
between society and space - that space should have, or be capable of having, social potential of 
some kind.  
 
This question has been the preoccupation of much early Space Syntax research, which has 
approached spatial systems at both urban and architectural scales with the graph techniques 
outlined above, producing a basket of spatial representations that reflect the integration structure 
of the spatial elements of a system. The most commonly used representations (and those which 
will be encountered in subsequent chapters) are the axial map, and the convex map. While each is 
a development of the same treatment of space, breaking the continuous spatial realm into a series 
of configurational elements, each is used in slightly different circumstances. The axial map, is 
typically deployed at an urban scale, and represents the least set of longest lines that pass through 
and connect all the spaces of a system. It is a representation that captures the potential movement 
structure of an urban system. By contrast, the convex map is typically deployed at the 
architectural scale and represents the discrete spaces associated with more static activity 
(typically rooms in a built structure)
11. 
 
Empirical work has shown that the prime correlate of the configurational structure of spatial 
systems is movement [see for example Hillier 1987, 1993 and 1996]. The theory of ‘natural 
movement’ [Hillier, 1993] argues that the urban grid shapes the existing natural movement of 
individuals through a spatial system by overlaying a probability structure of route selection. 
Given that there is sufficient movement through the system, and that origins and destinations are 
evenly spread, then the patterns of movement observed will be highly determined by the spatial 
structure of the system. This has important social implications - primarily that the structure of 
movement will in turn influence patterns of co-presence and hence social interaction by creating 
“a probabilistic field of potential encounter and avoidance” [Hillier, 1993; p 32]. Indeed, there are 
further consequences of this spatial structuring of movement patterns, for it was shown (in Cities 
as Movement Economies [Hillier, 1996]) that movement patterns - and therefore in turn the 
                                                 
11 These techniques form the basis for more recent approaches which include the ‘all-line map’, which constructs all 
potential direct lines of sight and movement within a defined series of spaces and Visibility Graph Analysis (VGA) 
which represents the visual connections between all points in a notional grid. Both are representational techniques that 
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spatial structure of the city - influence land use patterns through the attraction of movement 
dependent activities such as retail to areas of high natural movement in the grid. This then 
initiates a constructive feedback process, not only in terms of attracting more movement to these 
already favourable locations because of their land use functions, but also initiating spatial 
adaptations of local grid intensification and smaller block sizes to allow for ease of movement in 
the centre, which in turn biases its strategic location within the overall grid to further encourage 
movement attraction. This biasing of the ‘town centre’ leads Hillier to describe centrality “as a 
process” rather than a state, a process which begins with the configurational inequalities of the 
urban grid, and results in the familiar pattern of dense mixed use areas set within a background of 
more homogeneous residential development [Hillier, 1999a; 2001]. 
 
These papers describe the impact of the spatial form of the city upon economic and social 
activity. But they do not investigate the grid itself and the socio-spatial generative process by 
which it is constructed. This is tackled in the recent paper A Theory of the City as Object [Hillier, 
2001] which argues that the marked invariants and differences in the spatial structure of sample 
cities can be explained by social forces working through invariant spatial laws. However, Hillier 
does not refer to spatial laws in any deterministic sense relating to universal human behaviours. 
Rather he refers to the independent configurational effects of placement decisions when objects 
are aggregated into spatial systems. These ‘spatial laws’ interface with the social realm in two 
related ways therefore - firstly in that the placement of objects within the [urban] system is a 
social act which inevitably reflects a series of embedded social conventions and intentions, and 
secondly that there will be a social outcome of placement through the principle of natural 
movement outlined above. The spatial laws are the intermediaries, therefore, between embedded 
social rules and social outcomes. 
 
A number of urban structures are analysed from different cultures, including single systems that 
are bisected by two cultures (such as the city of Nicosia in Cyprus). The analysis shows that while 
at the local level there are many spatial differences according to the culture in which the urban 
system has evolved, at the global scale there are strong cross cultural parallels, particularly in the 
structures of the system related to commercial activity. There are therefore, two aspects to the 
settlement generative process - a socio-cultural component that is idiosyncratic and local, and a 
micro-economic process that is universal and global  [Hillier, 2001; p 8]. However, Hillier argues 
that both these processes are themselves the outcome of the aggregative process and the impact 
that this has upon movement patterns.  Towards a theory of space as configuration 137 
Modifying the basic J-graph approach to give a ‘depth gain’ measure for various basic systems 
(the difference in the total number of moves required to move from each cell in a system to each 
other when configurational changes are made to the system) two spatial laws are proposed which 
can be shown to have independent effects upon the structure of the system
12. The first is described 
as the “Law of Centrality”, and states that objects placed centrally in a space will increase 
universal distance (the overall depth of the system) more than objects placed peripherally. This is 
then essentially a statement about the spatial impact of aggregative building strategies; it 
“addresses the fundamental spatial problem of settlement: how to aggregate built forms in such a 
way as to preserve the interaccessibility which is potentially interrupted by those built forms, and 
how to maintain this as the settlement grows” [ibid.; p 14]. The result of this law of centrality is 
that the lines of accessibility through the system (the open space of the street network) will tend 
to bifurcate into long and short lines rather than lines of equal length. This implied result of the 
laws of aggregation is born out in the duality of the physical structures examined. 
 
The second law, the “Law of Compactness” states that the more compact a group of objects the 
less the increase in universal distance in the surrounding space. ‘Island’ forms will conserve the 
accessibility through the system better than elongated forms. 
 
The duality that was observed in the structure of cities (a global structure associated with micro-
economic activity that is invariant and a localized structure associated more with residential 
activity that is culturally specific) is carried through into the spatial laws of settlement 
aggregation - the law of centrality relating to the spatial component of the urban system, the law 
of compactness the physical component of built forms. Indeed, Hillier goes on to demonstrate that 
the law of centrality alone accounts for the physical duality of urban structures, producing as it 
does many shorter lines in the process of conserving the longer lines of the system. The socio-
cultural process associated with the interstitial areas of residential space are associated with 
restrictions imposed upon the integrative micro-economic led process that always seeks to 
maximise natural co-presence [ibid.; p 17]. 
 
It is important to be clear that both laws are founded on simple geometric principles, what Hillier 
refers to as the “if-then” rules of object placement [ibid; p 2], and not in the first instance on rules 
derived from an assumed universal of human behaviour. This does not of course mean that such 
                                                 
12 These two laws are developed from the four more general ‘principles of partitioning’ [Hillier, 1996] which address 
the impact of partitioning strategies within a basic grid system [see Hillier 2001; pp 10-16 for the refinement of these Towards a theory of space as configuration 138 
configurational outcomes are detached from behavioural decisions. It is the fact that quite 
predictable configurational consequences follow from spatial decisions, although themselves 
wholly independent of human will or intention, that gives spatial strategies such strong social 
effects through the impact that configuration has on movement through spatial systems and hence 
co-presence. 
 
Space Syntax, then, treats both society and space as “strongly relational systems” in which it is 
movement that is the “strong force” linking the social and spatial through the structuring of 
possibility fields of encounter. Hillier outlines five points of correspondence between social and 
spatial systems so conceived which relate to key features of the Space Syntax approach. 
 
Firstly, they are made up of both material events occurring in space-time (encounters/ objects) 
and also ‘informational entities’ which govern the local patterns of these events. The analogy is 
proposed of social hardware (the manifest interactions) and software (the rule structures 
governing interaction). What is important is that the software is embedded in, and retrievable 
from, the hardware; that is, we are able to retrieve descriptions of social rules and conventions 
from our lived practice within the existing ‘hardware’ of socio-spatial forms. 
 
Secondly, both social and spatial systems are forms emergent from distributed processes, that is 
(with a few exceptions of imposed social and spatial orders) they are generated over time from 
the discrete actions and decisions of individuals, nonetheless to produce a recognisable global 
structure. 
 
Thirdly, both social and spatial systems are at least partially ordered, in contrast to the implied 
chaos of much contemporary urban commentary, and seem to control for the existence of 
randomness alongside reproducible patterns. 
 
Fourthly, both are predominantly non-discursive. This is to say that while we are able to operate 
intuitively within such systems we find it hard to give formal descriptions of their logic
13.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
basic principles into the more distinct spatial laws]. 
13 See also Hillier, 1996 for a full discussion of non-discursivity. Towards a theory of space as configuration 139 
Finally, such systems seem to exhibit a degree of top-down as well as bottom-up functionality, 
which is to say that while movement and land use patterns are functions of the overall structures 
of the urban grid, so individual behaviours seem to be - though to a varying degree - functions of 
the overall pattern we call society. It is importantly, therefore, not an approach that privileges 
space over society but rather understands the two as implicitly related. 
 
Space, analysed through graph theory lies at the heart of the theory. Empirical work using 
alternative models of urban forms (particularly models based on a metric scale of distance) have 
failed to post-dict movement patterns with the same success as the axial map. Two reasons are 
advanced to explain why the axial map may capture something of the essence of the urban system 
[Hillier, 2001; pp 20-21]. The first is a substantive argument that the model of spatial 
aggregation, centring on the conservation of longer lines and the resulting line inequalities 
represented by the axial map, seem to correspond to the observable dynamics of urban systems. 
The line length inequalities lead to a relation between local and global organisation which make 
structures intelligible and navigable. Without such a system of emergent line inequalities, the 
resulting form would correspond to a labyrinth, of the sort that many authors examined in 
previous chapters believe exists, despite the powerful morphological evidence to the contrary. 
 
The second is a cognitive argument, suggesting that the analysed axial map seems to correspond 
to the intuitive picture of urban systems that we utilise daily. Hillier argues that complex and non-
linear systems over-stretch our capabilities of judging simple linear distances, and instead we 
have to approach complex spatial systems of the order of cities as ‘assemblages of interrelated 
geometrical elements’. The most important such element is the line corresponding to the extent of 
visual perception, powerful in its simplicity of comprehension and yet its global importance 
within the system as a whole. It seems therefore that the techniques of discrete geometry, used for 
analysing such geometrical assemblages, are the most appropriate way of analysing these spatial 
forms. 
 
The space of configuration 
 
This approach to space in socio-spatial systems is in a very important sense paradoxical because 
it is grounded in the seemingly counter-intuitive step of removing space from both its social and 
material setting and treating it in isolation as a pure set of relations. The relationship between 
society, space and configuration that is proposed by Space Syntax can perhaps best be Towards a theory of space as configuration 140 
represented diagramatically, with configuration providing a system of possibilities and limits 
which are realised in both society and space, mediated by movement and the structuring of co-
presence and interaction [see figure 5.2]. 
 
Critically, in treating space as configuration with quantifiable invariant characteristics, 
independent of the material and social context, what Hillier refers to as “a thing in itself”, the 
problems of spatial determinism are avoided without sacrificing the ability to approach the direct 
relationship between society and space in a rigorous and quantifiable way. Hillier refutes 
architectural determinism most explicitly in Space is the Machine [1996] where he ‘fatally 
undermines’ what he terms ‘the three interrelated paradigms’ underlying the erroneous ‘tripartite 
edifice’ of determinism. He summarises as follows, 
 
Architectural determinism is the way in which the scheme of ideas appears within 
architecture, and confronts its practice and its theory. The paradigm of the machine is the 
invisible scheme of thought which history implanted in architectural discourse as the 
framework within which the form-function relation, seen as social engineering, should be 
defined. The organism-environment paradigm is the broader and older master scheme of 
quasi-scientific ideas upon which the whole fallacious structure was erected. The three-
level scheme constructs an apparatus of thought within which neither the form-function 
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Figure 5.2 A diagrammatic representation of Space Syntax. The relationship between society and space, 
both approached theoretically through the idea of configuration, is mediated through the structuring of co-
presence by movement. This in turn is analysable through configuration as a computational method Towards a theory of space as configuration 141 
relation in architecture, nor the role of space in society can be formulated in such a way 
that research can be defined and progress made in understanding [1996; p 390]. 
 
Hillier argues that in rejecting the notion of architectural determinism, we must not also reject the 
‘common sense’ notion that form and function in buildings are somehow related, since an 
architectural theory can only be distinguished from theories of art or aesthetics by the fact that 
‘they [architectural theories] are in essence propositions about the relation between architecture 
and life’ [ibid.; p 374]. Therefore, to understand the ‘apparently perverse’ rejection of theories 
based on form-function relationships as a result of their application to 1960s architecture, yet also 
“to see that it was in a certain sense justified”, we must understand exactly what it was that was 
rejected [ibid. p 376]. 
 
What was rejected was the ‘paradigm of the machine’, distinct from the ‘metaphor of the 
machine’ implied by the writings of Le Corbusier and others, which suggested that the built 
environment could have a direct, deterministic influence over the behaviour of people. This in 
turn was spawned by the third tier of Hillier’s ‘tripartite edifice’, the ‘organism-environment 
paradigm’. The origin of this paradigm lies in the first instance in the 18th century meaning 
ascribed to ‘environment’, 
 
It implies not only the milieu in which we exist, but a milieu which surrounds us. 
Environing means to surround, so an environment is not only a physical milieu but one 
which actively and significantly surrounds so that the environed thing in some way is 
aware of, or affected by, its ‘environment’ [ibid.; p 380]. 
 
However, the deeper origins lie in Aristotle’s enquiry into the relationship between the form and 
function of organisms which he ascribes to the idea of a ‘purpose’, in effect a reliance upon the 
antecedent order that characterizes the ‘unmoved mover’ of Aristotelean physics. 
 
This inelegant solution of Aritotle’s was overturned by the Newtonian conception of inertia 
which posits that all bodies move in a ‘right line’, thus placing motion ‘on the same level as 
beings at rest’ [ibid.; p 383]
14. This solution is then reapplied to Aristotle’s original organism-
environment problem in the work of Darwin who clarifies the mechanism by which the 
environment influences organisms by removing the necessity for antecedent order and replaces it 
with, ‘not a direct physical relation of cause and effect, but [....] an indirect relation, [....] an  
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abstract statistical mechanism’ based on randomness and probability [ibid.; p 385]. This crucial 
aspect of the theory of evolution has not infused into the commonly held understanding of 
‘environment’ however, and the theory of architectural determinism can be understood as a 
vestigial feature of the pre-Darwinian paradigm. 
 
The essential problem, then, with the paradigm of the machine is that it ‘sets up the built 
environment as no more than an inert physical background.... This blinds the enquirer to the most 
significant single fact about the built environment investigated above; that it is not simply a 
background to social behaviour - it is itself a social behaviour [ibid.; p 388]. Buildings and urban 
space are ‘probabilistic space machines’ [ibid.; p 395] in which configuration defines a system of 
co-presence and co-awareness which are the essence of what we experience as ‘society’. The 
form-function relationship, therefore, is preserved in a mutated form; 
 
This whole tripartite edifice of thought is dissolved by the proposition that the form-
function relationship in architecture, and the relation of space to society, is mediated by 
spatial configuration [1996; p 390]. 
 
Just as Hillier caricatures Aristotle, suggesting that, “in buildings people are the unmoved 
movers” [ibid.; p 392], so we can caricature Hillier, presenting the theory of Space Syntax as 
belonging to the ‘Newtonian-Darwinian paradigm’ based in the idea of an independent statistical 
relation between environment, conceived as configurational potential, and individuals, mediated 
by the “inertia theory” of natural movement. 
 
Natural movement is a kind of inertia theory: it says not how individuals are impelled by 
buildings to move in this or that direction, but that, given that they move, then their 
distribution in a spatial configuration will follow certain mathematical and morphological 
laws, given only that movement is from all - or at least, most - parts to all others, and 
follows some economy in route selection [ibid.; p 391]. 
 
This schematic introduction has hardly done justice to a theory whose evolution and explanation 
has depended so greatly on empirical work. The following chapters of this ‘reconstructive’ 
second section redress this balance by taking the skeleton argument presented here and 
developing it through empirical work. The intention is to return to some ‘key players’ of the 
renewed emphasis upon space in social theory and, in the light of the argument presented in 
section 1, to examine the shortcomings of their approach to material space and the potential for 
Space Syntax to provide a valuable integrative perspective.  
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The selection of theorists to be examined is not innocent, however, and there is an intention in 
moving from the macro scale of Harvey’s economistic argument to the micro scale of Foucault’s 
corporeal discourse to open up tensions within the Space Syntax approach. It is a deliberate 
omission, therefore, not to discuss some of the reservations that I have with Space Syntax at this 
introductory stage. Following the method of analysis presented in section 1, I wish to introduce a 
discussion of these concerns in the light of the strains increasingly apparent in the empirical 
application of the theory.  Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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Chapter 6 
The Urban Scale: 
Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’ 
 
 
Yet, Marx insists, there is a single unitary principle at work that underpins and frames all 
of this revolutionary upheaval, fragmentation, and perpetual insecurity. The principle 
resides in what he calls, most abstractly, ‘value in motion’ or, more simply, the 
circulation of capital restlessly and perpetually seeking new ways to garner profits. 
 
How we represent space and time in theory matters, because it affects how we and others 
interpret and then act with respect to the world. 
 
The Condition of Postmodernity [Harvey, 1989a; pp 107 and 205]. 
 
 
6.1 Introduction – ‘riding the tiger’ 
 
Although in his taxonomic work, “Postmodern Geographies”, Soja pays little attention to the 
work of David Harvey it is beyond contention that he has been at the forefront of ‘the reassertion 
of space in critical theory’. Given that Giddens has described him as “perhaps the greatest living 
geographer”
1, it is perhaps surprising that Soja pays him so little regard, especially given that 
their projects, as we shall see in more detail below, are broadly very similar. Like Soja, Harvey’s 
concern is to reintroduce a missing geographical sensitivity into the body of Marx’s historical 
materialist method. His work bridges the period of this spatial revival in social theory, such that 
in 1973 he wrote, “Social and spatial forms are, for the most part, distinct in our 
minds...distinctive and irreconcilable modes of analysis” [1973; p 10]; in 1985 that, “the question 
of space is surely too important to be left to geographers exclusively […] [s]ocial theorist of all 
stripes and persuasions  should take it seriously” [1985; p xii]; while by 1989 he notes the revival 
of recent interest in “the problem of spatiality”, citing the work of Gregory and Urry [1985] and 
Soja’s principal theoretical text discussed above [Harvey, 1989a; p 284]. Indeed, reflecting my 
argument and concerns about a new ‘structure of feeling’ towards space, in recent work he 
comments that, “[a] seeming consensus can be constructed from [these] multiple inquiries to the 
                                                 
1 Introductory comment made at a public lecture by David Harvey, London School of Economics, London 1999. Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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effect that time and space are social constructs...[behind which]...there lurk innumerable and 
potentially damaging confusions” [Harvey, 1996; p 207]. 
 
There is however a distinct difference in approach between the two authors. For Soja, the 
spatialization of historical materialism is not an absorptive but a transformative process allowing 
Marxist geographies to meet with postmodernism both as a theoretical position as well as a 
historical phenomenon on an equal and symbiotic level. We begin to see in Soja’s later works, 
therefore, a move away from a classic Marxian analysis, founded ‘in the last resort’ on an 
analysis of the economic sphere. It becomes clear that Soja’s main referent for his theoretical 
position is Lefebvre, and particularly The Production of Space [Lefebvre, 1991] with its far less 
prescriptive theoretical structure based in a typology of three types of social space. This 
theoretical structure comes to dominate his less objective and more positional writings about Los 
Angeles, in particular Thirdspace [Soja, 1996] which through its deliberate engagement with not 
only the subject but also the ‘attitude’ of postmodernism (to follow Cloke, Philo and Sadler’s 
distinction [1991]) displays the myopia of both the alephic and ecstatic visions discussed 
previously. 
 
Harvey’s approach is more cautious however, and his intention is to invoke a spatial element in 
dialectical materialism without significantly altering the understandings advanced by Marx. 
Ultimately he relies heavily on the idea of the economic as being the determinant of last resort 
and this in turn has an important impact upon the conception of space that is embedded in his 
‘respatialization’ project. In clinging to the fundamental importance of the economic and without, 
I will argue, any satisfactory way of dealing with the relationship between the morphological 
nature of space and the social (and implicitly, therefore, economic) structures within space, 
Harvey presents a conception of space based upon the idea of differentiation. His is a 
geographical more than spatial ‘consciousness’, and the link between the two cannot be made 
because he lacks a theoretical tool for doing so without returning to the rejected spatial science 
and determinism of earlier geographical theory [see above, chapter 1]. 
 
The previous section of this thesis introduced three key themes which will be further developed in 
this chapter. The first, originating in the analysis of Borges’ work, was epistemological in nature - 
the idea of the aleph, not as a physical object but as an epistemology that forces the world to fit a 
theoretical schema already devised – ‘the alephic vision’. The second was the idea of an ‘ecstatic 
vision’ - a view of the world rich in chaos, fragmentation, where ‘everything solid melts into air’. Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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The third was that the theoretical positions advanced to understand this world are based upon the 
removal of ‘matter’ from the classical ontological trialectic (space-time-matter) and its 
replacement with an alternative term, ‘sociality’ in Soja’s renewed trialectic of spatiality-
historicity-sociality. 
 
These themes will be encountered again in the analysis of Harvey’s work, although for different 
reasons and to varying extent, and the analysis will point to the same inability to deal 
convincingly with the impact of physical space and the experience of cities. This is particularly 
true in Harvey’s 1989 work, The Condition of Postmodernity, still his best selling and perhaps, 
therefore, most influential book
2. This work extends the earlier theoretical propositions of Limits 
to Capital [1982] to the phenomenon of ‘postmodernity’, and Harvey’s ambitious scope includes 
not only what Cloke, Philo and Sadler term ‘postmodernism as subject’ but also ‘postmodernism 
as object’ [1991, see above p 117]. It is their last distinction, ‘postmodernism as attitude’, that 
Harvey is most wary of, anxious as he is not to make the same elisions as Soja. Although Harvey 
examines a number of ‘postmodern objects’, most notably in his comparison of the visual work of 
Salle, Rauschenberg and a contemporary advertisement [1989a, chapter 3], the central theme is 
the contemporary experience of space and time. 
 
While his tone is indeed far more measured than that of Soja, once again familiar themes emerge, 
particularly in the synechdotal reference to particular key buildings such as the Bonaventure 
Hotel and also the ‘ecstatic’ treatment of the experience of time and space under the supposed 
‘condition of postmodernity’ with its emphasis on flux, impermanence and polyvalence. This 
would indeed be contested strongly by Harvey himself, who is keen to distance himself from the 
‘excesses’ of the postmodern discourse. He argues that, “postmodernism, with its emphasis on 
jouissance, its insistence upon the impenetrability of the other, its concentration on the text rather 
than the work, its penchant for deconstruction to the point of nihilism, its preference for aesthetics 
over ethics, takes matters too far”. Note here the familiar relationship between jouissance and 
nihilism, the former taken from Barthes’ attitude to the pleasures of textual deconstruction, the 
latter from postmodernism’s debt to Nietzsche, which parallels the tautologous nature of ‘ecstasy’ 
captured in Nietzsche’s term ‘rausch’ [See above, chapter 4]. Harvey continues, “postmodernist 
philosophers tell us not only to accept but even to revel in the fragmentations and the cacophony 
of voices through which the dilemmas of the modern world are understood” [1989a; p 116]. 
                                                 
2 According to a comment by Harvey at the London School of Economics, 1999. Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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Harvey groups this literature together as his fourth ‘response to [the] time-space compression’ 
that he sees as the basis of the postmodern condition. He describes these authors as, “trying to 
ride the tiger of time-space compression through the construction of a language and an imagery 
that can mirror and hopefully control it”. Within this group he highlights “the frenetic writings of 
Baudrillard and Virilio...since they seem hell-bent on fusing with time-space compression and 
replicating it in their own flamboyant rhetoric” [ibid.; p 351] and I would argue that Soja, among 
others, could be added to this grouping, although more as an emulator at second-hand of the 
frenetic writings of the inspirational ringleaders such as Baudrillard. Harvey accuses these writers 
of, “[losing their] hold on both the reality [they are] seeking to represent and on the language that 
might properly be deployed to represent it...” (speaking this time of Jameson), such that, “the 
hyper-rhetoric of this wing of the postmodern reaction can dissolve into the most alarming 
irresponsibility”. 
 
There are strong sympathies, therefore, between these and my own criticisms expressed in the 
preceding section. Harvey cites the selective use of sources (referring to Jameson, but as pertinent 
would be my criticism of Soja above) and indulging in euphoria in describing the experience of 
neurosis and anxiety. This last criticism, levelled at Jameson, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, is 
exactly analogous to the reading of ecstasy from the work of Koolhaas. He also follows Eagleton 
in warning of the powerful influence that such rhetoric has over ontological positions; “there can 
be no difference between truth, authority and rhetorical seductiveness” Eagleton argues in 
relation to Lyotard, mirroring in this instance the power of the ‘alephic vision’ presented above
3. 
 
In making these criticisms, Harvey is articulating the complex and blurred division of 
postmodernism as subject, object and attitude that Cloke, Philo and Sadler distinguish in an 
attempt to clarify such muddled rhetoric. However, Harvey’s antithetical position to the latter and 
indeed his concurrence with my argument presented above, is perhaps not quite as clean-cut as it 
might first appear. For while lambasting the authors cited above for their rhetorical excesses, he 
nonetheless refers to them either explicitly (in the case of Jameson whom he cites frequently) or 
implicitly in the debates with which he engages, clearly accepting the “fact of fragmentation, 
ephemerality and chaotic flux” [ibid.; p 117 sic]. Furthermore, he evidently accepts the thesis of a 
recent transformation in patterns of thought and practice and asks why “such a fact [of 
fragmentation etc] should have been so pervasive an aspect of modern experience for so long a 
                                                 
3 Eagleton, 1987 ‘Awakening from modernity’, Times Literary Supplement, 20 February 1987; quoted in Harvey, 
1989a; p 117. Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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period of time”, and further, why “the intensity of that experience seems to have picked up so 
powerfully since 1970” [ibid.] making the current features of “excessive ephemerality and 
fragmentation in the political and private as well as in the social realm [an] experiential context 
that makes the condition of postmodernity somewhat special” [1989a; p 306]. 
 
At some point, therefore, Harvey’s critical stance towards so much of the paradigmatic literature 
on the postmodern condition seems to be compromised. Although certainly he avoids the 
rhetorical excesses of Baudrillard and perhaps the more extreme passages of Jameson, his work is 
certainly not free from unsubstantiated generalisation, hyperbole and the fixation with the 
aesthetic of fragmentation. Once again, we find that distinctions between object, subject and 
attitude, though schematically useful, are easily blurred and transgressed in practice. I will seek to 
demonstrate that the critical turning-point that leads Harvey into such uncharacteristic ground 
comes as the argument moves to deal with the experience of urbanism in the contemporary 
period, and the relationship between the physical structure of the city and buildings 
(postmodernism as object) and the social structures within the city (postmodernism as subject). 
The lack of a satisfactory conception of this link, caused I will argue by an understanding of 
space which replaces matter with meaning, results in the blurring of Harvey’s epistemological 
and ontological positions on the city
4. The result, as with Soja, is a description of the [universal] 
experience of urbanism based in concepts of flux, fragmentation, schizophrenia etc which evolve 
less from a detailed study, either psychological or behavioural, of how people relate to the spaces 
of contemporary urbanism than from an engagement with the fashionable academic discourses of 
the generation. The inevitable consequence is that Harvey simply reiterates the alephic and 
ecstatic tendencies of the paradigm, and in doing so further entrenches the parallel approaches to 
                                                 
4 This chapter focuses mainly on Harvey’s descriptions of the contemporary urban experience in The Condition of 
Postmodernity [1989], linking this to the earlier theoretical texts, Social Justice and the City [1973] and The Limits to 
Capital [1982]. In so doing I am aware that I have not discussed directly his 1985 volume Consciousness and the 
Urban Experience. The reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, my interest is in addressing writing on the contemporary 
urban experience. While, as I have argued above in chapter 4, there is a strong genealogy of ideas between 19
th and 20
th 
century interpretations of the urban experience, my intention has not been to focus on discussions of the 19
th century 
city such as Harvey presents in this volume, beyond the necessity of explicating this genealogy in the context of 
contemporary descriptions. Secondly, although Harvey’s subject matter differs in this volume, whose empirical content 
focuses around his two famous essays, Paris, 1850-1870, and Monument and Myth: The building of the Basilica of the 
Sacred Heart, his theoretical position remains unchanged from his earlier 1973 and 1982 volumes [‘Social Justice’ and 
‘Limits’] – that is, “to progress toward[s] a definitive Marxian interpretation of the urban process under capitalism” 
[1985; p xi]. His understanding of space is, as will be demonstrated in detail below, encapsulated in the diagrammatic 
representation of the flow of capital through the urban system, manifested ‘physically’ only in terms of geographical 
differentiation (of, for example, rental values) [see Harvey, 1985; p 92 ‘Rent and the Sorting of Land to Uses’]. 
Similarly, his approach to built form, particularly in this instance Sacré-Coeur and the Place Vendôme, is restricted to 
suppositions about ‘meaning’ similar to his (as well as Jameson’s among others) comments on the Bonaventure Hotel 
in Los Angeles. Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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space within geography - the abstract approach of diffusion and the hermeneutic approach of 
space as place, as decodable sign. 
 
It requires some archaeology to explain why someone whose approach, even conviction, rests on 
a tradition of material understandings of social conditions should come to make such 
unsubstantiated claims of ‘common experience’ and ‘everyday life’. 
 
 
6.2 “Empty Boxes” - The spatialization of historical materialism 
 
Harvey’s work, as explained above, has tended to take the form of a diachronic development of 
theory and ‘empirical’ extension through the elaboration of historical-geographical materialist 
method that he advocates. Certainly his 1973 Social Justice and the City marks a turn towards the 
consideration of the linkages between ideas in social and moral philosophy and geography that 
are returned to in his more recent Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference [1996]. The 
1973 text, however, deals not with ecological issues but with the urban processes in a way that 
“[he] later saw to be erroneous” and whose reformulation into “a definitive statement on the 
urban process under capitalism” formed the basis for the subsequent The Limits to Capital  [1982; 
p xiii, xxix in the 1989 edition]. A close parallel exists between this work and The Condition of 
Postmodernity [1989a], the former essentially developing the theoretical framework that is to be 
applied to the understanding of contemporary changes in the latter. He describes this combined 
project as an attempt “to write the theory of urbanization, to integrate it with detailed historical 
studies...and to casually fill in a few ‘empty boxes’ in Marxian theory en route” [ibid.]. 
 
The Limits to Capital is, therefore, a critical fulcrum in Harvey’s work. Not only does it propose 
the theoretical union between Marxian theory and a geographical perspective (what Harvey 
describes as “deal[ing] only with the ‘empty boxes’ in the theory”) which is the theoretical core 
of his later work on the experience of urbanism,  it also represents an abandonment of earlier 
theoretical perspectives set out in Social Justice and the City, which when re-examined reveal 
some significant repudiated positions that chart the course of subsequent work. 
 
That Limits (as Harvey refers to it) is prescient for the concerns of this present study is clear. On 
reflection he writes, “I had no option except to write a treatise on Marxian theory in general, 
paying particular attention to the circulation of capital in built environments, the credit system Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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and the production of spatial configurations” [ibid. emphasis added]. This passage is important 
for two reasons. Firstly, it clearly orientates this work within that of the ‘re-spatialization’ 
theorists of whom he is clearly aware, making reference in a footnote to Lefebvre and Soja 
among others [1982; p 337]. Secondly, it introduces my principal criticism of Harvey’s approach 
- that he reduces the ‘spatial’ to that which he can conceive of as being important in the capital 
circulation system. ‘Space’, in Harvey’s self-declared “definitive statement on the urban process”, 
even modified by the qualifier “under capitalism” or “from a Marxian perspective”, is reduced 
simply to a consideration of rent and, as with Soja, the importance of the friction of distance to 
the distributive process. He states, “I saw...that earlier errors on the interpretation of rent arose 
precisely out of a failure to integrate this single aspect of distribution into the general theory of 
production and distribution that Marx proposed”, resulting in a holistic reworking of Marxian 
theory, since “the virtue and difficulty in Marx [is] that everything relates to everything else” 
[ibid.]. 
 
The principal contribution to this reworking is the idea of the importance of ‘spatial 
configurations’ and for us it is the link that Harvey draws between spatial configurations and 
social processes that is of central importance. The process of capitalism and the productive forces 
that lie at its root always form an intermediary layer between the two. “The historical geography 
of capitalism is a social process which rests on the evolution of productive forces and social 
relations which exist as particular spatial configurations” [ibid.; p 421]. This might suggest that 
spatial configurations remain passive manifestations of a social context that produced them. 
However, Harvey would adamantly deny this. In the introduction to the reissued volume [Harvey, 
1999] he makes the argument that many of his peer group of theorists working within Marxist 
Geography at that time tended “to segregate the geographical and spatial arguments from the 
general theory of accumulation that Marx proposed, and to cast the argument in a fixed rather 
than malleable spatial frame” [1999; p xxi]. He clearly rejects, therefore, the notion of a 
‘theoretically disenfranchized’ space standing outside the complex system of dialectical 
relationships that is the key epistemological and methodological tenet of Marx’s theory, ensuring 
that “everything [including space and society] relates to everything else”. 
 
This link is most clearly made in the section of Limits titled ‘Space, Place and Location’ which 
opens, “[r]ent is that theoretical concept through which political economy (of whatever stripe) 
traditionally confronts the problem of spatial organization” [1982; p 337]. Rent forms a 
controlling feature in capitalism as “space is required as an element of all production and human Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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activity” [Capital Vol 3, quoted by Harvey, 1982; p 337]. Furthermore, Harvey follows Marx in 
arguing that ‘spatial properties’ (he gives the list location, situation, shape, size, dimensions, etc) 
are to be considered as ‘material attributes of use values’, which “claim our attention only in so 
far as they affect the utility...of commodities” [ibid. quoting directly from Marx]. Hence, “the 
social aspects of use values is what counts in the end” which cannot be understood separately 
from exchange and the formation of values. Exchange involves the bringing of commodities to a 
market place and “this eventually involves a physical movement in space” and so we have the 
inevitable appeal to the friction of distance. Similarly, locations, stripped of their ‘material 
properties’ are given their true significance when seen in relation to use values, exchange values 
and value (following Marx’s framework). This leads Harvey to consider space in terms of “more 
favoured locations” [ibid.; p 339] in the production and consumption process. “The trick” he 
describes, “is to set our understanding of material spatial properties of use values into motion 
together with concepts of exchange value and value. The meaning of the spatial properties of use 
values in their social aspect can then be unravelled” [ibid.; p 338]. 
 
The ‘spatial configurations of built environments’ are seen as a response to these two processes as 
orchestrated by landowners, developers, financiers and the state. Spatial configurations, therefore, 
are seen as either opportunities or restrictions to this process, and the prime mechanism for 
moving capitalism out of the “crisis of accumulation” states to which it is prone through what he 
describes as a series of ‘spatial fixes’. Rent is critical, therefore, as “it is the basis of land price 
and operates to allocate capital and labour to land, guides the location of future production, 
exchange and consumption, fashions the geographical division of labour and the spatial 
organisation of social reproduction” [ibid.; p 396, emphasis added]. As the credit system unites 
the process, “[t]he effect is to reduce time and space to a common socially determined metric - 
the rate of interest itself a representation of value in motion”. 
 
Economic reductionism - spatial consequences 
 
‘Space’ is conceived, therefore, in terms of competition between locations. Harvey proposes a 
systemic view of the process of capitalism in which space has a role in terms of the aerial 
differentiation between competing locations or regions, which introduces a second theme; that of 
scale. When rephrased like this, it is easy to see why Harvey uses the terms ‘spatial’ and 
‘geographical’ so interchangeably - his is a quintessentially ‘geographical’ understanding of 
space as an abstract theoretical structure of hierarchical ordering rather than a ‘lived’ experiential Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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realm. As Hagerstrand says, in relation to Harvey’s early work, “[l]et us still take as the first 
fundamental assumption that the geographer sees his task as viewing the world in geometrical 
terms of some sort” [an assumption which would now be hotly contested]. He goes on. “[e]ven a 
purely verbal discourse, like David Harvey’s (1971) analysis of the redistribution of real income 
in an urban system, revolves around such central concepts as accessibility and proximity, both 
geometrical in nature” [Hagerstrand 1973, p 76]. 
 
I wish to suggest that Harvey’s spatial understanding is analogous to the processual flow diagram 
that he relies on in illustrating the process of capital accumulation
5 [Limits, p 408; reproduced 
here as figure 6.1]. This is not simply a representation of his theoretical understanding of the role 
of space; this is his ‘space’. 
 
This limited spatial imagination is a product of Harvey’s economistic viewpoint. Although in 
response to Marx’s position that “when we attempt to view society as a totality, then ultimately 
everything has to be related to the structures in the economic basis of society”, he comments that 
the “economic basis as the foundation of all analyses is open to dispute” and asserts that the key 
is the contradictions that exist within and between different structures [1973; p 292-3], his focus 
is entirely related to the economic sphere and its spatial manifestation as described above. 
 
This reductionism becomes particularly apparent when the theories developed within Limits are 
applied in the more experiential context of The Conditions of Postmodernity. A foretaste of this 
difficulty is found in the ‘Afterword’ to Limits. Labourers are too easily thought of as “hands 
possessed of stomachs, ‘like some lowly creature on the sea-shore’” (quoting Dickens), and it 
must be remembered that they are “human beings, possessed of all manner of sentiments, hopes 
and fears...” [ibid.; p 447]. Harvey’s concern to save ‘labourers’ from ‘labour’ and, particularly in 
The Condition of Postmodernity, to deal with the experiential realm, is intended to make a 
defence against the accusation of idealism that is often raised against Marxian theory. It is for this 
reason, perhaps, that such a qualifier comes in the afterword to such a theoretical, and at times 
obtuse, volume that was always conceived as the introduction to a more contextual historical-
geographical materialist discussion (published as the following 1989 volume). This is the 
beginnings of his emphasis on less theoretically reductionist and more experiential concern with  
                                                 
5 This same parallel was alluded to by Steve Pile and Nigel Thrift in a lecture at the Bartlett School of Architecture in 
1999 and appears in less explicit form in their City A-Z, where the entry for ‘Capitalism’ consists solely of  Harvey’s 
diagram from ‘The urban process under capitalism: a framework for analysis’ [Pile and Thrift, 2000; Harvey, 1978, 
reproduced in Dear and Scott, 1981]. Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’ 
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Figures 6.1 Harvey’s conception of space: The Paths of Capital Flow (from The Limits to 
Capital, 1982; p 408)  Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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practice, despite the fact that earlier he has discounted the importance of sentiment and 
emphasised the material and spatial basis of class struggle in capital distribution [ibid.; p 419]. 
 
Theory and practice: from Limits to The Condition of Postmodernity. 
 
This foregrounds the issue of the relationship between theory and practice, which characterises 
the following section, dealing with the contextual exposition of the theoretical developments of 
Limits in The Condition of Postmodernity. 
 
He acknowledges the idealism in Marx’s belief in theory as a clarified mirror of reality, and seeks 
to defend himself from similar criticism. He summarises Marx as follows; 
 
Theorists may seek to spin and weave their arguments so as to ‘locate and describe the 
concrete forms which grow out of the movements of capital as a whole’, and so approach 
‘step by step’ the concrete forms that capital ‘assumes on the surface of society’ [Capital 
Vol. 3; p 25]. In this way, ‘the life of the subject matter’ may be ‘ideally reflected as in a 
mirror’ [Capital Vol. 1; p 19]. 
 
However, he draws a distinction between idealism and an idealist position, defending himself 
against the latter, arguing that; 
 
the conceptual apparatus embedded in such a theoretical reconstruction is by no means an 
idealist  abstraction. It is built up of categories and relationships...forged through actual 
historical transformations.... The categories are born out of an actual historical 
experience [1982; p 450, emphasis added]. 
 
In making a distinction between idealism and idealist positions, Harvey aims to retain the tight 
binding between spheres of theory and practice evident in Marx, while locating the point of 
tangency in the experience of the theorist in choosing categories of relevance rather than in the 
resultant theory. The aim of theory, then, is to create ‘frameworks for understanding’ and it is 
false to conceive of theory as being ultimately separate from historical practice, since it is false to 
draw a distinction between methodology and philosophy, leading to a division between facts and 
values, and (significantly), between “‘things’ as possessing an identity independent of human 
perception and action” [1973; p 11]. Harvey repudiates these separations that he acknowledges in 
his earlier works (especially Explanation in Geography [1969]) as “injurious to analysis even in 
their apparently harmless form of a separation of convenience” [1973; p 12]. Ultimately, he 
dissolves the distinction between theory and practice altogether, arguing that the two become Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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elided through social practice. Similarly, verification in a formalist sense of testing abstract 
propositions is replaced with a focus on social practice in general – “verification is achieved 
through practice...”. 
 
At the heart of this theoretical inversion which occurs between Explanation in Geography and 
chapters one and six of Social Justice and the City is a “shift away from philosophical idealism 
towards a materialist interpretation of ideas as they arise in particular historical contexts” [ibid.]. 
If Harvey’s insistence that theory must be “born from actual historical experience” is to be 
maintained, then the scope of the arguments in Limits must be tested against their application in 
The Condition of Postmodernity; and conversely, the ‘material’ exposition of the theory presented 
in the later text must be tested for correspondence with the theoretical position that it illustrates.  
It is in this latter respect that we find that Harvey’s theoretical position cannot support the 
material descriptions to which he extends it. The key proposition will be that there is a weakness 
in Harvey’s conception of space, inherited from the theoretical schema of Limits, and that 
(appropriately) it is only revealed through his own ‘historical-geographical materialist practice’; 
that is, through the extension of what was a water-tight, if somewhat reductionist, theoretical 
platform into a contextual sphere for which it was never conceived, and is ultimately inadequate. 
 
This, indeed, upholds his own emphasis upon the importance of a priori categorizations and 
meanings as limiting the scope of research, since “definitions could dictate conclusions and a 
system of thought erected upon fixed definitions and fixed categories and relationships could 
inhibit rather than enhance our ability to comprehend the world”. Again, this is a position that he 
moves away from during the course of the theoretical evolution of Social Justice and the City, 
towards a more fluid and “contextually and relationally” defined set of meanings derived through 
practice [ibid.]. Having regarded the former position as a minor problem inherent to scientific 
enquiry [1969] he moves this issue front-of-stage as one of “fundamental importance” to be 
addressed through practice and not through a tighter methodological set of definitions at the 
outset [1973; p 12]. However, despite the appeal to fluid, contextually derived meanings, he never 
underpins the new areas into which he drags his understanding of space with a theoretical 
reworking, either through a restatement of the scope of his understanding of space or through 
reworking those understandings through the practice of materialist enquiry in The Condition of 
Postmodernity.  It is to these tensions and the causes for them that I now turn. 
 Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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‘The Argument’ 
 
For the most part The Condition of Postmodernity follows the theoretical framework set out in 
Limits, inheriting the idea of crises of accumulation in capitalism and the ‘spatial fix’ that allows 
their resolution, focusing particularly on what Harvey identifies as the current phase of spatial 
restructuring beginning circa 1972, and perhaps still continuing today. However, the scope of this 
work is much greater than its antecedent, as is captured in Harvey’s opening statement of ‘The 
Argument’ which warrants reproducing in full; 
 
There has been a sea-change in cultural as well as in political-economic practices since 
around 1972. 
 
This sea-change is bound up with the emergence of new dominant ways in which we 
experience space and time [1989a; p vii]. 
 
Already we see the scope has enlarged considerably. While the earlier volumes were centrally 
concerned with the economic sphere, albeit as related to other social structures, here we find the 
reference to ‘cultural practice’ coming at the forefront of the work. Furthermore, this is related 
immediately to the ways in which ‘we experience’ time and space. It is important to note that 
despite moving into new ground Harvey still retains his epistemological stance. Just as Marx (and 
Harvey) describe a system of relations into which we all fit, wittingly or not, so here we see that 
whether or not we are conscious of whatever the sea-change around us has been, we nonetheless 
experience it. This presumption, while perhaps sustainable when dealing with economic 
structures which are abstract and hidden from view (by their nature perhaps), seems hollow when 
invoking some weak idea of “common understandings” of the experience of space and time as 
Harvey later does in this context. ‘The Argument’ continues: 
 
While simultaneity in the shifting dimensions of space and time is no proof of necessary 
causal connection, strong a priori grounds can be adduced for the proposition that there is 
some kind of necessary relation between the rise of postmodernist cultural forms, the 
emergence of some more flexible modes of capital accumulation, and a new round of 
‘space-time compression’ in the organisation of capitalism. 
 
The relation is made directly back to the earlier texts and the link between the spatial nature of 
capitalism already explored in Limits and postmodernist cultural forms that are synchronic with 
the current changes in that nature. However, already there is a subtle slippage that should be 
noted, for the ‘postmodernist cultural forms’ of the third paragraph are not the same as the Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
 
157 
‘experience of time and space’ that ‘we’ share of the first. Already, I would suggest, Harvey is 
finding tensions between the ambitions and the sustainability of his thesis. For while 
‘postmodernist cultural forms’ returns us to an analytically distanced perspective familiar from, 
and compatible with, the earlier ‘re-spatialization’ of Marxian theory, it stands conceptually 
removed from ‘our experience’ of space and time. Between these two paragraphs in the pre-
introductory précis of the work, Harvey has glossed over the conceptual problem that he later 
magnifies - how to relate the ‘postmodernist cultural form’ that he identifies, particularly in terms 
of architecture and urbanism, to the changing experience of space and time. 
 
‘The Argument’ concludes; 
 
[b]ut these changes, when set against the basic rules of capitalistic accumulation, appear 
more as shifts in surface appearance rather than as signs of the emergence of some 
entirely new postcapitalist or even postindustrial society. 
 
We return to familiar ground, therefore, and in its rootedness in the theoretical structure of Limits 
the exposition in The Condition of Postmodernity is watertight and convincing. It is not my 
intention to argue that this work is unsound or that the ambition of the work in dealing with the 
role of space in contemporary urbanism is overstretched. Rather, it is my aim to uncover the 
weakness in the theoretical underpining to that argument and to offer (in the final part of this 
chapter) a reworking that places this extension on a firmer foundation. 
 
The experiential sea-change 
 
That Harvey links at once into the vein of the ‘re-spatialization literature’ introduced above, with 
its predilection for themes of chaos, fragmentation and schizophrenia, while also adhering to the 
‘alephic’ trope of seeing all as a manifestation of one’s own particular view of that world is well 
illustrated by a single summative passage: 
 
Fiction, fragmentation, collage, and eclecticism, all suffused with a sense of ephemerality 
and chaos, are, perhaps, the themes that dominate in today’s practice of architecture and 
urban design. And there is, evidently, much in common with practices and thinking in 
other realms as well such as art, literature, social theory, psychology and philosophy. 
How is it then that the prevailing mood takes the form that it does? To answer that 
question with any power requires that we first take stock of the mundane realities of 
capitalist modernity and postmodernity, and see what clues might lie there as to the 
possible functions of such fictions and fragmentations in the reproduction of social life 
[1989a; p 98]. Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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Despite the insistence that no particular social structure (in the Marxian sense) is fundamental to 
all others, it is once again the economic that Harvey focuses on, and the critical transition phase 
of the book between the introductory chapters on modernism and postmodernism and the critical 
discussion of the experience of time and space is concerned with the transformation of political-
economic forms from Fordism to what Harvey terms ‘flexible accumulation’. 
 
These politico-economic changes he relates then to cultural changes, as the mutating meaning of 
space under different regimes of time-space compression is seen to prompt a cultural response. 
While in the modern period this was based around an aesthetic of time manifesting itself in a 
concern with speed and disturbing the narrative chronology of the novel form, Harvey suggests, 
following Bell and Jameson, that in the current era “the sense that ‘all that is solid melts into air’ 
has rarely been more pervasive” [following Marx and Berman, 1982] and has lead to an aesthetics 
concerned with problems of space
6. In the current era, he argues following Toffler’s Future Shock 
[1970], time-space compression leads to “profound changes in human psychology” leading to a 
response analogous to that identified by Simmel relating to the modern era; in Harvey’s 
conception the preceding period of societal stress caused by time-space compression. 
 
The ultimate extension of this ‘Simmelian’ reaction draws Harvey towards the analysis of the 
culture of ‘late capitalism’ offered by Jameson [1984, 1991] in which a ‘schizophrenia’ of 
experience is the ultimate result and strategy, induced by “[t]he bombardment of stimuli, simply 
on the commodity front, [which] creates problems of sensory overload that makes Simmel’s 
dissection of the problems of modernist urban living at the turn of the century seem to pale into 
insignificance by comparison” [Harvey, 1989a; p 286]. Harvey recognises this as “perhaps the 
most problematic facet of postmodernism” in its relation to “personality, motivation, and 
behaviour” [ibid.; p 53 emphasis added], and cautions that ‘schizophrenia’ should not be 
understood “in its narrow clinical sense”. This reworking of established meanings forms the basis 
of Jameson’s analysis upon which Harvey draws. Jameson invokes Lacan’s understanding of 
schizophrenia as a linguistic disorder, “a breakdown in the signifying chain of meaning that 
creates a simple sentence” [Harvey, 1989a; p 3]. The effect is to reduce experience to “a series of 
pure and unrelated presents” which are consequently:  
 
                                                 
6 Here Harvey reinforces my earlier argument concerning the differences between the modern and emphases on time 
and speed, and the postmodern emphasis directly on space [see above chapter 4]. Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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powerfully, overwhelmingly vivid and “material”: the world  comes before the 
schizophrenic with heightened intensity, bearing the mysterious and oppressive charge of 
affect, glowing with hallucinatory energy [Jameson, 1984 quoted in Harvey, 1989a; p 54, 
emphasis added]. 
 
‘Material’ for Jameson has a particular and refined meaning, however. It is a two dimensional 
materiality that is depthless, a quality that he sees as being one of the primary features of 
postmodern culture, and is concerned, therefore, with image rather than object. For Jameson, “the 
world...momentarily loses its depth and threatens to become a glossy skin, a stereoscopic illusion, 
a rush of filmic images without density”, reducing the experience of the city to a hermeneutic 
deciphering of a chain of signifiers. 
 
This textual treatment of architecture and the city form has already been identified as a common 
trait of contemporary approaches, and here it is important to note that Harvey seems to take on 
the common themes of the postmodern literature, focusing on the ephemerality and superficiality 
of a new image economy, while arguing (contrary to Baudrillard) that Marx’s analysis can 
equally well address such an economy based upon the production of signs [p 289]. Reacting to 
what he describes as Baudrillard’s exaggeration, he is tempted to “join the [language] game” but 
prefers to find some solidity in the midst of ephemerality and flux in the constancy of change in 
the capitalist system [p 291]. Hence his assertion in ‘The Argument’ that “these, changes, when 
set against the basic rules of capitalistic accumulation, appear more as shifts in surface 
appearance rather than as signs of the emergence of some entirely new postcapitalist or even 
postindustrial society” [p vii]. He argues, therefore, that, “[w]e can link the schizophrenic 
dimension to postmodernity which Jameson emphasises...with accelerations in turnover times in 
production, exchange, and consumption ...”, which themselves ultimately rest on “another fierce 
round in that process of annihilation of space through time that has always lain at the centre of 
capitalism’s dynamic”. 
 
In spatial terms, just as with Soja, this rests on little more than an appreciation of technical fixes 
to the problem of the friction of distance. He gives a series of examples of these significant 
changes; satellite communications, air-freight, containerization, decentralization of the production 
process, near-instantaneous media technologies, mass tourism etc. While he rejects the thesis that 
this is tantamount to the “abolishing of time and space” (quoting McLuhan), seeing rather a 
converse rise in the importance of space, this is only conceived in terms of the capitalists desire 
for locational advantage and a heightened awareness of the differential advantages and the Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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commercial opportunities of alternative locations. He refines this still further, however, returning 
to his earlier theme of “value in motion” as the key to the capitalist process, by proposing that 
“[n]one of these shifts in the experience of space and time would make the sense or have the 
impact they do without a radical shift in the manner in which value gets represented as money”, 
which itself “has been ‘de-materialized’”, with neither a basis in gold nor commodities [pp 296-
7]. This approach leads Harvey to consider “more tangible and material ways” to consider the 
significance of space and time for postmodernity, resulting in the conclusion that since “cultural 
forms are firmly rooted in the daily circulation process of capital… [i]t is, therefore, with the 
daily experience of money and the commodity that we should begin...” [p 299]. 
 
Harvey’s econo-centrism is overt and he counters the criticism of understanding the economy as 
the determinant of cultural life, even in the Althusserian system of a ‘last resort’, with the 
challenge that, “if there is a meta-theory with which to embrace all these gyrations of postmodern 
thinking and cultural production, then why should we not deploy it” [pp 336-7, see also 344]. 
 
These passages invoke an understanding of space in economistic terms similar to that 
encountered in Limits. It is primarily a geographical conception and the central proposition is that 
there is a change in the way that capitalism as a whole, and individual businesses as elements 
within that whole, organise their production over space. The two key themes identified above are 
apparent again here - the notion of scale and nested hierarchies of interlaced understandings 
(capitalism - global, universal; individual firms - organisation of production process as part of 
capitalist process; individual worker - as part of the spatial organisation of the firm and of 
capitalism) and also the theme of difference over space, globally (developed/ under-developed), 
regionally (sun-belt/ rust-belt) and locally (locational advantage). The added experiential 
dimension causes difficulties with this economistic conception, which is tenuously extended from 
the politico-economic domain to the cultural domain, and an understanding of how individuals 
experience space, without a thorough reworking of the idea of space at the core. It remains 
essentially a systemic view of space, best captured by the sense of diagrammatic space. If figure 
6.1(above p 153) was the essence of the spatial vision of Limits then perhaps the spatial 
imagination of The Condition of Postmodernity might be captured by figure 6.2 [from Harvey, 
1989a; p 241]. 
 
Harvey might argue that figure 6.2 would indicate a relational understanding of space. However, 
this is surely to mistake a representation of relations with a relational understanding, perhaps  Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’ 
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Figures 6.2 Harvey’s experiential space: The shrinking map of the world (from The Condition of 
Postmodernity, 1989; p 241). Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
 
162 
once again an ‘alephic’ symptom of trying, with difficulty, to conceive of everything as 
conforming to a particular viewpoint and the blurring of subjects, objects and attitudes pointed to 
by Cloke, Philo and Saddler [1991]. Figure 6.2 illustrates the idea of a ‘shrinking’ globe that is 
central to the idea of time-space compression. However, the conception of space that it implies is 
surely more absolute than relational, with its implicit position of judgement and ideas of scale 
and measurement against which to apprehend absolutely the shrinking of the image on the page 
as much as the world that it represents. 
 
A comparison might be made with the thought experiment advanced by Poincaré [Space and 
Hypothesis, 1952 and also commentary in Huggett, 1999] of a non-Euclidean world that shrinks, 
as do its inhabitants, according to the laws of thermodynamics. As Poincaré demonstrates, to the 
inhabitants of his hypothetical world the laws of geometry remain Euclidean as they are unable to 
perceive any difference
7. The parallel resides in the fact that while Harvey presents a strong case 
for the impact of an acceleration in the circulation of capital and reduction in transportation and 
communication times
8 which might be represented as a shrinking globe, he has difficulty in 
relating this to the experience of space, beyond advancing the hypothesis that cultural forms have 
been influenced by this change - indeed have developed this representation that he now turns to 
for evidence. 
 
Matter and the material 
 
The difficulty lies in the conception of space that Harvey introduces early in his section on ‘The 
Experience of Time and Space’, using the looser style of the introduction’s ‘broad brush’ to slip 
through, perhaps unwittingly, some re-orientations that are significant and unsupportable, in a 
similar manner encountered in ‘The Argument’. Here, significantly, the juggling relates to 
materialism and matter as the basis of Harvey’s approach to the experience of space. 
 
He begins by noting that many authors working in this field do not clearly define what they mean 
by ‘space’ and ‘time’ as they relate to social life. Following a trajectory from Berman [1982] to 
Bell [1978] and Jameson [1984], Harvey introduces the idea of a relationship between cultural 
shifts from modernity to postmodernity, and a changing experience of space and time; the former 
                                                 
7 Huggett extends the explanation by considering the world as a disk that shrinks as an observer moves to the periphery, 
as does the observer himself, who thereby concludes that world he inhabits is infinite. 
8 Once again the limited ‘friction of distance’ argument forming the corner stone of the importance of material space as 
was the case with Soja. Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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coming to dominate the latter in aesthetic debates and developments towards the second half of 
the twentieth century, the earlier part having been dominated by the aesthetics of time [Bell cites 
Bergson, Proust, Joyce, and see above chapter 4]. He aims to rectify this lack of clarity by 
exploring the ‘material links’ between political-economic and cultural processes, which “will 
allow [him] to explore the link between postmodernism and the transition from Fordism to more 
flexible modes of capital accumulation via the mediations of spatial and temporal experiences” 
[1989a; p 201]. Spatial (and temporal) experiences are sandwiched as a mediating link between 
the two poles of Harvey’s enquiry (postmodernism as a cultural process and capitalism as a 
political-economic process), both of which are theoretical abstractions related to a materialist 
base invoking a conception of space which tends to be abstract, geographical and distributional. 
 
“Space and time are basic categories of human existence”, and because we rarely debate their 
meanings Harvey argues that the self-evident or common-sense attributes need to be questioned, 
offering a sampling of socially-defined conceptions of space and time as well as the ‘space-time’ 
of the physicists’ understanding as evidence for the more complex and multiple objective 
qualities that space and time can express [p 203]. However, whereas his argument on time is quite 
conclusive, challenging the idea of time’s “ineluctable arrow of motion” and ruling out any return 
to that as a commonly held understanding with alternative conceptions as mere “interpretations”, 
his argument in relation to space is a little less secure. 
 
He begins by arguing that space also “gets treated as a fact of nature” through the assignment of 
common-sense everyday meanings, and needs to be open to the same multiple understandings as 
those that were brought to time, principally derived from subjective, anthropological and 
historical perspectives. However, he concludes that there remains; 
 
some sense of an overarching and objective meaning of space which we must, in the last 
instance, all acknowledge is pervasive [p 203]. 
 
Following from the previous paragraph this appears to be a direct contradiction and Harvey is 
obliged to explain why he rescues a ‘pervasive objective’ quality of space where a similar gesture 
was not made for time, indeed it was ruled out explicitly. His argument moves swiftly but in 
distinct stages. Firstly, he argues against a single objective understanding of time and space, 
while simultaneously avoiding a total dissolution of the objective-subjective distinction, 
preferring rather a multiplicity of possible objective qualities which space and time can express 
and emphasising “the role of human practice in their construction”. The first step therefore is the Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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familiar one of a socially-defined conception of space and time which allows for competing 
understandings without descending into the formless relativism of subjectivism. The second step 
in bringing this within the scope of his Marxian perspective is to move from ‘human practice’ to 
‘material processes’, stating that “the objective qualities of physical time-space cannot be 
understood, therefore, independently of the qualities of the material processes”. 
 
However, there is a critical bridging construction to which the preceding ‘therefore’ refers; 
 
Neither time nor space, the physicists now broadly propose, had existence (let alone 
meaning) before matter; the objective qualities of physical time-space cannot be 
understood, therefore, independently of the qualities of the material processes. 
 
In making this link between ‘matter’ as conceived by the physicists and ‘material processes’ in its 
Marxian sense, Harvey is blurring two sets of ontological and epistemological positions. That he 
does so, even momentarily, perhaps reveals why he hints at, although cannot articulate fully, 
“some sense of an overarching and objective meaning of space, which we must, in the last 
instance, all acknowledge is pervasive”. This sense of space is captured in his description of what 
space is – “it has direction, area, shape, pattern and volume as key attributes, as well as distance” 
[p 203]. Here we see the basis of what I have referred to above as his ‘geographical 
consciousness’ (the parallel with his ‘geographical imagination’ of Social Justice and the City is 
intended and will be expounded upon below); space as distance, area, pattern. This also parallels 
the understanding of ‘materialism’ of Jameson; the peculiarly two-dimensional collapsing quality 
of his ‘stereoscopic illusion’. However, there is also a second key set of attributes referred to by 
Harvey - volume and shape - that point to a different spatial vision, one that is based more in the 
concept of matter. 
 
Harvey, however, repudiates this concession no sooner than it is stated, I would suggest because 
he realises where such a position inevitably takes him. He immediately positions “this particular 
physical conception” also as a social construct, since it relies on a particular version of the 
constitution of matter and the origin of the universe. He thus subordinates matter to “material 
practice”, concluding finally, and without the now subsumed appeal to matter, that “neither space 
nor time can be assigned objective meanings independently of material processes, and it is only 
through investigations of the latter that we can properly ground our concepts of the former” [p 
204]. 
 Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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Under a system such as capitalism which is inherently revolutionary, material practices are 
constantly changing so that the “objective qualities as well as the meanings of space and time also 
change” and such conceptual changes can then ‘have material consequences for the ordering of 
daily life” [ibid.]. The process is conceived of as referential, therefore, but in postulating the 
relationship between conceptions of time and space and material consequences, Harvey once 
again introduces the conception of matter that is continually lurking in the background of his 
understanding of the relationship between space and spatial experience. Here it is introduced 
through an example: 
 
When, for example, a planner-architect like Le Corbusier, or an administrator like 
Haussmann, creates a built environment in which the tyranny of the straight line 
predominates, then we must perforce adjust our daily practices [ibid.]. 
 
This introduces the geographical bug-bear of determinism that he has been so keen to avoid, 
realising (above) that it was the inevitable consequence of introducing physical space into his 
theoretical framework. His fix is revealing for he justifies his assertion that “this does not mean 
that practices are determined by built form” with the argument that “they [practices] have the 
awkward habit of escaping their moorings in any fixed schema of representation”. His solution, 
therefore, is to equate ‘built form’ with ‘fixed schema of representation’, a link that is reinforced 
by his following assertion that, “new meanings can be found for older materializations of space 
and time” [ibid., emphasis added]. 
 
Just as with Soja therefore, we see that Harvey struggles to avoid determinism in his conception 
of the relationship between experience and spatial form, and so finds himself forced to remove 
matter from his theoretical position despite the fact that his subject matter instinctively draws him 
back towards this ‘no-go’ area for geographers and all those considering the environment-society 
relationship. He avoids determinism by focusing more on the ‘meaning’ of space as an adjunct to 
his economistic absolutism despite his description of the key attributes of space, all of which were 
physical/ dimensional. 
 
Theoretical slipages 
 
Harvey explores this problem again in a more theoretical vein in Justice, Nature and the 
Geography of Difference [1996], reinforcing once more the temporal separation between 
theoretical development and its practical application (albeit for reasons of convenience) that one Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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finds across the body of his work. Here, with the perspective of hindsight, he is able to reflect 
upon the gains of the ‘re-spatialization’ literature which has resulted in a “seeming 
consensus...that space and time are social constructs” [1996; p 207, note the stark contrast with 
the position at the outset of Social Justice and the City over twenty years earlier, see above p 
144]. 
 
However, he points to “innumerable and potentially damaging confusions” lurking within this 
consensus, foremost among which is a slippage that occurs in ‘actual accounts’, “into a much 
more prosaic presentation [of the reflexive relations between a socially constituted space-time and 
social relations and practices] in which social relations occur within some pre-constituted and 
static framework of space and time” [ibid., sic]. Harvey here reiterates exactly my own criticism 
of his previous work, which relied upon just such a static framework of space and time, 
developed in Limits. His difficulty seems to be in seeing that an emphasis on the changing 
‘experience’ of space and time does not imply that the conceptions therein also necessarily 
change, in other words, although the quantitative aspects of space and time are alleged to have 
changed through time-space compression (the time taken to overcome a particular distance for 
example) the qualitative nature of the concepts remains unchanged in Harvey’s earlier vision. 
This is not unrelated to his argument, presented above, that although capitalism is in constant 
change, it is the constancy of that change that provides an analytical continuum between 
modernity and postmodernity. 
 
Harvey’s unintentional self analysis continues along a convenient path as he concludes that the 
explanation for this ‘slippage’ suggests that, “there is something radically amiss in the way 
relations between spatio-temporality and sociality are constructed at the very outset” [ibid., 
emphasis added]. It was suggested above that this foundational difficulty can be attributed to the 
way in which ‘physical space’ or matter is treated, and Harvey opens his renewed theoretical 
considerations by questioning the difference between material and metaphorical uses of ‘space’, 
arguing that, “it is therefore impossible to proceed far with a discussion of space and time without 
invoking the word ‘place’” [p 208]. Although he notes the multiplicity of meanings, both material 
and metaphorical, that are attached to this “most multilayered and multipurpose keyword[s] in our 
language”, he argues that rather than creating an impasse, this “immense confusion of meanings” 
should rather be seen as an advantage which “suggests some underlying unity which...will reveal 
a great deal about social, political, and spatial practices over time” [ibid.]. 
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In introducing the term ‘place’ into his theoretical arsenal, there has been a significant shift from 
the position set out in Limits where a material understanding of space was the foundation stone. 
Here, by contrast, there is “renewed emphasis upon the interrogation of metaphorical and 
psychological meanings which, in turn, generate material practices that give new material 
definitions of place”. This relationship between material practice and metaphorical 
understandings is reinforced by four points of clarification. Firstly, that ‘social constructions’ are 
based in “the materiality of the world”, derived from “the various forms of space [and time] 
which humans encounter in their struggle for material survival” [p 210]. Again, this seems to be 
an appeal to some intuitive ‘common understanding of space’ as an experiential as well as 
conceptual realm. However, the second clarification reinforces that there can be no understanding 
that is not contextually derived from “cultural embeddedness in language, belief systems, and the 
like” and so challenges the notion of a ‘fact of nature’ that might be understood as being implied 
in the first. Lest this be interpreted as radical subjectivism, the third clarification draws a 
distinction between personal subjectivism and social construction, arguing that the latter operates 
“with the full force of objective facts to which all individuals and institutions necessarily 
respond”. This establishes a set of “universal concepts and representations which are canonical 
for the society as a whole” [p 212, quoting Gurevich]. These clarifications might seem innocuous 
enough but once again they point to conflicts within the theoretical structure. 
 
What has been created is a characteristic Marxian framework of a shrouded ‘base’ overlaid by, 
and isolated from, an interpretative infrastructure (the cultural, metaphorical and intellectual skills 
of language and belief structures). The latter separates the base from society, which remains 
“unaware both of the imposition and the acceptance, the ‘absorption’, of these categories [derived 
from the base] by its members” [ibid., quoting Gurevich]. The effect is to confuse the assertion 
that understandings of space and time are ultimately embedded in the material world. How then 
are we to understand the “various forms of space and time encountered by humans in their 
struggle for material survival”? As social constructs, even though they were supposedly the 
material basis of those social constructions, or as material realities independent of contextual 
understandings? 
 
This confusion between realist and contextual positions is amplified by a series of examples of 
what this material and experiential base (that “which human beings encounter”) might be. But 
while elsewhere he asserts that space and time cannot be considered separately, it is noticeable 
here that he is only able to give decidedly temporal illustrations. “For example, night and day, the Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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seasons, lifecycles in the animal and plant world, and the biological processes that regulate 
human reproduction and the body are typical encounters with various kinds of temporality”. In 
relation to contemporary experience temporal examples are once again offered, “The swing of the 
pendulum or the pace of radioactive decay are now used, whereas in other eras it may have been 
the cyclical motions of the planets and the stars or the migrations of animal populations” [p 211]. 
In terms of time, therefore, Harvey is able to conceive of properties of the material world which 
are precursors to the social constructions balanced upon them. Continuing with time therefore he 
shows that “in modern societies we accept clock time, even though such time is a social construct, 
as an objective fact of daily life… Even when we do not conform to it, we know very well what is 
being rebelled against” [p 212]. 
 
It is notable, therefore, that in supporting his argument about the material grounding of concepts 
of time and space, he is only able to offer examples derived from time. This might be explained in 
two ways; either there is a weakness in the assertion that ‘social constructions of space and time 
are not wrought out of thin air, but shaped out of the various forms of space and time which 
human beings encounter in their struggle for material survival”, because constructions of space 
are indeed wrought out of thin air and are not based in any materiality. This would then suggest a 
philosophical position in which time had a material manifestation while space did not, which is 
contrary to Harvey’s own stated position. Alternatively, it would suggest that beyond flacid 
remarks about the material basis of space, he is unable to give a concrete example, presumably 
not because one could not be offered, given the above conclusion, but because he is reluctant to 
do so. This can only be because to do so would, within the context of the framework set out 
above, be to posit a link between material properties of space and society through the medium of 
human experience which would be dangerously close to spatial determinism. 
 
It is for this reason that in the fourth clarification that Harvey offers to the notion of space and 
time as social constructs he makes a clear distinction between space and representations of space. 
It is the latter that he sees to be of importance, using the example of the layout of the Kabyle 
house described by Bordieu [1977]. The “material embeddedness [of] social constructs of space 
and time which internalises social relations” is founded within the physical structure of the house 
(“the partitions within the house etc”) but this is not treated as material space but as a 
representation of space which, “arise out of the world of social practice but then become a form 
of regulation of those practices” [p 212]. The effects is to separate ways of representing space 
from the use of space (Harvey even construes these as oppositional in the text) such that although Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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it is the “spaces occupied at specific times” that are the key to understanding the role of women in 
Kabyle society, this is seen as a “way of representing (as opposed to using) space and time” 
[ibid.]. 
 
There seems to me to be a fundamental weakness in Harvey’s argument. Despite the assertion 
that space and time cannot be treated separately and that both are embedded in a material human 
experience, the two are treated very differently in the text. While Harvey is happy to point to ‘fact 
of nature’ phenomena such as night and day and the seasons as a material basis for a universal 
experiential understanding of time, no such examples can be given for space, although his 
argument continually returns to guarded allusions that such an experiential basis does exist. The 
spatial component of this experiential spatio-temporal base never seems to reconnect to that root, 
always circling within the interpretative superstructure of social construction. 
 
This conclusion undermines Harvey’s sympathy with the arguments of Gurevich, Munn and 
Mitchell [1985, 1987, and 1991 respectively] which he sees as pointing to the undermining of a 
world view derived from Descartes, Newton and Locke, opening a more relational understanding 
of space and time which overcomes the pervasive mind-matter, fact-value dualities of Western 
thought [see Harvey, 1989a; pp 220 and 224]. Mitchell characterizes this as a binary order with; 
 
on the one hand individuals and their activities and on the other an inert structure that 
somehow stands apart from individuals, pre-exists them, and contains and gives a 
framework to their lives. Such techniques have given rise to the peculiar metaphysics of 
modernity, where the world seems resolved into the two-dimensional form of individual 
versus apparatus, practice versus institution, social life and its structure - or material 
reality and its meaning [Mitchell, 1991; p ix, quoted in Harvey, 1996; p 224]. 
 
As we have seen, Harvey has not resolved this mind-matter duality in terms of his view of space. 
It is still present in his work as the disjunction between the social construction of space and its 
material basis. The way that he moves around this problem and tries to avoid what he calls the 
“Western conceit of the individual as a performed identity within a set of absolute structures of 
space and time” [ibid.] is to conceive of material objects in terms of their symbolic meanings. 
This is again an attempt to move away from what Harvey sees as the moribund dualisms 
described by Mitchell and is the mechanism proposed by Munn to link representations and 
material circumstances that Harvey finds lacking in Gurevich’s account, just as I have found it 
lacking in his. Drawing on Munn’s description of the importance of canoes and shells in Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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constructing social relations and concepts of space and time in Gawan society, Harvey argues 
that; 
 
The power of objects and things over us, the fact that they seem to have a life of their 
own and to possess value on their own account depends entirely on the way discourses of 
value envelop them and invest them with symbolic meaning [ibid.; p 221]. 
 
He thereby draws a parallel between Munn’s work and the idea of the fetishization of 
commodities in Marx, in which objects are seen to be invested with social values, and argues that 
central to this practice of valuation is the notion of evaluative discourses about the ‘thing’. 
Material objects are again seen to be accessible only through language and decoding of socially 
attributed meanings. In relation to built environments of all scales, from domestic interiors to 
cities, he argues that the “[t]he fixing of spatiality through material building creates solidly 
constructed spaces that instanciate negotiated or imposed social values” and that a semiotics of 
spatial ordering can create of these material realities ‘texts’ to be read in social terms. 
 
Money as ‘thing’  
 
There appears to be a distinct change in emphasis, therefore, between the early theoretical work 
of Limits and the current position outlined above, a change from an economistic and abstract 
understanding of space towards a relational and phenomenological understanding, what Harvey 
would identify as the positions of the ‘young’ and ‘old’ Marx. However, he argues that as there is 
no rupture between the two phases of Marx’s thought but rather a dialogue, so there is no 
distinction to be made between these seemingly different approaches to space [see Harvey, 1996; 
pp 232-3]. The key to mediating this union is the role of ‘things’. 
 
Particular importance must be paid to the mediating role of things in allowing the “translation and 
transformation from one spatio-temporality to another”, to the extent that the approach to 
‘thingness’ brings into question the binary duality identified by Mitchell between the spatio-
temporalities of the ‘lifeworld’ (rooted, it has been shown, in symbolic meanings) and the 
“abstract ‘rationalized’ spatialities attributed to modernity and capitalism (such as those that 
emerge from a discussion of market exchange)” [ibid.; pp 233-4]. This is a critical passage as he 
raises an awareness of exactly the criticisms I have made of his own work, and finds the 
resolution through a discussion of ‘thingness’ that is a direct engagement with the concept of Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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material objects that I have argued is the foundational problem within the ‘respatialization’ 
literature. 
 
Harvey illustrates his argument in relation to money, for the reason that it is “by far the most 
important ‘thing’ in which social relations become invested, values articulated, and social powers 
incorporated” [p 234], a role which I shall later argue should be ascribed to space itself, 
conceived as a ‘thing’ (if indeed such a singling-out is useful). Money, he argues, mirrors in its 
uses the heterogeneity of spatio-temporalities under capitalism, such that although “each concrete 
money use defines a particular spatio-temporality, it does so in some relation to the spatio-
temporal processes regulating the abstract qualities of money on the world market” [p 238]. 
However, it is able to make this translation between relational and abstract spheres because 
money is understood as ‘value’. It is, therefore, not possible to consider money as a thing outside 
of the system of ‘value in motion’ that is the process of capitalism. To do so would be to make 
the same mistake that Marx termed the ‘fetishization of commodities’ - the treatment of objects as 
distinct from the circumstances of their production that is caused by the way that markets 
“conceal social (and, we should add, geographical) information and relations” [Harvey, 1996; p 
232]. 
 
For Harvey, therefore, ‘things’ are not fixed material entities but must be seen in terms of 
processes. The groundwork for this position is laid early in his justification for following Marx’s 
dialectical thinking. This Ollman summarizes; 
 
 Dialectics restructures our thinking about reality by replacing the common sense notion 
of ‘thing’, as something that has a history and has external connection with other things, 
with a notion of ‘process’, which contains its history and possible futures, and ‘relation’, 
which contains as part of what is its ties with other relations [Ollman, 1993; p 11, quoted 
in Harvey, 1996; p 48]. 
 
The consequences for the understanding of the traditional ontology of space-time-matter can be 
seen in eleven propositions offered as the principles of dialectics, which itself is to be understood 
in processual, and so perhaps uncategorizable, terms, thus overcoming the Cartesian separations 
that are characterized here as mind: matter, thought: action, consciousness: materiality, theory: 
practice [ibid.; p 49].  
 
1. Dialectical thinking emphasizes the understanding of processes, flows, fluxes, and 
relations over the analysis of elements, things, structures, and organized systems.... There Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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is a deep ontological principle involved here, for dialecticians in effect hold that 
elements, things, structures, and systems do not exist outside of or prior to the processes, 
flows, and relations that create, define or undermine them. 
 
This initial proposition clearly has many ontological and epistemological consequences, which 
Harvey acknowledges and to which I will return in the light of the other propositions that follow 
to a degree as a consequence of this first critical axiomatic proposition. 
 
Subsequent propositions develop the understanding of ‘things’ as processual: “Elements or 
‘things’ are constituted out of flows, processes, and relations” (no. 2) and are therefore to be 
treated in the light of constituting and sustaining processes rather than as inert. ‘Things’ are seen 
not to be irreducible but as constituted by multiple problematic and contradictory processes (no.3) 
and are therefore seen to be internally heterogeneous and reducible to other things ad infinitum as 
there are no essential ‘things’ that are building blocks. Therefore, all levels of understanding can 
be resolved as a part of a further process, leading to the conclusion that parts and wholes are 
mutually constitutive of one another (no.6) and that subject and object, cause and effect are also 
interchangeable (no.7). However, there are boundaries to be set to the understanding of a relevant 
system, necessary to avoid the monadal-type conclusion that each thing (the example is given of a 
person) internalizes everything in the universe (no.2 and 4c). The boundaries are not established a 
priori but are set in terms of the systems of relevance (no. 4c), but these boundaries, with respect 
to space, time, scale and environment, are of strategic importance in the development of concepts, 
theories and abstractions. In geography this is particularly identified (by Harvey) with the 
question of scale (no. 4d). Space and time are to be seen, therefore, as “neither absolute nor 
external to processes” but as “contingent and contained with them” (emphasis added). This is the 
basis for the understanding of space explored above as produced by different “physical, biological 
and social processes” which do not operate in, but “actively construct”, space and time. 
 
Perhaps the most important principle according to Harvey is that “change and instability are the 
norm” and that what has to be explained is why and how, for example, the physical world 
appears to be a “relatively stable configuration of matter and things” (no. 9). 
 
These principles seem to lay a theoretical groundwork that might explain the particular 
understanding of space that has been found in Harvey’s work. However, the principles given 
involve epistemological as well as ontological principles, and indeed it is in the nature of 
dialectical thinking, Harvey argues, to question this separation also, since the problem of whether Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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dialectics is “an ontological statement about the nature of reality or a convenient epistemology for 
understanding nature” is also rendered inappropriate along with the other Cartesian binary 
dualisms [ibid.; p 48]. Principle 10 asserts, therefore, that as dialectical enquiry is “itself a process 
that produces permanences such as concepts, abstractions, theories and institutionalized structures 
of knowledge” the relationship between the researcher and the researched must be seen as 
constitutive also, such that it is integral to dialectical thinking to explore other “possible worlds”, 
that is to acknowledge that “ethical, moral and political choices (values)” are implicit in 
dialectical thinking and that its goal should be the exploration of other possible (and better) 
worlds through the union of theory and practice. 
 
There are two key attributes that can be extracted from this description of dialectical method by 
Harvey. Firstly, it blurs the distinction between ontological and epistemological positions. 
Methodologically this lack of distinction is hard to maintain, and Harvey notes that 
“epistemologically, the process of enquiry usually inverts this emphasis [on processes rather than 
things]: we get to understand processes by looking at either the attributes of what appear to us in 
the first instance to be self-evident things or at the relations between them”.  However, this 
“epistemological condition should get reversed when it comes to formulating abstractions, 
concepts, and theories about the world...[which, therefore,] transforms the self-evident world of 
things with which positivism and empiricism typically deals into a much more confusing world of 
relations and flows that are manifest in things” [p 49]. This resonates with the understanding of 
The Aleph introduced above. Dialectical enquiry holds that epistemological and ontological 
positions are blurred but it is the epistemological emphasis of dialectics on emphasizing an 
approach to ‘things’ that guides the ontological view of ‘what is’. 
 
Secondly, and as a consequence of this, the idea of material objects in the ‘self-evident’ and 
‘common sense’ understanding is dissolved as these are regarded as ‘permanences’, 
manifestations of constitutive and sustaining processes. ‘Matter’ is excluded, therefore, from the 
ontological framework as it is epistemologically of no significance in comparison with these 
processes (being always reducible to further processual understandings according to principles 3 
and 6 above). Again, this echoes earlier conclusions, both in relation to Soja’s work, and 
Harvey’s inability, described above, to reconnect his spatial understanding to a material base. 
That impossibility can now be understood not only in epistemological terms of how to conceive 
of a relationship between physical space and societal processes, but also in ontological terms, 
since physical space itself is to be conceived of not in terms of a ‘referential base’ but as a Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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process also. It is this basic interpretation of ‘thingness’ which is critical in understanding 
Harvey’s approach to the city and architecture as a physical as well as social phenomena. 
 
The City and Architecture 
 
Having reached a thorough understanding of the conceptual basis of space and matter within 
Harvey’s work, I now wish to turn to their more contextual development, examining the view of 
cities and architecture that emerges as a corollary of these positions. This necessitates a return to 
the early work Social Justice and the City, which forms the beginning of his concern with 
urbanism. 
 
During that work, Harvey makes a dramatic shift in position that he alerts the reader to in the 
introduction; “[t]he general approach contained in Part 2 is substantially different (and, I believe, 
substantially more enlightening) than that in Part 1” [Harvey, 1973; p 10]. While he argues that 
both parts maintain the view that the distinction between social processes and spatial form is 
artificial, the second part of the book does mark a distinct change of approach, “the distinction is 
regarded as unreal in a rather different sense” [ibid.]. There is a development from an idealist to a 
materialist approach, which perceives urbanism to be more than simply a ‘thing in itself’ and 
neither separate nor separable from ideas of space and social justice [p 17]. There is similarly a 
shift in the understanding of space from chapter 1, which he argues descends into a “formless 
relativism”, to a relationally defined conception and a change of approach from an ontological 
focus on the a priori definition of space to an epistemological and contextually motivated 
approach that seeks not “philosophical answers to philosophical questions” but turns to human 
practice as the source of answers. 
 
However, Harvey is adamant that the transformation of approach “does not negate the 
formulations of part I. It enriches them by assimilating them into higher order concepts” and 
gives them new meanings in the context of a renewed framework [ibid.; pp 10 and 301]. The 
formulations of chapter 1 should not be ignored, therefore, despite being written off as “formless 
relativism”.  
 
“Any general theory of the city must somehow relate social processes in the city to the spatial 
form which the city assumes” [1973; p 23]. Harvey develops this opening statement into a 
discussion of the elision between what he describes as the “geographical” and the “sociological Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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imaginations”. While the latter is concerned with the relation between history and biography 
within society, the former, which is also referred to simply as ‘spatial consciousness’, relates to 
the role of space within the biography of individuals. Thus it bears on “the spaces [the individual] 
sees around him [sic], and [recognizes] how transactions between individuals and between 
organizations are affected by the space that separates them”, as well as allowing one to gauge the 
significance of spatially removed events. 
 
Significantly, Harvey then continues that, “[i]t allows him also to fashion and use space creatively 
and to appreciate the meaning of the spatial forms created by others” [p 24, emphasis added]. 
Without the strength of an analytical method, he argues, the ‘geographical imagination’ relies 
heavily on intuition and is primarily based within ‘the plastic arts’ [p 24]. While the majority of 
his argument in this section is indeed weak in its lack of an analytical means for linking spatial 
form to behaviour - a lack to be rectified in later sections reworking Harvey’s theory and 
salvaging these early positions from the ‘formless relativism’ - this association between a ‘spatial 
consciousness’ and the ‘meaning of space’ becomes a persistent feature of his understanding of 
the physical form of the city and buildings. Indeed, despite his repudiation of the position taken in 
the opening chapter later in this book, much of his ‘conclusions and reflections’ continues in a 
similar vein. 
 
Harvey argues that the sociological and geographical imaginations cannot be separated, either in 
analytical terms or in any attempt to influence social practices, and yet seems to have difficulty in 
making this union. The reason for this difficulty is this hermeneutic approach to space, which 
Harvey sees as the only way in which to link society and space (and the two related forms of 
‘imagination’). He begins by seeking a ‘geometry’ or analytical framework by which to link the 
different experiential levels of space that he takes from Cassirer - organic space (biologically 
determined spatial responses etc); perceptual space and symbolic space (such as geometries 
themselves). However, he then asserts that “social space is not isomorphic with physical space” 
and, drawing on evidence from the study of space by physicists (a perpetually popular and 
dangerous parallel to make - see Sokal and Bricmont [1999]), argues that each form of social 
activity defines its own space of relevance as “geometry is defined by process” [p 30]. 
 
This is the beginning of his ‘formless relativism’ and here we begin to see Harvey’s limited 
‘architectural imagination’ evolve. While he states that this subordination of geometry to process 
gives geographers the concept of ‘socio-economic space’ (revealing also!) and psychologists and Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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anthropologists the idea of ‘personal space’, he continues... “[w]e know very little...about the 
exact manner in which the artist or architect fashions space to transmit an aesthetic experience” 
for the reason that [we] have little understanding of the processes operating within the perceptual 
realm of spatial experience [p 30, emphasis added]. 
 
This parallel between the artist and architect is important, and derives from the resolution of 
architecture into two principles of spatial organization - the first “designed to prevent the 
structure from violating physical constraints” which pose no analytical problem, being “Euclidean 
and tractable”; the second “designed to facilitate the transference of some aesthetic experience”. 
What precisely the first principles refer to is not clear. These are not the principles of physical 
constraint of the engineer which he remarks are distinctly different, but the “physical constraints 
of spatial organization” by which presumably he is referring to the ‘jigsaw’ skill of the architect 
in fitting elements into a scheme. This, however, is a disappointingly shallow conception of the 
importance of physical space within architecture, theoretically constrained principally because of 
the lack of an analytical methodology. Furthermore, ‘physical space’ is excluded from the second 
principle dealing with aesthetics also as, following Langer, “ ‘the space in which we live and act 
is not what is treated in art at all’, for the space in which we have our physical being is a system 
of relationships whereas the space of art is a created space built out of forms, colours, and so on” 
[Harvey, 1973; pp 30-1, quoting Langer, 1953; p 72]. 
 
Langer (and Harvey) extend this conception to architecture also and although it “defines and 
arranges spatial units in terms of the space in which we live and move”, as before these qualities 
of the built environment are seen as secondary to its common nature with the ‘artistic 
environment’ in transmitting an illusion, that is the physical manifestation of something purely 
conceptual. In the case of architecture this conceptual blueprint is what Langer calls an ‘ethnic 
domain’, which Harvey understands to mean that, “the shaping of space which goes on in 
architecture and, therefore, in the city is symbolic of our culture, symbolic of the existing social 
order, symbolic of our aspirations, our needs, our fears” [p 31, emphasis added]. Harvey here 
isolates the constitutive importance of the spatial form of the city, placing it at one remove from 
social importance, which is mediated through the perceptual and subjective realm of ‘symbolic 
meaning’ that leads him into such problems of relativism. ‘Culture’ is similarly removed one step 
from the physical domain, as the city is ‘symbolic of our culture’ which itself presumably resides 
in a non-physical therefore conceptual, mental domain. Here Harvey makes use of the work of 
Lévi-Strauss (particularly Structural Anthropology, 1966) and the idea of the physical form of a Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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village being a reflection of the mythological structure of that society. In doing so he loses 
perhaps some of the sense that Langer places on architecture as a “physically present human 
environment”, concluding that, “if...we are to evaluate the spatial form of the city, we must, 
somehow or other, understand its creative meaning as well as it mere physical dimensions” [p 
31]. 
 
I wish to argue that this marks for Harvey a critical wrong turn that he perpetuates into his later 
work. Harvey is seeking a correspondence between spatial symbolism and behaviour as he sees 
the understanding of the symbolic qualities of form as being the necessary precursor to a 
meaningful relationship between spatial and social forms mediated through behaviour. The result 
is a view of the city as containing, 
 
all manner of signals and symbols, [by which] we can try to understand the meaning 
which people give to them. We must seek to understand the message which people 
receive from their constructed environment. To do this we need a very general 
methodology for the measurement of spatial and environmental symbolism. Here, the 
techniques of pyscholinguistics and psychology have much to recommend them. [Harvey, 
1973; p 32]. 
 
Although this specific methodological approach is abandoned in later work, the view of space in 
relation to the built form of the city and architecture essentially remains little changed; 
 
In general, we have to conclude that social space is complex, non-heterogeneous, perhaps 
discontinuous, and almost certainly different from the physical space in which the 
engineer and the planner typically work… If we are to understand space, we must 
consider its symbolic meaning and its complex impact upon behaviour as it is mediated 
by the cognitive process [ibid.; pp 35-6]. 
 
In Social Justice and the City he gives what he himself admits to be “crude examples” - the 
Chrysler Building or the Chase-Manhattan Bank building as symbols of capitalism, the ‘dreaming 
spires’ of Oxford as symbols of church power, referents that he returns to in his analysis of the 
symbolism of key sites in 19
th century Paris [Harvey, 1985]- but his approach to urban space and 
architecture remains essentially unchanged in the later Condition of Postmodernity. Again, we see 
in that work a typical blurring of theoretical perspective and subject matter.  In introducing the 
subject of postmodern architecture and urban design Harvey describes postmodernism in stylistic 
terms, pointing to a turn from technologically rational, efficient and metropolitan wide planning 
of the modern era to a “conception of the urban fabric as necessarily fragmented”, a palimpsest, a Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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collage of ephemeral forms and uses and in architectural terms a new eclecticism of architectural 
styles paying particular attention to local vernaculars. He argues that; 
 
Above all, postmodernists depart radically from modernist conceptions of how to regard 
space. Whereas the modernists see space as something to be shaped for social purposes 
and therefore always subservient to the construction of a social project, the 
postmodernists see space as something independent and autonomous, to be shaped 
according to aesthetic aims and principles which have nothing necessarily to do with any 
overarching social objective, save, perhaps, the achievement of timeless and 
‘disinterested’ beauty as an objective in itself [Harvey, 1989a; p 66]. 
 
Harvey follows this ‘aesthetic turn’ in his own analysis, focusing more on how a “city looks”. 
The theme of ‘created’ as opposed to ‘effective’ space that was introduced in Social Justice and 
the City is here apparent again, with the inevitable following question, “in whose image are 
spaces created?” [see Social Justice and the City p 307]. Harvey shows sympathy with the idea of 
architecture as a form of communication, and quotes Barthes assertion that “the city is a discourse 
and this discourse is truly a language” [1989a; p 67] and relates this to his central theme of the 
impact of the changing capitalist process via Jencks who argues that postmodern architecture and 
urban design is driven by market forces, the “primary language of communication in our society” 
[ibid.; p 77]. 
 
Harvey links architecture to capital through Bordieu’s notion of “symbolic capital” [see Outline 
of a Theory of Practice, Bordieu 1977], the idea of architecture as a symbolic luxury good which 
is a ‘stand-in’ for capital serving the ideological function of “reproducing the establish order” 
while the fetishistic concern with surface appearance ensures that “ the perpetuation of 
domination remains hidden” [1989a; p 79]. He conceives, therefore, the eclecticism of 
architectural styles associated with postmodernism as a response to the economic ‘sea-change’ 
that forms the core of his thesis. To achieve this link between capitalism and aesthetics, 
architecture is reduced (‘flattened’ perhaps would capture the prevailing postmodern rhetoric) to a 
form of capital, ‘symbolic capital’, and is thereby treated simply in aesthetic terms. Although 
Harvey’s early suggestion that postmodernism as a style turns from modernism’s concerns with 
social programs may well be accurate, this does not mean that postmodern architecture does not 
have social outcomes related directly to the built form, physical or effective space any less than 
the architecture of the 1960s. However, Harvey’s approach to the importance of architecture 
precludes any focus on this possibility, despite the fact that he is supposedly concerned with 
human practice as the precursor to theory. Instead, he treats architecture as a language system and Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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suggests that the eclecticism of the postmodern period can be understood as a “highly specialized 
series of language games” [ibid.; p 82]. 
 
The result of this transformation in stylistic terms and, I would argue, in theoretical approach 
also, “is fragmentation, often consciously embraced” [ibid.]. Interestingly, Harvey here cites the 
Office for Metropolitan Architecture, the practice of Rem Koolhaas, who perceive the city as “a 
system of anarchic and archaic signs and symbols” and who understand “the perceptions and 
experiences of the present as symbolic and associative, a fragmentary collage, with the Big City 
providing the ultimate metaphor” [Harvey, 1989a; p 82, quoting Klotz, Postmodern Visions, 
1985; New York]. 
 
Such an appraisal could equally well apply to Harvey with the added nuance that for both Harvey 
and Koolhaas within the umbrella of the city metaphor particular emphasis is placed upon 
synechdochal examples; once again Harvey turns to the “inescapable complexity” of the 
Bonaventure Hotel with its supposed schizophrenic associations [ibid; p 83]. 
 
To review this complex argument before a ‘rebuilding’ is offered, this “flattening” of the 
importance of architecture to a decoding of its surface meaning comes as a result of the 
replacement of ‘matter’ with ‘process’ in Harvey’s ontological trialectic of space-time-process, as 
his engagement with dialectical method leads to ‘things’ being resolved (perhaps ‘dissolved’) into 
process to avoid the criticism of Marx’s ‘fetishization of commodities’. In relation to architecture, 
a processual approach is achieved by treating architecture in stylistic terms only and linking it to 
the process of capitalism by treating it as ‘symbolic capital’, following Bordieu. 
 
The subtext here is that any more materialistic conception of architecture would lead him towards 
what he would perceive as a deterministic understanding of the relationship between spatial and 
social forms, a possibility that he rules out on numerous occasions. For example, he accuses 
(rightly) Coleman and other members of “Prince Charles’ ‘kitchen cabinet’” of “the most vulgar 
form of crude determinism” in their association between design failure and social ills [1989a; p 
116]. However, like so many critics, in condemning determinism outright he shows no interest in 
reformulating the relationship between built space and society. Harvey thereby places a semantic-
buffer between the physical form of the city and its social significance. 
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Ultimately this rests upon his decision not to treat material ‘things’ as ‘things in themselves’, in 
adherence to Marx’s warnings of fetishization. However, this is precisely contrary to the 
approach of Space Syntax which rests upon understanding space as independent both of material 
objects and of human activities “but as an intrinsic aspect of both” [Hillier, 1999b; p 184]. Space 
Syntax’s approach of treating space as independent both of the material and social realm similarly 
rests upon a definition of ‘thingness’. While Harvey ‘dissolves’ ‘thing’ into ‘process’, Hillier by 
contrast argues, referring to Thom’s idea of objective ‘structural stabilities’ as the basis for the 
existence of ‘things’, that ‘thingness’ is defined through “configurational persistence” [Hillier, 
1996; p399]. As we have seen above [p 133], configurations show quantifiable material attributes 
such that when the spaces of a city, or indeed a building structure, are treated as a configuration it 
can be shown that movement, and critically in relation to Harvey’s arguments secondary 
correlates such as rental values and land-use, are directly affected by the spatial form of the city, 
unmediated by semantic factors [see Hillier, 1993 and above pp 135-6]. 
 
Through treating space precisely as ‘a thing in itself’, in direct contradiction to Harvey and indeed 
Marx’s approach, Hillier is able to demonstrate a direct link between physical structure and social 
forms. Moreover, it is a critical aspect of configurations that they ‘persist over time’. Spatial 
structures such as cities and buildings are emergent structures, and are hence not only explicitly 
social but are also implicitly processual. However, Hillier’s approach through configuration is 
able to “save ‘thingness’ despite the processual nature of everything”
9. 
 
There are strong grounds, therefore, for seeking to rework Harvey’s conception of the 
relationship between material space and society, around the idea of configuration, which appears 
to ‘tissue-type’ well with his own approach to space, with the qualification that it is not 
predicated upon a rejection of the importance of the material. This reinvesting of material space 
into the work of Harvey is the goal of the following section. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Hillier, personal communication. Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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6.3  Respatializing the spatial 
 
The previous section offered a detailed analysis of the role of space within Harvey’s work. The 
conclusion was that the understanding of space that he advances conforms to the polarity within 
the geographical canon - an abstract space of geographical difference and a hermeneutic space of 
hypothesised general meanings – in which there is no consideration of the materiality of space. 
 
This section will seek to advance an alternative approach to the spatial problems which pre-
occupy Harvey, one drawing upon the materialist conception of space advanced by Hillier et al. 
We have seen that while Harvey argues for the inseparability of theory and practice, in his 
practice he tends to develop theoretical ideas that he then extends into a ‘laboratory’ of 
experience. Here I will reverse that logic, introducing two empirical case studies before drawing 
out what their theoretical impact might be. Although there are many potential examples that 
would be of relevance (and some of the later case studies employed in relation to the work of 
Giddens, Goffman and Foucault will have resonances with Harvey’s work) I have decided to 
develop two that apply to Harvey’s earlier concerns with spatio-economic relations, particularly 
the idea of the city as ‘movement economy’ [introduced in the previous chapter, pp 135-6]. The 
themes of his later work - for example the move towards more experiential understandings of 
space found in The Condition of Postmodernity - are touched upon by these later examples. 
 
The two examples are as follows; the first will revisit Harvey’s concern with the role of rent in 
the urban system, developed in Social Justice and the City and The Limits to Capital, and will 
demonstrate the importance of the physical space of the city form, understood through a 
configurational approach, in determining rental values. The character of this example, particularly 
in relation to the approach to space upon which it is based, can usefully be compared to Harvey’s 
own more empirical exposition of these ideas in his essay Paris, 1850-70 [Harvey, 1985; pp 63-
220]. The second example will return to the key concept of a ‘spatial fix’ to capitalism’s crises, 
and will re-examine his weakly developed notion of competition between spaces and more 
favoured locations. The example will demonstrate that rather than conceiving of ‘space’ in 
abstract terms as a differentiated region of potential opportunity, the configuration of spatial 
systems plays a direct role in governing the success or failure of local economies. 
 
Having demonstrated the utility of the approach, the beginnings of a theoretical reconciliation 
may be proposed. Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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Rent and Spatial Order 
 
The aim of this thesis is to argue that the claimed ‘re-assertion of space in social theory’ relies on 
contrasting abstract and hermeneutic understandings of space that are opposed to common 
‘material’ understandings abandoned through a reaction against ‘spatial science’ and 
determinism. Nowhere is this more apparent than in Harvey’s approach to the role of rent in the 
urban system. For Harvey, as was demonstrated above, rent is of importance because it is the 
spatial expression of the inequalities of the capitalist process. Its central importance, both to his 
theory of urbanism and also in his reworking of historical materialism, derives from the fact that 
the differential spatiality of potential investment returns, defined by rental topographies, governs 
land price and “operates to allocate capital and labour to land, guides the location of future 
production, exchange and consumption, fashions the geographical distribution of labour and the 
spatial organisation of social reproduction” [Harvey, 1982; p 396]. 
 
This is, as was argued above, a quintessential ‘geographical’ conception of space - the abstract, 
systemic, birds-eye view, that Harvey himself describes as “invoking the facts of distribution” 
[ibid., emphasis added]. However, I suggest that distribution is a ‘second order’ spatial concept 
that describes the ordering of a category (defined a priori by theoretical constriction) within a 
notional, abstract (often diagrammatic or theoretical) space. The spatiality of rent topologies is 
important as a theoretical loop completing the recursivity of the system, but space is not 
fundamental to the process. In determining rent the importance of ‘location’ is often cited, but 
again this is typically understood in terms of proximity of access to other key sites (dependent 
functions, transport links etc) and so relates once again to ‘friction of distance’ considerations, 
more temporal than spatial. 
 
Desyllas aims to understand more thoroughly this location variable in office rents [Desyllas, 1997 
and 1998]. He draws a distinction between the importance of location in the ‘micro-behaviour’ of 
individual firms, and the ‘macro-behaviour’ that defines the market place as the aggregate of 
these decisions, which in turn produces the emergent structure of location rents across the city. 
This concern with the emergent structure at the macro/aggregate scale has obvious parallels with 
Harvey’s argument. However, Desyllas [1998] begins by challenging overly simplistic 
conceptions of the relationship between location and rent, arguing that “although there is a broad 
consensus...that ‘location’ is in some sense a critical factor in determining rents, the exact role 
that the location factor plays is unclear and elicits little consensus” [ibid.; p 2]. While previous Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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studies have attempted to use multiple regression analysis to isolate spatial and non-spatial 
variables in rental values, he notes that little work has been done relating the ‘location rent’ (that 
part of rent paid for the location distinct from other factors) to the observable pattern of rent in 
cities. His aim, therefore, is to separate out the locational variable of rent and, through mapping 
these values, to identify an emergent pattern and an underlying spatial logic. 
 
He also provides a far more sophisticated understanding of rent than does Harvey, necessitated 
partly through his empirical focus. He demonstrates that there is considerable difference between 
the ‘asking rent’ (that which typically is in the public domain) and the headline rent (that which 
appears in the concluded contract between tenant and landlords)
10. Using multiple regression 
analysis, Desyllas is able to account for the non-spatial determinants of rent, and by segmenting 
his sample into time periods is able to neutralize the influence of time, the most important non-
spatial variable. Mapping of the residual factors produces a distinctly non-random pattern, 
suggesting that the ‘location rent’ has been isolated [ibid.; pp 6-11].  
 
It is this spatial analysis location rent and the critical choice of study area that makes his work so 
interesting. The sample of 435 office leases are taken from Berlin between 1991 and 1997, a 
period of rapid spatial reorganisation following in the wake of reunification. What the mapping of 
location rent shows is that the most desired location in the city, measured by location rent 
‘hotspots’ changes rapidly post unification following “a re-valuing of locations by the market” 
[ibid.; p 3 sic]. While in the immediate wake of unification the peak location rents are bifurcated, 
with hotspots in the West Berlin CBD and a weaker concentration in the East, in the period 1995-
7 there has been a significant spatial shift to a much more monocentric pattern, focused on the 
former East Berlin district of Mitte [see figure 6.3]. As Desyllas concludes, “Downtown has 
moved from West to East Berlin” [ibid.; p 15]. 
 
Although thus far the case-study adds much needed empirical evidence to Harvey’s work, it still 
treats space as descriptive rather than as an independent variable. Desyllas’s aim, however, is to 
relate the observed pattern of ‘location rent surfaces’ to such an independent analysis of the 
spatial system of Berlin. While previous studies have tried to relate location rent approximates to 
‘dummy area location variables’, these are themselves significantly determined by the observed  
                                                 
10 He makes further distinctions between ‘consideration’ and ‘effective’ rent, but concludes that headline rent in all but 
a few cases provides an accurate guide [Desyllas, 1998; p 6]. Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’ 
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Figure 6.3 Location rent values for Berlin CBD for 1991-1994 (top) and 1995 – 1997 (bottom). 
The analysis shows a clear spatial reordering following reunification [Source: Desyllas, 1998]. 
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Figure 6.4 Axial analysis of Berlin before and after unification, showing the relocation of the 
integration core (higher integration values shown moving from blue, though green, yellow and to 
red) [Source: Desyllas, 1998]. 
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rent patterns, and models of distance from a point or points over-simplifies the complexity of 
accessibility in urban systems [ibid., p 17]. 
 
Desyllas turns, therefore, to the Space Syntax technique of ‘axial mapping’ (described above, 
chapter 5) to provide an independent measure of accessibility (‘integration’ in the Space Syntax 
terminology
11). Figure 6.4 shows the analysis of the spatial configuration of the urban system 
before and after reunification. The correspondence with the location rent pattern is striking, and is 
demonstrated by Desyllas statistically. 
 
The importance of this result is that it shows that the reordering of the spatial structure of the city 
was the driver of the spatial shift in rental values. The spatial configuration of the urban form 
itself is shown to have a direct impact on the rental market, therefore, because the configurational 
properties of the street grid will tend to influence locational decisions, forming an emergent 
pattern in aggregate. What Desyllas has shown is that the spatial distribution of rents can be 
explained without problematic reflexive recourse to social and economic data but through an 
analysis of the physical space of the urban form. He therefore treats spatial structure as an 
endogenous variable, rather than as an exogenous variable as in conventional studies [Desyllas, 
1997; pp 04.12-04.13]. This is to reverse the logic of Harvey, who sees spatial characteristics of 
the market as a dependent, though recursive, variable. His ‘spatial’ concerns are limited to the 
descriptive level of distribution without engaging with the fundamental influence that material 
space of the urban structure has in influencing that emergent spatial pattern of rental values. 
 
'Local Spatial Advantage': configuration and uneven economic development 
 
The second case-study [see figure 6.5] builds upon this result but develops the consequences 
further. Here the focus is upon the consequences of spatial configuration for the relative 
‘consolidation
12’ of ‘site and service’ settlements in Santiago, Chile [Hillier, Greene et al., 1998, 
Hillier, Greene and Desyllas, 2000]. The study is of relevance to Harvey’s argument because the 
results point to the role of urban configuration in determining economic activity through what 
Hillier and Greene term ‘local spatial advantage’, analogous to the disparity of potential between 
locations that is the impetus to Harvey’s spatial fix. Once again, the empirical analysis offered by 
                                                 
11 See Hillier, 1996 and Hillier and Hanson, 1984 for a full description and mathematical basis. 
12 Consolidation is defined by several complex composite indices of physical, social and economic factors [Hillier, 
Greene et al, 1998; ch 5 and 6, Hillier, Greene and Desyllas, 2000]. Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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Space Syntax points to the fundamental importance of material space, ignored by Harvey in his 
focus on the spatiality of other factors, principally rent. 
 
The study examined 17 settlements in Santiago of differing perceived levels of consolidation, 
collecting data on land use, pedestrian and vehicular movement as well as questionnaire data 
from 553 households across the 17 settlements for the formulation of the consolidation indices. 
Furthermore, an axial map of Santiago was constructed to quantify aspects of the urban 
morphology of the spatial system as a whole as well as of the individual settlements and their 
immediate (1.5km radius, 7km) areas. 
 
The results contradict conventional understandings because they show, through regression 
analysis, that the social factors (income, savings, persons per dwelling, length of residence, car 
ownership etc) have relatively little influence over the consolidation indices, while spatial 
configuration is seen to be more influential, as are space use factors, particularly vehicular 
movement rates which are themselves largely determined by configuration [see analysis in 
Hillier, Greene et al., 1998; chapter 7]. Furthermore, there is a strong relationship between the 
level of commercial activity and consolidation. While this might be expected, there is an 
unexpected spatial refinement. There are strong correlations between the consolidation indices 
and the ‘edge commercial index’. This is an amalgamation of two ratios seen to be of importance; 
firstly, the number of commercial premises to the number of plots in the settlement (shops/plots) 
and secondly, the ratio of such commercial premises located on outward facing edges of the 
settlement to those on interior streets. The combined index expresses the rate of commercial 
activity in the settlement and its spatial orientation; a measure of ‘edge-oriented commercial 
activity’ [ibid.; p 163]. 
 
The multiple regression analysis reveals four key determinants of settlement consolidation: edge-
orientated commercial activity, crime, vehicular movement and aspects of local and global spatial 
integration [ibid.; p 168]. However, it is only the latter that are truly independent. Crime is shown 
to be dependent upon the level of commercial activity as well as income (and has been shown in 
previous studies to be highly dependent itself on spatial configuration as it impacts upon 
pedestrian movement potentials [see for example Hillier and Shu, 1999, 2000]). Edge orientated 
commercial activity is determined principally by vehicular movement (an R2 result of .888) but 
also with another independent spatial variable, Local Spatial Advantage, as well as spending (not 
income) within the settlement. Vehicular movement is critical, therefore, but because it is shown  Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’ 
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Figure 6.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a 
 
 
 
 
 
b Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’ 
 
188 
Figure 6.5 Informal settlement dynamics in Santiago. Figure a (see previous) shows the axial 
analysis of 17 settlements in the Santiago grid. The configurational structure is a strong predictor 
of vehicular movement (b). Figures c-f show two settlements with conversely weak (c & d) and 
strong (e & f) positions in the configurational structure. The settlement with the stronger 
vehicular movement at the periphery (strongly influenced by configuration) develops a high 
degree of ‘edge-orientated commercial activity’ (see d & f). This in turn is shown to be a strong 
factor influencing the combined consolidation index of settlement success (g) [Source: Hillier, 
Greene et al. 1998]. Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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not to be affected by the level of car ownership within the settlement, what is critical must be the 
accessibility of the settlement to the wider urban context. 
 
The key determinants of vehicular movement (and in consequence edge-orientated commercial 
activity) are two independent spatial measures. The first is termed ‘synergy’, meaning the 
correlation between local and global aspects of spatial layout, and the second ‘Local Spatial 
Advantage’. This measure expresses the degree to which each settlement holds an inherent 
spatially strategic position in the overall urban system
13. The higher the value, the more the 
settlement has a higher integration value compared to a uniform metric context. 
 
This analysis allows Hillier and Greene to suggest a direct spatial process affecting what they 
term the ‘pathways of development’ of different settlements. They argue that the key independent 
variables are spatial, relating specifically to the local configurational environment determining 
how individual settlements cohere with the wider urban morphological context. In consequence, 
this determines the pattern of movement through different settlements, particularly vehicular 
movement. In settlements with a particular local spatial advantage, the concentration of vehicular 
movement stimulates the generation of edge-orientated economic activity (i.e. commercial 
activity orientated to the wider urban context as well as simply the internal spaces of the 
particular settlement). This in turn is seen to be the prime determinant of overall economic 
success in different foundling communities evidenced through the various consolidation indices 
[ibid.; p 169]. Even individuals’ incomes, conventionally thought to be determined principally by 
education, are seen in this study to be affected to an equal degree by the spatial factors of local 
spatial advantage. Taken together education and the local spatial advantage of the settlement in 
question account for 66% of the variation in family incomes and 71% of the variation in 
individuals’ incomes (r-squared values of 0.656 and 0.711 respectively [ibid., p 170]. 
 
As with the previous example, this demonstrates that the physical layout of settlements has a 
demonstrable effect upon the capitalist process, impacting directly upon not only rental 
topologies but also upon the viability of local neighbourhood economies, with the knock-on 
impact on social variables identified in the consolidation indices. 
                                                 
13 This is calculated by taking the mean radius-n integration value of each settlement in the context of the 7km local 
system, and dividing it into the mean integration value of the 7km system [Hillier and Green, 1998; p 162, for detailed 
discussion of the principles of this calculation see Hillier and Hanson, 1984, and for a brief summary above chapter 5]. Harvey’s space as ‘value in motion’  
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The space of difference 
 
These two worked examples have sought to demonstrate an alternative approach to the problem 
of space in the economy of the urban system. These studies have not relied upon a notion of 
‘spatiality of capitalism/ the market/ the urban system’. Rather, they have approached space in a 
material way that is in stark contrast to Harvey’s historical-geographical materialism. The focus 
has been upon the physical space of the city, approached through the idea of configuration, and 
the direct impact that this has upon economic factors. In this way it puts space at the centre of the 
analysis, as an independent variable with observable and quantifiable emergent effects, rather 
than as a theoretical construct brought to bear on an intellectual problem, without correspondence 
with empirical examples beyond the level of anecdotal reference. 
 
However, this is not to encourage a separation between empirical exegesis and theory, for the 
technique of Space Syntax is rooted in a theory of the relationship between society and space 
which, moreover, is implicitly spatial. Critically, it is founded upon an approach to space that 
does not necessitate the ‘trade-off’ between the material and processual which lies at the heart of 
Harvey’s approach. For Harvey, ‘space’ refers either to the abstract spatial differentiation of the 
capitalist process, or to the symbolic meaning of built forms. Both are conceptually one step 
removed from lived experience, rejecting the direct, unmediated, influence of physical space. 
 
He rejects the possibility of this influence early on in his essay on “the conceptual problems of 
urban planning”, itself part of the rejected ‘liberal formulations’ of the first section of Social 
Justice and the City [1973]. There he makes the early orientation away from the importance of 
the physical, arguing that, “if we are to understand spatial form, we must first enquire into the 
symbolic qualities of that form” [ibid, p 32, emphasis added]. He offers two approaches; the first 
using psycholinguistics and psychology to approach “the measurement of spatial and 
environmental symbolism”. His second approach, however, is “simply to observe people’s 
behaviour and thus gauge their reaction to objects and events…At the aggregate level, we have to 
rely upon the information provided by a generalized description of spatial activity” [ibid.; p 33]. 
However, instead of relating spatial activity directly to the physical form of the city, Harvey’s 
interest (rejected within the same volume) is to relate spatial activity to the response to the 
symbolic meaning of the city; “If we are to understand space, we must consider its symbolic 
meaning and its complex impact upon behaviour as it is mediated by cognitive processes” [p 36]. 
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These early ‘liberal formulations’ are rejected entirely by Harvey in favour of his more ‘socialist 
formulations’ focusing on the ‘space-economy of urbanism’. What the approach of Space Syntax 
demonstrates is that the appeals to symbolic meaning are an unnecessary linkage between 
“understanding space…[and]…its complex impact upon behaviour” [ibid], thereby offering the 
possibility of reuniting Harvey’s ‘liberal’ and ‘socialist’ formulations through an understanding 
of space relating the behavioural impact of material forms to the embedded capitalist process. 
 
This is a strategy that unites his theoretical perspective with a more empirical understanding of 
the lived experience of space, such that his more recent commentary on behaviour and experience 
in the contemporary city can be made more robust to theoretical and empirical criticism. 
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 Chapter 7 
The Architectural Scale: 
Giddens, Locales and co-presence – white spots and black 
boxes. 
 
 
While the previous chapter focused on the urban scale, and the contribution that Space Syntax can 
make to the understanding of the spatial dimension of the capitalist system, this chapter aims at a 
more architectural scale through an analysis of Giddens’ work on the ‘spatiality’ of social 
processes. Giddens’ ideas, particularly his ‘structuration theory’, have been influential in arguing 
for a spatialized social theory, making his work central to this analysis. However, once again, a 
detailed critique of the approach to space within structuration theory reveals that he is unable to 
deal effectively with material space at an empirical level. The analysis will offer a detailed 
deconstruction of structuration theory and its referents [section 7.2], before developing an 
empirical case study [section 7.3] demonstrating the potential for the configurational approach to 
material space of Space Syntax to integrate both a theoretical and empirical dimension to 
Giddens’ work. 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
I find them [Hägerstrand’s ideas] attractive in so far as, coming from a background in 
sociology, I am just not used to thinking in terms of concrete aspects of context [Giddens, 
1984b; p 126]. 
 
This quotation, from an interview with Derek Gregory, makes an appropriate introduction to an 
analysis of Giddens’ work for two reasons. Firstly, it implies that having encountered the work of 
Hägerstrand and others, on what Giddens himself admits was a rather “circuitous route to the 
writings of geographers” [ibid.], he has identified the lack, and acknowledged the importance, in 
his own work of what he here calls “the concrete aspects of context”. Indeed, a conception of 
space-time is central to his theory of structuration, as will be outlined below. Secondly, in 
addition to this acknowledgement and rectification in regard to his own theory, the comment also 
encapsulates a statement of fact; that there are “concrete aspects of context” which are of Giddens, locales and co-presence 194 
importance. Although this may seem tautologous, we will see that in his work ‘concrete’ material 
contexts are often alluded to but are never dealt with successfully. This incapacity is inherited 
firstly from the work of Hägerstrand and Goffman for whom physical contexts are always present 
but never resolved beyond the level of opaque ‘stations’ or ‘regions’ within which co-presence 
occurs, and secondly from a fear, openly acknowledged in Giddens’ work, of the influence of 
geographic determinism upon sociology. 
 
The work of Giddens, influenced as it is by Hägerstrand’s focus upon the time-space biography of 
individuals and Goffman’s dramaturgical theories of human interaction, allows the focus of this 
analysis and reworking to move closer to the level of the individual, in anticipation of the 
reworking of the theory of Space Syntax itself proposed in chapter 10. Clearly, any preservation 
of the distinction between agent and structure would be a misrepresentation of Giddens’ 
argument. For what he refers to as the “base domain of study for the social sciences” should be 
“neither the experience of the actor, nor the existence of any form of societal totality”. Rather it is 
“social practices ordered across space and time” with which social science should concern itself, 
a formulation echoing Harvey’s focus on ‘human practice’ [Giddens, 1984a; p 2]. However, it is 
this ordering and the role that space plays that is the focus of this discussion rather than the 
prominent concern of structuration theory with the ‘duality of structure’ and the reworking of 
oppositions between agent and structure. While it is difficult to separate the theory of duality of 
structure and the importance of space from the overall framework of structuration, which after all 
Giddens suggests dissolves disciplinary boundaries between sociology and geography (as well as 
history), it is necessary to bear in mind when dealing with such a wide ranging theory that it is 
only the role of space and the concrete context that is of pertinence to this enquiry. 
 
That Giddens is a key figure in what I have termed the ‘respatialization theorists’ is attested to by 
his late introduction to the work of geographers. As noted already above, he came by what in his 
own admission was a “circuitous route” [Giddens, 1984b; p 126] as his initial area of interest was 
the role of temporality in social theory and the challenging of disciplinary boundaries between 
sociology and history [Gregory, 1989; pp 186]. He explains, “I came first of all to see problems 
of temporality as essential to social theory in some part via phenomenology”, the key theme of 
interest being the duration of human action through which he developed an interest in Heidegger. 
“In Heidegger, time is theorised in some sense as time-space, as ‘presencing’: and that lead me 
back to look at the origins of geography” [ibid.; also Giddens, 1981; p 29]. Despite this route to Giddens, locales and co-presence 195 
geography through Heidegger’s ideas of ‘presencing’, Gregory argues that, “[i]n common with 
most other writers, however, Giddens paid little or no attention to questions of spatiality” [ibid.]. 
 
Certainly, then, over time Giddens has been involved in a conscious attempt to ‘re-spatialize’ his 
theory of society such that he can argue that, “I’ve come to believe that contextuality of time-
space, and especially the connection between time-space location and physical milieux of action, 
are just not uninteresting boundaries of social life, but inherently involved in its constitution or 
reproduction” [Giddens, 1984b; p 126] and that, in apparently direct contradiction of Gregory’s 
point, “most forms of social theory have failed to take seriously enough not only the temporality 
of social conduct but also its spatial attributes” [1979; p 202, sic]. He concludes that the same 
disciplinary permeability advanced in respect of history and sociology should, therefore, also 
apply to geography; “The same point made in relation to history applies to (human) geography: 
there are no logical or methodological differences between human geography and sociology!” 
[Giddens, 1984a; p 368]. Indeed, Gregory interprets Gidddens’ ‘project’ as a ‘deconstruction of 
historical materialism’ which, while not following the same path as Harvey (and Soja) in seeking 
to formulate a historical-geographical materialism, nonetheless places him within the 
‘geographical tradition’ [Gregory, 1989; p 187]. 
 
However, the question remains, ‘what is the nature of the geography (or space) that Giddens 
wishes to fuse with his theory?’ For Gregory remains critical; 
 
“Structuration theory in its present form remains close to the analytics of spatial 
science...it continues to theorise the problem of order as in large measure a problem of 
pattern. [It] is virtually silent about the ‘production of space’” [Gregory, 1989; p 187]. 
 
It is perhaps ironic that Giddens, who is so strongly associated with the overcoming of 
oppositional dualities, and clearly keen to heal breaches between disciplines, should so obviously 
antagonise the chasmic ‘human/ physical’ division within geography. But his clumsy insistence 
on “(human) geography” is critical; for it is in its implicit relation to the physical context of co-
presence that his theory seems weak. Before following further the genesis of Giddens’ ideas 
about space in the geographical literature that he leans on, it is necessary to describe where we 
encounter the influence of physical context within the theory of structuration. 
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7.2 Space in Structuration 
 
The critical distinction that Giddens makes is between structure and system. “Social systems are 
composed of patterns of relationships between actors or collectives reproduced across time and 
space. Social systems are hence constituted of situated practices”. In contrast to systems, 
structures have only virtual existence but are recursively connected to the constituting practices of 
social systems as the medium and outcome of these practices (the ‘duality of structure’) [Giddens, 
1981; p 26]. They exist, therefore, “only in so far as forms of social conduct are reproduced 
chronically in time and space” [1984a; p xxi]. His concern, therefore, is “first and foremost with 
reworking conceptions of human being and human doing” and understanding the “situated” 
character of social practices at the conjunction of three “moments of difference” - temporally, 
structurally and spatially [1984a; p xx; 1981; p 30]. 
 
Giddens is explicit about the notion of space that is implied by the idea that time-space relations 
are constitutive of social systems. He points to a continuity between Heidegger and Leibniz and 
argues that the Kantian portrayal of space and time as concepts of mind was a regressive step 
from the Leibnizian conception of space and time as “modes in which relations between objects 
and events are expressed” [1981; p 31]1. However, Giddens’ focus is upon the notion of ‘Being’ 
and he aims to connect this to the understanding of space and time. He achieves this through 
using the idea of ‘presence’, again from Heidegger. The idea of a four dimensional time (past, 
present, future and the animating term ‘presence’) he tentatively compares to conceptions of 
space-time in post-Newtonian physics (particularly Minkowski) with the aim of undermining the 
‘imposed’ idea of space and time as a succession of measurable instants. The aim is to achieve the 
union between a unified conception ‘time-space’ and the ontological ‘presencing’; “To say this, 
in other words, is to reaffirm time-space as ‘presencing’ rather than as a ‘contentless form’ in 
which objects exist” [ibid.; p 34]. 
 
Although considerably more complex, the essential idea here bears similarities to Soja’s attempt 
to ‘socially animate’ the understanding of space and time (see chapter 2). For Giddens the aim is 
to understand the relationships between social systems and structures manifested in time-space 
and the role these relationships have, particularly in power relations and the development of 
                                                 
1 Note the continuity here with Soja’s argument that geography, “that most stiflingly cocooned of traditional 
disciplines” had to “reaching outside of its traditional Kantian cage” [Soja, 1987b; pp 289 and 291, and above p 32]. Giddens, locales and co-presence 197 
‘ontological security’. Despite the intensely theoretical nature of Giddens’ work he relates it to 
the possibility for empirical extension, for “[s]ocial theory has the task of providing conceptions 
of the nature of human social activity and of the human agent which can be placed in the service 
of empirical work, [t]he main concern of social theory [being] the same as that of the social 
sciences in general: the illumination of concrete processes in social life” [1984a; xvii]. 
 
He achieves this jump from philosophical exegesis to the formulation of empirical research 
possibilities by stating that; 
 
It follows from what has been said about time-space relations in general that discussion 
of temporality can best be approached through grasping the interpenetration of presence 
or absence, the movement of individuals through time-space being seen as processes of 
‘presencing/absencing’ [1981; p 37]. 
 
This ‘concretization’ of the Heideggerian themes of ‘presence’ and ‘Being’ into the ‘real world’ 
phenomena of presence and absence through the movement of individuals through space-time 
opens up the possibility for Giddens of using Hägerstrand’s ‘Time-Geography’ as a notational 
system accessible to empirical investigations. Also, it opens the connection between 
presence/absence in space and the construction of actors’ performed identities; “The situated 
character of action in time and space, the routinization of activity and the repetitive nature of day-
to-day life - these are phenomena which connect dimensions of the unconscious with Goffman’s 
analysis of co-presence” [1984a; p xxiv]. 
 
Co-presence and the physical context – space as ‘stage’ 
 
‘Co-presence’, whether focused or unfocused [see; Giddens, 1984a; pp 70-72 and Goffman, 
1963; pp 17-19], involves encounters between one or more agents. “During the course of 
[focused] encounters agents establish intimate contexts and engage in absorbing activities through 
the mutual co-ordination of talk, as well as the reflexive monitoring of facial expressions and 
bodily posture” [Cohen, 1989; p 96]. Such encounters, when embedded in the routinized 
character of day-to-day life establish social-relationships and social integration between 
individuals and the group. Cohen makes the “basic point” that such seriality implies a temporal 
ordering and, therefore, a spatial ordering, “in so far as face-to-face reciprocities are reproduced 
in diverse settings” [ibid.]. The key, then, for Giddens is to understand the conditions that shape Giddens, locales and co-presence 198 
the opportunities for face-to-face interaction in time and space, the opportunities and constraints 
therefore, to presence-availability among actors [Cohen, 1989, p 96]. 
 
Giddens relates the importance of routinized physical co-presence directly to the spatiality of the 
body and argues, drawing on Merleau-Ponty, that “the body, and the experience of bodily 
movement, is the centre of forms of action and awareness which really define its [the body’s] 
unity” which, he argues, is geared into the “spatiality of situation”, the ‘here’ of the body relating 
to Heidegger’s conception of ‘being in the world’ rather than a “determinate series of co-
ordinates” [1984a; p 65]. 
 
Despite this understanding, which suggests that “the body [following Merleau-Ponty] does not 
‘occupy’ time-space in exactly the same sense as material objects do”, there is an expressed 
concern with the physical environment in which interaction takes place which is inherited from 
Goffman’s work [ibid.]. The key is the understanding of the contextuality of co-presence. “By the 
term ‘context’...I mean those ‘bands’ or ‘strips’ of time-space within which gatherings take 
place…. Context includes the physical environment of interaction but is not something merely ‘in 
which’ interaction occurs” [1984a; p 71]. Giddens extends Goffman’s formulation, however, to 
emphasize the importance of the routinized character of interaction, thus extending the concept of 
context to include the temporal and spatial ordering (identified above by Cohen). In so doing he 
makes a link between the dramaturgical theory of Goffman, with its emphasis on the spatiality of 
the body and the presentation of ‘face’, and the time-geography of Hägerstrand which examines 
the spatial organization of encounters through time. Thus it is “the contextual organization of 
encounters [which] must be examined, since mobilization of time-space is the ‘grounding’ of all 
the above elements” [ibid.; p 73]. 
 
Goffman’s theory of the reflexive monitoring of action is related to Hägerstrand therefore 
because, as Giddens notes, the dramaturgical nature of the theory implies that ‘roles’ must be 
played out on a particular ‘stage’ upon which expected norms of conduct are enacted and “such 
settings of interaction are virtually always provided by a specific locale or type of locale in which 
regularized encounters take place” [ibid.; p 86]. The ‘space’ within the work of Goffman refers 
not to the material space of physical co-presence but the ‘social space’ of normative behaviours. 
So for example, “bystanders are usually expected not only not to exploit a situation of proximity 
of presence, ... but also actively to demonstrate inattention” [ibid.; p 75]. While there are clearly 
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eavesdropping are achieved) these are not dealt with by Goffman whose analysis does not 
penetrate below the level of the ‘stage’. 
 
This physical level of analysis is related to Goffman’s distinction between the ‘situational’ 
aspects of activity and the ‘situated’ aspects. For example, the library is a place for study and not 
talking and to transgress this is to contravene the situational aspect of the activity of study 
[Goffman, 1963; p 22]. What I would term the physical aspects of the library space and the 
readers presence in it are “merely situated aspects of activity” - where the reader sits for example 
within the opportunity-space of the building. Similarly, in the description of institutions as 
“places such as rooms, suites of rooms, buildings, or plants in which activity of a particular kind 
regularly goes on” he places the emphasis on the activity, and sees its setting as habitual, not 
questioning the physical structure of the spaces themselves [Goffman, 1961; p 15]. In relation to 
the urban scale, also, streets are treated as “relatively unobstructed”, a presumption that also 
surfaces in Giddens’ claim that “in many ‘public places’, in jostling crowds on the street and so 
on, [...] there is no clear physical circumscribing of the conditions of co-presence” [Goffman, 
1963; p 18; Giddens, 1984a; p 68]. Earlier examples in this thesis have demonstrated this to be an 
oversimplification, the configurational structure of street layouts being highly stratified both 
spatially and in terms of use along their length [see the examples in chapter 6.3]. There is 
throughout a lack of sensitivity to the role of physical space in ordering opportunities for co-
presence and thereby influencing ‘presence-availability’. 
 
I would argue that this is the case even in Goffman’s The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life 
which he argues focuses on “especially the kind of social life that is organized within the physical 
confines of a building or plant” [Goffman, 1959; p ix]. There he examines two ‘regions’ of 
action, a front region where the normative performance expected is given, and a back region, “a 
place, relative to a given performance, where the impression fostered by the performance is 
knowingly contradicted as a matter of course” [ibid.; p 97]. Although the back region is defined 
‘relative to the performance’ it also has a material dimension; “any place that is bounded to some 
degree by barriers to perception”, whether that perception be auditory or visual (e.g. a glass as 
opposed to plasterboard wall) [ibid.; p 92]. So, for example, “very commonly the back region of a 
performance is located at one end of the place where the performance is presented, being cut off 
from it by a partition or a guarded passageway” allowing a performer to slip quickly from one to 
the other without revealing his ‘off-stage’ persona [ibid.; p 98]. 
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Goffman gives a number of anecdotal examples; the waiter retiring to the kitchen letting slip his 
demure professional image; the mechanic who removes the car or watch from the presence of the 
customer so that work can be carried on without supervision; the hostess who uses the hall as a 
way to greet and say goodbye to guests individually and the kitchen as an ‘off-stage’ area from 
which hospitality is produced apparently effortlessly [ibid.; pp 104, 106-7, 120-21]. However, for 
Goffman these are simply ‘zones’. For example, in my own experience of working on a shop 
floor, the distinction between front and back regions was far more complicated than the ‘upstairs-
downstairs’ notion that Goffman presents. Rather than a ‘zone of performance’ on the shop floor 
and a ‘zone of relaxation’ in the storeroom downstairs, both ‘regions’ (to use Goffman’s 
terminology) were spatially fragmented according to the irregular physical structure of the 
building and the sight-lines afforded through the space (including those of the CCTV monitors 
which opened the front region to surveillance from the back). 
 
Despite, therefore, his claim that “it is apparent that the backstage character of certain places is 
built into them in a material way”, he still has a simplistic notion of the effects of built structures 
on co-presence, which he sees as further distinct from ‘outside’ space that is treated as a separate 
category. Thus, “within [buildings] we find rooms that are regularly or temporarily used as back 
regions and front regions, and we find that the outer walls of the building cut both types of rooms 
off from the outside world” [ibid.; p 117]. Giddens has perhaps a more sensitive idea of the 
potentials of physical space, commenting that, “back regions in, say, settings of the shop floor 
include ‘odd corners’ of the floor, tea rooms, toilets and so on, as well as the intricate zonings of 
displacement of contact with supervisors which workers can achieve through bodily movement 
and posture” [1984a; p 128]. However, his illustration remains anecdotal and while there is an 
attempt to extend the concept of ‘regionalization’ to a generic scale this results in an oppositional 
treatment of front and back regions in terms of urban zoning which, while sensitive to the 
importance of differential levels of through-movement in ‘ghetto areas’, again is not linked to the 
spatial morphology of the urban system2. The second part of this chapter will explore the role that 
a material understanding of architectural space can play in illuminating the physical contextuality 
of Goffman’s (and Giddens’) theory. 
 
                                                 
2 A further instructive example of the potential for Space Syntax to clarify such issues would be the extensive work 
undertaken in just such ghetto or ‘back region’ areas of housing estates. This work is not dealt with here, because 
although important, it addresses an area of theory, particularly Newman’s ‘defensible space’, that does not strictly form 
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Generating co-presence – spatial influences on interaction 
 
While for Giddens, Goffman deals effectively with the situation of co-presence, still it remains to 
be shown how “the placing of actors in contexts of interaction” is linked to the “interlacing of 
those contexts themselves” [Giddens, 1984a; p 110]. “The ‘being together’ of co-presence 
demands means whereby actors are able to ‘come together’” [ibid.; p 123]. In Hägerstrandian 
time-geography Giddens finds a methodology whereby the routinization and constraint in the 
praxis of ‘day-to-day’ life, related to the generation of co-presence and social integration, is 
opened to empirical analysis. While Giddens does not make the criticism advanced above 
concerning the treatment of ‘physical context’ within the work of Goffman, he does note that the 
‘situatedness’ of interaction in time-space is treated as given. Time-geography confronts this lack 
in “a concrete rather than philosophical way” as “[w]e are able to begin to flesh out the time-
space structuring of the settings of interaction which, however important Goffman’s writings may 
be, tend to appear in those writings as given milieux of social life” [1989; pp 110 and 116, 
emphasis added]. ‘Time-geography’ addresses this weakness in Goffman’s formulation by 
providing a notational methodology for tracing the ‘spatial-biographies’ of individuals as they 
undertake specific ‘projects’. As the analysis incorporates the ‘trajectories’ of groups of 
individuals in time and space, points of co-presence become identified as ‘stations’ (for example 
the home or workplace) [see Hägerstrand, 1970, 1975, 1978, Carlstein, Parkes and Thrift, 1978 
and Pred, 1977]. 
 
However, Giddens is cautious about many aspects of Hägerstand’s schema, particularly his 
limited conceptualization of agents, the reinforcing of the distinctions between agent and 
structure, the focus on constraints more than opportunities and the role of power relations and 
institutions, and maintains a “reserved attitude...to the usefulness of [his] ideas in their unaltered 
fashion” [1984a; pp 116-8]. Yet he argues that in general, while the theory maybe “conceptually 
primitive”, it is nonetheless “methodologically sophisticated” [1984a; p 116, 1984b; p 125]. 
Certainly, the Hägerstrandian graphical device for illustrating the choreography of the 
“biographical project” meshes closely with Giddens’ focus on ‘presence’ which “replaces both 
the idea of the ‘present’ and the ‘point in space’” [ibid; p 111, 1981; p 31]. However, it is perhaps 
naive to assume that the methodological application of Hägerstrand’s work can be so easily 
separated from its conceptual make up. Certainly in relation to this chapter’s concerns with the 
notion of space embedded within these nested theoretical positions there are important features of 
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For Giddens the main difficulty with Hägerstrand’s work is that it has a simplistic notion of the 
‘individual’, conceived independently of the social settings that confront their lives. The idea of 
‘projects’ that agents pursue is left unexplored and Giddens therefore argues that Hägerstrand 
recapitulates the dualism of agent and structure, “albeit in rather novel form because of his pre-
eminent concern with time and space” [1984a; p 117]. Therefore, while Giddens takes on the 
importance of time and space within Hägerstrand’s methodological approach, his own concerns 
that the ‘stations’ and ‘domains’ of the thesis remain ‘black boxes’, “taken as givens”, is related 
more to the lack of emphasis on “the transformational character of human action” than to the lack 
of an adequate resolution of such domains as physical spaces [ibid.]. 
 
We see this in his comments on Hägerstrand’s idea of ‘place’ [ibid.; pp 118-9]. Giddens argues 
that the time-geography approach suggests a powerful critique of the notion of ‘place’ as 
“ordinarily used by geographers” - as ‘a point in space’ - which, he continues, is inappropriate in 
the context of social theory where a far more socially animated variable is required. For Giddens 
this can be captured in his terms ‘locale’ and ‘region’. The ‘locale’ is more than simply a point in 
space as it “refers to the use of space to provide the settings of interaction, the settings of 
interaction in turn being essential to specifying its contextuality” [ibid., emphasis added]. 
 
For Giddens, therefore, there is no distinction between space and the routinized social use to 
which it is put, the two being recursively linked. Locales, therefore, “may range from a room in a 
house, a street corner, the shop floor of a factory, towns and cities, to the territorially demarcated 
areas occupied by nation states”, as defined by the meaningful context of the scale of interaction 
of interest. Locales themselves are further composed of ‘regions’ and regionalization “should be 
understood not merely as localization in space but as referring to the zoning of time-space in 
relation to routinized social practices” [p 119]. It therefore refers to the “structuration of social 
conduct across time and space” rather than to a “physically demarcated area [on a map] of the 
physical features of the material environment” [p 122]. 
 
While such a formulation has many advantages within the context of Structuration Theory, 
countering the criticisms that Hägerstrand’s ‘domains’ remain “black-boxes” without social 
animation and, in particular, brokering the reworking of the duality of agent and structure at the 
heart of the theory, it nonetheless inherits certain problems. Most significantly, it moves Giddens’ 
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‘spatiality’; “the concept of presence...has to be explicated in terms of its spatiality as well as its 
temporality” [p 118]. 
 
This reorientation does little to clarify the role of material space which is nonetheless referred to 
frequently in both Giddens’ and Hägerstrand’s work. As Giddens notes, “Hägerstrand’s approach 
is based mainly upon identifying sources of constraint over human activity given by the nature of 
the body and the physical contexts in which activity occurs” [p 111]. Giddens interprets 
Hägerstrand’s focus on the seriality of ‘life biographies’ to mean that “[t]he conduct of an 
individual’s day-to-day life entails that he or she successively associates with sets of entities 
emanating from the settings of interaction”; entities being, “other agents, indivisible objects (solid 
material qualities of the milieu of action)” as well as divisible materials (such as air, water and 
foodstuffs) and domains, equivalent to Giddens’ ‘regionalizations’. However, how interaction 
with other agents comes about and how it is that “solid material qualities of the milieu of action” 
have an influence is not fully explained. 
 
Material space as the constraint of distance 
 
Hägerstrand tackles these issues only through the idea of constraints upon action. He makes a 
division into three types of constraint; capability, coupling and authority constraints [Hägerstrand, 
1970]. ‘Authority constraints’ refer to domains which control access (an area that Giddens does 
not acknowledge in his review and which goes some way to countering his criticism of a lack of 
power relations in Hägerstrand’s work). ‘Coupling constraints’ refer to the necessary location and 
duration of interaction with others as well as the tools and materials that might be needed to 
achieve the goal of the ‘project’ engaged upon. It is capability constraints that are of most 
significance in terms of the impact of the physical environment. These are primarily related to 
“physiological and physical necessity” [ibid.; p 11], the need for regular food and sleep which 
entails a spatial as well as a temporal routine. However, the other key element is once again the 
notion of friction of distance, and the roles of transportation and communication technologies in 
defining the ‘island’ of constraint [see also Pred, 1977; p 208, Hägerstrand, 1978]. This focus 
upon the means of communication and mobility of the body is also noted and absorbed by 
Giddens [compare 1984a; pp 111 and 123]. 
 
This concern with the physical environment in terms of the ease of communication leads both 
Hägerstrand and Giddens to tackle the issue of time-space ‘distanciation’ (in Giddens’ Giddens, locales and co-presence 204 
terminology), the collapsing of space through time that is another characteristic feature of recent 
work on space (see for example the discussion in chapter 4 above on the linkages between 19
th 
century and contemporary literature and chapter 6 referring to Harvey’s ‘time-space 
compression’, and particularly figure 6.2 p 161). For example, in his early work we find 
Hägerstrand arguing that,  
In a society where there are no appreciable time or cost obstacles preventing one 
individual from coming into contact with any other individual, relations within ‘social 
space’ cannot be appreciably modified by the constraints of geographical space 
[Hägerstrand, 1967; p 7]. 
 
He goes on to argue, somewhat prophetically in advance of contemporary debates (the 1967 text 
being itself a re-edition of a 1953 manuscript), that open access to air travel and television would 
produce a “one point society”, the precursor to contemporary claims of ‘the end of space’ 
[Virilio, 2000; p 3, and see discussion above, p 109].  As with all such claims, however, the 
question of what conception and role the author gives to the material environment rises to the 
fore. 
 
Hägerstrand’s changing space – from ‘distance’ to ‘room’ 
 
In his paper The Domain of Human Geography [Hägerstrand, 1973] Hägerstrand makes a clear 
distinction between ‘human’ as the primary subject of enquiry and ‘geography’ as implying “a 
way of viewing this subject matter” [p 67]. This again illustrates the separation between the agent 
and, in this case, his/her environment. Hägerstrand attempts to construct the “outlines of a new 
frame” to approach the role of space and time in geography. However, despite his assertion that 
“[a]part from the conceptual difficulties in handling the space-time problem it may be that we 
have become inhibited from trying to do so by the constantly repeated assumption that geography 
is the science of flat spatial relationships as depicted on maps”, he nonetheless begins his 
reworking from the “first fundamental assumption” that “the geographer sees his task as viewing 
the world in geometrical terms of some sort” [ibid.;  pp 73 and 76]. 
 
Pred argues that his outlook is conditioned by the prevailing mood of Swedish geography at the 
time, particularly the influence of De Geer and Kant [Pred, 1967b]. He quotes De Geer as 
arguing, 
 
it is certain abstract qualities which are studied by Geography, and not the objects 
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must be regarded as abstract qualities...and it is these qualities that form the subject of 
Geography, it also follows that the object of Geography in its very nature is non-material 
- abstract. [De Geer, 1923 quoted by Pred in Hägerstrand 1967; p 304]. 
 
Hägerstrand confirms this view in his work on innovation diffusion [1967]. There he makes a 
justification for his use of the descriptive ‘spatial’ in preference to ‘geographical’. He argues that 
firstly his theory is based on abstract, theoretical, hypothetical “model areas” which, “puts space 
per se in a position of more fundamental importance than would be so if analysis were restricted 
to a given part of the earth’s surface, i.e., a geographical area” [1967; p 6]. Secondly, he argues 
that the prefix ‘geo-’ “involves irrelevant associations with those natural science disciplines that 
are concerned with various aspects of the earth’s surface. The locational relationships here under 
investigation are essentially horizontal man-man relations and only in passing are of the vertical 
man-earth’s surface variety” [ibid.; emphasis added]. 
 
To illustrate the point he gives the example of examining crop distributions. Instead of advocating 
observing the absolute and relative distributions ‘in the field’, he argues instead that the approach 
should be to count the number of farmers growing a particular crop and their average acreages, 
thereby “bypassing any consideration of individual acreages” and “divest[ing] ourselves of our 
bonds to the physical landscape and acquir[ing] information about social conditions in return” 
[ibid.; p 7]. 
 
He seems to construct in this [early] text a distinction between real and abstract, geographical and 
spatial that parallels his argument elsewhere that geography is [at that time, possibly still] overly 
descriptive and genealogical, and lacks a theoretical position of analytic and predictive potential 
[Hägerstrand, 1973; p 67]. In this text which deals directly with the question of the nature and 
future of geography, he argues that the discipline of geography has been orientated by a 
predilection for the outdoors, in particular for the pursuits of exploration and surveying which 
have “cut off both the human and the geographical content of our investigations in ways which 
prevent the field from developing in a truly fundamental direction” [1973; p 69]. 
 
The most important symptom of this fascination with the outdoors is the development of the 
characteristic geographic scale; 
 
In size the Geographical scale of analysis and observation is bounded on the lower end by 
the architectural region - the area an architect usually considers when he designs a 
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This is the clearest explanation for why the ‘stations’ within time-geography remain ‘black 
boxes’ the focus being on movement between them across an abstracted spatial landscape [see 
Giddens, 1984a; p 135]. He continues that “[a]s soon as people disappear behind their doors thy 
somehow cease to be living entities and turn at best into abstract densities per unit area” [1973; p 
74]. 
 
However, this is not to say that Hägerstrand has not attempted to rectify this problem, but he has 
failed for the lack of an adequate notation, something “probably closer akin to the score of the 
composer” [ibid.; p 77]. He begins by try to dissolve the idea of geographical scale to access what 
he describes as “a large white spot to be explored”; 
 
How precisely do human beings on the organic level and viewed without the bounds of 
the conventional scale limitations organise their interaction and non-interaction with 
objects in the environment including fellow-men? [1973; p 74]. 
 
This unifying of approaches, regardless of “conventional scale limitations”, is precisely the 
agenda of the second section of this thesis, which introduces the configurational approach from 
the supra-urban to architectural scales3. Indeed, Hägerstrand’s starting position bears a striking 
resemblance to the approach of Space Syntax, for he begins his reworking by questioning the 
very nature of space as it is used in geography. He argues, following a “direction that I intuitively 
feel to be crucial” that the geographers’ concentration on the “distributional arrangement of 
things and quantities in a relative locational sense...[has]...tended to overlook the space-
consuming properties of phenomena and the consequences for their ordering which these 
properties imply” [1973; p 70]. Thus, the characterization of geography as a ‘discipline of 
distance’ is insensitive to “structures seeking spatial accommodation” and he points to 
‘interlocking’, ‘elbowing’ and ‘predation’ as processes in space ignored by geography [ibid.]. 
 
He makes a re-characterization, therefore, which appeals to a notion of a ‘lost’ understanding of 
space, in rather the same way that this thesis argues for a loss of a material conception of space in 
contemporary theory, and draws on an appeal to a ‘common sense’ notion; “[t]he notion of space 
as made up of distances has overtaken the notion of space as a provider of room” [ibid., emphasis 
added]. Furthermore, Carlstein, Parkes and Thrift defending Hägerstrand’s position, argue that 
physics has been the basis of understanding of time and space for too long and that, “much of the 
                                                 
3 Not withstanding the criticisms of the Space Syntax approach that emerge at the scale of the individual, to be 
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philosophy of space and time is derived from study of inorganic natural systems and is therefore 
biased towards such systems and not society” [Carsltein, Parkes and Thrift, 1978 ; p 2]. Again, 
this has resonances with the current project as well as Harvey’s insistence of understandings 
based in human [social] practice. 
 
There are clear parallels here with the notion of configuration that is advanced in Space Syntax 
[see above, chapter 5]. Furthermore, Hägerstrand’s conception is an overtly materialistic one, 
based around the idea of “packing problems” as objects “compete for space”; 
 
As soon as one object has found a location, the space it occupies is not available for a 
host of other ‘weaker’ objects and the probability field of their location has changed [p 
71]. 
 
This is precisely analogous to Hillier’s proposition of basic invariant spatial laws of aggregation. 
Unlike Hägerstrand, however, Hillier is able to demonstrate through empirical work not only how 
these laws determine actual spatial forms, but critically that such laws are not abstracted from a 
social context but form the basis of spatial strategies upon which social reproduction depends [see 
above, chapter 5 and Hillier, 2001]. 
 
‘Space packing’ – the “large white spot” of the architectural scale 
 
This renewed conception of space is directly linked, as in this thesis, to the re-evaluation of that 
lower limit of the ‘geographical scale’ as defined by Hägerstrand - the architectural realm. “The 
neglect of space-packing processes could hardly have continued for so long a time if we had not 
on the whole crossed out from our universe the microspaces conventionally belonging to the 
engineering and architectural scale” [p 72]4. For, as Hägerstrand argues, “[i]t is clear that the 
packing problem is impossible to abstract from in spaces below the size of the building”. Still 
more pertinently he suggests that insights at the micro, building, level will have resonances at the 
more conventional scale of geographical analysis. 
 
                                                 
4 It is noticable also that critics of Giddens’s theory within geography tend to focus on the contribution of Hägerstrand 
and not on the equally important influence of Goffman whose attention to performative ‘regions’, though not satisfying 
the material aspirations of this thesis, nonetheless offer an analysis at an architectural more than ‘geographical’ scale 
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However, his solution to the notational problem (his time-geography) loses much of the promise 
of this theoretical repositioning for two reasons. Firstly, Hägerstrand is unable to do away with 
the ‘first fundamental assumption’ that “the geographer sees his task as viewing the world in 
geometrical terms of some sort” [p 76]. He points out rightly that; 
 
Those who prefer multivariate statistical analysis on the application of systems concepts 
also begin with spatially organized data and evaluate their findings in terms of spatial 
form, location and distribution. Even a purely urban discourse, like David Harvey’s 
[1971] analysis of the redistribution of income in an urban system, revolves around such 
central concepts as accessibility and proximity, both geometrical in nature. 
 
This gives him cause to accept rather than question such a geometrical approach, and despite his 
concern that geography is too much a subject of ‘distance’ and not of ‘packing’ the result is that 
the materialistic overtones of his theoretical position are lost to a concern with the ease of 
movement through space governed by the constraints of friction of distance. The limitations of 
this conception, as well as the potential for the configurational approach to shed light upon the 
influence of just such material ‘packing problems’, has already been addressed, precisely in 
relation to Harvey’s arguments referred to by Hägerstrand [see above, chapter 6]. For want of an 
adequate methodology linked to a developed theory of the ‘packing problem of space’, he is 
forced to return, therefore, to the abstract notion of space that Pred describes, inherited from De 
Geer and Kant among others, and fails to explore the “large white spot” of the sub-geographical 
scale. 
 
Secondly, his approach is centred finally not on space so much as time, as his behaviouralist 
methodology, focused on the simplistic notion of ‘projects’ and ‘goals’ within a “budget-space”, 
reduces space to an abstract contextual role while making time the active dimension, reflected in 
his suggestion that a union needs to be made between geography and accounting techniques. 
 
The character of Hägerstrand’s space can best be summarized in the ‘axiomatic’ constraints that 
lie at the heart of his theory; these are: 
 
The indivisibility of human bodies and other living and inorganic things 
The finite length of human life 
The limited ability to take part in more than one activity at once 
That fact that every task has a duration 
That movement between points takes time 
The limited packing capacity of space Giddens, locales and co-presence 209 
The limited outer size of terrestrial space 
That every situation is inevitably rooted in past situations 
[Hägerstrand, 1975; see also Giddens, 1984a; pp 111-12]. 
 
 
The basic characteristics of the individuation of objects and people within a passive conception of 
time and space which ‘contain’ and constricts objects and events according to principles of 
contiguity points to an understanding of space and time derived from the Kantian tradition that 
separates material things from space and time as organizing concepts. He proves unable, 
therefore, to release geography “from its Kantian cage” [the phrase is Soja’s, 1987b; pp 289, and 
see above p 32], and I would consequently dispute Pred’s claim that time-geography says 
something about ‘man/man’, ‘man/elements-of-the-natural-environment’ and, most significantly, 
‘man/man-made object relations’, constituting a “new level of intellectual maturity for 
Geographers”, since it lacks the fundamental requirement of an approach to the material realm 
that has theoretical sophistication and empirical potential [Pred, 1977; p 207]. At its core, 
therefore, Hägerstrand cannot address “the large white spot” of the sub-geographical scale 
effectively, because his theory implicitly separates space and time from the material realm, which 
has no active role other than through the constraint of the friction of distance. 
 
Similarly, I would argue that Giddens has done little to address these problems. While 
undoubtedly strengthening the weak conception of the agent in the theory and integrating time-
geography into structuration theory’s far more sophisticated understanding of social systems, he 
nonetheless absorbs the essential spatial character of Hägerstrand’s work, particularly the concern 
with the friction of distance. Although, through the work of Goffman, he begins to open the 
“large white spot” of the architectural scale, as we have seen there is no real understanding of the 
role that physical space plays, and Giddens seems unaware of Hägerstrand’s tentative move to a 
more materialistic conception of space [Hägerstrand’s 1973 paper is not sited in the bibliography 
of The Constitution of Society]. 
 
Once more the fear of determinism in geographical literature seems to be pertinent. As Pred notes 
in his introduction to the 1967 edition of Innovation Diffusion as a Spatial Process, “[i]t was 
written at a time when it was still relevant to argue against physical determinism...” and Giddens 
argues that, “[t]he suppression of space in social theory derives from different origins [from that 
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works any hint of geographical determinism” [Giddens, 1979; p 202]. Saunders expresses the 
same concern; 
 
If they [locales] are more than the backdrop to action, then how exactly do they enter into 
the reflexive constitution of action? We know the theory of structuration is antithetical to 
any explanation couched in terms of physical determinism; so how do actors derive 
meaning from their physical environment? How does the context situate the action? What 
is the mechanism and where is the explanation for how it works? 
 
I cannot find any answers in Giddens’ work to any of these quite basic questions. There 
are references all through his work to the significance of space and the importance of 
locales, but he rarely provides illustrations of what he means, and when he does they are 
profoundly disappointing [Saunders, 1989; p 230]. 
 
The following section [7.3] aims to demonstrate that a materialistic theory of space need not 
resort to deterministic formulations, and will seek to illustrate how the approach of Space Syntax 
can be used to answer just the types of questions posed by Saunders. Through an analysis of the 
performative behaviours of teenagers in retail environments, the following section demonstrates 
the importance of the physical space provided by different design strategies in determining 
different social strategies. The aim, therefore, is to provide the detailed material analysis of 
‘stages and ‘stations absent from Goffman, Hägerstand and [consequently] Giddens’ theories, 
thus rendering opaque the “white spots” and “black boxes” of their approaches. Furthermore, 
Space Syntax, although providing empirical methodologies to address the material realm, does 
not sacrifice theoretical sophistication in formulating a theory of the socio-spatial relation, which, 
moreover, integrates well with, and adds empirical authority to, the approach of, Goffman, 
Hägerstand and indeed Giddens. It provides, therefore, empirical arguments for rejecting 
Saunders’ inference that, “social theory has been quite right to treat space as a backdrop against 
which social action takes place”, as a materialistic approach need not imply that “it [space] is 
passive; it is context” [ibid.; p 231].  
 
I hope, therefore, to revive Hägerstrand’s unrealized ambition to unite geographical and 
architectural scales of analysis in a common notational and theoretical footing (and along very 
similar lines to those that he himself proposed), advancing the configurational approach of Space 
Syntax as a powerful theory with which to address the ‘space packing’ issues of the ‘sub-
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7.3 ‘Hiding in the Light’: teenage performance in retail centres – a materialist approach 
 
Social theory has the task of providing conceptions of the nature of human social activity 
and of the human agent which can be placed in the service of empirical work. The main 
concern of social theory is the same as that of the social sciences in general: the 
illumination of concrete processes in social life. [Giddens, 1984a; p xvii, and above p 
197] 
 
This section follows this agenda set by Giddens and also reverses it. I aim to make an empirical 
analysis in the context of the work of Giddens analysed above but to suggest that it is this 
empirical work that can illuminate deficiencies in social theory5. Space Syntax offers a 
clarification of the role of material space in generating what Giddens refers to as “presence-
availability”, engaging with Hägerstrand’s concerns with the physical circumscription of action in 
the generation of ‘bundles’ of co-presence, thus extending the limited role of space in both their 
theories, reduced to friction of distance inhibiting free transportation and communication. 
 
This section, rather than recapitulating that point, returns to Hägerstrand’s challenging task of 
opening the ‘sub-geographical’ architectural scale to the same theoretical position applied to the 
understanding of the ‘geographical phenomena’ investigated previously, a project for which 
Hägerstrand’s methodology proved inadequate. Also, I will seek to show that this same approach 
can fill the ‘spatial holes’ noted before in Goffman’s work, thereby achieving a closer and more 
satisfactory union between the two than perhaps Giddens achieves, allowing a more convincing 
treatment of the ‘physical environment’ that appears in his work than is currently the case. 
 
‘Hiding in the Light’; the ‘spatiality’ of ‘hanging out’ 
 
This section presents an empirical reworking of the idea of ‘hiding in the light’ advanced by 
Hebdidge as a description of teenage behaviours [Hebdidge, 1988]. While his work is implicitly 
spatial, it does not accord an active role to the physical environment. Rather, his work reinforces 
the spatial stereotypes of ‘hanging out’ on street corners without understanding why it is that 
particular spaces are of significance. He follows in the wake of the William Whyte school of 
intense observation and anecdotal description, therefore, which while of considerable empirical 
                                                 
5 Indeed, my ultimate aim (pursued in the ‘speculative epilogue’ of the final chapter) will be to follow Giddens’ further 
assertion that such reciprocal developments between social theory and empirical work should form the basis of 
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value has little theoretical content, certainly in regard to linking the observed spatial nature of 
phenomena to wider social theories [Whyte, 1980 and 1988]. 
 
That it is appropriate for this study to focus on the activity of teenagers is confirmed by the 
emphasis in sociological literature on ‘youth’ as a constructed categorization in which spatial 
display performs an important role. The idea of ‘youth’ as a social category has emerged in the 
postwar period as a perennial thorn in the side of the moral guardians of society. Cohen has 
argued that group solidarity among young people is an expression of reaction against 
conventional stereotypes of what ‘young people’ should be and how they should behave. ‘The 
Youth’ have been understood as a counter or sub-culture, therefore, and have consequently 
generated a degree of ‘moral panic’, associated with a perceived ‘youth problem’, in the dominant 
(adult) culture [Cohen, 1972; Hall, 1976]. Although there have been several studies of teenage 
behaviour, few understand the spatial expression of counter-cultures as being of any more than 
contextual importance. Hebdidge’s work on the Mods and Rockers conflicts of the early 1960s is 
no more than ‘set’ in the context of the beaches of Brighton, and while Shields adds some spatial 
understanding to the debate - through the concept of the ‘liminal space’ of reduced moral 
authority and heightened social permissiveness - there is still no fundamental understanding of 
why particular spaces are important for the construction of youth identities and how the behaviour 
of ‘problem groups’ is mediated through space [Shields, 1991]. 
 
The  sites  studied  were  not  the  beaches  of  the  1960s  conflicts  nor  the  urban  estates  but 
contemporary shopping malls. This shift is in no way inappropriate however. As the urban realm 
becomes increasingly privatized and regulated through surveillance, shopping malls have become 
key  sites  for  the  social  construction  of  identity  as  well  as  for  consumption6.  They  feature 
increasingly prominently as sites of significance in academic and popular discourse of all kinds7 
and particularly the literature examined above that emphasises the dissolution of reality into a 
‘hyper-reality’ of signs and commercially orientated simulacra8. 
 
                                                 
6 See for example the work of Fisk on surveillance and Mort and Nixon in relation to the construction of masculinity 
through shopping [Fisk, 1998; Mort, 1996; Nixon, 1991] 
7 See for example Sorkin’s Variations on a Theme Park [Sorkin, 1992] Zukin’s Landscapes of Power, particularly 
sections dealing with redeveloped and gentrified shopping areas such as Faneuil Hall in Boston [Zukin, 1991], Miller’s 
Shopping, Place and Identity [Miller, 1998]. Also popular sources, for example Woody Allen’s Scenes from a Mall. 
8 In this regard see particularly Featherstone’s Consumer Culture and Postmodernism [Featherstone, 1991] and Eco’s 
Faith in Fakes: Travels in Hyper-reality [Eco, 1986]. Giddens, locales and co-presence 213 
Shopping malls, therefore, most certainly conform to the idea of a ‘station’ within Hägerstrand’s 
terminology, becoming an increasingly prominent part of the choreography of human biographies 
since  Hägerstrand  was  writing, but they also conform to  Giddens’ more socially active term 
‘locale’. Finally, they provide a ‘stage’ in terms of Goffman’s dramaturgical analogy, in this case 
upon which the often conflictual identity of ‘youth’ is negotiated. Thus, as Cosgrove argues; 
 
The precinct, then, is a highly textured place, with multiple layers of meaning. Designed 
for the consumer, to be sure [...] nevertheless its geography stretches way beyond that 
narrow and restrictive perspective. The precinct is a symbolic place where a number of 
cultures meet and perhaps clash [Cosgrove, 1989; pp 118-119]. 
  
However, none of this work examines the role that the physical space of the mall plays and so 
malls make an ideal focus for the re-evaluation of the role that space plays in the ritual displays 
and auto-surveillance that Hebdidge terms ‘hiding in the light’, thereby demonstrating an 
analytical role for physical space in the theoretical positions examined above. 
 
Two case studies 
 
To investigate the role of spatial configuration in ‘youth’ behaviour patterns, a comparative study 
of teenage behaviours was made in two centres, Le Centre Commercial Grand Ciel in Ivry, Paris, 
and the White Rose Centre in Leeds [hereafter ‘Grand Ciel’ and ‘White Rose’]9. This was 
particularly important because the centre in Paris was perceived by the management to suffer 
from a ‘youth problem’, whereas in the Leeds centre managers felt that any problems with groups 
of teenagers had been overcome through the installation of an extremely sophisticated electronic 
surveillance system. The aim was to understand the degree to which these social outcomes were 
related to spatial phenomena through assessing the opportunities that the different spatial designs 
of the centres afforded teenagers for ‘hanging out’. That is, using Hebdige’s terminology, to 
assess the differing spatial strategies used by teenagers in different environments in the 
construction of their individual and group identities though strategies of spectacle and 
surveillance, what he terms ‘hiding in the light’. 
                                                 
9 This research formed part of a larger study into benchmarking of quality assessment variables in the European 
construction industry [see Carr, Michell, Stonor and Winch, 1999]. Giddens, locales and co-presence 214 
The two centres make an appropriate comparison for while there are many similarities between 
them10 they differ principally in the spatial strategy that the architect (BDP/Groupe 6 in both 
cases) has employed. While the White Rose is a conventional ‘bone’ shaped mall on one level 
with two axes on either side of a central atrium and food court, the Grand Ciel is split into two 
distinct sectors; an original 1982 mall based around a Carrefours supermarket and an adjacent and 
connected three level extension with sub-level parking, completed in 1997. The two centres, 
therefore, exhibit very different spatial forms and consequently different spatial potentials for the 
patterning of co-presence. 
 
Furthermore, in relation to the focus on teenage behaviour, both centres have a comparable social 
context. While the White Rose Centre is ‘out-of-town’ there are a number of council estates 
nearby on the far side of the main road facing the centre. These were identified by the architect as 
being some of the least affluent areas of Leeds. Although by no means the only residence of 
teenagers using the centre, these estates were identified by the security staff as being the base for 
groups of “known individuals” whose behaviour was perceived to be “undesirable” [Clarke, 1998 
and security personnel, personal communication]. 
 
The Grand Ciel similarly has a close relationship to the neighbourhood of Ivry which is similarly 
a less affluent area associated with an immigrant North African population. There is also a 
perceived problem with teenagers using the centre in Ivry but the responses in the two centres are 
very different. In the Grand Ciel the presence of teenagers is still seen to be a problem, despite a 
significant security attempt to discourage teenage use of the centre for ‘recreational’ purposes 
which verge on the management’s definition of ‘anti-social’, particularly persistent ‘hanging out’ 
on the upper levels. The management of the White Rose Centre see there to be no further problem 
following initial confrontations after opening. This was understood to be a result of the 
sophisticated surveillance equipment that allows continued monitoring of the mall and car 
parking spaces, and the quick response to the presence of identified offenders [ibid.]. 
 
                                                 
10 Both have similar “out of town” locations close to major route networks (the Leeds, Sheffield, Bradford, Wakefield, 
Barnsley nexus and the Péripherique respectively), both are of a similar size and both attempt to position themselves as 
‘regional’ rather than local facilities hoping to draw clientele from beyond their immediate neighbourhoods [Clarke, 
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However, this study suggests that it is the differing spatial layouts of the centres and the 
behavioural opportunities that each affords that is the cause of the imbalance in apparently 
“undesirable” activities. 
 
Both centres were intensively observed over a period of days with sampled ‘gate count’ data 
being collected by zones and by category (gender and age) to establish the pattern of spatial and 
temporal co-presence within the centres and more behavioural ‘snap-shot’ information being 
collected to address questions of activity in space. These were then compared with spatial ‘axial-
models’ of the centres11. 
 
Analysis 
 
Figures 7.1 to 7.5 [see pages 210 to 229] show the results of the movement study. They show that 
while in White Rose the levels of movement in the main retail spaces are consistently high, in the 
Grand Ciel there is a considerable deterioration in movement levels up to the upper floor levels. 
 
When compared to the computer models of the centres, figures 7.6 to 7.10, one can identify an 
immediate visual correspondence. The areas of highest movement, represented in red, correspond 
well to the areas of highest integration (or ‘spatial accessibility’) picked out by the model12. The 
models shown are the most successful in accurately reflecting the spatial use of the centres. 
Several others were constructed however, including weighting for floor areas of individual shops 
to test the thesis that ‘attractors’ or ‘magnets’ affect movement patterns and modelling of the 
surrounding car parking areas and the immediate urban contexts of each centre to establish the 
influence that these had on space use. 
                                                 
11 Gate counts and snap shots are both common observational techniques used within the Space Syntax methodology 
for collecting data on space use. Gate counts involves the counting of pedestrians or vehicles in whatever categories are 
appropriate for the study (men, women, locals, tourists etc) for a number of minutes each hour allowing for an average 
hourly flow rate to be calculated throughout the day. ‘Gates’ are typically positioned across every element of the spatial 
structure and counted every hour for 5 minutes (every two hours in this study because of the size of system involved 
and the limited number of researchers). ‘Snap shots’ are instantaneous evaluations of static space use, again divided by 
category and activity (sitting, walking, in conversation etc) and are typically made once an hour for all the spaces of the 
system under investigation. 
12 Integration measures the degree to which each unit has strategic importance within the overall configuration, in 
terms of the total depth of that element from all others in the system. This is equivalent to the number of ‘moves’ 
required to move from that space to all other spaces, a measure therefore of accessibility. Giddens, locales and co-presence 216 
That the simplest model of the internal structure of the centres was the most successful in 
explaining the spatial use of the centre confirms that ‘magnets’ do not in fact have a strong 
influence over the use of the mall compared to the overall spatial structure itself. This questions 
the view that key magnets generate patterns of movement (and therefore co-presence) within 
retail environments. Furthermore, the external environment in these examples affects only the 
numbers of people entering the centres and not their distribution within the spaces of the centre. 
 
This intuitive correspondence between movement and the computer model is confirmed using a 
statistical correlation. Figures 7.11 and 12 present a statistical correlation between the computer’s 
measure of spatial accessibility and the levels of movement observed. The r-squared value shows 
that in Le Grand Ciel the model successfully accounts for over 80% of the observed movement 
while in White Rose the figure rises to over 90%13. This result is highly significant since it 
suggests that the most important influence over the movement of visitors within the centres is the 
spatial design of the centre itself - over and above other factors such as the ‘attractor’ qualities of 
individual stores/facilities. In other words, spatial design organises overall levels of “presence-
availability” and therefore co-presence. 
 
Teenage Behaviour 
 
A more detailed analysis of the gate count data is presented in figures 7.13 and 14. Figure 7.13 
shows that in the White Rose the adult population peaks between 12 am and 2 pm remaining 
relatively constant during the rest of the day. By contrast the teenage population builds steadily 
throughout the day to a peak in the two hours before closing between 18 and 20 pm. There is also 
a similar gender disparity between male and female teenagers, the males showing the significant 
peak between 16 and 18 pm . However, the disparity in numbers is slight compared to the 
relationship between adults and teenagers, the ratio varying around 10:1. 
 
The usage by adults in Le Grand Ciel is much more consistent, varying little during the day 
(7.14).  However, the teenage population shows a similar steady increase to a peak in the fourth 
time period (16 to 18 pm). There are two notable differences in the Paris example, however. 
                                                 
13 The correlation for White Rose shows three spaces that are ‘over-performing’, that is have a higher than expected 
level of movement for there degree of spatial accessibility in the overall system (marked in blue on 7.12). However, 
these spaces are the three spaces associated with the Savacentre, the main anchor in the centre. The movement levels 
are higher than the model would predict in these spaces (compare 7.04 and 09) because they are used as a point of 
access into the main mall space from the parking and are the start point of many visits to the mall. Giddens, locales and co-presence 217 
Firstly, the numbers of male teenagers is significantly greater than female, reaching a peak at 
c.1600 compared to a steady level of c.900 after 2 pm for the females. Secondly, and more 
importantly, whereas the White Rose data showed little differentiation between the lower and 
upper levels in any category or time period, the evidence from Le Grand Ciel shows that as the 
teenage population grows so the number recorded on the top floor of the mall increases 
disproportionately to the number on the lower two levels which remains relatively constant. This 
is particularly the case with the male teenagers between 16 and 18 pm. 
 
This observation is confirmed by more detailed analysis. The proportion of teenagers found in the 
lower level and the food court level of White Rose varies little during the times of lowest and 
highest teenage use. The composition of users in each space at all times of the day can be said to 
be a representative cross-section of the population of the whole centre. In the case of Le Grand 
Ciel the percentage of teenage users on the top floor changes from 6% between 10 and 12 am to 
30% between 16 and 18 pm. The growth in the numbers of male teenagers makes up for 23% of 
this increase. A similar change in comparative use occurs on the first floor (6% to 21%) while on 
the ground floor there is little alteration in the composition of users. Peaks occur at almost every 
gate on the upper levels during the peak teenage hours. Those gates that consistently score lower 
are those at the extremities of the aisles. This indicates that teenagers are clustering towards the 
centre of the floor towards the atrium. 
 
It seems therefore that while space use is homogeneous in the Leeds example, in the Paris case 
the upper floors are used preferentially by teenagers during the later parts of the day. 
 
This difference in use can be shown to be statistically significant. There is a good correlation 
between average adults per hour movement rates and average teenage per hour rates across all the 
gates in White Rose with the exception of one, B3 (discussed below) [see figure 7.15]. The R-
squared value (measure of correlation between 0 and 1) for teenagers considered as a whole is 
0.743 - 0.572 for female teenagers and rising to 0.761 for males. This indicates statistically that 
adults and teenagers inhabit the same spaces in the White Rose centre during the day. This is in 
marked contrast to Le Grand Ciel, which shows a much poorer result, 0.221 for teenagers as a 
whole. The reason for this is that the scattergram shows a clear bifurcation [see figure 7.16] 
which indicates that the teenagers and adults are not inhabiting the same spaces in the centre. This 
result is replicated across all time periods and between male and female teenagers, indicating that  Giddens, locales and co-presence   218 
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not only are teenagers and adults segregated but so are male and female teenagers, unlike their 
Leeds counterparts. 
 
Spatial Structure, co-presence and ‘hanging out’ in Leeds and Paris 
 
This bifurcation phenomenon Hillier has described as “the L-shaped problem” [Hillier, 1996; 
chapter 5]. He demonstrates that such a segregation is caused by the probabilistic opportunities 
offered by a spatial environment which allows single category ‘virtual community’ to develop. 
This, he demonstrates, is symptomatic of the ‘spatial pathology’ of many contemporary housing 
estates, which while attempting to construct a safer environment through the segregation of 
vehicular movement to peripheral routes and concentration of pedestrian access into raised 
corridors and walkways, have in fact encouraged the segregation of user groups. This is 
fundamental to the understanding of how architecture is perceived to ‘cause’ social problems, as 
adult and through movement tends to be purposeful, using the more direct peripheral routes 
intended for vehicular access, effectively abandoning the internal routes to children who use the 
spatially complex networks of walkways as areas for recreation, “essentially about discovering 
the potentials of space”, unsupervised by any incidental adult co-presence [Hillier, 1996; p 205]. 
It is this domination by a single use and user category that lies behind the perception of 
architecturally generated social problems.  
 
However, while in that context Hillier characterises children as “space explorers”, by contrast in 
this case we find teenagers using the space as a ‘stage’ upon which to construct and display their 
identities in relation to the environment of consumption possibilities, the mutual surveillance of 
their peers and in reaction against the dominant adult presence. Again, rather than pursuing the 
more conventionally purposive activities of shopping they are “discovering the potentials of 
space” to differentiate themselves from the majority of users. Through the use of gate-counts the 
role of space in providing opportunities for generating, and avoiding, co-presence has been 
elucidated. However, while gate counts give an accurate measure of the numbers of people 
passing through a space they cannot describe what those people do within that space as would be 
required for a clarification of Goffman’s description of ‘front and back regions’. For this we need 
to turn to ‘static snapshot’ data. 
 
The static snapshots from the White Rose Centre show that there is no clustering of static 
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and the aisle spaces while in the food court there is clustering only in the seating areas, not 
around the balustrade of the atrium. Neither is the lower mall area visible from this seating area, 
which is too large to give a direct view. Even when the teenage population of the centre reaches 
its peak (18-20 pm), they do not form the dominant user category on either the upper or lower 
level. There is no spatial segregation in either space between static teenagers and other user 
categories. The only exception to this is the gate B3, the only stair access from the lower to the 
upper mall level, situated in a highly strategic and visible location in the centre of the mall. This 
route is used preferentially by teenagers, and is the only space in which they are able to form a 
single user-defined ‘virtual community’ and which allows the teenagers both to see the central 
areas of the mall and, importantly, to be seen by the greatest number of other people. 
 
By contrast, in the Grand Ciel there is considerable clustering of static teenagers at the balustrade 
of the upper level. Figure 7.17 shows details of the atrium spaces on the top and ground floors 
with teenagers observed at all time periods shown. The clustering is pronounced on the top floor 
while much less so on the lower levels. In contrast to White Rose, when all users are shown at all 
time periods the teenage population is seen to form a significant proportion of users on the top 
floor, almost forming a single user category, while becoming ‘invisible’ on the ground floor, 
diluted by the adult presence. This discrepancy can be highlighted by analysing the distribution of 
user categories by floor shown in the static snapshots. The Grand Ciel was broken down into 
density areas and the numbers of each category counted for each area. The numbers of teenagers 
observed on the upper level, while not greater in absolute terms than the numbers on the ground 
floor, do form a much larger proportion of users observed. 
 
I wish to suggest that the reason for this clustering of static teenagers on the upper level also has a 
spatial explanation. It has already been noted that the opportunity for surveillance of the lower 
level from the food court in The White Rose Centre is poor, the only vantage point being afforded 
by the stair access between the floors. Figure 7.18 shows the isovists constructed from the food 
court. The views into the central atrium are largely obscured by the overhang of the food court 
itself and the number of physical interventions in the central space; lifts, stairs and elevators. 
Views from the atrium on the ground level are restricted because each arm of the bone-shaped 
centre is offset from the other. Furthermore, the isovists from the spaces that overlook the main 
aisles are obscured by the placement of trees in front of the balcony on the lower level. 
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In the Grand Ciel, however, the isovists from the top level are exceptionally strong. Because of 
the visual permeability of each level the isovists are extremely hard to construct graphically. The 
photographs (figures 7.19 and 20) show the extent of the visual field from the top floors and the 
attraction of clustering at the balustrade to watch people on the lower levels. 
 
It is my contention that while the two centres appear to function differently in terms of teenage 
behaviour this is in reality not the case. The differences are in the spatial opportunities that each 
centre affords the teenagers. In the White Rose centre there is no space that is poorly used by 
other categories in which teenagers can construct a single-category community other than the 
limited space of the central stairway. Furthermore, there are no spaces that offer the opportunity 
for static surveillance except again for the stairway. In the Grand Ciel the top floor readily offers 
both these possibilities. 
 
In effect the Leeds centre encourages movement integrated with the other diverse user groups 
(hence the good correlation with the axial model) as the only available strategy through which 
teenagers can see and be seen, while the Paris centre encourages static, segregated surveillance. 
This is not a cultural difference in teenage behaviours. Both groups are adopting an appropriate 
spatial strategy, given the configuration of the malls, to achieve their social objectives in using 
the space; that is the articulation of their group and individual identities through strategies of 
spectacle; the ‘hanging out’ in strategic locations that Hebdidge terms ‘hiding in the light’ 
[Hebdidge; 1988]. However, there are unintended consequences of these strategies, for in denying 
the spatial opportunity for ‘hanging out’ in visually strategic locations and therefore encouraging 
visibility through movement about the centre, the teenagers in the White Rose find themselves in 
a situation of co-presence with the adult community, and as a result of their numerical 
unobtrusiveness their activity is not perceived as threatening and therefore ‘socially undesirable’. 
In stark contrast, the teenagers of Le Grand Ciel are able to exploit the highly visible upper levels 
of their centre and thereby define themselves as a threatening group by the absence of co-
presence with an adult community, and hence come to be defined as a ‘social [as opposed to a 
spatial] problem’. 
 
Furthermore, the work of Hillier and others in relation to housing estates demonstrates that this is 
a generalized phenomenon that relates material space to the structuring of co-presence. Moreover, 
this is a far more spatially sensitive analysis than Goffman’s ‘regions’ which tend to be limited to 
generalized descriptions of ‘front’ and ‘back’ in terms of generic criteria (the far corner, Giddens, locales and co-presence 241 
upstairs/downstairs) rather than any direct analysis of the spatial circumstances under 
consideration. It is also a more versatile and theoretically embedded approach than Hägerstand’s 
Time Geography, which through tracing individual biographies within an abstracted ‘space’ of 
constraint is unable to extract such systemic principles, nor to understand the role of architectural 
space that lies in the ‘white spot’ of the sub-geographical scale.  
 
What this chapter has aimed to show is that it is the physical structure of space itself which is the 
generically important variable between different situations. Not only does it play a direct role in 
structuring the “presence-availability” of actors, thereby generating circumstances of co-presence, 
it also provides the spatial arena in which social groups go about constructing their identities 
through spatial strategies. This chapter has sought to demonstrate that the spatial constraints of 
Hägerstrand and Giddens can be related directly to the physical ‘milieu’ of action without 
implying a geographical or physical determinism, and indeed that physical space should 
(following Giddens’ criticism of Hägerstrand) be conceived of as opportunity creating as much as 
simply constraining. 
 
Furthermore, in following the previous empirical reworking at the urban scale of chapter 6.3, this 
chapter has taken a step towards realizing Hägerstrand’s ambition to integrate a geographical and 
architectural scale of analysis in a common methodology which retains social awareness and 
explanatory potential. The following chapter on the work of Foucault will take this challenge a 
step further. 
 Foucault’s Panopticism 242 
Chapter 8 
The Individual Scale: 
Foucault’s Panopticism - “Part of the way modern men think”  
 
 
Everything in [architecture], from its fondness for certain shapes to the approaches to 
specific building problems…reflects the conditions of the age from which it springs…. 
However much a period may disguise itself, its real nature will show through in its 
architecture [Gideon, 1967; p 19
1]. 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The inclusion of a historian, Michel Foucault, in a discussion of approaches to space populated 
mainly by geographers and architects might seem inappropriate were it not for the extraordinary 
penetration of two of his works in particular into the architectural/ geographical canon – 
Surveiller et Punir: Naissance de la prison [1975] and Questions à Michel Foucault sur la 
géographie [in Hérodote 1/4, 1976]
2. Indeed, these and his other works have made significant 
contributions to the eradication of the persistent divisions between the two disciplinary 
strongholds of history and geography, entrenched in their respective spatial and temporal 
prejudices. It is this spatial sensitivity combined with his style of sociological history that affirms 
Foucault’s status as one of the critical players in the ‘re-assertion of space in social theory’. This 
is confirmed in the latter text, an interview with the board of editors of a geographical journal 
concerning the inclusion of space as a theoretical factor within his work. It is the source of what 
has become one of the ‘sound-bites’ of what I have termed the ‘respatialization theorists’ – that 
“[s]pace was treated as the dead, the fixed, the undialectical, the immobile, [while] time, on the 
contrary, was richness, fecundity, life, dialectic.” It ends with the much-quoted admission that, 
“Geography must indeed necessarily lie at the heart of my concerns.” [Foucault, 1980; pp 70 and 
77]. Furthermore, Foucault’s work lies at the heart of my own concerns, for his work deals 
explicitly with architectural space and his focus on the body as a locus of power relations 
transgresses the usual spatial categories associated with geography, thus further undermining the 
distinction between approaches to space within architectural and geographical theory. 
                                                 
1 Reproduced in Tittler, 1991; p 1. 
2 These texts appear here respectively as Discipline and Punish [Foucault, 1995] and Questions on Geography in 
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It is Discipline and Punish and in particular Foucault’s analysis of Bentham’s Panopticon that has 
captured the imagination of architectural theorists, perhaps acting as a conduit to open interest in 
the rest of his work. While interest in the Panopticon predates Foucault’s analysis, the impact of 
his work cannot be overstated. In 1971 Robin Evans was able to write that; 
 
Many architectural historians have never heard of the Panopticon principle of 
construction, while philosophers and penologists tend to pass over it with a scratch of the 
head or a raised eyebrow [Evans 1971; p 21]
3. 
 
This is clearly no longer the case by the time of his 1982 analysis (The Fabrication of Virtue; 
English prison architecture 1750-1840) where he makes reference to Foucault’s work among 
others concerned with penitentiary design. More strikingly, by 1992 Semple, one of Foucault’s 
harshest critics regarding his treatment of Bentham’s ideas, writes that “Foucault is fascinating, 
eloquent, trendy, brilliant, relevant, modern…”, indeed he is “part of the way modern men think 
[sic]” [Semple, 1992; p105]. 
 
Driver confirms the relevance of Foucault to this thesis by noting that his work has particular 
“intriguing connections with recent attempts to conjoin the analysis of society with that of space” 
and Harris assents, asserting that, “[s]ocial power is no longer conceived apart from its 
geographical context.” [Driver, 1985; p 432; Harris, 1991; p 678]. 
 
However, Foucault’s work has an added significance because he cleaves precisely the vein of 
ambiguity between the sub-geographical and supra-architectural scales identified in the previous 
chapter, principally through the work of Hägerstrand [see above, especially p 204 onwards]. 
Harris notes that space and power are mutually constitutive of one another, following a refrain of 
reciprocality that should now be familiar, and he uses this conclusion to argue that the work of 
Foucault (as well as Giddens’ Structuration Theory in particular) has lead to, “an intellectual 
environment that…could hardly be more hospitable for Human Geography in general and 
Historical Geography in particular”, continuing that now one cannot write Historical Geography 
as if one had not read Foucault [ibid. 678-80]. This alliance of Foucault with geography is 
perhaps surprising given that the ‘geographical spaces’ analysed above tended to be abstract 
conceptions of space concerned more with regional and distributional analyses that appear to be 
antithetical to the concrete architectural analysis presented by Foucault in Discipline and Punish. 
Furthermore, Foucault’s prolonged concern with the ‘spaces’ of the body and the treatment of the 
                                                 
3 A notable exception being Markus’ 1954 work discussed below. Foucault’s Panopticism 244 
body suggest a scale of analysis of greater resolution still than that typically associated with a 
geographical, even a ‘human geographical’ scale. 
  
What is at issue once again, therefore, is the precise use and understanding of ‘space’ in the work 
of Foucault. Following the now established pattern of questioning and rebuilding through 
empirical example I hope to show that a configurational understanding of space may help to 
counter some of the substantial empirical concerns of many of Foucault’s critics and in so doing 
may open the possibility of a more complete dissolution of the boundaries between not only 
geography and architecture but also history that Foucault himself hoped to have achieved but, as 
we shall see, did not fully realise. In so doing the configurational approach to space derived from 
Space Syntax will be seen to be stretched to its conceptual limits as the scale of analysis slides 
from statistical ‘population’ to the Foucauldian ‘body’, prefiguring a necessary reworking of the 
original theory. The confluence of both geographical and architectural debates locates Foucault’s 
work at the fulcrum of this argument, constructing a bridge to the subsequent section [chapter 10] 
where a more speculative discussion of the scope of a configurational theory of space will 
(among other things) seek to resolve the theoretical sublimation from geographical to 
architectural scales identified by Hägerstrand. 
 
8.1 “So the key was architecture!”: critical approaches 
 
In The Eye of Power [Foucault, 1980; chapter 8] Foucault summarises the physical principles of 
Bentham’s scheme, prompting the exclamation from his interviewer (Michelle Perrot) “So the 
key was architecture!” Foucault’s response exposes not only the essence of his argument’s 
strength but also its problematic and controversial nature. For while he begins by discussing the 
increasing politicisation of architectural responses during the 18
th century he goes on (famously) 
to assert that; 
 
A whole history remains to be written of spaces – which would at the same time be the 
history of powers (both these terms in the plural) – from the great strategies of geopolitics 
to the little tactics of the habitat, institutional architecture from the classroom to the 
design of hospitals, passing via economic and political installations [Foucault, 1980; p 
149, sic]. 
 
This passage is critical for it highlights firstly the great contribution of this work - the thematic 
alliance of space and issues of power relations - and the dissolution of the restrictive disciplinary 
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frustrating difficulties with his project. For behind the superficially exciting prospect of 
presenting a spatial analysis ranging in scale from the geo-political to the ‘micro-political’, a 
range geographical in its upper limit and architectural if not corporeal in its lower, lies the 
fundamental question as to whether there is indeed an approach to space that can sustain such a 
meta-theoretical project “from bedroom to battlefield” [Driver, 1985; p 425]. 
 
Such a challenge itself needs to be sensitive to Foucault’s own approach, which is defiantly anti-
essentialist and particular (the significance of his qualifying remark “both these terms [spaces and 
powers] in the plural”) and therefore resistant to such totalizing theorizations. According to 
Driver, Foucault, 
 
would reject the label of ‘abstract theoretician’ with which he is sometimes saddled. 
Within his work, one finds a vigorous championing of the particular and the concrete, 
alongside a rejection of all forms of explanation which seek to reduce reality to a single 
essence, such as a ‘spirit of the age’ or the ‘mode of production’ [Driver, 1985; p 426]. 
 
Furthermore, his work neither conforms to an established ‘school’, “nor forms a progressive and 
coherent ensemble on its own terms”, leading White to complain that his work; 
 
…is extraordinarily difficult to deal with in any short account. This is not only because 
his oeuvre is so extensive, but also because his thought comes clothed in a rhetoric 
apparently designed to frustrate summary, paraphrase, economical quotation for 
illustrative purposes, or a translation into traditional critical terminology [White, 1979; p 
81, emphasis added]. 
 
Whether this ‘subversion’ of the conventions of history and philosophy is seen as positive 
[Driver; op. cit.] or in part as a deliberate attempt “ to render his discourse impenetrable to any 
critical technique based on ideological principles different from his own” [White, ibid.] it poses 
an academic minefield laid primarily in the path of critical analysis from the historical or 
philosophical traditions.  
 
Inconsistencies in Foucault’s approach to space have been highlighted already, particularly by the 
editors of Hérodote
4. Although many commentators focus on the final statement that, “Geography 
must  indeed  necessarily  lie  at  the  heart  of  my  concerns”  [ibid.;  p  77],  few  note  that  this  is 
something  of  a  recantation  and  that  in  the  earlier  part  of  the  interview  Foucault  has  some 
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difficulty in understanding the direction that the questioners are taking
5. In particular they raise 
this issue of the use of spatial and geographical terms (territory, geopolitics etc) contrasted with 
the  “uncertainty  about  spatialization”,  referring  here  to  a  perceived  imbalance  in  Foucault’s 
‘methodological discontinuity’ in the treatment of time and his “nebulous or nomadic spatial 
demarcations [Christendom, the Western World, Northern Europe, France] whose uncertainty is 
in contrast with [his] care in marking off sections of time, periods and ages” [ibid.; pp 67-8]. 
 
However, the interviewers’ approach founders because Foucault is able to demonstrate that these 
terms are themselves essentially neither geographical nor spatial but are equally political and 
strategic.  In  trying  to  demonstrate  that  Foucault’s  historical  discourse  draws  him  into  spatial 
difficulties they fall foul of his subversion of historical conventions identified above by White 
and Driver that make his discourse so resilient to ‘traditional critical terminology’. Furthermore, 
they  highlight  the  surprisingly  contested  spatial  notions  at  the  heart  of  geography  (territory, 
region for example) which are (as Foucault notes) perhaps too polluted with political, strategic, 
historical concepts to be an effective device with which to navigate Foucault’s minefield. 
 
More promising, I believe, is to reverse the approach of Hérodote and to examine how the spatial 
and  in  particular  the  architectural  analysis  within  Discipline  and  Punish  impacts  back  on 
Foucault’s  writing  of  history.  This  is  particularly  pertinent  in  the  section  dealing  with  the 
Panopticon  where  I  hope  to  show  we  find    [following  Driver]  “unexpected,  [and  worse, 
dangerous and inaccurate] abstractions where we look for local detail” [Driver, 1985; p 429]. This 
approach will prove to be more robust because it relies on a ‘clean’ understanding of space free 
from historical and geographical association; the idea of space as configuration to which Foucault 
is seen already to be sympathetic through the importance he places in the later part of his analysis 
on the spatial structure of disciplinary institutions.  
 
The direction of this analysis, therefore, outflanks the traps encumbering any historical critique 
and focuses on Foucault’s treatment of space and architectural concerns. This is not a petty 
‘territorial’ approach, for paradoxically, the rapprochement between history and geography which 
Foucault facilitated allows us to rejoin the historical debate from a renewed perspective, arguing 
that there are considerable inconsistencies in his treatment of the two subjects whose closer union 
he has sought to promote. For while he expresses aversion to an epistemic understanding of 
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history it is hard to view his description of the development of a ‘disciplinary society’ in anything 
other than those terms. However, rather than uncovering a fracture in the continuity of his well 
defended approach to history, I believe that this can be explained by his erratic understandings of 
space and simplistic treatment of the architectural themes that come to the fore in this work. 
 
Foucault’s Panopticon 
 
In Discipline and Punish [hereafter DP] Foucault’s argument follows the historical evolution of 
the penal system from a focus on the torture of the body to the institutional attempts at reform of 
the soul. This can be seen also to have a spatial expression; a change from the urban arena to the 
interior, from spaces of spectacle (implying spectators) to spaces of introspection, from public 
space to architecturally defined private space. For Foucault space is a reflection of the forces of 
power operating within society. He treats space as a manifestation of these structures of power 
and consequently sees built forms and spatial strategies as testament to the social structures that 
produced them. However, he sees a discursive relationship between power and space in which 
space is not only the passive expression of power relations but is also an active ‘technique’ of 
power. This logic runs through the entire work although the spatial scale of interest narrows as 
the historical narrative progresses. 
 
In the first part of the book, Torture, it is the public space of the scaffold and the spectacle of 
punishment that is central. Foucault summarises the first section in the following passage, which 
highlights  some  of  the  confusion  over  spatial  metaphor  and  direct  spatial  reference  that 
characterises his work. 
 
If torture was so strongly embedded in legal practice, it was because it revealed truth and 
showed the operation of power. It assured the articulation of the written on the oral, the 
secret on the public, the procedure of the investigation on the process of the confession; it 
made it possible to reproduce the crime on the visible body of the criminal; in the same 
horror,  the  crime  had  to  be  manifested  and  annulled.  It  also  made  the  body  of  the 
condemned  man  the  place  where  the  vengeance  of  the  sovereign  was  applied,  the 
anchoring  point  for  a  manifestation  of  power,  an  opportunity  for  affirming  the 
dissymmetry of forces [DP; p 55]. 
 
The  public  arena  is  central  to  torture,  therefore,  because  it  is  only  through  the  presence  of 
spectators that the “physico-political force of the sovereign” can be reinforced [DP; p 48].  “In the 
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ceremonies of public execution, the main character was the people, whose real and immediate 
presence was required for the performance”, where they acted as guarantors of the punishment 
[DP; p 57]. Urban space is an arena for the expression of power relations at an individual level, “a 
micro-physics of power, whose field of validity is situated between these great functionings [of 
institutional bodies] and the bodies themselves with their materiality and their forces” [DP; p 26]. 
 
The ‘space’ of torture has two components, therefore. The first is the object of the torture, the 
body of the condemned, where power is manifested as is evident in his definition of political 
anatomy;  “a  set  of  material  elements  and  techniques  that  serve  as  weapons,  relays, 
communication routes and supports for the power and knowledge relations that invest human 
bodies and subjugate them by turning them into objects of knowledge” [DP; p 28]. However, the 
‘object’ of power ought not to be privileged over the other body in this power system: that of the 
King – the author of power. These polarised manifestations of the power structure of mediaeval 
society Foucault speaks of in terms of their materiality; “…the King’s body wasn’t a metaphor, 
but a political reality. Its physical presence was necessary for the functioning of the monarchy”, 
just as the material presence of the vicitm’s body was necessary for the functioning of justice 
[Body/Power, Foucault, 1980; p 55]. 
 
The second component of the ‘space’ of torture is the urban space that forms the arena of the 
affirming spectacle. This space, by contrast, has no material significance for Foucault in the way 
that later the Panopticon does. The ‘space’ is a metaphorical one, which acts as a magnifying 
medium, translating the assertion of power between Monarch and regicide as individual people 
into the subjugation of the populace through knowledge of that power. The city space is not 
literally an arena  where spectators  watch and take heed (although this certainly happened  as 
Foucault demonstrates) but it is a metaphor for the citizenry, and their conscious knowledge of 
the power of the King. It is primarily an institutional rather than physical understanding of space, 
therefore, similar to the idea of ‘parliament’ for example. 
 
The approach to space, however, evolves with his historical narrative. As the exercise of power 
extends from a bipolar confrontation between Monarch and regicide to a pervasive “disciplinary 
society”,  based  on  temporal  and  spatial  constraints,  Foucault  becomes  concerned  with  the 
‘materiality’ not of the author and objects of power but with the techniques by which power is 
exercised. The object of power is no longer the body of the condemned which itself becomes little 
more than a spatial technology to access the soul, and the figure of the King is replaced by a Foucault’s Panopticism 249 
transcendental notion of social justice. The spatial focus becomes the mediating techniques of 
power.  
 
In section three of Discipline and Punish (‘Discipline’) Foucault outlines the “micro-physics of 
power” that constitute the “machinery of power” over the body [DP; p 139]. It is significant that 
the first of these is entitled “The Art of Distributions”. He states that, 
 
In the first instance, discipline proceeds from the distribution of individuals in space [DP; 
p 141, emphasis added]. 
 
and  continues  that  several  “techniques”  are  employed;  enclosure  in  heterogeneous  spaces  of 
disciplinary monotony; partitioning into “as many sections as there are bodies or elements to be 
distributed” [DP; p 143]; and functional ordering of bodies in space according to the needs of the 
institution. Foucault’s thesis describes a transition in architectural terms from an urban space of 
spectacle to an interior space of individuation and control. 
 
A whole problematic then develops; that of an architecture that is no longer built simply 
to be seen (as with the ostentation of palaces), or to observe the external spaces (c.f. the 
geometry of fortresses), but to permit an internal, articulated and detailed control - to 
render visible those who are inside it; in more general terms, an architecture that would 
operate to transform individuals; to act on those it shelters, to provide a hold on their 
conduct, to carry the effects of power right to them, to make it possible to know them, to 
alter them [DP; p 172, emphasis added]. 
 
It is this ordering of bodies in space which allows the functioning of the body/power relation 
through surveillance which is central to Foucault’s work. He makes this relationship explicit, 
 
Thanks to the techniques of surveillance, the ‘physics of power’, the hold over the body, 
operate  according to the laws of optics and  mechanics according to a  whole play of 
spaces, lines, screens, beams, degrees and without recourse, in principle at least, to force 
or violence [DP; p 177]. 
 
The treatment of space is somewhat confusing, therefore, and reaffirms the concerns of Driver 
and White expressed above. It is a ‘puzzling book’, as Driver notes, which “presents us with 
minute particulars when we expect generalisations, and unexpected abstractions when we look for 
local details” [Driver, 1985; p 429]. He moves from a concern with the ‘materiality’ of the body 
(corporeality) to a concern with the materiality of the techniques of discipline (architecture); from 
an  understanding  of  space  as  the  corporeality  of  the  body  (King  and  regicide)  to  space  as Foucault’s Panopticism 250 
distribution  of  bodies;  in  essence,  a  move  from  a  relative,  corporeal  space  (defined  by  the 
embodiment  of  power  relations  in  the  King  and  regicide)  to  an  abstract  space  defined  by 
distributional and hierarchical relations diffused through society  [see figure 8.1]. 
 
Paradigm of control:  Torture  Discipline 
Power resides in:  King  Diffused through society 
Power exercised on:  The body (torture)  Soul (reform) 
Power expressed through:  Direct physical punishment  Spatial techniques 
Spatial manifestation  In King and Regicide  In distributional techniques 
Paradigm of space  Relative  (embodied  in  King/ 
Regicide duality) 
Abstract, distributional, 
network 
 
Figure 8.1 The “Architecture of moral purpose”; Foucault’s changing approach to space 
 
It is Bentham, the “Newton of legislation”  [Evans, 1971; p 23], who is singled out by Foucault as 
the agent of this transformation, his “Columbus’s Egg” more a ‘discovery’ than simply an 
architectural design
6. It is only on page 200 that Foucault addresses the architecture of the 
Panopticon directly; an annular building comprising tiered cells, back lit to afford the guard 
strategically placed in a central tower complete knowledge of prisoners, while himself remaining 
unseen [see figure 8.2]. The effect; “to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent 
visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power” [DP; p 200]. However, unlike the 
vengeful destruction of the regicide, “the prison was linked from its very beginning to a project 
for the transformation of the individual”, a project achieved, “[w]ithout any physical instrument 
other than architecture and geometry, it [the prison] acts directly on the individuals” [Prison Talk, 
in  Foucault, 1980; p 39 and DP; p 206]. 
 
Of immediate concern, however, is the mechanism by which such a transformation is effected
7. It 
is clear that his argument in Discipline and Punish relies on a basic functionalism of two kinds; 
an associational functionalism in which aesthetic and psychological factors impact upon 
perception and behaviour, and spatial functionalism reliant on the manipulation of architectural 
space for moral outcomes [Driver, 1993; p 13 drawing on Schmiechen, 1988]. The former is  
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Figures 8.2 and 8.3 Bentham’s Panopticon (top) and the reformatory at Mettray, external and 
internal views (below) [Source: Bentham’s Panopticon, from Markus, 1993; Mettray exterior 
from Driver, 1990, interior from Foucault, 1995].  Foucault’s Panopticism 252 
associated with the “economy of signs” active in the disciplinary regime - “semio-techniques” to 
be interpreted by the presumed rational and ‘semio-literate’ onlookers. It is a repetition of the 
familiar ‘building as sign’ theme in the understanding of relations between architecture and 
individuals, encountered above in the work of Koolhaas and Harvey in particular [see above, 
chapters 3 and 6 respectively]
8. 
 
The latter, spatial functionalism, is most clearly apparent in Foucault’s insistence on the idea of 
the Panopticon as a machine. It is an “architectural apparatus…a machine for creating and 
sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises it…The Panopticon is a 
machine for dissociating the see/being seen dyad…[in which] subjugation is born 
mechanically…also a laboratory; it could be used as a machine to carry out experiments, to alter 
behaviour, to train or correct individuals [DP; pp 201-3]. As Evans notes in similar vein, it was a 
building to achieve a moral outcome, not as language or symbol (the associational functionalism 
employed elsewhere) but, “as part of a purely mechanical operation [perhaps] the most significant 
monument to a forgotten creed that linked human betterment with architecture above all else” 
[Evans, 1971; p 21]. 
 
Hillier demonstrates that such a conception of buildings having a direct and unmediated effect 
upon individuals is the pernicious basis of what he calls the ‘organism-environment paradigm’ 
that is in turn the foundation of environmental determinism. However, he draws a distinction 
between the ‘metaphor’ and the ‘paradigm of the machine’. Contradicting popular belief, he 
shows that Corbusier’s description of a house as ‘a machine for living in’ is surprisingly an 
example of the innocent ‘metaphor of the machine’ as nothing in Corbusier’s description equates 
to the organisation of matter that characterises a machine and would be represented 
architecturally in the plan as determinant of life. Corbusier’s treatment of plans concerns 
symbolic more than mechanistic potential, founded on a belief in rationalism rather than 
determinism, and his interest relates to the aesthetics rather than mechanics of machines [Hillier, 
1996; p 377]. 
 
By contrast, the Panopticon, in Foucault’s analysis, clearly conforms to the paradigm of the 
machine, that is, that the building has a direct and unmediated effect on the people within it - 
“[w]ithout any physical instrument other than architecture and geometry, it  acts directly on the 
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individuals” [op. Cit.]. What Hillier shows is that this architectural determinism (and the 
environmental determinism that foreshadows it in geographical literature [see chapter 1]) is a 
relic of 18
th and 19
th century pre-Darwinian theories of speciation, rooted in a logic originating 
from an Aristotelian system of physics, reliant upon a chain of causation and ultimately an 
‘unmoved mover’, replaced by the elegance of Newtonian inertia, just as environmental 
determinism was by Darwinism. 
 
And yet the form-function relationship that lies at the heart of Bentham’s Panopticon is still 
intuitively credible, not only for us but clearly for Foucault. Hillier argues that this relationship 
has been “structurally excluded from thought” as a result of the unmediated deterministic 
predicate at the heart of the paradigm of the machine. What Space Syntax proposes is a system of 
natural movement in space that is patterned by the configuration of space, a move from an 
Aristotelian to a Newtonian mode of understanding [ibid; 393, see above, chapter 5]. Rather than 
direct effects there are system effects of the space structure of buildings on the probabilistic 
distribution structure of individuals which has consequent social effects realised through co-
presence
9. It is these social effects of the structuring of co-presence that allows space to express 
social potentials (the second key proposition for behind the existence of a society/ space 
relationship [see above p 130 and Hillier and Netto, 2001; p 5]. Society is expressed, therefore, in 
its spatial output and how that output seeks to control the interface between social groups, either 
in weak programmed situations (for example the urban street where cultural differences in 
morphology embed different norms of social interaction), or in strongly programmed 
environments where the potential for natural movement and co-presence is deliberately 
controlled, perhaps the ultimate example being the strict spatial seclusion of the Panopicon
10.  
 
Space Syntax overturns, therefore, the deterministic stance of the paradigm of the machine, which 
posited a direct (Aristotelian) relationship between the [built] environment and individuals, to 
focus on the systemic effects of the distribution of bodies in space, and importantly the 
structuring of the interface relation through the opportunities for co-presence. In so doing, Hillier 
redirects attention away from trivial properties of building layouts in terms of their specific 
functions (that is cells and watchtowers, or offices and canteens) to focus on the properties of 
‘generic function’ which focuses on the way that spatial configuration within building types 
limits the potential encounter field between different groups of space users [see Hillier, 1996; 
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chapter 8, especially pp 313-327]. In moving from specific to ‘generic’ functioning of spatial 
layouts in buildings, he is able to demonstrate the common principles that underpin building types 
with apparently different [specific] social functions, for example prisons and hospitals. 
 
This seems to offer the greatest possibility of a common ground between Foucault’s approach and 
that of Space Syntax, for Foucault too places great emphasis on the importance of the spatial 
configuration of the Panopticon and the distribution of individuals within the space. The 
Panopticon is a “royal menagerie” of individualising observation achieved through the “analytical 
arrangement of space” using the twin tools of “axial visibility” and “strict spatial partitioning” 
[DP; pp 203, 200, and 195]. Perhaps the greatest convergence is seen in the following passage 
from Space, Knowledge, and Power [Rabinow, 1984; 239-257]. Foucault is asked what the 
difference in approach is between architects, who are “primarily concerned with walls” and his 
own approach, “perhaps more concerned with space”. He replies; 
 
I think that there is a difference in method and approach. It is true that for me, 
architecture, in the very vague analyses of it that I have been able to conduct, is only 
taken as an element of support, to ensure a certain allocation of people in space, a 
canalization [sic] of their circulation, as well as the coding of their reciprocal relations. 
So it is not only considered as an element in space, but is especially thought of as a 
plunge into a field of social relations in which it brings about some specific effects [ibid.; 
p 253]. 
 
This is extraordinarily close to the position described by Space Syntax with, however, one crucial 
exception. While he understands the congruence of spatial and power relations and sees that the 
Panopticon is “polyvalent in its applications” [DP; p 205] he still lacks a versatile tool with which 
to understand the configuration of space that is the corner stone of his argument. The Panopticon 
is, as he continually repeats, an ideal form [e.g. DP; p 205] but one that is also “a generalizable 
model of functioning” [ibid.]. However, when he attempts to make this leap from Panopticon to 
‘Panopticsim’ his argument collapses under the weight of his generality. Statements such as, “[i]s 
it surprising that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble 
prisons?” are patently exaggerated; there are clearly some spatial similarities but these are far 
more subtle than Foucault’s description suggests or his analysis can cope with [DP; p 228]. 
 
What Foucault has done is to mistake the Panopticon for a spatial genotype, when in fact it is an 
extremely particular phenotype [see Hillier and Hanson, 1984; chapter 4]. The genotypical 
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relation between configuration, distribution and power is not to be found in any one building form 
but in the commonalities of abstract spatial relations in the many apparently distinct 
configurational phenotypes, of which the Panopticon is just one. That is to say, that in an 
arrangement of space where individuals are absolutely isolated and in fixed relation to the 
controller of the space (i.e. the Panoptic space), Foucault is able to conceive of the importance of 
spatial configuration. But in anything other than this extreme case, for example the penal 
institution at Mettray described by Foucault as the disciplinary form at its most extreme, he is 
unable to tackle the spatial aspects of the institution in anything other than the most general 
descriptive terms for want of an analytical tool, despite spatial configuration apparently lying “at 
the heart of my [Foucault’s] concerns”
11.  
 
Empirical concerns 
 
This difficulty extrapolating out from Bentham’s Panopticon raises serious concerns about the 
empirical validity of his argument. Foucault places enormous importance on the Panopticon as an 
architectural and technical blueprint of what develops, he argues, into a ‘carceral archipelago’. He 
claims that; 
 
Although the panoptic procedures, as concrete forms of the exercise of power, have 
become extremely widespread, at least in their less concentrated forms, it was really only 
in the penitentiary institutions that Bentham’s utopia could be fully expressed in a 
material form. In the 1830s, the Panopticon became the architectural programme of most 
prison projects [DP; p 249, emphasis added]. 
 
This passage itself conceals some of the vagaries of Foucault’s empiricism; “less concentrated 
forms” refers to his amalgamation of “the Benthamite Panopticon in its strict form, [with] the 
semi-circle, the cross-plan, the star shape” following the general principle that all have a central 
inspection tower [DP, p 250]. However, Space Syntax (as applied to all situations, architectural 
and urban) demonstrates that small changes in the spatial morphology can result in far more 
fundamental changes in the configurational arrangement of spaces [see for example Hillier’s 
principles of partitioning, Hillier, 1996]. An obvious example, yet devastating from Foucault’s 
point of view, would be that in a cross or star shaped system the axes of cell blocks are visible to 
a centrally placed tower but the cells and prisoners themselves are not. This is emphatically not a 
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spatial equivalent of the Panopticon because it violates its most basic postulate; that the prisoner 
should at all times remain within a field of potential visibility. 
 
Many authors have also questioned Foucault’s claim that “the Panopticon became the 
architectural programme of most prison projects” [op. Cit]. Objections form into two defined 
camps, which again express the resilience of the analytical and scalar divisions between 
geographical and architectural approaches and demonstrate the failure of those discourses to gain 
any serious critical purchase on Foucault’s argument. The geographical camp raise valid [spatial] 
concerns about the historical geography of penal reform. Driver argues that, “[h]is constant 
recourse to the language of boundaries, locations, separations and colonisations highlights the 
relative neglect of questions of space and spatial strategies in the history of social policy”, 
pointing particularly to a ‘struggle for spatial control’ in the north of England, and clear regional 
disparities which are overlooked in the empirical cracks between localised, particular histories 
and national histories focusing on legislative and policy aspects [Driver, 1993; pp 15-16]. These 
concerns mirror the criticism raised by the editors of Hérodote over Foucault’s spatial 
“vagueness”, and concern a neglect of the ‘geographical space’ of regional difference [Foucault, 
1980; p 67]. Harris also joins this camp, writing of the importance of Foucault’s work for human 
and historical geography and drawing parallels with Giddens’ work, citing in particular the ideas 
of locale and time/space distanciation that were discussed in the preceding chapter [Harris, 1991; 
p 678; see above chapter 7.1 for discussion of Giddens’]. Finally, Philo points to an “institutional 
geography” of the “mad business”, informed by differing cultural and professional 
understandings of madness, producing a variegated historical geography of asylum forms [Philo, 
1987; pp 402-4]. 
 
A different, but equally ‘spatial’, critique is raised by those who are concerned with Foucault’s 
empirical research on penal architecture. In this context Philo worries that Dear (of the 
‘geographical camp’) “paints a picture of an institutional history full of asylums whose internal 
spaces have been neatly chopped up into the minute portions demanded by Bentham’s 
‘Panopticon’ design” and ignores (in the case of asylums) the internal chaos that he demonstrates 
was typical [Philo, 1989; p 261]. He goes on to question the examples used by Foucault and 
demonstrates that the penal colony at “seemingly very un-Panoptic” Mettray does not follow 
Foucault’s archetype [see figure 8.3, p 251].  He argues that in the case of asylum design the 
focus rather was on the congregation of patients in small cottage units dispersed in the asylum Foucault’s Panopticism 257 
grounds, and that of those asylums proposed, modified or built “few followed the letter of 
Bentham’s Panopticon” [ibid.; p 266]. 
 
Driver also presents a detailed study of Mettray and notes the absence of confinement as a key 
feature (although he remains sympathetic to Foucault’s argument) [Driver, 1990, see figure 8.3]. 
Similarly, Evans argues that it was the idea of the Panopticon more than the form that was 
‘ingested’ and points out that Bentham himself abandons unmitigated seclusion on the basis of 
evidence that it would be detrimental to mental health and because of the extreme cost of 
construction [Evans, 1971; pp 23-26]. 
 
This accusation of a selective reading of Bentham by Foucault is central to Semple’s argument 
which aims “to lift the shadow that has fallen across Bentham’s reputation”. She argues that 
“when considered as a work of historical scholarship, Discipline and Punish does indeed leave 
much to be desired” pointing to Foucault’s “limitations as a historian” [Semple, 1992; pp 105-6 
and 109-10]. She argues that Foucault treats the Panopticon less as an historical artefact than as a 
philosophical concept, and in so doing has treated the historical record “as a quarry for facts to 
construct his theory… Like a magpie, Foucault selects his glittering evidence to construct his 
baleful picture of the present” [Semple, 1993; p 17 and 1992; p 110]. The Panopticon, she points 
out, was never built, the closest example being the Western Penitentiary in Pittsburgh (1820-26), 
demolished as unworkable after ten years
12. 
 
Panopticon and Panopticism 
 
This might appear as a rather petty argument between historians, both working in the monograph 
form, but one focused on a more conventional history of individuals and buildings and the other 
on the history of ideas and discourse
13. However, the relation between the Panopticon and 
Panopticism is crucial because rather than a historical argument it is in fact a spatial argument. 
Indeed, in selecting ‘glittering evidence’ to construct the ‘baleful view of the present’ that is 
Foucault’s hallmark, expressed in language which Sheridan describes as “verging on the 
hyperbolic”, we find resurface the related ideas of the ecstatic and alephic visions presented 
                                                 
12 Markus [1954; p 253] also notes another near perfect example; Latrobe’s State Prison for Virginia in Richmond of 
1797 although this was based on a semi-circle as was the Edinburgh Bridewell of 1791 [Markus’ 1993; pp 15-18]. The 
other example, not mentioned in any of these commentaries, is Richard Rodgers’ Seeley History Faculty library in 
Cambridge, based on an almost perfect panoptic segment. 
13 See Foucault’s comments regarding return to the monograph form based around discourse in Prison Talk [Foucault, 
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above, founded upon the interlaced themes of a partisan understanding of space which precludes 
a material analysis [Sherdidan, 1980; p 71]. 
 
Driver makes a clear distinction between the Panopticon and Panopticism. While he agrees with 
Semple that “Discipline and Punsih contains little concrete discussion of the ways in which such 
models [the Panopticon] were put into practice”, he does not dismiss Foucault’s work but stresses 
the difference between the Panopticon, as a particular architectural project, and Panopticism as a 
range of spatial techniques that transcend any one built form [Driver, 1993; p 13 and 1985; p 
433
14]. Indeed, he argues against reducing Discipline and Punish to an abstract architectural type 
and quotes Foucault as saying; “There can be no question here of writing the history of the 
different disciplinary institutions” [Driver, 1985; p 42, DP, p 139]. 
 
And yet Foucault continues that, “I simply intend to map on a series of examples some of the 
essential techniques [defined earlier in spatial and architectural terms] that most easily spread 
from one [disciplinary institution] to another”, and himself talks of the Panopticon as; 
 
“a generalizable model of functioning…[which] must not be understood as a dream 
building: it is the diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form; its 
functioning…a pure architectural and optical system…[DP; p 205]. 
 
The argument in Discipline and Punish is instinctively compelling (even Semple admits as 
much), and it seems clear that there must be some explicit spatial correspondence between the 
Panopticon and ‘panopticism’; between Bentham’s design and more contemporary concerns with 
surveillance described by Foucault as a ‘carceral archipelago’ as well as by (Davis, Sinclair and 
others). However, the relation between the Panopticon and panopticism will not be resolved 
through historical debate over the significance of idiosyncratic built forms. Nor will it be resolved 
by the ‘spatial’ analysis of historical geographers who focus on distributions of these same forms. 
This is neither a historical nor geographical but a spatial problem, that highlights the 
inadequacies of both historians’ and geographers’ approaches to space at an architectural scale. 
The problem originates with Foucault’s instinctive realisation of the importance of spatial 
configuration but his lack of a methodology with which to tackle spatial morphology in an 
analytical rather than descriptive way, and in anything other than extreme manifestations such as 
the Panopticon. He lacks, in other words, a way to understand the relation of spatial phenotypes 
                                                 
14 Philo likewise insists that panopticism should not be ‘conceptually collapsed’ to the internal workings of the 
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(the particular forms that fixate critics such as Semple) to the genotypical relation that is the 
spatial (not historical or geographical) essence of his panopticism. 
 
Furthermore, this is not simply a problem of substantiating evidence in a perhaps unfamiliar 
discourse that is marginal to the whole. For I suggest that Foucault’s difficulties in understanding 
space undermines not only his spatial argument but also his approach to history. Foucault 
maintains, “a distrust of histories which revolve around empty abstractions such as the ‘spirit of 
an age’; he has, in contrast, sought to indicate the significance of the particular, the local, and its 
articulation with the ‘whole’”, such that to reduce Discipline and Punish to a set of theoretical 
ground rules “fails to recognise Foucault’s abhorrence of ‘totalizing’ forms of explanation” 
[Driver, 1985; pp 425-6]. And yet in Discipline and Punish it seems that he has over-stated the 
importance of the particular [the Panopticon], ignored the significance of the local [the regional 
concerns of Driver and Philo] and has failed to articulate clearly the relationship between the 
particular [Panopticon] and the whole [panopticism]. The result is that it is difficult to understand 
his panopticism and ‘carceral archipelago’ as anything other than a totalizing ‘spirit of an age’ 
akin to just the essentialist history to which he is so opposed. Space is, then, perhaps more central 
to his thesis than even he realises for ultimately it is in conflict with, and undermines, his most 
fundamental epistemological position. 
 
 
8.2 Buildings and Power 
 
To validate both the idea of panopticism and the claim that space lies at the heart of his concerns, 
Foucault needs to found both on more than metaphor and rhetorical brilliance. Critically, he needs 
an approach to spatial configuration that is not simply based in building form but that is able to 
distinguish genotypical abstract relations among varied phenotypes. The more empirically 
grounded approach of Markus is perhaps suggested by the title of his work Buildings and Power, 
juxtaposed to the more common Foucauldian construction of ‘space and power’ [Markus, 1993]. 
He begins from the assertion that buildings “are not primarily art, technical or investment objects, 
but social objects” and argues that there is a need to probe beneath the surface appearance of 
buildings to uncover “the way that relations are established in and through buildings” that is the 
heart of his concerns [ibid.; pp xix-xx]. He is critical, therefore, of standard discourses on 
architecture, arguing that architects themselves tend to treat architecture as either a work of art 
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sensible to works of art but to undervalue architecture, architectural historians tend to treat 
architecture as art and to ignore its social aspects, neither offering an adequate approach to 
buildings as social objects [pp 26-27]. 
 
This focus on the social aspects of built forms, and particularly the power relations that are 
established ‘in and through them’ makes his approach similar to that of Foucault. He also posits 
an epochal change from 1750 to 1850 when a typological explosion occurs. In earlier work on the 
Scottish Enlightenment he similarly identifies the period 1730 to 1830 as critical, when “almost 
overnight completely new building types were called for”, defined not only stylistically but also 
in terms of spatial structure in response to the new social forms emerging during that period 
[Markus, 1982; p 1]. Furthermore, like Foucault he focuses on the relationship of bodies to 
building space and in particular the ordering of individuals through spatial structure
15. He argues 
that, “it is reasonable to regard buildings as material classifying devices; they organise people, 
things, ideas in space so as to make conceptual schemes concrete” [ibid.; p 19]. 
 
However, unlike Foucault he maintains a much more consistent and analytically productive 
approach to space. He argues that space should be approached topographically rather than 
geometrically; that is in an a-formal manner distinct from the characteristic ‘formal’ 
understanding concerned with the symbolic, semiotic and abstract content of style and geometry 
based in the “analysis of such properties as axial composition, proportion, scale, rhythm, 
regularity and articulation” [1982; p 5]. In making this clear distinction between form, function 
and space he avoids Foucault’s overloading of the term ‘space’ and his subsequent difficulty in 
linking spatial and social phenomena through an analysis of ‘space’ which derives more from 
‘formal’ analysis despite his distinction between ‘architecture’ (as walls) and ‘space’ (as 
distribution) [see above, chapter 8.1]. The understanding of the relationship between formal 
attributes and social outcomes has always been mired in the problems of determinism and 
Foucault’s confused treatment confounds the potential of the configurational ideas that he touches 
upon. 
 
For Markus buildings are a particular form of social practice which, along with texts and 
language, complete a critical triangulation between social practice, social relations and the 
                                                 
15 Although for Markus this interest in the body in space comes through an engagement with Husserl’s notion of the 
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experiencing individual, together forming ‘society-in-history’
16. Space, considered topologically 
rather than geometrically, is critical in this articulation of experience, practice and relations 
because through ‘nextness’ space expresses the functional requirements of the building, such that 
“not only who did what, when and with whom, in what form of space but where and next to 
whom” is prescribed. Buildings are, therefore, “more than passive containers for relations. Like 
all practices they are formative, as much through the things that happen in them, their functional 
programme, as by their spatial relations and their form” [1993; pp 9-11]. 
 
He draws a distinction between two types of human relations; the first, power relations, are 
constituted through rules, structures and control of resources; the second, bonds, are not 
controlled by rules and include love, friendships and solidarity. However, both are produced and 
modified through ‘concrete’ social settings [pp 10-11] and Markus relies heavily on the ideas of 
Space Syntax in analysing this impact, focusing particularly on the relations between 
‘inhabitants’ and ‘visitors’, ‘controllers’ and ‘controlled’ within the social and spatial structure, 
following closely the ideas of strong and weakly programmed space introduced above [see above 
p 253 and Markus, 1993; pp 13]
17. His use of the techniques of Space Syntax are, by his own 
admission, limited to the most elementary, and centre on the techniques of the justified graph as a 
tool by which to relate configurations of spaces to a relativized measure  of strategic importance 
and control; “Depth indicates power” [p 16]. 
 
He provides two examples. Analysis of plans of three hospitals from the mid to late 18
th century 
(the period of interest for both Markus and Foucault) show the gradual systemisation of 
techniques of spatial control [see figure 8.4]. The earliest example, 1738, shows patients on 
varying levels of depth within the spatial system and also on circulation routes shared with other 
patients and staff. By 1797, however, all patients are individuated, isolated both from one another 
and staff [Markus, 1993; p 17-18]. This perfectly illustrates the development of what Foucault 
would term the “disciplinary society” based upon the spread of spatial techniques of power, yet 
here it is described within a historicist and spatially sensitive analytical framework of which 
Foucault seems incapable. 
 
 
                                                 
16 See Markus, 1993; p 8 for his explanation and diagrammatic representation. 
17 Markus’ profound debt to Hillier and Hanson’s work, in particular The Social Logic of Space [1984] can clearly be 
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Figure 8.4 The spatial structures of three hospitals analysed by Markus; from top, Edinburgh 
Infirmary (1738), the London Hospital (1752) and the Manchester Infirmary with extensions 
(1797) [Source: Markus, 1993, figure 1.7 pp 17-18 in original]. 
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Markus’s other example, closer still to Foucault’s project, is an analysis of the Benthamite 
Edinburgh Bridewell prison of 1791. He focuses on the apparent contradiction of the plan which 
shows two observation towers, one where Hillier and Hanson’s theory would predict, in a shallow 
position controlling the prisoners in their cells, the other inexplicably deep in the plan, placed to 
oversee the exercise yards. However, the two surveillance points are connected by a tunnel in the 
basement, not shown by the principal ground floor plan. A configurational analysis taking 
account of this route of access shows both points of surveillance and power to be where one 
would expect, shallow in the spatial structure controlling the interface between the outside world 
and the prisoners in the deep recesses of the prison [see Markus, 1993; pp 15-16]. Furthermore, 
Markus overlays the structure of spatial configuration with the visual linkages that cut across the 
spaces and are of vital importance to the functioning of this panoptic space. As was pointed out 
above, had Foucault performed a similar technique he would have seen that the star and gallery 
shaped variants on Bentham’s proposal do not exhibit the same continuity between spatial and 
visual characteristics that allows the maintenance of discipline through the presumption of 
continuous surveillance. 
 
Space Syntax provides, therefore, the technique by which to approach the problem of spatial 
configuration which Foucault lacks. Furthermore, it resolves the problem of the genotypical 
power relations in built forms. Rather than lying in any one building type, where Foucault 
mistakenly tries to locate it, the genotype is found in the abstract relations between people as they 
are manifested in all built forms, which themselves can only ever be more or less idiosyncratic 
phenotypes of this more basic relation. To quote directly;  
 
A building may therefore be defined abstractly as a certain ordering of categories, to 
which is added certain systems of controls, the two conjointly constructing an interface 
between the inhabitants of the social knowledge embedded in the categories and the 
visitors whose relations with them are controlled by the building. All buildings, of 
whatever kind, have this abstract structure in common; and each characteristic pattern 
that we would call a building type typically takes these fundamental relations and, by 
varying the syntactic parameters and the interface between them, bends the fundamental 
model in one direction or another, depending on the nature of the categories and relations 
to be constructed by that ordering of space [Hillier and Hanson, 1984; p 147]. 
 
Markus’ study develops this theme of control through spatial structuring far more convincingly 
than Foucault’s across a range of differing building types; those that Foucault would include in 
his ‘carceral archipelago’ such as, of course, prisons, schools, courthouses, factories; but also 
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itself certainly owes much to Foucault’s schema, his less abstract and more historical and 
taxonomic approach complements Foucault’s well, both in terms of the historical development of 
building types and discourses about buildings. I use it here as an example of the potential for 
more contextual extrapolation (in the vein of that offered by Foucault) than Hillier and Hanson 
typically provide, thus opening up perhaps a more palatable mediation to their essentially abstract 
ideas on building genotypes. 
 
Theory of Reversed buildings 
 
Hillier and Hanson do, however, provide a detailed analytical discussion of the building types that 
so concern Foucault [see The Social Logic of Space, pp 183 – 197]. The object here must not be 
to reproduce that discussion, rather necessarily to paraphrase it to demonstrate the considerable 
parallels and weaknesses within Foucault’s work. The aim then, as with the preceding discussions 
in this second section, is not to deny the validity of Foucault’s work, but to demonstrate that a 
configurational understanding of space clarifies the spatial components of his argument. 
 
Hillier and Hanson make a distinction between two broad types of building. The former 
(“elementary type”) is characterised by power or control increasing with depth in the spatial 
structure. Inhabitants (or ‘controllers’) occupy these deeper spaces while visitors are kept in 
shallower spaces of interaction. Examples might be a church, where the priest occupies the deep 
space at the altar and the congregation enter directly from outside to the nave, or a domestic 
building, where private spaces (bedrooms, study areas, bathrooms) are recessed deeper into the 
configuration while spaces of interaction (halls, living rooms, kitchens) are typically shallower
18. 
The latter, which they loosely describe as “public institutional”, exhibit the opposite 
characteristic. As we have seen, an example would be the Panopticon or indeed all prison forms, 
where the controllers (guards) are shallow in the space, while the prisoners (controlled) are deep 
in the space. 
 
While this equates roughly to the analytical extent of Foucault’s approach, Hillier and Hanson 
develop the theme considerably further. Like Foucault they argue that buildings are reflections of, 
and constitutive of, society but while the mechanism of this mediation for Foucault is unclear 
(though implicitly spatial), Hillier and Hanson are able to articulate it. They argue that the former 
                                                 
18 I am aware that this is a great over simplification of their argument, both generally and specifically in relation to 
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building types embody knowledge of social relations and by the spatial control of the 
inhabitant/visitor interface act as rule systems that reinforce social solidarity. Buildings are 
concretised social knowledge and replicate and reinforce the social rules found outside the 
building’s boundary [Hillier and Hanson, 1984; p 184]. 
 
However, the latter ‘reversed building types’ are “about the pathology of [social] descriptions” 
and are concerned not with the reinforcing of established relations through enactment but with the 
“restoration, purification and instillation of descriptions” through a highly controlled domain of 
‘overwriting’ in which social knowledge is suspended to allow its reconstitution [ibid.; pp 184-5]. 
The distinction is apparent in the function of the primary cells and circulation spaces in the spatial 
structure. In the elementary type the primary cell defines a social category by defining its 
permissible relations – in a domestic house, for example, bedrooms of family members are highly 
segregated because of the powerful incest taboo, exceptions being permissible relations such as 
spouses and young siblings. In the reversed type, the primary cell is a singularity without 
relations, which have been deemed detrimental. Similarly, while in the elementary building 
circulation spaces permit inhabitant/visitor interaction and define through their asymmetries the 
heterogeneity of social status, in the reversed type circulation spaces allow the inspection and 
control of prisoners/patients, thus defining their homogeneity [ibid.; pp 184-5]. 
 
This is perhaps only one level of sophistication beyond Foucault’s analysis, which as I argued 
above, one feels intuitively grasps many of these spatial refinements but lacks a system by which 
to understand and articulate them. However, Hillier and Hanson then demonstrate that there are 
two distinct types of reversed building with an entirely different socio/spatial logic; those dealing 
with the pathology of individuals and those dealing with the pathology of society. I wish to 
suggest that it is Foucault mistaken elision of these two subtypes within his ‘carceral archipelago’ 
that lies at the core of his misunderstanding of the role of space. 
 
The first type of building is typified by the infirmary, in which individuals interact directly and in 
a controlled environment with “those whose knowledge of the inner workings of nature can 
restore them to their proper state” [ibid.]. This is the basis, Hillier and Hanson argue, for the 
professional relationship of doctor and patient in hospital; the doctor comes (at the bedside) into 
direct physical yet unequal relationship with the patient. To allow this interaction the control 
function of the space must be weak compared to the circulation function, the professional 
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In the second type, dealing with the pathology of society, the control function is exaggerated and 
the interface structure weak, the building centring on the need to remove from society 
undesirables. The building is reversed in the interests of spatial control more than the interests of 
redemption, the visitors are maximally segregated both from each other and from the controllers 
though the absence of an interface [ibid.; pp 186-7]. 
 
Hillier and Hanson rehearse two examples of the building types, but I wish to return to Foucault 
and suggest that the characteristic similarities and yet configurational differences between 
Foucault’s pivotal examples of Mettray and the Panopticon can be explained by these two related 
but quite distinct types. At Mettray there was close association between ‘inmates’ as well as 
between inmates and overseers. Foucault shows us the dormitory systems at Mettray [see figure 
8.3, p 251], and Driver provides us with considerably more detailed information from his review 
of the dozen and more pamphlets published between 1855 and 56 in Britain [Driver, 1990]. They 
both concur that although surveillance and record taking was still central, there was an absence of 
physical confinement, surveillance being carried out by a ‘chef de famille’ who lived with the 
young boys in the reformatory [Driver, 1990; pp 272-6; Foucault, 1995; pp 293-6]. Furthermore, 
these foremen were themselves “subjected as pupils to the discipline that, later, as instructors, 
they would themselves impose” [ibid.]. This clearly corresponds to the first type, that was 
concerned with the pathology of the individual (as one would expect with a ‘reformatory’). The 
spatial structure is centred around the circulation spaces in which the pathologies of individuals 
are ‘cured’ through ‘unmediated, direct and physical relation’ with mentors. 
 
In contrast, the Panopticon represents the second type of institution. Here I disagree with Hillier 
and Hanson who argue that the Panopticon is “an attempt to have both aspects of the genotype of 
the reversed building at once” [1984; p 188]. While I agree that in its conception the Panopticon 
aimed for the reform of the individual, I disagree that as well as its strong control dimension 
characterised by segregated prisoners, at the same time, “through direct visual links from centre 
to periphery it attempts to construct a direct interface between the inhabitant possessors of 
knowledge and the prisoners” [ibid.]. Hillier and Hanson are perhaps forgetting that the visual 
link between the central watch tower and the peripheral cells operated in only one direction. It is 
central to Bentham’s vision that the prisoners should never know whether or not they were being 
observed and so they become trapped by the fear of constant potential surveillance. Great pains 
were taken that no shadow or sounds should give away the presence of the overseer and so the 
direct interface with the ‘reflexive knowledge’ embodied in the socialised inhabitant/controllers Foucault’s Panopticism 267 
of the space breaks down. It was perhaps in denying the interaction of prisoners, even with those 
in authority over them, that Bentham made his greatest spatial and criminological error, earning 
him the reputation of ‘tyrant’ rather than ‘reformer’. 
 
Coda: Foucault and the alephic and ecstatic visions. 
 
The previous sections have attempted to show that while Foucault has perhaps an intuitive sense 
of the importance of spatial configuration he lacks the rigour of approach that the methodologies 
of Space Syntax provide. In approaching buildings in formal rather than ‘spatial’ terms he misses 
the subtle similarities and configurational differences between plans, eliding structures such as 
Mettray and the Panopticon which are in reality quite different. This refinement is expressed in 
Hillier and Hanson’s analysis of the modern hospital, in which they identify four different socio-
spatial genotypes at work [ibid; p 192]. In so doing they uncover the parallels between the 
hospital form and other types of building, a far more sophisticated spatial analysis than that 
presented by, say, Foucault or the huge taxonomic work of Thompson and Goldin [1975]. 
Furthermore, without fully grasping the mechanism by which space has social significance, his 
account carries unsatisfactory deterministic overtones and misses not only the spatial but also the 
social differences between such buildings.  
 
In this respect it should be recognised that Space Syntax, often misrepresented simply as a 
methodology for analysing spatial configuration, is as much a social as a spatial theory. In 
confronting Foucault’s work with this alternative approach to space, his understanding of society, 
as much as space, is therefore brought to the fore. Hillier and Hanson propose a fundamentally 
unified approach to the understanding of social and spatial forms in which it is from the 
experience of our built forms that we are able to retrieve the basic description of what society is. 
For Foucault, by contrast, buildings are signs of what society has become. While he understands 
there to be a reciprocal relationship between built form and society the two are not equal. For 
Foucault, space follows society de facto. I question, therefore, the assertion of Driver and others 
that space is of central importance to Foucault. Rather, space is a technique, not only in the sense 
in which he presents it in his historical narrative, but also in the sense of a rhetorical technique of 
persuasion within his own discourse. That is to say, that rather than setting out to understand the 
relationship between society and space (as do Hillier and Hanson), Foucault uses space as 
evidence to consolidate his already formulated understanding of society. Space is not central, Foucault’s Panopticism 268 
therefore, because for Foucault it is never part of the question, rather it is an ‘alephic’ technique 
mobilised in providing the answer 
 
It is not possible therefore to abstract Foucault’s understanding of space from his wider picture of 
the world. In opening this avenue we see further parallels with the second underlying theme of 
this thesis, what I have referred to above as an ‘ecstatic vision’. We have already encountered 
Semple’s criticism of Foucault’s scholarship, that he quarries evidence from the past to construct 
his theory [Semple, 1992; p 110; and above, chapter 8.1] but she goes on to argue that his 
evidence is not simply selective but sensationalised. “Like a magpie [she argues,] Foucault selects 
his glittering evidence to construct his baleful picture of the present” [ibid.]. 
 
There are two issues at stake here. Firstly, Foucault’s view of the world. Semple’s theme – that 
Foucault has done Bentham a “grave injustice”  - is based on his vastly truncated reading of 
Bentham’ writings. She argues that in fact there is a great deal of similarity and sympathy 
between the two authors, and argues that Bentham would have shared Foucault’s understandings 
and fears of “secret, furtive power” [Semple, 1993; p 321]. Likewise, she notes that Foucault 
entirely ignores Howard, who was Bentham’s precursor in the invention of the Panoptic space. 
“Howard, humdrum, sensible, religious and genuinely altruistic was far less suitable for 
Foucault’s polemical purposes”, she argues [ibid.]. Furthermore, Driver notes that Foucault seems 
not to consider the less sensational possibility that such regimes could be neutralised through 
practises of resistance. This possibly seems to contradict Foucault’s approach to the converse of 
discipline, freedom, which he says cannot be separated not only from social relations and spatial 
distributions but also the “practice of freedom by people” [Driver, 1993; p 4 and Foucault in 
Rabinow, 1984; pp 246-7]. 
 
We see in Foucault the distopian vision that was encountered in so much popular writing about 
modern spaces reviewed above [see chapter 4]. His discourse on space, just as those encountered 
above, is rhetorical rather than analytical and simply bolsters Foucault’s narrative. As Semple 
argues, “Foucault had a revelation of a new meaning of human existence which must be either 
accepted or rejected – we are in the realms of the unverifiable” [ibid.; p 109]. 
 
The second issue is the style in which Foucault writes. Again, like much of the more popular 
writings on cities and architecture examined above it is polemical and declamatory. “[I]t is 
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more about Foucault’s claustrophobic distrust of the world than they do about Bentham’s theory 
of representative democracy” [Semple, 1993; p 329]. 
 
Postscript: Beyond Foucault 
 
Before leaving Foucault and issues of space and power I  want to demonstrate the continued 
influence that his work has, particularly among architectural and urban theorists (reminiscent of 
the  impact  Bentham’s  own  work  had  almost  two  centuries  earlier),  and  its  pertinence  to  the 
suggestion of a ‘structure of feeling’ towards space. Following the concern of this thesis to draw 
parallels between more theoretical and abstract academic works and populist writings on cities 
and architecture, I want to turn briefly to the work of Mike Davis who perfectly straddles this 
divide. 
 
In his enormously popular book, City of Quartz [hereafter CQ], Davis, like many who cross the 
boundaries  between  academic  and  populist  literature,  does  not  provide  a  bibliography
19. 
However,  we  must  assume  that  in  the  chapter  “Fortress  LA”  [pp  223  to  263]  there  is  an 
unacknowledged debt to Foucault. Davis’ examples resound with Foucauldian imagery; 
 
Downtown,  a  publicly-subsidised  ‘urban  renaissance’  has  raised  the  nation’s  largest 
corporate citadel, segregated from the poor neighborhoods around it by a monumental 
architectural glacis. In Hollywood, celebrity architect Frank Gehry, renowned for his 
‘humanism’, apotheosizes the siege look in a library designed to resemble  a foreign-
legion fort. In the Westlake district and the San Fernando Valley the Los Angeles Police 
barricade streets and seal off neighborhoods as part of their ‘war on drugs’. In Watts, 
developer Alexander Haagen demonstrates his strategy for recolonizing inner-city retail 
markets: a panopticon shopping mall surrounded by staked metal fences and a substation 
of the LAPD in a central surveillance tower [p 223, emphasis added]. 
 
However, Davis’ focus is not upon a Foucauldian notion of power as exerted at the level of the 
body but at the level of class and economic interests. He continues; 
 
Welcome to post-liberal Los Angeles, where defense of luxury lifestyles is translated into 
a proliferation of new repressions in space and movement, undergirded by the ubiquitous 
‘armed response’. This obsession with physical security systems, and, collaterally, with 
the  architectural  policing  of  social  boundaries,  has  become  a  zeitgeist  of  urban 
restructuring, a master narrative in the emerging built environment of the 1990s [ibid., 
emphasis added]. 
                                                 
19 Semple, rather pettily, raises the same issue in relation to Discipline and Punish as evidence of Foucault’s 
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The themes are reminiscent of Foucault’s ‘disciplinary society’, and architecture is seen to serve a 
similar role as a strategy of power relations which forms the basis of a new model of society, a 
“zeitgeist” in the same way that the form of the Panopticon becomes the basis for Foucault’s 
‘panopticism’. 
 
As with Foucault the built environment is seen as a text that describes the society in which it was 
formed; 
 
The  ‘Second  Civil  War’  that  began  in  the  long  hot  summers  of  the  1960s  has  been 
institutionalized into the very structure of urban space [p 224]. [...] Indeed the totalitarian 
semiotics of ramparts and battlements, reflective glass and elevated pedways, rebukes any 
affinity between different architectural or human orders.... [T]his is the archisemiotics of 
class war [p 231, emphasis added]. 
  
Furthermore, like Foucault architecture is seen as a  strategy, here geared to the political and 
economic exercise of power; 
 
The observations that follow [Davis states in the introduction to Fortress LA] take as their 
thesis the existence of a new class war (sometimes a continuation of the race war of the 
1960s)  at  the  level  of  the  built  environment.  Although  this  is  not  a  comprehensive 
account, which would require a thorough analysis of economic and political dynamics, 
these images and instances are meant to convince the reader that urban form is indeed 
following a repressive function in the political furrows of the  Reagan  Bush era.  Los 
Angeles,  in  its  prefigurative  mode,  offers  an  especially  disquieting  catalogue  of  the 
emergent liaisons between architecture and the American police state [CQ, p; 228, my 
emphasis]. 
 
The built form is not only a reflection of these social changes but also a technique or strategy of 
repression. Again, the rhetoric is distinctly Foucauldian: 
 
[T]he ‘fortress effect’ emerges, not as an inadvertent failure of design, but as a deliberate 
socio-spatial strategy [p 229]. 
 
Davis understands society in a Marxian framework of duality and conflict between a repressive 
hegemon and subversive counter-culture. Like Foucault he sees the socio-spatial strategy as being 
entirely successful and does not countenance the idea of the architectural environment being 
subverted. 
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Like Foucault he implicitly understands there to be a direct relationship between the physical 
structure  of  cities  and  buildings  and  behaviour.  He  takes  on-board  uncritically  the  work  of 
William Whyte [The Social Life of Small Places, Whyte 1985, see footnote 11, CQ p 232] who 
advocates  such  a  relation  between  form  and  use,  and  also  Midler  [Crime  and  Downtown 
Revitalization, 1987 in Urban Land, see CQ p 231] whose design proposals for reducing crime 
are  reminiscent  of  Jane  Jacobs’  determinism.  His  descriptions  of  LA  rely  heavily  on  what 
Foucault  would  refer  to  as  ‘semio-techniques’,  particularly  in  relation  to  the  corporate 
architecture of the new downtown areas and the suburban architecture of Frank Gehry and mall 
environments; 
 
the neo-military syntax of contemporary architecture insinuates violence and conjures 
imaginary dangers. In many instances the semiotics of so-called ‘defensible space’ are 
about  as  subtle  as  a  swaggering  white  cop.  Today’s  upscale,  pseudo-public  spaces  – 
sumptuary malls, office centres, culture acropolises, and so on – are full of invisible signs 
warning off the underclass ‘Other’. Although architectural critics are usually oblivious to 
how the built environment contributes to segregation, pariah groups…read the meaning 
immediately [CQ, p 226]. 
 
However, like Foucault this approach via semiotics sits uncomfortably with the central issue in 
his  work;  the  permeability  of  the  physical  space  of  the  city,  particularly  in  relation  to  the 
differential movement possibilities and distributions of opposed class groupings. Once again there 
are two approaches to architectural and urban space here that Driver referred to as ‘associational 
and spatial functionism’; firstly as the decodable sign and secondly as the material realm of action 
where the response to decoding is manifested [see above p 250]. And once again the former is 
handled fluently in the language of semiotic analysis, leaving the latter to be taken for granted 
through rhetorical force; “[they] read the meaning immediately” and presumably act, but there is 
little evidence presented that this is the case. 
 
Their approaches to spatial and architectural issues are parallel therefore, and Davis finds his 
Panopticon in the ‘fortified’ development of Bunker Hill [see figure 8.5]. His concern is partly 
semiotic and partly with what he terms the loss of ‘pedestrian democracy’; “the current bias 
against any spatial interaction between old and new, poor and rich…” [CQ; pp 229-30]. However, 
beyond emotive references to an “architectural glacis”, the “fascist obliteration of street frontage” 
and the removal of the historic Angels’ Flight funicular railway, there is no discussion of the 
urban and architectural forms that apparently have such an impact on pedestrian movement. Very  Foucault’s Panopticism 
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Figure 8.5 Views around Bunker Hill, 
Los Angeles; Clockwise from top left, 
the view up to Bunker Hill from Hill St, 
towards ‘Skid Row’; the ‘pedestrian’ 
streets of Lower Grand Avenue; office 
workers looking out over ‘Skid Row’ 
area from the viewing platform (visible 
in first image); Lower Grand Avenue 
[Source: author’s own photographs]. Foucault’s Panopticism 273 
basic research was conducted in 1996 to correct this lack
20. Although not using the more 
sophisticated techniques of spatial analysis offered by Space Syntax (which were not familiar to 
me at the time) it did confirm Davis’ thesis, demonstrating that there was considerable spatial 
isolation between the Bunker Hill area and the poorer immigrant districts immediately adjacent. 
Although a configurational approach was not employed, certainly the severing of all direct 
pedestrian linkages between the two zones (access to Bunker Hill from the east is by way of two 
narrow staircases scaling the three storey basement parking structure) and the tunnelling of all 
road connections below the new development would lead to a high degree of segregation between 
the two. 
 
As with all the authors discussed in this section, Harvey, Giddens, Goffman and Foucault, as 
Davis moves from geographical to architectural spaces his analysis begins to fragment and he 
patches the link between social and spatial phenomena with implication, didacticism, hyperbole 
and sensationalism. At root there is a critical lack of an empirical methodology with which to 
approach the material spaces of social experience which nonetheless have critical importance to 
the overall arguments of authors proposing the ‘reassertion of space in critical social theory’. 
 
Conclusion: Part of the way modern men think? 
 
I wish to return to the quotation with which I opened this chapter, taking some liberties with 
Giedion’s original. Following Hillier and Hanson’s assertion that built form provides us with the 
description retrieval of society, and Foucault’s focus on discourse, I wish to suggest that; 
 
Everything in [architectural discourse], from its fondness for certain shapes to the 
approaches to specific building problems…reflects the conditions of the age from which 
it springs…. However much a period may disguise itself, its real nature will show 
through in its [discourse] [op cit.]. 
 
Discipline and Punish is less an historical analysis than a discourse on socio-spatial relations, and 
if we are to follow Semple and credit Foucault with being ‘part of the way modern men think’, 
then one would expect Discipline and Punish to reflect commonly held ideas on social and spatial 
forms, forming what Giedion describes as “an index to a period”. 
 
                                                 
20 This research, a dissertation on the idea of ‘Fortress Cities’, was undertaken as part of an undergraduate degree in 
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I have sought to make these reflections explicit, and ironically for one intolerant of epistemic 
histories, we find Discipline and Punish ‘indexing’ precisely the spirit of the age in relation to its 
understandings of space. Not only is space presented as the ‘Columbus’ Egg’ (another ironic twist 
of  history!)  that  revitalises  historical  and  social  understandings,  the  trademark  of  the 
respatialization theorists, but the conception of space is as muddied as ever. It is at once literal 
and metaphorical; geographical, architectural and corporeal; relative and abstract
21. 
 
If  indeed  there  has  been  a  détente  between  the  disciplines  of  history  and  geography  and  a 
diffusion between their respective analytical preferences of time and space, this is surely based on 
a view of space rooted in the absolutism of  conceptual distributions and the subjectivism of 
semantics that typifies the bipolar approach of geography. It only opens an alternative chasm 
between historico-geographical understandings of space and material (dare I say ‘common sense’ 
or at least ‘popular’?) understandings based on the physical space of our experience. It does little, 
therefore, to realise Hägerstrand’s ambition of uniting approaches to space at a geographical and 
sub-geographical scale. With Foucault, as with the other players in the ‘reassertion of space in 
social theory’, as the skein of spatial concerns expand to cover new subject areas, the concept of 
space has become over-stretched and the material understanding of physical space has been lost. 
 
What is needed, therefore, is a new approach to space that is not only elastic enough to underpin 
such  a  wide  structure,  but  also  is  not  an  analytical  ‘add-on’;  not  a  ‘revelatory’  approach  to 
overcoming a theoretical bottleneck but a theory in which space and society are implicitly linked, 
more than simply reciprocally related. 
 
Space Syntax has been proposed as a theoretical perspective that has the strength of an associated 
methodology by which to address the architectural-scale analysis of spatial configuration that 
Foucault  can  only  allude  to.  Whether,  therefore,  Space  Syntax  might  fulfil  Hägerstrand’s 
ambition of a unitary approach to spatial problems across geographical and architectural scales, 
and what the implications of such a suggestion might be, will be discussed in the final chapter. 
                                                 
21 Indeed, further parallels could be drawn for with the analysis of other authors presented above. For example, there is 
clearly some correspondence between Foucault’s view of space captured by the diagrammatic representation of the 
Panopticon, and Harvey’s conception expressed diagrammatically as the process of capitalism [see above, chapter 6 
and figure 6.1, p 153]. Furthermore, there are parallels between Foucault’s analysis of webs/ networks and circulation 
of power and the spatial approach of, for example, Castells [see above, chapter 4.4]. Pas de rapport sans support 275 
Chapter 9 
Pas de Rapport sans Support
1
  
 
 
The previous section has aimed to build on the assertion of a new ‘structure of feeling’ towards 
the understanding of space and the city in both academic and more populist literature that was the 
subject of section 1, by developing both a common critique and alternative approach to the work 
of a number of authors associated with the widespread reassertion of space as a lever by which to 
approach questions of society. This second section has aimed to demonstrate, through a series of 
theoretical deconstructions and empirical reconstructions, the possibility for a theory of socio-
spatial interaction based upon the idea of the configuration of built space. Configuration, and its 
impact upon the structuring of probabilistic movement, and therefore encounter, and social 
patterns of urban and architectural forms, was shown to address the ongoing problems 
experienced in dealing with the influence of the physical realm without encountering 
deterministic objections. 
 
This penultimate chapter, before the more speculative conclusions and extrapolations of the final 
chapter, aims to accomplish two things. Firstly, I aim to condense the arguments presented in this 
second section and to reinforce my insistence on the possibility of a mutual common ground 
between the approach of Hillier et al and those contributors to the wider socio-spatial discourse. 
However, rather than reiterating what has gone before I hope to achieve this by introducing one 
final, and perhaps many would argue most significant (and thus far most conspicuously absent) 
‘spatial player’; Henri Lefebvre. Having made a case for a common ground with this, perhaps, 
most unlikely of theorists, I wish secondly to examine the responses, such as they have been, to 
the propositions of Space Syntax by those better known socio-spatial ‘pioneers’ who themselves 
draw heavily on Lefebvre’s work, thereby bringing the thesis full circle by focusing particularly 
on recent contributions from Ed Soja.  
 
It is perhaps not inappropriate to use the work of Henri Lefebvre in this summational capacity, as 
his writings on cities, and more recently specifically space, is a tangible undercurrent through 
much of the literature examined thus far (the notable exception being the work of Foucault, which 
                                                 
1 This phrase is Lefebvre’s, referring to the spatial contextuality (‘support’) of social relations (‘rapport’) [Lefebvre, 
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Lefebvre criticised for its loose metaphoricity in its approach to space [Lefebvre, 1991; p 4; see 
also Kofman and Lebas, 1996; p 5]). Indeed, a genealogy of the seemingly pervasive but under-
current nature of his ‘millpond’ influence can be assessed through the comments of his reviewers. 
Shields notes that, although often uncited, Lefebvre’s work underpins the discourse of the mid-
twentieth century French intellectuals, those same French philosophers and social theorists whose 
work has been the subject of an “uncontrolled international intellectual exportation”, particularly 
to the United States [Kofman and Lebas, 1996; p 4; quoting Wacquant, 1993; pp 254-5]. So it is, 
then, that he is now described as a “cult figure” in Anglo-American intellectual circles, although 
interestingly Merrifield argues that his pre-eminent status owes as much to the particular attention 
he has received among Anglo-American geographers such as Soja, Harvey, Jameson and 
Gregory, as to his prior independent influence [2000; pp 168-9]. 
 
Despite Lefebvre’s long association (beginning as early as 1935) with urban analysis, his work 
remained little known (and translated) outside France, meriting only passing reference in critical 
works in the development of 1970s Marxist geography such as Harvey’s Social Justice and the 
City [1973; see the analysis of Lefebvre’s contributions pp 305-14]. However, it was the 
translation into English of the ‘second moment’ of Lefebvre’s analysis, moving from discourse on 
space towards “the diachronic discovery of the process by which meta-level discourses of space 
are socially produced” that was to have the most profound impact [Shields, 1988; pp 3-4]. For the 
publication in English of The Production of Space has been described as “the event within critical 
human geography of the 1990’s” [Merrifield, 2000; p 170, sic]. 
 
Given this genealogy of relevance, it is perhaps important to justify why such a critical figure has 
not appeared earlier in a thesis whose subject has been as much about tracing such bloodlines in 
recent writing on the city as addressing new perspectives. My justification is twofold, and nested. 
Firstly, as has already been indicated above, Lefebvre forms a theoretical underpinning for many 
authors discussed above, perhaps the most important being Soja who develops Lefebvre’s ideas 
almost religiously. In a very real sense, therefore, we have already encountered many of 
Lefebvre’s contributions, albeit in a ‘pre-digested’ form. However, this in itself is important, for 
one of the strengths of Soja’s work is in dragging Lefebvre’s theoretical framework into the more 
tangible context of ‘Soja’s LA’. It has been the explicit approach of this thesis to attempt 
theoretical extensions through empirically based reworkings. My second justification for 
relegating Lefebvre’s work to this concluding stage, therefore, is that he offers little material with 
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as “tantalizingly loose, prolix and episodic”, proceeding through a series of ‘approximations’ in a 
manner parallel with a musical score [Merrifield, 2000; p 170, Borden, 1998; Shields, 1988; Soja 
1989]. Although this undoubtedly makes it difficult to draw comparisons with authors such as 
Hillier, raised very much in the Anglo-American tradition of logical empiricism, I hope to show 
in what follows that although perhaps Lefebvre’s Production of Space does suggest a ‘sensibiltiy’ 
more than the ‘closed system’ of Hillier’s work, nonetheless these antithetical authors do share 
considerable common ground
2. However, more than a stylistic impasse, the difficulty in 
approaching Lefebvre’s Production of Space in the same way as I have the other work examined 
in this section is that the analysis itself deliberately frustrates what Lefebvre might well have seen 
as ‘empirical hijacking’ by geographers and other ‘spatial scientists’ to whose approach to space 
he would have been (mistakenly, I aim to show) resolutely opposed. As Markus generously 
argues, “[I]t was not his task to push the analysis of concrete experience further” [Markus, 1993; 
pp 12-13], while Harvey, discussing the spatial triad of The Production of Space,  demands more 
bluntly, “Where is it, Henri?!”
3 
 
Lefebvre’s interest in space and the urban realm develops, much as did Harvey’s and Soja’s, in 
response to the changing global circumstances, economic and social, of the post war era, 
particularly the 1960s. His concerns moved increasingly from his earlier focus on rural life to 
engage with the reorganisation of the capitalist system and its impact upon both the urban and 
social systems. Passages from Le Droite à la Ville [1968] are reminiscent of Harvey’s analysis in 
Social Justice and the City, and indeed Harvey’s debt to Lefebvre is clear. Lefebvre writes; “The 
projection of the global on the ground and on the specific plane of the city were accomplished 
through mediations...Global processes, general relations inscribe themselves in the urban text 
only as transcribed by ideologies, interpreted by tendencies and political strategies” [Lefebvre, 
1996; pp 107-8]. Lefebvre’s project bore similarities therefore to the work within geography at 
the time, his aim being the redirection of historical materialism towards a spatial problematic that 
was later to resurface as the central theoretical concern of Soja [Soja, 1985; 1989; Shields, 1988; 
p 3, Kofman and Lebas, 1996]. 
 
And yet despite this, his work remained largely ignored, even commentators such as Harvey 
paying only passing attention [see the concluding remarks in Harvey, 1973]. Kofman and Lebas 
advance two explanations for this isolation during the 1970s and 80s. Firstly, they note that 
                                                 
2 Kofman and Lebas suggest that “being a Lefebvrian is more a sensibility than a closed system” [Kofman and Lebas; 
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Lefebvre was antagonistic to the perspectives of the structural Marxists which was the dominant 
discourse of the time, and further, that by the 1980s there was a waning of interest generally in all 
such Marxist approaches. Secondly, however, they identify an antagonism surrounding the issue 
of space. They argue that, “[o]n the whole, geographers were concerned with concrete space, 
while much sociology has spoken of space in metaphorical terms” [ibid.; p 37]. Neither was 
concerned with the “production of space” in the sense that Lefebvre was to develop. 
 
Indeed, if Lefebvre’s work opened up in a sense a ‘new space’ between that of the geographers 
and sociologists, it must be clear that despite his intention to promote discourse across 
disciplinary boundaries, even a ‘unified idea of space’, he was himself deeply antagonistic 
towards the ‘space’ of other disciplines. He is quite explicit; “the theory of space refuses to take 
the term ‘space’ in any trivial or unexamined sense, or to conflate the space of social practice 
with space as understood by geographers, economists and others” [Lefebvre, 1991; p 420]. He is, 
furthermore, scathing of the putative ‘science of space’ which he argues has been struggling to 
emerge for some time. “To date”, he continues [writing in the early 1970s], “work in this area has 
produced either mere descriptions which never achieve analytical, much less theoretical, status, or 
else fragments and cross-sections of space” [ibid.; p 7]. This failure of what he calls a ‘science of 
space’ he relates back to the basic philosophical problems of the nature of space. “It [the ‘science 
of space’] disperses itself and loses itself in various considerations about what there is in space 
(objects and things), or over an abstract space (devoid of objects and geometrical)” which in turn 
he linked to disciplinary fragmentations, and hence to the epistemological problems of knowing 
space [1996; p 196]. For although these approaches may provide inventories of what exists in 
space, or generate discourse on space, Lefebvre argues that they, “cannot ever give rise to a 
knowledge of space” [1991; p 7]. 
 
He is similarly antithetical to the extremes of semiological approaches, despite in earlier work 
arguing for the conception of the city as a ‘semantic system’, “urban language or urban reality 
considered as a group of signs” [from Le Droite à la Ville, reproduced in Lefebvre, 1996; p 108]. 
He goes on to argue for a more nuanced semiology, one that is sensitive to the context of the 
urban [ibid., and pp 115-6], and it is this less orthodox position that is further developed in The 
Production of Space, where he asserts that such approaches likewise do not penetrate beyond the 
descriptive level and “must surely reduce that space itself to the status of a message, and the 
inhabiting of it to the status of reading” [p 7]. He describes the work of Kristeva, Derrida and 
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Barthes as dogmatic, and guilty of the basic sophistry of fetishizing what he describes as a 
“philisophico-epistemological” notion of space, in which “the mental realm comes to envelop the 
social and physical ones” [p 5]. As with his critique of a ‘science of space’ he argues that 
ultimately we are, “bound to transfer onto the level of discourse, of language per se - i.e. the level 
of mental space - a large proportion of the attributes and ‘properties’ of what is actually social 
space” [ibid; p 7]. 
 
Lefebvre’s central concern reflects to a remarkable degree the central thrust of this thesis. 
Conceived of within the more conventional format of a thesis, Lefebvre’s ‘problem statement’ is 
that, “the modern field of enquiry known as epistemology has inherited and adopted the notion 
that the status of space is that of a ‘mental thing’ or ‘mental place’”. How then, he asks are 
“transitions to be made from mathematical spaces (i.e. from the mental capacities of the human 
species, from logic) to nature in the first place, to practice in the second, and thence to the theory 
of social life - which also presumably unfolds in space?” [1991; p 3]. The parallel should be clear 
with my own concerns with the dematerialzed space uncovered through the preceding two 
sections and its relation to the physical realm of experience. The familiar tone of Lefebvre’s 
frustration and his sense of paradox almost parodies my own earlier arguments; 
 
We are forever hearing about the space of this and/or the space of that: about literary 
space, ideological spaces, the space of the dream, psychoanalytic topologies, and so on 
and so forth. Conspicuous by its absence from supposedly fundamental epistemological 
studies is not only the idea of ‘man’ but also that of space - the fact that ‘space’ is 
mentioned on every page notwithstanding [ibid.]. 
 
We are, then, confronted by an “indefinite multitude of spaces, each one plied upon, or perhaps 
contained within, the next: geographical, economic, demographic, sociological, ecological, 
political, commercial, national, continental, global” [ibid; p 8]. To the end of this perhaps 
predictable list, Lefebvre adds, separated for emphasis, “[n]ot to mention nature’s (physical) 
space” [sic], for it must be clear that Lefebvre’s resolution to the problem of space as he 
conceives it is to propose a rapprochement between mental, social and physical spaces to achieve 
what he refers to as a “unitary theory of space” [ibid.; p 11]. In uniting these fields he aims not to 
reinforce the distinctions between them but rather to open mediations between them that can 
counter entrenched disciplinary subdivisions [Shields; 1988, p 6]. 
 
It should be clear that in intention at least this offers opportunities for parallels with the work of 
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space and society, which Lefebvre clarifies as the space of social practice, the space occupied by 
sensory phenomena and logico-epistemological space [1991; pp 11-12]. Indeed, Lefebvre’s own 
summary of the [then forthcoming] Production of Space reflects many of the central tenets of 
Hillier’s approach; the close relationship between ‘urban reality’ and ‘practico-social activities’ 
which revolves around a mutually constitutive reciprocity, producing and reproducing patterns of 
social and spatial relations. Lefebvre writes;  
 
This theory of social space encompasses on the one hand the critical analysis of urban 
reality and on the other that of everyday life. Indeed, everyday life and the urban, 
indissolubly linked, at one and the same time products and production, occupy a social 
space generated though them and inversely [sic]. The analysis is concerned with the 
whole of practico-social activities, as they are entangled in a complex space, urban and 
everyday, ensuring up to a point the reproduction of relations of production (that is social 
relations). The global synthesis is realized through this actual space, its critique and its 
knowledge. [Introduction to Espace et Politique (2nd part of Droite à la Ville), 1973, 
reproduced Lefebvre, 1996; p 185, sic]. 
 
Lefebvre places great emphasis upon ‘spatial practice’ as does Hillier. His project is described by 
Shields as an attempt to build a “radical phenomenology” of space, which focuses on the level of 
body and behaviour in what Merrifield calls a “humanist-naturalism”, in which ‘space’, “does not 
consist in the projection of an intellectual representation, does not arise from the visible readable 
realm, but is first of all heard (listened to) and enacted (through physical gestures and 
movements)” [Shields, 1988; p 4; Merrifield, 2000; p 177 quoting Lefebvre, 1991; p 200]. So it is 
that Lefebvre’s approach to the urban, again resonating with Hillier’s, focuses on what in the 
latter’s terminology would be syncroneity and co-presence. The urban form is based in 
simultaneity, “which socially involves the bringing together and meeting up of everything in its 
environs”. “It [the urban] is a mental and social form, that of simultaneity, of gathering, 
convergence, of encounter (or rather encounters)” [Kofman and Lebas, 1996; p 19; Lefebvre, 
1996; p 131]. 
 
However, this is not to suggest that Lefebvre reduces space to “an element ensuring a certain 
allocation of people in space and a canalization of their circulation” in the same way as he 
accuses Foucault of doing, and as Space Syntax is often accused of doing [Kofman and Lebas, 
1996; p 5]. Lefebvre attempts his unitary theory of space by constructing what Soja refers to as a 
trialectic; spatial praxis, representations of space and spaces of representations. Lefebvre is clear 
that this trialectic cannot be resolved into a binary opposition between the lived and conceived, 
and the latter terms cannot therefore be bracketed. Representations of space refers to discourses Pas de rapport sans support 281 
on or about space and is therefore concerned with systems of knowledge and ideology embedded 
within socially dominant understandings of space. Spaces of representation are “spaces 
experienced through complex symbols and images” linked to more clandestine and underground 
dimension of social life which prompt alternative representations of space and new modes of 
spatial praxis [Merrifield, 2000; p 174; Shields, 1988; p 7]. 
 
Without wishing to disrupt this ‘trialectic’, my concerns lies with understanding the status of 
physical space for Lefebvre, and its relation to the social and mental. For although the emphasis 
on spatial practice producing a society’s space, that is in turn the key to deciphering the rule 
structure of that society, has many close parallels with Hillier’s approach as outlined above, there 
can be little doubt that Lefebvre would dismiss Space Syntax as just the sort of reductionist 
‘spatial science’ to which he is adamantly opposed. In his analysis of The Production of Space, 
Merrifield reminds us that Lefebvre remains a Marxist and argues therefore that the critical term 
in his conception is perhaps ‘production’ rather than ‘space’ [pp170-171]. He argues that the 
focus on production in both Marx and Lefebvre is an expression of a radical desire to expose the 
root causes and inner dynamics, in Marx’s case of capitalism, and for Lefebvre of capitalist social 
space. This search for ‘generative moments’ focuses on production as a process with the 
difficulty that, it is “never easy to get back from the object [the present space] to the activity that 
produced and/or created it” [Merrifield, 2000; p 171; Lefebvre, 1991; p 113]. 
 
This theoretical construction and difficulty is important, for Merrifield shows that it exactly 
parallels the analysis of the fetishism of commodities within Marx. The objective ‘thing-like’ 
character of commodities in the market place masks (fetishizes) the social relations that are 
inherent to the productive process. There is, therefore, a parallel transformation in Lefebvre’s 
analysis from ‘things in space’ to the ‘production of space’ as in Marx’s transition from ‘things in 
exchange’ to ‘social relations of production’ [ibid.; p 172]. 
 
This in turn has profound implications for the way space (or indeed commodities, objects, within 
Marx’s analysis) are treated, for the key must be to remove the opacity of fetishism to reveal the 
truth of commodities, of space, that is to reveal the social relations of production. Lefebvre 
cautions us; 
 
instead of uncovering the social relationships...that are latent in spaces, instead of 
concentrating our attention on the production of space and the social relationships 
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to think in terms of spatiality, and so fetishize space in a way reminiscent of the old 
fetishism of commodities, where the trap lay in exchange, and the error was to consider 
‘things’ in isolation, as ‘things in themselves’ [1991; p 90]. 
 
What then is the status of space? It, like commodities, is a ‘concrete abstraction’ - that is it is 
abstract and yet real, concrete “though not in the sense that an object or product is 
concrete...social space is constituted neither by a collection of things or an aggregate of (sensory) 
data, nor by a void packed like a parcel with various contents, and that is irreducible to a ‘form’ 
imposed upon phenomena, upon things, upon physical materiality” [ibid.; p 27]. 
 
This is surely the defining difference in the approach of Lefebvre and Hillier, for while 
Lefebvre’s space is a ‘concrete abstraction’, the two oxymoronic terms working in counterpoint 
to avert the condensing of space within either the physical, mental or social field, for Hillier space 
is concrete and abstract in a crucially different sense which places space within the physical 
realm but reveals, precisely through treating ‘space as a thing in itself’, its abstract and social 
potential. Therefore, for Hillier social codes are produced and reproduced through spatial 
practice, and the codes themselves ‘exist’ within the physical spatial form, recoverable through 
our lived experience and ability for description retrieval. This is a condensation around one pole 
of the physical:social:mental triad which Lefebvre always tries to resist. 
 
Lefebvre concludes by questioning the mode of existence of social relations, and offers the 
solution, “Pas de rapport sans support” – “Social relations, which are concrete abstractions, have 
no real existence except in and through space. Their underpinning is spatial” [1991; p 404]. To 
this simple formula I would seek to add Hillier’s enquiry into the mode of existence of spatial 
relations, similarly concrete abstractions whose underpinning and expression is social [see above 
chapter 5 for a discussion of configurations as spatial abstractions which nonetheless exhibit 
concrete properties, and their reflective and constitutive relationship to social relations]. 
  
I have aimed in this argument to approach the ‘Lefebvrian sensibility’ with a suitably broad brush 
and to do no more than suggest the commonalities with the approach of Hillier et al and the 
possibility for a mutually expansive common ground. This is perhaps best illustrated by 
contextualizing Lefebvre’s analysis in the way that is a starting point for Hillier. Lefebvre’s work 
has long been associated with the urban unrest of 1968, and Merrifield draws a parallel with the 
more recent ‘Reclaim the Streets’ and May Day protests of recent years, arguing that Lefebvre’s 
approach can help to explain these urban, spatial and social phenomena [Merrifield, 2000; p 180]. Pas de rapport sans support 283 
While this is undoubtedly the case, and I would agree that Lefebvre’s analysis adds [particularly] 
a political dimension that is largely absent in the work of Hillier et al, nonetheless there is a 
sensitivity to the role of space in social (and political) performance that Space Syntax can add. I 
am thinking here, for example, once again of my work (discussed above) on the behaviour of 
teenagers within retail centres and the way that they manipulate the physical structure of spatial 
potential to achieve social (indeed political) ends. Also, of Hillier’s anecdote concerning the 
socio-spatial (once again ‘political’ in a sense) tactics of a child’s disruptive behaviour within a 
group of adults, using the structuring possibilities of physical space to achieve the social end of 
receiving attention [see Hillier, 2001]. 
 
In opening up these parallels my aim must not be misunderstood as a dispute over the true nature 
of space. Rather it is to demonstrate a truth of space, physical space, which indeed reinforces 
Lefebvre’s own perspectives. Once again, this opens a parallel with Lefebvre, who argues that his 
own project will identify a “truth of space, generated by analysis-followed-by-exposition”. He 
distinguishes this from a true space, “whether a general space as the epistemologists and 
philosophers believe, or a particular one as proposed by specialists in some specific discipline” 
[1991; p 9]. The importance of the Space Syntax approach is in demonstrating that such a specific 
discipline, which Lefebvre rejects as ‘spatial science’, can also demonstrate a truth of space 
which similarly has social significance. 
 
There is an opportunity therefore, for the Space Syntax approach to ‘dove tail’ with that of 
Lefebvre as well as other theorists, some of whose work I have examined in this section. 
Regrettably, this possibility is often not taken up or lost for two reasons; firstly, because of the 
frequent lack of engagement with wider theoretical perspectives within the often introverted and 
intensely empirical work of the Space Syntax ‘camp’
4; secondly, because when engagement 
occurs from outside, Space Syntax is often misunderstood and denigrated as a simplistic and 
reductionist ‘science of space’ rather than as an attempt to construct an alternative socio-spatial 
theory based upon an understanding of space at variance with the hegemonic. To address the first 
difficulty from within Space Syntax has been one motivation behind this thesis, and it is to an 
example of misreading from outside the discipline that I now turn, bringing the thesis full circle 
with an analysis of the recent contribution of Ed Soja, who is perhaps among the most dogmatic 
followers of Lefebvre within contemporary spatial theory, and with whom this discussion began. 
                                                 
4 Although I am thinking here more particularly of the empirical work of students and the commercial work of the 
Space Syntax Ltd which receives more general attention than the theoretical work of Hillier and Hanson among others. Pas de rapport sans support 284 
In Different Spaces 
 
Soja makes it clear that the title of his 2001 paper to the Third Space Syntax Symposium, “In 
Different Spaces”, refers to the theoretical domains of Space Syntax practitioners and theoretical 
human geographers. It is a remarkably partisan paper, and does little to realise Lefebvre’s 
concerns with reducing the fragmentation between disciplines, going so far as to retract the 
“ecumenical” conclusion that he initially arrives at, that somehow ‘residual’ disciplines such as 
Space Syntax should be encouraged “atleast in so far as it stimulates an active engagement with 
the larger debates on space and social spatiality” [Soja; 2001]. 
 
Soja has one essential point, which though perhaps valid is misdirected because of a common 
misunderstanding of Space Syntax. He argues that theories of socio-spatial relations based upon a 
physical understanding of space are reductionist, analytically restricted and cannot address the 
social nature of space. This argument is developed through a discussion of the historical evolution 
of twentieth century geography, from the rejection of environmental determinism to the 
development of positivist approaches and their rejection in favour of post-positivist approaches 
based in a humanist and phenomenological cultural geography and Marxist geography which 
together form the contemporary critical human geography [see the similar outline in chapter 1]. 
 
Positivistic approaches attempted to produce a “new geo-metry”, the spatial science so derided by 
Lefebvre, which Soja argued became difficult to apply to ‘noisy’ real world situations and hence 
began to delineate acceptable research. It was in attempting to bring this technique of spatial 
analysis into the wider context of critical debate on how to explain and interpret the spatial 
organization of society that the limitations of the approach became apparent. 
 
This is evidently the situation that Soja perceives with Space Syntax, and indeed with efforts such 
as this thesis, which attempts to describe a role for such analytical approaches within the wider 
domain of socio-spatial theories. He is, however, adamant that he is not trying to compare directly 
Space Syntax and mathematical geography, but only for the double-edged reason that “what was 
happening years ago at Northwestern was much more academically ambitious” compared to the 
Space Syntax movement, “much more pragmatic in its aims” with a clearly defined “professional 
and practical niche, providing descriptive and modelling tools to assist creative individuals in 
designing buildings and the small scale urban built environment” [ibid., emphasis added]. 
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The fatal misreading of Space Syntax inherent in Soja’s critique, and that of many others, is to 
reduce it to a methodology of morphological analysis without realising that this in itself is only 
the expression, and indeed the generator, of an underlying socio-spatial theory. Soja argues that 
positivist geography, and by extension Space Syntax, suffered from “misplaced concreteness”. 
This critique is inherited from Lefebvre’s critique of spatial science that reflects Marx’s 
fetishization of commodities (see above). He argues, then, that in treating space as pure extension, 
form or geometry, the variable imbued with causal or explanatory authority (in this case space) is 
itself the consequence of other “unseen and unexamined” social and spatial processes. 
“Physicalist methodologies are fixed too exclusively on the formal properties of materialized 
spatial configurations, giving too little attention to the complex social forces that exist behind 
their appearance”. 
 
What he has misunderstood is that Space Syntax is also as suspicious of the “misplaced 
concreteness” of physicalist approaches. The example which Soja develops as an illustration of 
these misguided approaches is that of defensible space, apparently oblivious to the amount of 
critical literature from within the Space Syntax movement on these approaches, with the shared 
concern over the unmediated relationships proposed between physical space and social 
behaviours. Space Syntax is based in exactly the approach to space that Soja appeals for; “as a 
complex social formation, part of a dynamic process that actively and often problematically 
produces...social spatiality”. The difference between Space Syntax and positivistic geography is 
that, unlike the latter, Space Syntax does not approach questions of the application of techniques 
to a theory of society in retrospect; rather the techniques are formulated in response to questions 
posed by a socio-spatial theory. Soja is absolutely wrong, therefore, in stating that, “At the core of 
these problems [with positivist approaches] is the conceptual autonomy of the physical space 
described in Space Syntax from the fundamentally social processes that produce spatial form” 
[ibid.]. In aligning his analysis with that of Giddens’ theory of Structuration, and in arguing that 
in Giddens, unlike Space Syntax, the idea of structure is embedded in the socio-spatial process 
rather than the physical properties of spatial form and configurations, he has misunderstood that 
Space Syntax approaches these physical forms as the expression of the socio-spatial process, and 
indeed the part of it in which social structures can be expressed, retained over time, lived and 
hence reproduced. 
 
In turning to Lefebvre, “arguably the leading spatial theorist and philosopher of the twentieth 
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and see above chapter 2, p 13], Soja reaffirms his adoption of the spatial trialectic examined 
above. Indeed, he goes as far as to concede that, “Space Syntax and Mathematical Geography 
provide specialized ways of describing the surface properties of the first space of Lefebvre’s 
triad, the perceived or empirical space created through material spatial practices”. He goes on to 
argue that such approaches have little contribution to the second and third spaces of the triad, and 
yet his partisan approach seems to prevent him from acknowledging that there is, therefore, 
perhaps some common ground, and indeed that approaches such as Space Syntax may help to 
reground theories in danger of ‘lifting off’ (to return to Chambers’ analogy [see above, chapter 
4]). I would suggest that Space Syntax is strongly placed to make such a contribution, being 
already a developed socio-spatial theory, and in fact, far more ‘academically ambitious’ than 
positivistic geography, which is in no way its academic ancestor as Soja suggests, since Space 
Syntax was conceived “in direct and sceptical opposition to this tradition”
5. 
 
This union between Space Syntax and the wider canon of critical theoretical perspectives on 
space has always been the limited ambition of this thesis; never to attempt to replace one reading 
of space with another but rather, through a gradual process of ‘tissue-typing’ to suggest that there 
are indeed many parallel perspectives and points of potential integration. 
 
It is implicit in saying this that Space Syntax also stands to benefit much from a more inclusive, 
less partisan and confrontational debate than that which Soja has offered. Of vital importance is 
the resolution of the problem of the individual that becomes apparent in tackling the work of 
Foucault in particular (and also Goffman). As the scale of analysis has been drawn to the 
conceptual limits at the lower register of Space Syntax, moving from statistical populations to 
individuals in space, the Newtonian theory of natural movement reliant on distributional 
probabilities begins to fail. To pursue the possibilities of Space Syntax further, therefore, we must 
also ease the tension building up within this approach by finding a conceptual way of introducing 
the individual. 
 
The following and final chapter begins by assessing some of these obstacles that Space Syntax 
presents to wider acceptance in its current form, before exploring possible future directions and 
returning to some fundamental debates about the nature of space. 
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Section 3 – Coda and speculative epilogue 
 
Chapter 10 
Beyond ‘deep space’: towards a spatial ontology?  
 
 
This final chapter does not intend to follow the convention of restating all that has gone before, 
but rather seeks to rejuvenate the argument by introducing, if not new material, then certainly 
new perspectives on the argument, perhaps even standing it on its head. I wish to return to the 
tentative ideas of the prologue, that bookends this speculative epilogue, where two propositions 
of ‘strategic naivety’ were put forward. The first of these ‘working hypotheses’ related to the 
approach to space that has been an undercurrent throughout this argument.  There I followed 
Hillier’s ‘WYSIWYG’ approach, asserting both a commitment to empirical enquiry and that our 
understanding must be accessible to common discourse and relevant to material experience, that 
is, to ‘actual spaces’ as well as theoretical spaces [see above pp 17-18]. The ultimate destination 
of this thesis will be the proposition of a spatialized ontology based in the idea of configuration, a 
speculative response to that deliberately tentative and naïve proposition that stands on the 
evidence presented in section 2, thus responding to the intention of making philosophical 
speculation ‘responsible to reality’ that was proposed at the outset [see above, p 14]. 
 
However, to underpin this speculative epilogue, there is a final piece of ‘evidence’ to be 
presented. This relates to the second “naïve, even arcane” starting proposition derived from Tuan. 
He argues that; 
 
Appreciation for nature or landscape [‘actual spaces’] is a principal reason for becoming 
a geographer. The aesthetic impulse and experience are not, however, confined to any 
class of individuals. They are a universal human trait, and we find evidence of it in all 
areas of human life. Satisfaction with life consists largely of taking pleasure in form and 
expressiveness - in sensory impressions, modified by the mind, at all scales from the 
smile of a child to the built environment and political theatre [Tuan, 1979; p 233, and 
above p 19]. 
 
The issue of scale has been a deliberate undercurrent throughout the second section of this thesis 
that offered a series of demonstrations of the empirical and theoretical potential for the ideas of 
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material conception of space, the ‘psychasthenia’ if you will, of the ‘deep space’ of contemporary 
social theory. To recall Smith’s description: 
 
By deep space I refer to the relativity of terrestrial space, the space of everyday life in all 
its scales from the global to the local and the architectural in which…different layers of 
life and social landscape are sedimented onto and into each other. Deep space is 
quintessentially social space; it is physical extent fused through with social intent, Henri 
Lefebvre’s ‘production of space’ in its richest sense [Smith, 1990; p 160-61, and above p 
9]. 
 
Section 2 has followed a similar scalar trajectory from the global spaces of Harvey’s circuits of 
capital to the architectural spaces of Giddens and Foucault. And yet the argument thus far has 
necessarily addressed the socio-spatial problematic, the ‘quintessentially social space’ resulting 
from the welding of ‘deep space’ to social theory. To realise my ambition of a speculative spatial 
ontology, it is necessary to move beyond the ‘deep space’ of the socio-spatial problematic, to 
address the embodied space of the individual, to investigate, in Tuan’s words, the realm of 
“universal human traits” [op. Cit.]. The final step of this trajectory returns, therefore, to Tuan and 
Lowenthal’s concerns with “living at the surface” and “the palpable present, the everyday life of 
man on earth” invoked in the prologue [op.cit. see above p 18]. In introducing the individual I 
want to take the perhaps unorthodox step of ‘bracketing off’ the reworking of the socio-spatial 
problematic that has formed the substantive part of this thesis. This itself is to stand as evidence 
for the spatial argument that has been occluded since the beginning; the proposition of 
configuration as an approach to space distinct from Space Syntax as the iteration of that space in 
a developed socio-spatial theory. 
 
My aim, therefore, is an approach to space that retains implicitly the social intent of Smith’s 
‘deep space’ - won I hope in the argument presented in section 2 - while also moving beyond 
‘deep space’, being sensitive to Tuan’s ‘geography’ of form and expressiveness. I wish to 
recapture, therefore, the synthesising ambition of Hägerstrand who asked; 
 
How precisely do human beings on the organic level and viewed without the bounds of 
the conventional scale limitations organise their interaction and non-interaction with 
objects in the environment including fellow-men? [Hägerstand, 1973; p 74, and above p 
206]. 
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In moving to the individual scale I hope ultimately to transcend the scalar limitations of the 
global, local, architectural and individual [following Smith], and to propose configuration as a 
‘space’ that might offer the possibility of a common approach to the spatiality of the social and 
material world. 
 
Following these two opening propositions, this chapter is divided into two sections, therefore, the 
first something of a coda, the second a speculative epilogue. I wish to pursue two areas of 
research in which the ideas of configuration have been articulated at a ‘sub-social’ scale and 
through which the theoretically important notion of the conscious individual is introduced, 
refining ‘configuration’ from ‘Space Syntax’. It must be clear that in so doing it is not my 
intention to isolate space from society but to build a case for configuration as being as relevant to 
the individual as the collective. In so doing the argument will return to the two pivotal “moments” 
in the genealogy of socio-spatial approaches that were established as the precursors to the current 
‘structure of feeling’ towards space [see above p 11]; the rejection of environmental determinsim 
and of spatial science. This coda will examine Hillier’s own response to these two moments, 
where we will encounter, and hopefully resolve, some inherent conflicts within Space Syntax that 
impede its integration with much contemporary theory, in particular its epistemological position 
founded upon an implicit (though modified) structuralist approach and a belief in scientific 
legitimacy. Both restrict Space Syntax to considering only statistically significant ‘populations’ 
within a material space, but one in which ‘intrinsic’ qualities (surface, texture etc) are neglected 
as inaccessible to theoretical insight. I wish to question the sustainability of these positions which 
are, I aim to show, violated in the way Syntax is applied in practice and to argue that the 
exclusion of both the individual and the sensory experience of space isolates Space Syntax in the 
contemporary theoretical climate. In this respect it is important that this thesis attempts a 
rapprochement between Space Syntax and wider social theories, with the bilateral concessions 
which that implies. There is no intention to propose Space Syntax as revealing the ‘true’ space, 
but at most an important and neglected ‘truth of space’ [following Lefebvre, 1991; p 9 and above 
p 283], some speculative implications of which are proposed in the final section. 
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10.1 Coda: Beyond ‘deep space’ – introducing the individual 
 
The important contribution of Space Syntax lies in its unique formulation of the society-space 
relation, based in the twin proposition that “society must have or be capable of having spatial 
necessity of some kind”, which is to say that society must be material in some sense and not 
entirely non-spatial, and that, “space must have, or at least be capable of having, social potentials 
of some kind”, it must express society in some way [Hillier and Netto, 2001; p 5, and above p 
130]. However, there is an imbalance in the way in which these parallel propositions are 
developed in relation to the resolution of ‘society’ into individuals. For while the ‘society to 
space’ relationship implicitly resolves to the aggregative spatial decisions of individuals which 
collectively form emergent socio-spatial patterns (for example cities), the ‘space to society’ 
relationship apparently cannot similarly be resolved to consider an individual in a specific space, 
for reasons set out below. 
 
This is most easily described through an example. In chapter 7.2 above I examined the behaviour 
of teenagers in a Parisian mall. The teenagers in a very real sense became ‘visible’ to Space 
Syntax enquiry at the point when they became a ‘statistically significant clustering’ [see figure 
7.17; p 234]. However, while ‘significant’ this clustering represented no more than a dozen 
individuals, and was indeed an aggregation of activity patterns through a number of time periods, 
in any one of which there may have been just one or two individuals in that space. And yet 
individuals fall beneath empirical insight, as do the experiential aspects of space in which they 
gather. The reasons for this empirical myopia are epistemological, and crucially relate to Hillier’s 
own response to environmental determinism, the ‘first moment’ in the rejection of a theoretical 
role for physical space [above, p 11]. While Hillier has sought to reinvest physical space with 
theoretical importance, there have been unintended consequences of his approach which need to 
be resolved, hence this penultimate section as ‘coda’. 
 
As was discussed above in chapter 5, environmental determinism for Hillier is the expression of a 
‘tripartite edifice’, which rests on the cornerstone of what he terms the “organism-environment 
paradigm” [Hillier, 1996; p 390 and above pp 140-41]. This 18
th Century system of thought 
treated the environment as “not only a physical milieu but one which actively and significantly 
surrounds so that the environed thing in some way is aware of, or affected by, its ‘environment’ 
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environment and organism that restricts the “common sense” notion that form and function are 
related to a crude causal determinism; 
 
The three-level scheme constructs an apparatus of thought within which neither the form-
function relation in architecture, nor the role of space in society can be formulated in such 
a way that research can be defined and progress made in understanding [Hillier; 1996; p 
390]. 
 
Hillier’s resolution to this impasse is to invoke the power of ‘random variation’, the 
epistemological equivalent of Newton’s concept of inertia, which posits that all bodies move in a 
‘right line’, thus placing motion “on the same level as beings at rest”. This epistemological 
innovation was reintroduced to the organism-environment problem through the work of Darwin 
who clarifies the mechanism by which the environment influences organisms by removing the 
direct relation of cause and effect, reliant ultimately on an Aristotelian notion of antecedent order, 
and replacing it with, “an indirect relation, [....] an abstract statistical mechanism based on 
randomness and probability” [ibid.; pp 384-5, and above p 142]. This crucial aspect of the theory 
of evolution has not infused into the commonly held understanding of ‘environment’, and the 
theory of architectural determinism can, therefore, be understood as a vestigial feature of the pre-
Darwinian 18
th Century paradigm, based in a direct causal relationship between the organism and 
environment. 
 
Hillier’s ‘common sense’ salvaging of the form-function relation relies, then, upon what might be 
described as a ‘Newtonian-Darwinian’ paradigm, “the proposition that the form-function 
relationship in architecture, and the relation of space to society, is mediated by spatial 
configuration” [p 390]. He argues that, “[t]o caricature Aristotle, in buildings people are the 
unmoved movers”,  buildings thus being considered as “probabilistic space machines” [ibid.; pp 
392, 395]. This relationship between spatial configuration and the distribution of occupants is the 
basis of the theory of ‘natural movement’, “a kind of inertia theory”, discussed above in chapter 
5. 
 
While this application of Newtonian theory may preserve the form-function relationship in an 
acceptable form, it does however have important consequences. For as the approach to the 
relation between society and space is switched from a deterministic to a probabilistic relation, the 
rigours of statistical analysis need to be met. There are a series of necessary condition that must 
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Newton’s inertia theory); that movement is from all, or most, parts to all others; that there is 
economy in route selection; and that the system is of a ‘significant’ size. This has important 
consequences for the scale at which research is routinely conducted. Movement levels must be 
‘significant’ in a statistical sense and we are therefore concerned with ‘populations’, again in the 
statistical meaning of the word. The individual is, quite literally, ‘insignificant’. 
 
The theory of Space Syntax is founded, therefore, on an epistemology that negates the legitimacy 
of discussing an individual as un-statistical, un-systemmatic and hence un-scientific. Hillier 
makes this clear at the outset of his Space is the Machine; 
 It is not in the nature of science to seek to explain the richness of particular realities, 
since these are, as wholes, invariably so diverse as to be beyond the useful grasp of 
theoretical simplifications. What science is about is the dimensions of structure and order 
that underlie complexity.... Every moment of our experience is dense and, as such, 
unanalysable as a complete experience. But this does not mean that some of its 
constituent dimensions are not analysable, and that deeper insight may not be gained 
from such analysis. 
This distinction is crucial to our understanding of architecture. That architectural realities 
are dense, and as wholes, unanalysable does not mean to say that the role of spatial 
configuration (for example) in architectural realities cannot be analysed and even 
generalised. The idea that science as a whole is to be rejected because it does not give an 
account of the richness of experience is a persistent but elementary error. Science gives 
us quite a different kind of experience of reality, one that is partial and analytic rather 
than whole and intuitive [Hillier, 1996; p 85]. 
 
While Hillier’s rejection of determinism mirrors the ‘first moment’ in the genealogy of 
contemporary approaches to the socio-spatial problematic introduced in chapter 1, here he moves 
in the antithetical direction to the second moment, describing the rejection of scientific 
approaches as a “persistent but elementary error”. We see traces of this rejection of the ‘non-
scientific’ powerfully in the 1996 text, where Hillier argues that “[s]uch relations [directly 
between the building and individual] do not exist, or not in any interesting sense”, and then again, 
“do not really exist in any systematic sense [which is] amply confirmed by the lack of research 
results which show such relations, and by the fact that the only relations we can find are those 
that pass through spatial configuration” [ibid.; p 379, emphasis added]. 
 
Statements such as these, which restrict approaches to socio-spatial relations to the empirically 
verifiable are equally apparent in respect of the approach to spatial experience proposed by 
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systems”, that is, “systems in which the complex of relations amongst elements is more important 
than the intrinsic properties of elements in how they function” [Hillier, 1998; p 1, emphasis 
added]. The intrinsic properties of space, “such as shape scale, proportions and surface attributes” 
are similarly rejected as insignificant, despite the acknowledgement that, “although the intrinsic 
properties of space dominate our experience, it turns out that it is the extrinsic properties that are 
most critical to the way in which space is used” [ibid.; p 2]. 
 
This limiting of legitimate phenomena of study to those accessible to scientific and 
configurational analysis is a feature of Hillier’s methodological approach which relies heavily on 
Hacking’s notion of ‘the creation of phenomena’ - “central to what we do, even though we see as 
our objective the creation of theory” [Hacking, 1983; Hillier, 1996; p 266]. Hacking re-orientates 
the hypothetico-deductive model of science proposed by Popper, with its reliance upon the 
Cartesian primacy of theory over a Baconian empiricist position, and stresses rather the role of 
the experimentalist. The relation between observed phenomena and theory is more complex, he 
suggests, than Popper allows. Phenomena are created by the observer through processes of 
observation, representation, calculation and transformation. 
 
However, in practice the ‘Space Syntax experimentalist’ is constrained through the primacy given 
to the role of the computer which “can and will hold centre stage” in the creation of phenomena 
[Hillier and Penn, 1994]. It is important to realise that computers are not simply benign catalysts 
to explanation, but themselves impose a ‘programmatic’ viewpoint, particularly when – as in the 
case of Space Syntax – research relies on a number of ‘in-house’ software tools. Kuhn’s 
comments on the implications of the education process for independent research are important in 
this regard, offering (in my experience) an accurate description of training in ‘technical’ 
disciplines such as Space Syntax [and mirroring Harvey’s concerns with the restrictions of spatial 
science discussed in Chapter 1, p 12]. Kuhn describes a process beginning with Gestalt exercises 
which initiate the student into the correct manner in which to view a problem which are then 
reinforced with simple ‘finger exercises’ to habituate the use of equipment (software) and 
textbooks which, “are systematically substituted for the creative scientific literature which gave 
rise to them” [Kuhn, 1996; p 47]. The effect is that for the individual researcher, 
 
Questions like these [what is a valid question or methodology] are firmly embedded in 
the educational initiation that prepares and licenses the student for professional practice. 
Because that education is both rigorous and rigid, these answers come to exert a deep 
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devoted attempt to force nature into the conceptual boxes supplied by professional 
education” [Kuhn, 1996; p 5]. 
 
It is unsurprising given this circularity that Hillier and Hanson see Space Syntax as an example of 
what Lakatos describes as a “progressive problem shift” in which new research results support the 
general propositions at the core of the thesis [Hillier and Hanson, 1998; Lakatos; 1970]. I would 
question, therefore, the proposition that computers are potential integrators of different 
approaches [Hillier and Penn, 1994], and suggest that perhaps their unquestioning use has led 
Space Syntax to become methodologically entrenched such that theoretical and conceptual 
questions, such as the role of the individual and the importance of scientific explanation, are seen 
as part of a “negative heuristic core”, to use Lakatos’ terminology, made up of the general 
propositions at the heart of the research programme which the research does not seek to 
challenge. 
 
Furthermore, this methodological isolating of the theoretical core has inhibited Space Syntax 
from wider influence by focusing attention on analysis rather than theoretical exposition, and has 
constrained the mutual recognition of Space Syntax and other approaches to socio-spatial 
questions. The delineation between ‘population’ and individual, ‘use’ and ‘experience’ of space, 
legitimate and non-legitimate questions, methodology and phenomena presents many problems 
for an integration with theories which do not treat the individual’s experience as “downwind of 
this primary correlate” between extrinsic properties of space and the movement structures of 
‘populations’ of users. 
 
Indeed, in practice I would argue that Space Syntax itself struggles to maintain such a distinction. 
The empirical examples in Section 2 pursued a descending scale from the urban, in which 
statistical treatments of populations seem intuitively appropriate, to an architectural scale at 
which they begin to falter, for example in the case of individuals clustering in the Parisian mall 
cited above. There is therefore a ‘cusp of relevance’ that is both scale and time dependent which 
runs like a fault line through the theory. The issue of time is critical because Hillier argues that 
society can only be considered as a ‘thing’ with spatial expression if ‘thingness’ is understood as 
‘configurational persistence over time’
1. He therefore argues that; 
 
Society is, at the very least, something that outlasts individuals. In spite of the claimed 
realism of those who reduce society to individuals, this reduction is in fact the one thing 
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we cannot logically do, since it fails to explain the primary property of society, namely its 
persistence beyond the lives of any collection of individuals who make it up at any point 
in time. It follows that we cannot reduce society to individual interactions [1996; p 401]. 
 
The importance of time for Space Syntax has been encountered earlier in the importance placed 
upon the ideas of emergence and the description retrieval of social structures from the material 
form of society which is “the means by which that society is transmitted into the future” [ibid.; p 
402, and above pp 130-31]. There is however, a slippage in the way in which the society to space 
and space to society relationships at the core of Space Syntax operate. For while the ‘society-
space’ relationship relies on emergent processes that implicitly occur over time and are intuitively 
resolvable to the aggregate of individual decisions, the ‘space-society’ relationship cannot be 
resolved to the scale of the individual (since it acts through the statistical ‘population’ of Hillier’s 
‘Newtonian-Darwinian’ paradigm). However, empirical studies develop an effectively 
momentary analysis of individual behaviours through the ‘creation of [instantaneous] phenomena’ 
such as the “snap shot” and gate counts (in which the computer, naturally, “can and will hold 
centre stage” [Hillier and Penn, op. Cit. p 293]). This instantaneous analysis dissolves Hillier’s 
argument for rejecting methodological individualism and ‘precipitates out’ the conscious 
individual, the teenager in the Parisian mall. 
 
Herein lies the coda, for while there is a shared rejection of environmental determinism, the first 
pivotal moment, it is the response to the second that sets Hillier on a divergent path from the 
‘respatialization theorists’ examined in the previous sections. While their repudiation of the 
spatial science of the 1960s leads to the ‘psychasthenic’ rejection of material space, Hillier’s 
reformulation of the ‘organism-environment’ relationship within the ‘Newtonian-Darwinian’ 
paradigm methodologically excludes the conscious individual within the space that he has 
reinvested. This is despite the fact that Hillier’s ‘environment’ is socially active, informational as 
well as material, and necessarily implies the experience of the conscious individual through the 
process of description retrieval of the social information embedded in spatial forms through 
emergent socio-spatial processes. His argument can be understood, moreover, as a ‘defence of 
intuition’, since the configurational properties that encode and decode this information, mediating 
between the organism and environment as Hillier conceives them, are cognitive yet ‘non-
discursive’, that is experiential but beyond easy explication. The paradox, therefore, is that in 
defending cognitive intuition Hillier invokes an epistemological structure that methodologically 
excludes this implicit conscious individual. Perhaps the circle of the coda is complete, therefore, Beyond ‘deep space’: towards a spatial ontology 296 
since is not the inability to resolve the self from the environment just as much a trait of the 
psychasthenic as the inabiltiy to resolve the environment from the self? 
 
This thesis attempts a double critique and resolution, therefore, bringing material space, society 
and the individual simultaneously into play. Once again it is through empirical work that 
theoretical advances will be made towards this resolution with the lever coming from empirical 
work within Space Syntax itself. My critique above has been in one sense divisive therefore, 
since recent work has raised both explicitly and implicitly the figure of the conscious individual. 
The challenge, however, is not to see this as a fracture in the theoretical core of Space Syntax, 
instigating what Lakatos would term a “degenerating problem shift” [op. cit.] leading to a slow 
demise of the discipline, but an opportunity for a further paradigmatic shift, perhaps towards a 
speculative spatial ontology. 
 
 
10.2 Epilogue: Of cabbages and Kings - towards a speculative spatial ontology? 
 
The first example of a configurational approach addressing a ‘sub-social’ scale opens new 
theoretical possibilities through approaching a ‘conventional’ Space Syntax problem but in an 
unconventional way. Conroy’s work focuses on spatial navigation within spatial systems, but the 
‘urban’ systems that she studies are immersive virtual environments [Conroy, 2001]. This allows 
her the important freedom of altering the qualities of the environment and observing the 
behavioural responses of her subjects in a way that is impossible in the ‘real world’. Conroy 
exploits this possibility by constructing two subtly different urban worlds derived from Hillier’s 
proposals for a characteristic urban layout and its deformed ‘less urban’ counter part [see Hillier, 
1996; pp 124-132 and figure 10.1]. Hillier argues that the configurational properties of the first 
make it more ‘intelligible’ than the second; that is, in formal terms, that local properties of the 
connectivity of each space to its immediate neighbouring spaces provides a good guide to the 
systemic properties of the global network that remains beyond the perceptual realm. To 
reinterpret this in terms of an empirically testable hypothesis of the kind that underpins much 
Space Syntax research, the layout whose configurational structure is more ‘intelligible’ will prove 
easier to navigate through. 
 
Through constructing an immersive virtual world through which participants are able to ‘walk’ 
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within each ‘urban’ realm. Her results showed that, indeed, in the layout with greater 
intelligibility routes to and from the destination were more direct – the environment was easier to 
intuit [see figure 10.1]. 
 
The significance of this result is twofold. Firstly, it shows that the relationship between 
configuration and behaviour need not be articulated simply through the emergence of patterns of 
cumulative behaviours but is reducible to the level of the individual. Secondly, and more 
importantly, it demonstrates at the level of individual consciousness a phenomena that is evident 
at the statistical scale of the population; that in moving, people behave as though they are aware 
of the entirety of a spatial configuration (even a city) even though they cannot possible be aware 
of more than their locality. 
  
This is a highly significant stepping stone for my speculative ontology and one that relies upon 
the presence of the conscious individual within our theoretical framework. For at the statistical 
level of Hillier’s ‘Newtonian-Darwinian paradigm’ it is demonstrable that a complex spatial 
system, populated by a ‘significant’ number of individuals moving randomly from all points to all 
other points, will come to exhibit the same movement distributions as are found in an urban 
system. This is the foundation of the theory of the movement economy discussed above [see 
chapters 5 and 6]. However, we have demonstrated experimentally that individuals moving 
purposefully through such a system exhibit the same spatial behaviour. There are two possible 
explanations. The first is that individuals behave like automata, discountable simply on analytical 
grounds, the movement of individuals being ‘purposive’ not random. The second explanation is 
that individuals have an internalised understanding of configuration. 
 
Again, this is worth clarifying. Individuals behaviour is shown [by Conroy] to be related to the 
‘intelligibility’ of the system. Intelligibility has two components, a localised component that 
relates to the immediate connectedness of congruent spaces, accessible through perception, but 
also a global component, integration, that is based on the configurational properties of the entire 
system, that is the relationship of each space to every other space. This cannot be accessible to 
perception, since it is by definition a global property of the whole system. Moreover, as Conroy’s 
experiment shows, it is not simply learned since individuals navigating through a system of 
spaces for the first time exhibit the same ability. 
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 Figure 10.1 Way finding in ‘urban’ and ‘non-urban’ immersive environments. Figures a and b 
show a hypothetical ‘urban’ and ‘non-urban’ layout proposed by Hillier. Figures c and d present 
the integration analysis for the systems. The ‘intelligibility’ of each system is shown in figures e 
and f. The closer correlation between connectivity and integration in the ‘urban’ system suggests 
that it is more intelligible, that is accessible to intuitive understanding. Figures g and h present 
Conroy’s analysis of movement paths around these virtual environments, the task being to 
navigate from the starting arrow to the central ‘square’ and back. Individuals in the ‘urban’ (and 
more intelligible) system appear to navigate to and from their goal with greater ease. [Source: 
Hillier 1996, Fig 3.14; pp 126-8, Conroy, 2001]. 
a b
c
g
d
e f
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I wish to return to the significance of this in the light of the second example. However, I wish to 
translate this into a more convenient ‘conceptual format’ to carry forwards. Individuals navigate 
through cities as though they were aware of the configurational structure of the whole, 
responding to not only that which can simply be seen, but also to configurational property of the 
urban structure that must be to some degree intuitive. 
 
The second example extends this theoretical opening through the application of configurational 
techniques to new areas, explicitly in the sub-social scale. Hillier has suggested that ‘strongly 
relational systems’, accessible through the principles of configuration, are not confined to spatial 
systems alone, but are applicable to a wide range of phenomena, reminiscent of Tuan’s appeal to 
the aesthetic impulse and the appreciation of ‘landscape and nature’ at all scales “from the smile 
of a child to the built environment and political theatre” that was my second naïve opening 
proposition [Tuan, 1979; p 233, see above chapter 1 and p 287]. He argues that; 
 
[o]n the contrary, the artificial world in which we live seems to be largely made up of 
such systems. Societies, cities and even aesthetic phenomena where the problem of the 
ensemble is so often the key, all seem in some sense to be both strongly relational and 
characterized by emergence [1998; p 7]. 
 
I would like to follow the suggestion of an aesthetic theory as an example of a new area in which 
the theory of configuration has been applied, explicitly abstracting this approach to spatial 
phenomena from the socio-spatial problematic addressed through Space Syntax. 
 
Hillier pursues the possibility of applying configurational analysis to aesthetic forms in the wider 
consideration of ‘non-discursive technique’. Drawing on an anecdote of trying to achieve a 
pleasing a-symmetry on a mantelpiece, Hillier asks whether there is some measurable quality of 
a-symmetry that can be formally described [Hillier, 1996; chapter 3; 1998; pp 12-13]. Indeed, this 
is not a new consideration. Both Arnheim and Gombrich attempt to describe simple 
configurations of diagrammatic and pictorial elements. While Arnheim focuses on ‘balance’, 
Gombrich is critical of this attention to order and focuses on disorder or ‘restlessness’ [Arnheim, 
1974; ch1; Gombrich, 1984; p 121]. This is to polarize what is essentially a relative or perhaps 
gradual quality of more or less order in a configuration, but neither have a methodology for 
assessing such a quality. Gombrich refers to eye-tracking experiments, while Arnheim’s analysis 
relies on what he terms ‘perceptual forces’ which define a “structural skeleton” of forms related 
to the principle rectilinear and diagonal axes. Considering ‘the hidden structure of a square’,  Beyond ‘deep space’: towards a spatial ontology 
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Figure 10.2 ‘The hidden structure of a square’. Contrast Arnheim’s approach (top pair) with 
Hillier’s. Arnheim talk of the circle being unbalanced in relation to the hidden ‘induced structural 
skeleton’, right. In contrast, Hillier, using very similar examples but applying the principles of 
configurational analysis through the theory of ‘depth gain’ is able to analyse the configurational 
effects of a series of arrangements. The figure on the right demonstrates the effects of ‘grounding’ 
the figure on a notional surface. The figures on the left are the mean depth from each cell, those 
on the right the number of identical mean depth values divided by the number of cells, such that 
the lower the value (0-1) the more weak the symmetry present [Source: Arnheim, 1954; Hillier, 
1999c]. 
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Arnheim argues that if a circle is placed within a square it will be more at balance (lest ‘restless’ 
in Gombrich’s terminology) as it approaches an axis of the ‘structural skeleton’ where fewer 
perceptual forces are active upon it. 
 
While Hillier’s analysis does not ascribe ‘volition’ to configurational elements wishing to achieve 
visual balance in one direction or another, it does provide a means by which to access relative a-
symmetry. The analysis of depth in spatial forms can provide a measure of symmetry or ‘counter-
symmetry’ by indicating the number of isomorphic j-graphs within the form
2. His analysis shows 
the effects of placing a circle within a square and rectangle on total depth, or ‘relative symmetry’ 
(interestingly exactly the same illustration, in both senses, used by Arnheim), and further the 
effects of considering an ‘orientated shape’ grounded on a representative earth [Figure 10.2]. 
  
As well as this analysis of simple configurations, the question of a configurational understanding 
of aesthetics can be approached from the perspective of the production or construction of more 
complex aesthetic forms intended to satisfy some ill-defined yet widely appreciated quality of 
‘rightness’ or ‘restlessness’. Artists working with configuration properties to produce such effects 
might include Ben Nicholson or Mark Rothko who expressly deal with the configuration of forms 
in space. The work of Victor Pasmore, however, is a perfect example for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, unlike many artists he has spoken about and explained his work, in particular in relation 
to his approach towards space and configuration, a term that he uses explicitly. Secondly, he has 
also worked in the architectural realm and has drawn close parallels between his two-dimensional 
and three-dimensional work, linking this extrapolative epilogue back to the urban roots of this 
thesis. Finally, his work exhibits a development from a rectilinearity, which is intuitively 
amenable to configurational analysis, to an organicism which certainly is not, thereby stretching 
the theory beyond its elastic limit, as is my intention. 
 
Pasmore’s work has been described as musical composition, being concerned with “structure and 
pattern, light and space, shape and colour” more than representation, and has been paralleled with 
topological mathematics [Bowness and Lambertini, 1980; pp 12, 16]. His artistic concerns reflect 
the general academic climate of the 1960s, as he was influenced by Bierderman’s call for the 
study of structural process more than visual effect in the creation of a new artistic morphology, 
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and attempted to construct, “an alphabet of visual sensations in abstract form” [Victor Pasmore, 
ibid.; p 14]. Describing his method, he says that; 
 
To implement this [independence of painting] I turned my studio into a kind of research 
laboratory with the object of establishing a basic and objective alphabet or process from 
which an independent morphology, appropriate to both painting and sculpture, could be 
developed. This meant changing the process of painting from one of visual abstraction to 
that of intrinsic and organic construction [ibid.; p 94]. 
 
When in 1955 he was asked to participate in the design of the new town at Peterlee, he insisted 
that the only difference between a three dimensional relief and architecture was in terms of scale. 
He conceived, “town planning as a matter of movement though space, and thus a logical 
extension of the new conception of space that the reliefs and paintings embodied” [ibid.; p 15]. 
 
However, Pasmore emphasizes that his approach is not “the result of a process of abstraction 
derived from nature, but a method of construction emanating from within” [ibid.; p 12, emphasis 
added]. Lambertini argues, therefore, that the later works are a manifestation of his subconscious 
since despite his “intellectual rigour” and continuous analysis, “there is no preconceived design - 
not even at the level of ideas” [ibid.; pp 21-2]. Pasmore’s interest lies in exploring and exploiting 
the psychological difference between formal and symbolic attributes of this emergent symmetry, 
without being able to explain or rationalize the distinction [ibid.; p 16]. 
 
Pasmore’s work is interesting, therefore, because it suggests that as well as configuration being 
the basis of a common experience of perception (as Arnheim and Gombrich might suggest) it also 
lies behind a process of construction or production of visual forms which emanates ‘from within’. 
This echoes Gombrich’s argument that ‘delight’ lies somewhere between “boredom and 
confusion”, that is, between symmetry and asymmetry [Gombrich, 1984; p 9] and also Tuan’s 
approach to landscape as aesthetic impulse [see above, p 287]. 
 
However, Gombrich questions Gestalt theory’s assertion that there is an “observable bias in our 
perception for simple configurations...and we will tend to see regularities rather than random 
shapes in our encounter with the chaotic world outside”. In contrast to the Lockian “bucket 
theory” of knowledge, which treats the pre-sensate mind as a tabula rasa, he locates the origins of 
this delight ‘within’, turning to Popper’s view that we exhibit a priori an “immensely powerful 
need for regularity” which is “inborn, and based on drives, instinct” [Popper, 1979]. He argues, Beyond ‘deep space’: towards a spatial ontology 303 
therefore, that the simplicity hypothesis at the heart of gestalt theory cannot be learned; “indeed, 
[it is] the only condition under which we could learn at all” [ibid.; p 5]. 
 
This, it should be recalled, was the final conclusion from the previous example, that people move 
though urban space as though they had a sense of configuration of the whole that itself could 
neither be perceived nor learned. There are also echos here of ‘Freddie’s theorem’ (Hillier’s 
anecdote about a young child manoeuvring a balloon between a group of conversing adults), as 
well as resonances with the work of Piaget (which Hillier and Hanson refer to in The Social Logic 
of Space, [1984; p 47]
3) and also O’Keefe and O’Keefe and Nadel’s work on the 
‘neurophilosophy of space’ [O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978 and O’Keefe, 1993]. 
 
“There must be a link, then”, Gombrich argues, “between ease of construction and perception, a 
link that accounts for both the tedium of monotonous patterns and for the pleasure we can obtain 
from more intricate constructions, from configurations which are not felt to be too boringly 
obvious but which we can still understand as the application of underlying laws” [Ibid.; p 9]. 
“What theory of perception would be needed to make this correlation between construction and 
perception intelligible?” Gombrich asks, mirroring ‘Pasmore’s predicament’ with which I opened 
this argument; “By what geometry must we construct the physical world now that Euclid’s gone 
and Newton dead?” 
 
This thesis has constructed an empirical argument to support the proposition of configuration as 
being an approach to space that offers a truth of the physical realm that seems to offer some 
insights into the socio-spatial relationship through its extension in the theory of Space Syntax. 
However, the tentative arguments presented in this speculative epilogue open new areas of 
importance. 
 
I wish to propose that the idea of configuration may perhaps offer new approaches to a series of 
embedded philosophical debates surrounding the nature of space. Firstly, I wish to suggest that 
the idea of configuration brokers a middle-ground between the Newtonian view of  ‘absolute 
space’ and the Liebnizian view of a ‘relative space’
4. For while spatial configuration is dependent 
upon the structuring presence of objects, it is nonetheless a systemic view that relies on the 
simultaneous relationship between all elements of the system and all others. It is relative in the 
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local sense that it constructs a particular view of a system from each element, yet absolute in the 
global sense that its power lies in examining every particular view at the one time. 
 
This tension between the local and global nature of configuration was above seen to force the 
‘precipitation’ of the conscious individual from the social formulation of Space Syntax. 
Extrapolating from those tentative examples discussed above, I would propose therefore, that 
configuration may also be a spatial formulation that we ‘think with’. This would appear to 
suggest configuration as being akin to Kant’s space as “synthetic a-priori” – a sensibility 
fundamental to the possibility of knowledge which could not be verifiable by recourse to 
empirical investigation. 
 
And yet unlike any other formulation of the idea of space, Hillier shows configurations to have 
independent properties. Configuration is not passive in the same way as the Euclidean space upon 
which Kant founded his theory. It is active, and moreover has been shown to be activated in the 
socio-spatial realm. I would further suggest, therefore, that the idea of configuration may offer the 
opportunity to recover a neo-Kantian view of space, and that Soja and others were perhaps overly 
hasty to seek to “[reach] outside [the] traditional Kantian cage” [Soja, 1987b; pp 289 and 291, 
and above p 32].  Soja argues that Kant’s transcendental spatial idealism was culpable for a 
“vision of human geography … in which the organisation of space is projected from a mental 
ordering of phenomena, either intuitively given, or relativized into many different ways of 
thinking” [Soja, 1989; pp 124-5, and above p 42]. What ‘space as configuration’ is able to do is to 
suggest that it was unnecessary to reject Kant’s transcendental space on the basis of the discovery 
of non-Euclidean geometries since configuration offers the prospect of reversing the idealism of 
Kant’s space, being empirically grounded in the socio-spatial relationships of the material realm. 
Configuration, articulated as a socio-spatial theory in Space Syntax, counters therefore Soja’s 
criticism of Sack’s neo-Kantianism whose, “analysis of the ‘elemental structures’ of ‘modes of 
thought’ is virtually divorced from the specific influence of ‘socio-spatial conditions’” [ibid; p 
125, referring to Sack, 1980]. 
 
This is essentially a debate about whether space is ‘out there’ (in the material world) or ‘in here’ 
(a mental construct). What the argument above suggests is that ‘space as configuration’ is both. 
There is perhaps a useful analogy between this approach to space and the wave-particle duality in 
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physics. What Space Syntax as a socio-spatial theory based in configuration argues is that the 
configurational properties of the material world embody social information, recoverable through 
use and experience, and exhibits social potential through the structuring effects that complex 
emergent socio-spatial systems have on movement and co-presence. These properties, like the 
wave in the double slit experiment, rely on probability and emergence over time (a wave being a 
probability function). However, the question of philosophical importance (that importantly arises 
through empirical results) is how is it that an individual within that world, be it a person within an 
urban system or photon within the ‘world’ of the double slit experiment, appears to know how to 
behave in a way that is only consistent with an a-priori and transcendental (that is global) 
knowledge of the whole system? 
 
Just as light cannot be a wave and a particle at the one time but is shown experimentally to be so, 
so the idea of configuration appears to offer a common ground for material and idealist 
conceptions of space. In doing so I would suggest that it brings us full circle to question the 
validity of the organism-environment paradigm which was the departure point for both Hillier’s 
Space Syntax and the ‘respatialization theorists’ examined in section 1. For while the latter have 
demonstrated an inability to deal with the material realm, focusing perhaps on ‘organism’ to the 
detriment of [at least ‘physical’] environment, Hillier has recaptured the importance of the 
material realm through the theory of Space Syntax, but has achieved this by reconfiguring the 
organism-environment paradigm within his ‘Newtonian-Darwinian paradigm’. The effect of this 
has been to remove the conscious-individual such that the role of space as configuration can be 
conceived as a socio-spatial (wave) theory but not as an individual-spatial (particle) theory. 
 
His approach, therefore, though certainly clarifying the organism-environment paradigm at a 
macro (social) level has achieved this by focusing on environment to the detriment of the 
[individual] organism. This is in spite of three features of the theory of Space Syntax that offer 
fertile ground for a theory of the embodied individual and should form the focus of future 
attention. Firstly, despite focusing on ‘environment’ this is categorically not the passive and a-
social environment of the 18
th century organism-environment paradigm but an objective material 
and informational environment that embodies human social activity. Secondly, Space Syntax 
deals implicitly with spatial experience in the process of retrieving this embedded social 
information, a retrieval process which, thirdly, relies upon the intuitive grasp of non-discursive 
configurational properties. 
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By abstracting configuration as an approach to space from Space Syntax, as its iteration as a 
Social theory, I have sought to offer some inklings of a speculative spatial ontology that might 
overcome many of the entrenched approaches to space that reinforce this distinction between 
organism and environment. Certainly, for Space Syntax as a socio-spatial theory to explore 
further these potentials of the idea of configuration that lie at its core it needs to engage directly 
with the realms of experience and cognition and to address its hostility to the principles of 
methodological individualism and of phenomenology. Moves towards a détente with these 
approaches more attuned to the scale of the individual have already been advanced, using 
Werlen’s reworking of Popper’s ontological structure towards phenomenalism [see Michell, 
1998, Werlen, 1993]. This now needs to be taken forward in a combined empirical and theoretical 
reworking that can address Hägerstrand’s question; 
 
How precisely do human beings on the organic level and viewed without the bounds of 
the conventional scale limitations organise their interaction and non-interaction with 
objects in the environment including fellow-men? [Hägerstand, 1973; p 74, and above pp 
206 and 288]. 
 
This thesis has sought to prepare for this question by proposing configuration as one possible 
answer to Pasmore’s predicament. 
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